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ABSTRACT
The basic precepts and characteristics of Greece's national security posture dictates that, 
as a result of its geographic circumstances and the nature of the disputes with its main rival 
Turkey, very high expectations are placed on air power. Yet, a detailed analysis of the Hellenic 
Air Force and the country's other air-power relevant assets reveals that a number of shortcomings 
and discrepancies exist in a number of key areas and capabilities.
The implications of this discrepancy between the high Greek expectations of air power 
and what it can actually deliver, could not be more significant. Given the high responsibilities 
with which Greek air power is entrusted in order to back up the current Greek policy line of 
challenging Turkey at all possible levels and platforms, air power cannot and should not be 
expected provide all the services demanded of it. Turkey, in this regard, appears to be a major 
regional military power with more advanced, sizeable and comprehensive air power-relevant 
capabilities than Greece. If this discrepancy is not properly addressed, it will undoubtedly result 
in Greece being extremely disillusioned, and in case of an armed combat, with both sides' 
national security goals in mind, Turkey would be the one to reap greater strategic benefit.
Accordingly, from the perspective not only of air power, but its overall military 
capabilities as well, Greece is presented with two possible courses of action: faced with a much 
larger and better equipped opponent such as Turkey, Athens either has to increase its military 
capabilities, or else, it will have to reduce the scope of its national security goals in line with the 
services its military can provide. Given Greece’s human and financial resources, the former 
option - further boosting Greek military capabilities -  appears to be an insurmountable task. This 
leaves Greece one viable option: to revise its national security objectives and, even more 
importantly, to seek a more conciliatory attitude to replace its current confrontational and 
escalatory attitude towards Turkey.
ÖZET
Yunanistan’ın, coğrafi konumu ve önde gelen rakibi olan Türkiye ile mevcut sorunlarmm 
niteliğinin belirlediği ulusal güvenlik konjonktürü, hava gücünden büyük beklentilerinin olmasına 
sebebiyet vermektedir. Ancak, Yunan Hava Kuvvetleri ve ülkedeki hava gücüyle ilgili diğer 
kaynaklann detaylı bir analizi, etkin bir hava gücü elde edilmesi açısından hayati önem taşıyan 
bazı yetenek ve sahalarda Yunanistan’ın bazı eksiklik ve yetersizliklerle karşı karşıya 
bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.
Yunanistan’ın hava gücünden yüksek beklentileri ile hava gücünün bu ülkeye temin 
edebilecekleri arasmdaki bu tutarsızlığın, son derece önemli bazı sonuç ve yansımalanmn olduğu 
söylenebilir. Bu manada, Türkiye’ye mümkün olan her platformda karşı çıkma şeklinde 
özetlenebilecek Yunanistan’ın mevcut politikalannın. Yunan hava gücüne bazı önemli görevler 
yüklediği, ancak Yunan hava gücünün bu beklentileri yerine getirebilecek imkan ve yetenekte 
olmadığı kolaylıkla ifade edilebilir. Gerçekten de Türkiye, Yunanistan’mkinden daha gelişmiş, 
büyük ve kapsamlı bir hava kuvvetine sahip bölgenin önde gelen askeri gücü olarak ön plana 
çıkmaktadır. Beklentiler ile gerçekler arasmdaki bu tutarsızlığın gerektiği gibi göz önüne 
alınmaması durumunda, Yunanistan’ın ciddi bir şekilde hayal kırıklığına uğrayacağı ve taraflar 
arasmdaki bir silahlı çatışma halinde de, en azından iki ülkenin ulusal güvenlik çıkarları 
açısından, Türkiye’nin daha kayda değer stratejik faydalar sağlayacağı aşikardır.
Dolayısıyla, yalnız hava gücü değil, aynı zamanda genel manadaki askeri yetenekleri 
açısından da Yunanistan’ın, önündeki iki seçenekten birisini seçmek durumunda olduğu 
söylenebilir; ya Türkiye gibi kendinden daha büyük ve daha iyi donatılmış bir askeri güçle boy 
ölçüşebilmek için kendi askeri yeteneklerini daha da geliştirecek; ya da. Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin 
sağlayabilecekleriyle uyum sağlayacak bir şekilde, ulusal güvenlik hedeflerini gözden 
geçirecektir. Yunanistan’ın mevcut insan ve mali kaynaklan dikkate alındığında, ilk seçeneğin, 
yani askeri yeteneklerin daha da geliştirilmesinin ulaşılması mümkün olmayan bir hedefi teşkil 
ettiği anlaşılmaktadır. Bu durumda, Yunanistan için geriye tek bir seçenek kalmaktadır ki bu da; 
ulusal güvenlik hedeflerini revize etmek ve daha da önemlisi, Türkiye’ye yönelik mevcut 
tırmanmaya ve çatışmaya meyilli tutumunu, daha uzlaşmacı ve yapıcı bir yaklaşımla değiştirmek.
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INTRODUCTION
In the post-Cold War era, the complex set of relations between Greece and Turkey and 
their intermittent quarrel over a whole variety of issues continue to constitute one of the more 
curious aspects of the study of international relations. In this regard, besides the causes giving 
rise to a continuous state of tug of war between these two fellow NATO allies, the ramifications 
of a possible war between Greece and Turkey on the overall Western security system are also 
being scrutinised at length. Especially since the outbreak of the so-called Kardak/Imia crisis of 
1996, during which the two coxmtries came dangerously close to an armed encounter, there has 
been renewed interest, accompanied by extensive media coverage and modest zicademic analyses 
of the circumstances and consequences of a possible Greek-Turkish conflict. The highly-charged 
rhetoric by both Athens and Ankara over the Greek Cypriot decision to deploy S-300 missiles has 
kept international attention alive, and the prospects of a possible Greek-Turkish war continues to 
attract substantial media and academic interest.
Despite this, amidst all the current interest in the issue, what really attracted this 
student’s attention was the absence of in-depth and accurate accoimts of the military capabilities 
and options at the disposal of each side. Indeed, in order to determine not only the likelihood but 
also the circumstances and final outcome of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey, 
this student believes that the actual balance of power in the field, the range of military options 
available to each side and their respective deterrent postures must be identified and elaborated in 
more detailed form. Only then will the picture become complete and the large variety of political 
options, motives and calculations that have to date been elaborated by others will be conducive to 
more accurate, valid and far-reaching propositions.
Without doubt, academic and, especially, media coverage of the military capabilities 
residing in Greece and Turkey have not been totally absent. On the contrary, whenever the 
tensions between the two rivals have been heightened and renewed talk of an actual conflict has 
been paramount, attempts have been made to draw comparisons between the military assets and 
capabilities of each country. Yet it is noteworthy that, those analyses have been limited to purely 
quantitative and simplistic explanations about major categories of military hardware (i.e. aircraft, 
warships, tanks, etc.) and the niunber of troops at the disposal of each side, and the deductions 
drawn have not paid due respect to such vital aspects as the quality of the equipment, skills and 
overall proficiency of the personnel operating them, deployment patterns, and supporting 
infrastructure.
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While such over-simplifection on the part of the media is understandable, international 
relations literature on Greece and Turkey is equally poor as regards the analytical treatment of 
the military capabilities of the two countries. Amidst the abundance of scholarly investigation 
into poUtical and diplomatic aspects of Greek-Turkish rivalry, the only in-depth and sufficiently 
objective analysis of the miUtary options and capabilities available to each side, containing 
predictions made on the basis of those observations, appear to reside in the worthy but outdated 
work by James Brown, entitled “Delicately Poised Allies: Greece, Turkey” published in 1991. In 
varying degrees, all other scholarly work is based on assumptions drawn on the basis of the so- 
called “bean-counting method”, implying that the conclusions were drawn solely by comparing 
the quantity of military equipment in the inventory of the two countries.
While the “bean-counting method” provides a helpful first glimpse into the military 
balance, in and by itself, it gives a far cry from an accurate picture of the actual balance of power 
in the field, and could thus lead to dangerously misleading predictions and conclusions. Instead 
what is needed is a time-consuming and in-depth analysis taking quantitative figures as a starting 
point, and combining them with such critical considerations as the quality o f the equipment and 
personnel, geographical and geo-strategic circumstances, deployment patterns, institutional and 
organisational inhibitors of military effectiveness, and a whole set of other variables.
The desire to fill this gap in the literature of Greek-Turkish relations with an in-depth 
inquiry into various aspects and ramifications of their comparative military capabilities, 
constitutes one of the motives of this work. Accordingly, this student believes that, thanks to a 
more accurate portrayal of the militaiy aspects of the relationship, research on Greek-Turkish 
interactions will be based on more solid groimds.
Furthermore, combining his primary objective with another provocative aspect of 
strategic studies, this student opted to concentrate on the aerial dimension of the Greek-Turkish 
military balance, at the expense of land and maritime military capabilities. The selection of air 
power as one of the focal points of this study is explained and justified by two closely interrelated 
considerations.
The first consideration is the importance and prominence enjoyed by air power in both 
nations’ military postures towards each other. Except for a small strip of land border in Thrace, 
the overwhelming portion of the dividing line between the two countries lies over the Aegean Sea. 
Hence, given the absence of a noteworthy land border, the role of the ground forces can best be 
labelled as ancillary. Likewise, the morphological circumstances of the Aegean as a semi- 
enclosed sea and the subsequent difficulties which naval vessels experience in concealing 
themselves sigmfy that, although of importance, the role and contribution o f naval power would 
not be independent of the developments in the air. Conversely, given aircraft’s inherent ability to
apply their destructive power on all three dimensions of warfare, the shape, pace and outcome of 
a possible Greek-Turkish military confrontation is far more likely to be determined by air power. 
Under these circumstances, given the high degree of interaction and synergy between air power 
and the Greek-Turkish military balance, the rationale behind this study’s concentration on air 
power becomes evident.
The second and equally important consideration leading this student to place emphasis on 
air power, culminates from the current academic interest in aerial warfare precipitated by the 
Gulf War of 1991. In this sense, over the last hundred years since its appearance, air power’s 
status vis-à-vis the other two forms of military capabilities has risen steadily. But, due to the 
highly visible and successful aerial operations of the Gulf War and subsequent bombing raids 
over Bosnia, air power has assumed a distinguished position whereby it now commands 
prevalence over other forms of military capabilities, and shapes conflict rather than supporting it. 
But, extensive scholarly investigation has concentrated on the use of air power in its ideal form, 
taking as its focus the range of options available to such resource and skill-fortunate states as the 
US, and those regional powers much less fortunate on these accounts receive little attention. 
Hence, the need to formulate alternative methodological approaches, and ultimately seek a 
satisfactory theoretical framework. Though a lot more modest in its context and aspirations, this 
student hopes that by developing a systematic approach to study the case of Greece, he will be 
able to address this methodological disparity, and thus make a humble contribution to the study 
of air power and strategic studies in general. Combined with the first consideration, namely filling 
the literature gap in the Greek-Turkish context, this student believes that the content and the 
contribution of his study is compatible with the requirements of a doctoral dissertation.
Before proceeding to those aspects pertaining to data collection and data classification, 
further clarification is deemed necessary. Accordingly, the focus of this study will be on the 
Greek, rather than Turkish side of the equation. The justification for this is more circumstantial 
than academically-oriented, given this student’s current position in Turkey’s national defence 
bureaucracy, which dictates that detailed contemplation of Turkey’s military capabilities could 
well be deemed as a national security breach. A deliberate decision therefore was made by this 
student to focus on Greek air power.
Turning our attention now to those aspects concerning data collection, the first 
observation concerns the relative ease with which basic information about air power could be 
attained. Indeed, the world-wide abundance of air power related studies transforms the task of 
literature review into a real challenge, leaving the researeher with more information than he may 
need. However, the same is hardly true for the second aspect of this study, namely the analysis of 
military and other air power-relevant capabilities and assets residing in Greece. Strikingly,
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despite Athens' decades-long membership of a number of western defence organisations such as 
NATO and WEU, information ^ lin g  in this category is neither readily accessible nor easily 
manageable, and aside from such basic quantitative information as the number of combat aircraft 
Greece possesses, relevant data on a number of tangible and intangible aspects of Greek air 
power, as well as related contingency and operational planning, are immersed in a shroud of 
secrecy, speculation and ambiguity. In certain cases, even if seemingly valuable information is 
attainable, a careful comparison with alternative sources reveal fundamental inconsistencies.
Hence, as reliable information of satisfectoiy content also appears to be absent in Greece 
itself, as in the case of all research on the topic, in most cases the process o f data collection is 
reduced to the analysis of information released by a number of international organisations, 
governmental and commercial entities elsewhere in the West. Among them are the periodic 
reports released by UN, NATO, WEU, OSCE and predominantly a number of defence and 
security-oriented think-tanks and research institutes located in Western Europe and North 
America. Additionally, as Greece is obliged to meet most of its air-power related hardware and 
even training needs abroad, the information made public by manufacturers, as well as publicly- 
available export notifications (i.e. notifications to United Nations Arms Register or US Congress) 
are invaluable sources of highly accurate information.
While the data filing  in the latter category is readily accessible through international 
defence publications and periodic reports by various institutions, the real challenge lies in 
locating, categorising, and comparing it with previously-collected data, in order to produce 
meaningful and reliable information. To accomplish this task, which turned out to be the most 
time-consuming undertaking of this study, all major defence publications, as well as relevant 
books and security-oriented academic journals that have appeared over the course of the last 25 
years were carefully screened to glean information about Greece and its air power-related assets.
While a literature review along those lines is obviously based on secondary sources, this 
student is of the firm conviction that; first data compiled in this way would be highly reliable, and 
second is that, the particular way in which they are blended together could produce noteworthy 
insights o f significant originality. Indeed, this study might illustrate that, through the bits and 
pieces of information compiled from a large variety of secondary sources, a truly original portrait 
o f any western military organisation could be drawn, and that most of the information produced 
in this manner would not be foimd in open literature. In other words, this student believes that, 
through such a comprehensive data collection and evaluation process and within the conceptual 
framework presented in the initial chapters of this dissertation, access into one of the most 
secretive topics of international politics could be found and the way for the achievement of the 
purposes of this work could thus be paved.
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Against the background of the above mentioned clarifications and assumptions, the 
dissertation will commence with an introductory overview of basic theoretical premises pertaining 
to air power, as well as a brief overview of its historical evolution, with the intent of providing 
the reader with a better understanding of the circumstances surrounding the use of air power. As 
regards the theoretical aspect, and for the purposes of this study, the most important presumption 
concerns air power’s fundamental characteristic as a form of military power, and therefore, a 
national security policy instrument to help achieve the political objectives of its possessor. This 
presumption is as applicable to Greece as any other nation possessing some form of aerial 
capability. Relating to the first chapter’s historical overview, an equally important observation 
will be made with respect to the current status of prominence and distinction enjoyed by air 
power. Accordingly, an argument will be put forward to the effect that, not only air power’s 
efficacy and success is still dependent on the political objectives and specific circumstances of a 
given conflict, but also that its potential cannot be readily exploited in the same degree of 
effectiveness by all those who possess air power-relevant assets and capabilities. Besides its 
direct relevance to the specific purposes and circumstances of this study, our attempt to scrutinise 
the use of air power by ‘less-capable’ operators gains utmost significance against the background 
of a noteworthy failure by other analysts to address this important topic.
To this effect, those circumstances inhibiting the use of air power by certain nations, as 
well as their causes, will constitute the subject of the Second Chapter, together with which a 
division will be drawn between what we have termed “first-rate air powers” and “second-rate air 
powers”. The findings of this chapter are important. Since air power is an instrument to achieve 
political goals, discrepancies between different nations’ ability to exploit its potential will affect 
the fulfilment of political objectives through the use of air power. The second part of this chapter 
will encompass the last phase of our theoretical and circumstantial analysis of air power. 
Building closely upon the findings of previous sections, it will scrutinise on an additional aspect 
of air power that is nowhere to be found in the literature of strategic studies. Accordingly, an 
attempt will be made to portray the likely circumstances of an aerial confrontation between those 
air powers whose control of the range of options offered by air power is not as comprehensive 
and full-fledged as that of the “first-rate” air powers. The section in question will also identify the 
basic roles and missions of air power, with the aim of using this valuable insight in subsequent 
chapters as a frame of reference with which to analyse the dynamic aspects of Greek air power.
Laving aside the findings and observations of the first two chapters, in Chapter Three, 
our focus will shift towards the case of Greece. This chapter will elaborate on Greece’s relations 
with neighbouring countries and the accompanying threat perceptions. Obviously, this task will 
be fulfilled from a perspective readily applicable to the use of Greek air power. Following closely
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on the previous one. Chapter Four will first identify Greek national security and foreign policy 
goals, on the basis of which the expectations of air power fulfilling those objectives will also be 
explored. Given the vital link between the fulfilment of those objectives and the material means 
potentially available. Chapter Four will also include a brief overview of the human and financial 
resources at Greece’s disposal, which are both inexorably related to the military power­
generating capabilities of the Hellenic Republic.
Chapter Five will encompass a detailed descriptive analysis of Greek air power, focusing 
on the Hellenic Air Force’s assets and capabilities. Obviously, static aspects of the Hellenic Air 
Force such as the force structure, aircraft and air defence weapons inventory, munition 
stockpiles, command-coritrol-communications and logistic support infrastructures, will constitute 
the focal points of this chapter. In addition, aerial assets at the disposal of the Hellenic Army and 
Navy will be given due consideration in the course of our descriptive analysis.
Building upon the static properties described in the previous chapter. Chapter Six will 
give an analytical overview, a task to be accomplished against two equally important yardsticks. 
The first yardstick will apply to the case of Greece the basic missions of air power—previously 
identified under Chapter Two—and attempt to derive important findings concerning the mission- 
oriented effectiveness of the HAF. Our second and much more inventive yardstick will take us 
back to an earlier and equally original distinction drawn between “first-rate” and “second-rate” 
air powers, and try to determine into which category Greece really falls.
Having derived important clues concerning both the proficiency and deficiencies of Greek 
air power, an attempt will be made in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight to apply those findings to 
a number of contingencies that might necessitate the use of Greek air power. Accordingly, the 
first part of Chapter Seven will consider conflict scenarios involving the three neighbouring 
countries to the north, and elaborate on the likely role of Greek air power. The second part of the 
chapter will concentrate on expeditionary assignments in the context of multinational operations, 
and in the way of the post-Cold War emphasis on this particular category of aerial operations, 
stipulate the applicability of Greek air power to such tasks.
Finally, in Chapter Eight, scenarios pertaining to a Greek-Turkish confrontation will be 
analysed, and in consideration of the immediate relevance and prominence of the issue at hand, 
three alternatives along which a Greek-Turkish military encounter could unfold will be identified. 
As would be expected, given each of these scenarios, the role and impact of Greek air power will 
be considered at length, and important commentary concerning the important characteristics of a 
likely Greek-Turkish confrontation forwarded. Given the high probability of third-party 
intervention in a Greek-Turkish conflict, an attempt will also be made in this Chapter to identify 
those options and capabilities at the disposal of major outside actors. However, given the novelty
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of the issue at hand and the subsequent inability to gain access to reliable information, the 
findings of this highly speculative sub-issue must be treated with extreme care.
Along conventional lines, the concluding chapter will summarise the findings of the 
previous eight chapters, and ultimately also postulate on air power’s contribution, if any, to the 
advancement of Greek national security goals.
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CHAPTER 1
DEFINITION, PROPERTIES AND HISTORICAL 
EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER
The spectacular success of aerial operations during the Gulf War of 1991 and in the skies 
of Bosnia in 1995, and the undeniable and direct impact they had on the final outcome of both 
conflicts, evinced the potential of air power as a war-fighting instrument. In the eyes of the 
general public at least, the success of flying machines in dominating most aspects of modem 
combat has transformed air power into some kind of a miraculous entity, capable of fulfilling 
whatever responsibilities are entrusted upon it, irrespective of such restricting factors as the 
geographic situation and political objectives of a given conflict. However, those grossly 
exaggerated accounts of air power’s virtues and capabilities have tended to pass over a number of 
issues and assumptions fundamental to air power, and its eventual rise during the course of the 
last 100 years to its current privileged status. So, before setting sail on the scholarly analysis of 
topics relating to air power, those misplaced visions of air power must be rid of dangerously 
misleading clichés. Accordingly, before concentrating on Greece and its air power as the 
underlying topic of this study, emphasis will be placed on the term ‘air power’ itself, gaining a 
deeper insight into the theoretical premises of the concept, and proceeding to a brief overview of 
air power’ historical evolution, so as to better comprehend its current status. Beyond any doubt, 
the contents of this introductory chapter is to be found in a fairly large number of other studies 
scmtinising air power. Conversely, it will be on the basis of these more familiar and conventional 
observations of the first chapter that the much more original and provocative propositions of the 
second chapter will be forwarded.
I- AIR POWER: DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES
The most basic and widely accepted definition of air power to be employed elsewhere in 
this study is “r/je ability to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension 
above the surface o f the earth. In this regard, that which distinguishes air power from land and 
sea power is the actual exploitation of the third dimension above the earth giving advantage to the 
platform or vehicle; for example, for manoeuvre, deployment, concealment or surprise rather than 
simply traversed as by a bullet, a shell or ballistic projectile. Building upon this particular 
definition, the properties of air power could be analysed under four categories: its attributes, its 
constituent elements, the characteristics pertaining to its employment, and its objectives.^
1. Attributes of air power
Elevation above the earth’s surface that provides relative advantages over surface-bound 
(i.e. ground and naval) forces constitutes an obvious superiority of air power over other forms of 
military power. Elevation provides broader perspective, greater potential speed and range, and 
three-dimensional movement, and thereby gives rise to air power’s greater mobility and 
responsiveness. Hence, the combined outcome is exceptional flexibility and versatility, both of 
which are universally accepted as inherent characteristics of air power. On that accoimt, regardless 
natural obstacles, air power can quickly concentrate on or above any point on the earth’s surface. 
Furthermore, unlike ground or naval forces, it can apply force against any facet of enemy power, 
and be co-ordinated with surface elements, so as to boost the latter’s effectiveness.
2. Constituent elements of air power
Air power results from the effective integration of people, aerial platforms, weapons, CT 
(command, control, communications, and intelligence) capabilities, and supporting facilities. 
Ultimately, air power depends on the performance of the people (pilots, technicians, air controllers 
etc.) who operate, command and maintain the other components of air power. Besides people, 
however, aerial platforms are also of fundamental importance, in the sense that they constitute the 
primary means through which the destructive impact of air power is applied. They consist mainly 
of aircraft of all types and purposes, including the combat-capable front-line machines—bombers, 
fighter-bombers, interceptors and attack helicopters, and non-combat platforms such as 
reconnaissance, transport, tanker and electronic warftue aircraft which are used to enhance the 
effectiveness of the front-line platforms. In recent years, and by virtue of their ability to use the 
third dimension above earth for manoeuvring, concealment and surprise, cruise missiles and 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have also joined the ranks of aerial platforms.
Weapons constitute another key aspect of air power and they consist mainly of bombs, 
rockets, guns and missiles carried by aircraft, and also groimd-deployed guns and missiles used 
against an adversary’s aerial platforms. In this regard, while aerial platforms are the means to 
project force over the enemy, weapons carried onboard constitute the striking force, and ground- 
based weapon systems are the means to neutralise them.
Command and control capabilities also constitute an important element of air power. To 
this end, exploiting the full potential of air power requires timely, relevant intelligence and 
sufficient command and control assets to permit commanders to take advantage of its speed, range, 
flexibility, and versatility. In fact, as compared to the groimd and naval operations, the much 
quicker reaction times, higher transit speeds, and longer ranges involved in aerial warfare, make the 
acquisition of precise and comprehensive C I^ capabilities imperative.
Last but not least, supporting bases, systems, facilities, related infrastructure, and overall 
logistic support capabilities, are essential for the launch, recovery, and sustainment of aerial 
platforms, to the extent that the effectiveness of any air force depends on base availability and 
operability.
Over and above the constituent elements themselves, the organisational unit that combines 
them together is the “air force”. As such, an air force commonly takes the form of an independent 
branch of modem armed forces, and indeed it is fielded as such by most contemporary states. Yet, 
according to a country’s specific circumstances, certain elements of air power may come under the 
organisational stmcture and control of ground or naval forces, most likely coming under the air 
defence units and/or aviation wings.
3. Characteristics pertaining to employment of air power
Given the host of dynamic circumstances peculiar to every conflict, in a campaign there is 
no universal formula for the proper employment of air power. Among others, three factors play a 
pivotal role in determining, not only the likely circumstances of a looming aerial confrontation, but 
also the way air forces position, stmcture, equip and train themselves for future conflicts. Those 
three factors are;
• Nature of the enemy; An enemy’s nature defines his centres of gravity, how he will fight, and 
thus, the magnitude and direction of the threat he poses to another’s achievement of friendly 
objectives. For instance, the type of aerial operations, and therefore make-up of a force required 
to eliminate a mral guerrilla movement could be remarkably different from those needed to 
counter an opponent in possession of a full-fledged air force.
• Characteristics of war; The specific characteristics of a war determine what missions comprise 
the air campaign, how they are executed, and what degree of freedom of action is available for 
military operations. During the Korean War of 1950-53, for instance, the US air power was 
capable of striking enemy air bases inside Chinese territory, thus attaining rapid air supremacy 
over the Korean peninsula. However, the fear of Soviet nuclear reprisal constituted a major 
restraint, and in confining its operations to the skies over the Korean peninsula, US air power 
had to assume a reactive stance vis-à-vis its opponents.
• Interaction with geography; The exercise of air power is governed by geography more than is 
generally recognised. In this sense, geography does not only refer to terrain, vegetation and 
weather, but also covers such varied aspects as the width of the front, the depth of the theatre, 
its distance from the home bases, and the characteristics of the infrastmcture available. Because 
of this, the interaction between geography and air power influences not only the course of armed 
conflicts, but may also be a critical determinant of whether they can start at all.  ^ Hence,
geography will influence the role and the impact of aerial power and determine mission 
requirements, mission priorities and the operational tempo of air warfare. What is more, 
geographic circumstances are also of critical importance in determining the structure of any 
aerial force. For example, the type of aircraft, weapons systems, training, command & control 
capabilities and supporting infirastructure to be fielded by an air force gearing itself towards 
transatlantic operations, would be quite different from those of a regional air power, whose 
primary challenge is to eliminate the opponent’s air force and conduct sorties in support of 
surface warfare, all to be conducted over short distances in a confined theatre. Similarly, while 
topographic circiunstances such as deserts and featureless plains offer the best opportunities for 
attacking ground targets, a heavily forested and/or mountainous landscape works to the 
detriment of air-to-ground engagements.
4, Objectives of air power
In its most basic sense, air power is an instrument to fight wars. In ‘Clausewitzian terms, 
since the war itself is merely a continuation of policy by other means, air power must also be 
conceived and treated as a political instrument to help fulfil a nation’s political objectives.^ 
Consequently, while effective use of air power is based upon the principles of war and military 
science, ultimately it must be co-ordinated and orchestrated by non-military instruments of national 
power.
Ideally an air war calls for the quick seizure of ‘air superiority’, or preferably, ‘air 
supremacy’, and the consequent ability to attack any target within range and prevent the enemy 
from making any use of its air power. In this sense, air supremacy refers to a state of affairs in 
aerial combat wherein all use of the air is denied to a potential enemy, unimpeded use of it is 
retained by oneself. Air superiority, for its part, is a less ambitious state of affriirs in which control 
of the air is sought in a given region for a given period. On this account, he who attains either air 
supremacy or air superiority, can conduct grand-strategic bombing to break his enemy’s will to 
fight before sur&ce forces meet in a decisive engagement, or he can hold air superiority over a 
limited area, enabling his surface forces to achieve their goals unmolested, with air support as and 
when needed. In this sense, air power can either supplement surface warfare, or be independently 
employed to strike decisive blows on an enemy. Its use however should never be isolated from its 
operators’ overall war effort, and the political objectives defined before and during an armed 
conflict.*
As regards the likely targets of aircraft, usually the opponent’s aerial assets (i.e. aircraft, 
ground-based air defences, air bases and other supporting infi^ructure, command-control network 
etc.) are closely followed by his ground troops and various army-related installations, as well as
naval vessels and naval infrastructure (i.e. naval bases, dockyards etc.). Depending on the nature of 
the conflict, non-military, yet strategically-significant installations (i.e. power-generation/ 
distribution and industrial ^ ih tie s , communications and transportation grids), and ultimately the 
civilian population itself could also be targeted, whether that destruction take a physical or 
psychological form.
II- AN OVERVIEW OF AIR POWER’S HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
The use of the third dimension for military purposes is as old as the idea of flying itself 
Indeed, the Montgolfier brothers’ 1783 flight in a hot air balloon, the first sustained flight in 
history, was accompanied by speculations concerning the use of ‘flying globes’ for miUtary 
purposes.® During the last decade of the 19* century, as primitive hot air balloons were 
transformed into much more manoeuvrable airships, the idea of skipping over battlefields to strike 
directly at people emerged.^ Indeed, as early as 1893, Major Fullerton of the Royal Engineer Corps 
argued that the impact of aeronautics foreshadowed as great a revolution as the discovery of 
gunpowder, that future wars might well start with a great air battle and that the arrival of the aerial 
fleet over the enemy’s capital would probably conclude the campaign.® Yet, despite strikingly 
imaginative and progressive thinking about the potential of flying devices in military operations, 
throughout the 18* and 19* centuries, the use of ‘lighter-than-air’ devices for military purposes 
was confined to the role of observation and remained marginal at best.
While those early thoughts about the military potential of airborne devices did much to 
shape the basic principles behind ‘air power’, the term itself began to be used in coimection with 
manned aircraft, that being in 1905, the year the Wright brothers succeeded in flying the first 
aeroplane over a California beach. In this sense, the early definitions of the term ‘air power’ are as 
appropriate today as they were then: “air power is the ability to project military force by or from  
a platform in the third dimension above the surface o f the earth
The period 6~от the first sustained flight by an aircraft until the outbreak of the First 
World War in 1914 was characterised by extensive efforts by all Great Powers to develop ever­
more capable aircraft as compared to the primitive air machine flown by the Wright brothers. The 
1911-12 Italian invasion of Libya offered the first chance for this new military instrument to prove 
itself in actual combat. The Italian expedition force that landed on Libya to capture those barren 
lands from the Ottoman Turks fielded a handful of aircraft, intended for mapping, observation and, 
later in the conflict, for aerial bombardment purposes. However, in addition to giving early signs 
of the potential of by air machines, the war in Libya revealed that air power had certain
vulnerabilities. After all, while marking the first use of aircraft in combat, the conflict also saw the 
first incidence of an aircraft shot down by enemy ground fire, which revealed the vulnerability of 
flying machines when faced with remarkably accurate enemy gunners. Likewise, the Libyan 
campaign revealed the limitations of equipment and that training, organisation and doctrine were as 
important as the flying machines themselves.'®
As would be expected, the First World War of 1914-1918 constituted the first large-scale 
air war and as such witnessed the rapid development of a variety of techniques for more air 
power’s effective use." In fact, those early experiments in the use of air assets heralded the types 
of operations in which air forces have since performed in much more refined and elaborate forms, 
not only during the Second World War, but also in contemporary conflicts. As World War I began, 
the role assumed by air power was that of gathering battlefield information, so as to locate enemy 
armies. Subsequently, reconnaissance and missions related to it—liaison, artillery observation and 
aerial photography—proved very important during the four-year conflict, and thereby validated one 
of the first and fundamental missions of air power: aerial reconnaissance}^
Thereafter air power assumed long-range bombing as a further mission. Since the primary 
aim of air strikes falling in this category was psychological, i.e. to shatter the morale of the 
civilians, and extended beyond the ‘tactical’ confines of the front line, they constituted a distinct 
function of air power, and on that account, the label ^strategic bombing' was attached to them. 
While the damage inflicted by aerial bombing was actually very light, the horrible spectre of the 
power of the bomb was created during the following years. Although this vision was largely out of 
touch with reality, it played a part in run-up to the Second World War. On the whole the 
psychological lessons learned from the aerial bombing during the First World War were that 
initially the shock effect was great upon civilians long undisturbed by war, especially when the 
defences appeared to be unable to stop the attackers, but that in the end attacking stiffened the 
opponents’ will to make war.
In addition to the appearance of the term ‘strategic’, the First World War witnessed the 
emergence of a further category of operations which later came to be known as "tactical 
operations’}^ Unlike strategic operations realm, these were air strikes launched with the more 
direct and immediate objective of influencing the turn of events on the battle front. As such they 
consisted of bombing and strafing runs over enemy positions, with the clear aim of destroying 
enemy troops or else disrupting their war effort. Those early experiments proved that, when 
properly applied, air power could indeed tip the balance on the ground in one's favour. Meanwhile, 
the application of air power to surface operations was not limited to ground combat, but thanks to 
their remarkable potential in spotting enemy ships, aircraft also became an indispensable player in 
naval warfare. In this regard, among aircraft’s basic maritime missions which remained unaltered
up until today are reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare and strikes on enemy surface vessels. 
Last but not least, since on a modest scale both sides used aircraft to bring supplies to the front, 
during WW-I ‘'tactical transport ’ emerged as a further mission of air power.
Over and above the contribution made in the conduct of surface warfare, a further 
dimension of air power receiving an uneven attention during WW-I was air-to-air combat— 
signifying the struggle for survival between opposing sides’ aircraft. Between 1914 and 1918, as 
the performance of military aircraft improved, gigantic aerial duels, sometimes involving hundreds 
of machines, became a common sight. The obvious aim was to gain ‘command of the air’, a 
concept indicated as a pre-requisite for all successful ground and air combat.'"’ However in most 
cases, those air battles were fought merely for the sake of controlling the air, without any clear 
objective or conceivable scheme to apply the advantages gained to ground warfare. This 
misdirected use of air power during WW-I taught all parties that the command of the air, in the 
sense of denying all use of the air to a potential enemy while retaining unimpeded use of it oneself, 
was an extremely costly and, in fact, from a tactical point of view, unnecessary undertaking. 
Instead, ‘air superiority ’ in a given region for a given period with the clearly-defined objective of 
applying air power to surface warfare, and ‘air supremacy ' as a more ambitious version of the 
latter extending over larger areas and time frames, soon replaced ‘command of the air’ as more 
realistic goals of aerial warfare.'^
In short, air power was not in a position to strike decisive military blows independently 
even at the end of the Great War. However intensive utilisation developed an understanding of 
aircraft’s strengths and weaknesses, which has persisted to this day. The principal strengths are 
speed, flexibility, the ability to reach out and hit any point regardless of natural and artificial 
obstacles and great potential for achieving surprise. Conversely, the most important weaknesses are 
dependence on sophisticated ground facilities, vulnerability to attack when on the ground, limited 
endurance, and a great drop in effectiveness during bad weather or at night. Even more 
importantly, neither strengths nor weaknesses worked in one side’s favour. Rather, it was a 
question of understanding them thoroughly and using them effectively.'®
Inter-war period and doctrinal foundations of air power
The end of the First World War left the victorious powers with a large surplus of material 
and personnel and, in the deceivingly calm environment of the post-war years, the surplus nature of 
air assets heralded a number of problems for military aviation. In their painful struggle to prove 
their worth and to break free from the domination of other services, airmen often carried arguments 
to their extremes, and too often vision outran reality, resulting in disappointment and reaction.” 
This tendency to exaggerate the power of the new instrument was particularly marked in a number
of so-called ‘air power visionaries’, among them General Guilio Douhet of Italy, General Frederick 
Sykes of Britain, and General William Mitchell of The United States. For them, the apparent 
lesson of the German air attacks on Britain in the First World War was that the next war would 
open with a devastating air attack on enemy cities. Thus, in Italy and Britain, offensive 
bombardment quickly gained favour due to the willingness of the politicians to consider some way 
to win war other than through the appalling casualties that resulted from local ground actions, 
which, in retrospect, brought no apparent result in a war of attrition. Instinctively, politicians and 
military alike sought a weapon which would win the next war swiftly without terrible casualties. 
The solution they hit upon was strategic air bombardment.
The Second World War, however, was to prove how over-optimistic Douhet and his 
coimterparts in Britain and US had been and to what extent they, like airmen, over-estimated the 
power of conventional bombs and accuracy of bombing and under-estimated the public’s 
toughness. Likewise, the inter-war presumption that the bomber would always get through was, in 
large measure, true only because offensively-minded air marshals did little work on defensive 
measures. When faced with their opponents’ better organised air defences, fleets of non- 
manoeuvrable bomber aircraft were doomed to suffer heavy losses. In retrospect, the Second 
World War demonstrated that, aerial bombing did not only fell to precipitate an immediate collapse 
of the targeted population, but that it also stiffened the latter’s resolution to resist. In the final 
analysis, the Second World War also proved that the dreams of air power visionaries were to be 
fulfilled not by air power itself, but rather through its 1945 marriage with the atomic bomb.'*
As against those on the victorious side, the air arms best prepared for the Second World 
War were those whose showmanship attitudes had been destroyed by the realities of the combat. 
Consequently, the more practical theorists in the German and Soviet armies who created air- 
supported mechanised armies, saw the most potent use of air power as tactical, in order to strike at 
targets in front of advancing ground troops. Fortunately in terms of their technical and doctrinal 
progress, these two air forces, alongside with the Japanese, were able to participate in the limited 
wars of the 1930s, and had thus had an opportunity to test and elaborate techniques for the most 
effective use of tactical air power in support of ground warfare. Thanks to the experience gained 
during those limited wars, and owing to scientific and technological progress, by the time peace 
ended in 1939, air weaponry was much more sophisticated than it had been in 1918. Conceptually, 
however, there was a large disparity between those air forces that saw their role as strategic and 
those regarding themselves as the hand-maiden of a surface service. As events were to show, the 
latter could often destroy forces in the field before strategic bombers had a paralysing effect.
A last aspect of the inter-war period that deserves mention, is the technical and 
technological advances that made possible the markedly more effective use of air machines during
the Second World War. On the performance side, improvements in speed, range, weapons load 
and overall reliability were breath-taking. Additionally, the rapid progress in the electronics 
industry allowed the fitting of aircraft with two-way radio sets, and heralded the beginning of the 
era of instant radio communications between land and airborne aircraft. This last aspect was vital 
in achieving effective air-ground co-operation, and as such became one of the most important 
factors explaining the dramatic changes that took place in the conduct of air warfare between the 
First and Second World Wars. While the progress in the technical and technological fields were 
still some years away from realising the far-fledged ideas and expectations of the air power 
visionaries, nonetheless it was about to terminate air power's role as ancillary to other forces. The 
turn of events during the Second World War proved that air power had been transformed into a 
force in itself, if not by itself.
World W ar II
From the very first day of the Second World War, a new dimension of air power was 
validated initially in Poland and then during other campaigns in Western Europe. In Poland, the 
German air force opened the war with so-called ‘'counter-air ’ operations - decisive blows on enemy 
airfields and air assets. Once the enemy’s air force was crippled and air supremacy attained, the 
German aircraft became the eyes of the army and its long-range artillery. Using the lessons learned 
earlier during the Spanish Civil War, radio-equipped forward air controllers were held by the 
leading army elements so that aircraft could be directed onto enemy targets immediately in front of 
friendly troops. This new type of warfare that combined the potential of ground support aircraft in 
the air with the mobility and firepower of the armour on the ground was termed ‘‘blitzkrieg'' — the 
lightning war. '^*
The term blitzkrieg, while normally associated with German mechanised operations in the 
years 1939 to 1941, can equally be applied to the subsequent Allied operations in that it consisted 
of a combination of armour, infantry and air power providing a fast striking force. In this respect, 
the Allies were quick to learn and when the Allied landing in Normandy finally took place in 1944, 
Allied air power had already become plentiful and it had a decisive impact on the conduct and 
outcome of the grand campaign. The obvious danger, however, was that air power promise, and 
land forces expect, too much.^'
In stark contrast to the unambiguous effectiveness of the aerial operations in the tactical 
realm, were strategic bombing raids launched first on Britain by the German air force, and then by 
the Allies on Axis countries. The initial disillusionment came with the Battle of Britain, when the 
widely disorganised and misdirected German air offensive failed to break the resolute leadership 
and people of the United Kingdom. For the rest of the war, the German air force reverted to a
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purely defensive role, assigned to protect the German heartland and to a tactical role in support of 
their ground forces. In contrast, the British and Americans who had long placed emphasis on grand 
strategic bombing in order to decapitate their enemy by crippling his high-value economic and 
industrial infrastructure, could not resist the temptation to use the strategic bombing assets 
acquired during the inter-war period. Hence, the Royal Air Force’s initial bomber offensives 
against Germany that had had a negligible impact, were later supplemented by large formations of 
US bombers and, starting in late-1942, the Allies carried out a round-the-clock air offensive 
against the Third Reich.^‘ Some of those raids took the form of gigantic efforts involving more than 
a thousand bombers flying in formation, a large number of whom fell prey to German fighters and 
ground-based defences. Initially, the Allied bombers suffered heavy casualties, and the whole 
strategic bombing campaign became another example of the 1918-style war of attrition this time 
fought between airmen. But, as the German war machine became increasingly over-stretched and 
the German economy grew ever weaker, so did the Third Reich's ability to defend itself against 
bomber offensives. Consequently, the bombing offensives’ true effectiveness was in the form of 
economic asphyxiation and the diversion of German troops from the Russian front into air defence 
units. In the final analysis, while much of Germany was transformed into rubble and the German 
economy eventually came to a standstill, the big debate on “whether a bombing offensive was the 
most cost-effective way to finish Germany o ff’ has remained unresolved. Five decades later, most 
observers agree that the Allied strategic offensive against Germany was used as a sledgehammer, 
often wastefiilly and blindly.^^
During the war, while the centre of gravity of the Allied strategic bombing effort was 
directed against Germany, Japan also received its share. However, bearing striking similarities to 
the bombing offensive against Germany, the one launched against Japan also resulted in lots of 
rubble, but little loss of determination on the part of Japanese people. Yet, the final act in Japan 
came in a strikingly different manner. When the US Air Force dropped two air-delivered atomic 
bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the sheer size of the destruction and the immediate 
surrender of Japan revealed beyond any doubt that, the A-bomb had finally made possible the 
realisation of the Douhetan theories.
Two further dimensions of air power that proved their worth beyond any doubt during the 
Second World War were maritime operations and the use of aircraft for tactical transport 
purposes. With regard to the former, it could safely be asserted that air power’s contribution to war 
at sea has always been decisive and dominant. During the naval war in the Atlantic Ocean, for 
instance, nearly 60 percent of Germany’s submarines were destroyed by aircraft, while a great 
majority of Italy and Germany’s surface vessels were also crippled from the air. Meanwhile, the 
conflict in the Pacific Ocean between The US and Japan, further validated the vulnerability of
unprotected capital ships to air attack, and in that particular theatre, it was the duels between 
aircraft operating from aircraft carriers, not conventional sur&ce vessels, that determined the shape 
and the outcome of the conflict. On the other hand, the Second World War also demonstrated that, 
in the struggle between aerial and naval platforms, identification could be a serious problem and it 
was soon realised that closely co-ordinated control of both air and sur^ce elements was essential to 
avoid fratricide.^''
Regarding the tactical transport role, air power proved its worth in supplying isolated or 
encircled ground troops. The vivid example offered by the sustained British air transport effort in 
Burma, was proof of the fact that air supply could free an army of traditional logistic support.“  
Similarly, ‘air landings’ as a direct extension of air transport in support of groimd warfere, have 
demonstrated the tactical advantages accrued from landing paratroopers behind the enemy lines, in 
order to capture critical targets lying in front of a ground advance. However, the ill-fated Allied air 
landings at Arnhem, Belgium, drew all sides’ attention to the fact that, while air landings had great 
potential for surprise, they were also extremely vulnerable to enemy coimteraction. Airborne troops 
had to be content with light weapons and stood every chance of being overwhelmed by enemy 
groimd forces backed by vehicles, artillery and tanks. The most successful application therefore 
was against isolated targets, as demonstrated by the Germans at Norway and Crete.“
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Cold W ar and operations on the periphery
Following the Second World War, the world tumbled into a new type of confrontation 
between the two opposing blocs led by The US and The Soviet Union. The first military showdown 
of the so-called Cold War was the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49, during which the entire population 
of the city of Berlin, as well as the Allied troops stationed there, were sustained by an airlift of 
gigantic proportions. Having realised the futility of their effort vis-à-vis Western material 
superiority, the Soviets blinked and lifted their blockade.
The next confrontation between the two opposing blocs was the Korean War of 1950- 
1953. Upon the invasion of the southern half of the country by the communist north, air power’s 
flexibility and potentials to intervene in overseas conflicts was fully revealed: the US aircraft 
stationed in Japan were the first on-call military units to lend immediate support to the hard- 
pressed South Korean forces. Owing to its qualitative and quantitative superiority, the US Air 
Force quickly attained air supremacy and, thanks to the effective air support lent to ground 
combat. North Korean invaders were quickly repelled. However, after the Chinese intervened on 
the side of the North, the conflict took the form of a static ground warfru'e, in which air power 
could find little opportunity to execute decisive operations. Valuable air resources were thus drawn 
into activities that had no perceptible connection either with ground fighting or with the war’s
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political aims and, even if air superiority could be claimed, it was air superiority for its own sake. 
While making little contribution to the existing concepts of air power, the war in Korea did re­
validate a fundamental lesson; aircraft alone are not enough to win wars.^’
The first two decades of the Cold War also witnessed the European powers’ struggle to 
resist the de-colonisation of their overseas territories, in which air machines produced for a possible 
war between the two Superpowers were often diverted for use in imorthodox military 
confrontations. After 1945, the British were the first to use with their air force to put down 
dissident activity in their overseas holdings. The mixed results attained in a munber of colonial 
skirmishes demonstrated that air attack as a means of eliminating terrorist or guerrilla activity had 
definite limitations. To this effect, an enemy that was very difficult to locate was even harder to 
attack. Likewise, the French experience in Indo-China demonstrated that, successful suppression of 
guerrillas must be achieved on the ground. Air power could only be effective if its ability to spot 
and spoil is backed up by intelligent ground support, which both denies the guerrillas sustenance 
and wins over the local population. The object in counter-insurgency operations was peace and 
prosperity, and massive destruction brought about by air power was not the answer.“
Failing to take notice of those lessons in a timely manner, the French lost their four-year 
long campaign in Indochina, and together with it their last hold in the Far East. Surprisingly, 
however, only a decade later their mistakes were to be repeated in the very same territory and by 
the world’s leading air power, namely The US. In this regard, the gradual increase in the American 
military presence in South Vietnam during the 1960s included a sizeable air component, and air 
power was perceived by both military planners and decision-makers in Washington as an efficient 
means to tip the balance on the ground, without having to risk large numbers of American lives. 
But, as the war dragged on and as air power ^ le d  to accomplish what was expected of it, a 
vicious cycle, involving ever-increasing troop and aircraft deployments, was set. Despite the 
overwhelming numerical and technological superiority of the The US, air power failed to prevent a 
himuliating defeat, and the war in Vietnam became synonymous with the failure of air power. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to classify the aerial war over Vietnam not as a downfall of air power, 
but rather as a case in which a gross exaggeration of air power’s potential once again resulted in 
disillusionment and fhistration.“
Its outcome aside, from the perspective of air power’s historical evolution, the war in 
Vietnam encompassed a fairly large number of tactical and technological novelties. Among those 
were the first ever large-scale use of helicopters in combat, bringing to the battlefield mobility on 
an entirely different scale which enabled the US to engage the enemy in areas where no other forces 
could do so; the emergence of SAM (surface-to-air missile) as a potent aircraft killer which forced 
the US to assign its smaller and more agile air superiority fighters to strategic bombing; the
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introduction into aerial combat of the early versions of precision-guided munitions which enabled 
aircraft to strike ground targets with pinpoint accuracy; and, finally, a dramatic increase in the 
importance of electronic w a r^ e , thenceforth an indispensable component of all aerial operations. 
Furthermore, the US military appears to have viewed its struggle in Vietnam as a great opportunity 
to test its equipment and theories; and the fearsome capabilities of the US air power that were to 
become apparent during the Gulf War of 1991, have their roots in the lessons and experience of the 
non-declared war in Vietnam.
A more recent conflict reminiscent of the colonial era was the Falklands War of 1982 
during which air power proved formative and was decisive in its outcome. The three month-long 
confrontation between Argentina’s land-based aircraft and the naval task force dispatched to the 
region by the British gave rise to a munber of important lessons regarding the use of air power in a 
maritime environment. At the tactical level, the campaign revealed once more the vulnerability of 
naval vessels to air strikes.^'
The last major conflict of the Cold War took place in the mountainous landscape of 
Afghanistan, and involved the extensive, but inconclusive use of air power by the invading Soviets. 
Moscow's decision to intervene in the on-going civil war there, was initiated through a massive air 
bridge bringing in thousands of Soviet troops. Throughout the conflict, air support provided by 
tactical aviation units constituted an integral part of all Soviet ground action, and it was Moscow’s 
turn to discover that, pitted against rural guerrillas, air power had little impact. On the other hand, 
without air power the Soviet intervention would have doomed fi’om the start, it being air power in 
Afghanistan that enabled the Red Army to maintain a precarious hold with a force of only one 
hundred thousand men, fighting much greater numbers of guerrillas in an extremely hostile
terram.32
Regional conflicts and Arab-Israeli wars
A curious conflict of the post-1945 period was the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. 
Its significance derives from the fact that it set the first post-war example of an aerial duel between 
regional powers, neither of whom had aerial assets in abundance. Being essentially a Second World 
War-type campaign, the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965 was fought without much imagination and, 
in the end, without much effect. If any lesson can be drawn, it is that countries entirely dependent 
for their supply of arms upon the outside world should very carefully weigh up the odds and the 
objectives of going to war. For, fighting was largely brought to a halt by supplier powers imposing 
an embargo on arms shipments to both warring parties.^^
Similarly, the 1974 Cyprus War revealed some of the deficiencies and limitations that 
typify regional air powers. As the Greek Cypriots had no air force and the fer-ofif Hellenic Air
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Force of Greece was unable to intervene, the Turks achieved air supremacy right from the 
beginning of the conflict and close air support on fierce ground combat had a sigmficant impact. 
Yet, casualty rates in the Turkish Air Force were exceptionally high, and mishaps in the fields of 
command, control and communications, as well as deficiencies in inter-service co-ordination led to 
a dramatic incidence of fratricide, in which a Turkish destroyer was sunk by its own fighter- 
bombers.^^ Other regional conflicts, among them the Sino-Vietnam War of 1978 and the Iran-Iraq 
War of 1980-87, also included an aerial dimension. However, the insignificant and latent role 
played by air forces in those re-validated the fact that air forces untuned to the specific 
circumstances and political objectives of a looming conflict, can alter neither the course nor the 
outcome of it.
However, an exception should be made here with regard to the Arab-Israeli wars. Indeed, 
the operations undertaken by the Israeli airmen have presented analysts with an amazingly rich and 
diversified source for the assessment of air power and the consequences of its successful 
application. The most striking and noteworthy of the Israeli air campaigns was conducted during 
the Six-Day War of 1967. During this particular conflict, air power not only formed the basis of 
Israeli strategy and prepared the way for victory, but it also made its most spectacular contribution 
to warfare since the Second World War. Faced with numerically superior Arab forces and intent on 
avoiding international pressure, Israel launched a pre-emptive, blitzkrieg-tyi>Q strike, in which the 
primary role of the Israeli Air Force was to win air superiority and then assist deep penetrations by 
the Israeli armour. The operations were based upon precise timing, hard training, accurate striking 
power, understanding of their own limitations and proper intelligence, including an accurate 
psychological assessment of their opponents. The outcome was astonishing by any standards; the 
air forces of four Arab states were destroyed during the opening hours of the conflict: Thanks to 
the ample air support provided thereafter, the Israeli Army defeated its Arab counterparts in all 
three fronts; Sinai, the West Bank, Gazza Strip and Golan Heights were captured in less than a 
week. In fact, the campaign were so spectacular, and the lessons so unambiguous that it was highly 
unlikely that the opportunities of June 1967 would ever reoccur, at least not imtil the Gulf War of 
1991.”
However, the euphoria created by the ease with which the war of 1967 was won, led Israeli 
to be over-confident, and resulted in the formation of Israeli defences based on the assumption that 
air power would be available to support ground troops whenever and wherever needed. The Yom 
Kippur War of 1973 proved how far-fetched and deceptive this assumption was. During the 
opening hours of the conflict, as the Egyptians and Syrians were carrying out their two-pronged 
and closely synchronised surprise attack against Israel, the latter’s response was, as anticipated, a 
massive air strike on advancing Arab ground forces. This time, however, it was the Israelis’ turn to
be disappointed: After the initial sorties, they were horrified to discover that they were losing three 
out of five aircraft sent over Arab positions. The Arab armies were advancing under the protective 
umbrella of several hundred radars and SAM sites laced into a centrally-controlled air defence 
complex.^® Luckily for the Israelis, conscience of their absolute reliance on the SAM umbrella and 
unwilling to venture beyond its missile cover, the Arab armies limited their advance and, with little 
room to manoeuvre, they were unable to defend themselves adequately against Israeli counter­
attacks. Eventually, assuming a totally defensive position vis-à-vis the air undermined Arabs 
initiative on the ground, and finally turned the tide of the battle in Israel’s favour.
The unique lessons of the 1973 Yom Kippur War concerned the vulnerability of SAMs to 
ground attack, electronic counter-measures, precision munitions and specialised tactics which 
places them securely and dangerously in the ‘Maginot tradition’^ ’, that when SAMs and other 
beyond-visual range sensor and weapon systems became integral to the conduct of aerial combat, 
airspace management (and avoiding fratricide) became an acute problem, and started to produce a 
modem manifestation of Clausewitz's ‘fog of war’^ ®; and last but not least, that electronic 
advantage in the overall conduct of air combat assumed an importance unmatched in previous 
conflicts.
This last aspect was to become even more obvious in another Arab-Israeli confrontation: 
the Lebanese War of 1982. During that particular conflict, a massive aerial duel in the skies of the 
Bekaa Valley resulted in the loss of 80 Syrian aircraft, for the loss of one on the Israeli side. In this 
text-book example of effective use of air power, the Israelis had developed a variety of innovative 
tactics and equipment to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Syrians, while the latter were left 
fhiitlessly throwing their aircraft in the ffay.^’
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Gulf W ar - revolution in warfare ?
The six-week long Gulf War of 1991 precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
highlighted the ways in which air power had come to dominate most forms of modem warfare, and 
how the ability to exploit the third dimension with relative freedom had become an indispensable 
precondition for successful military operations. In this regard, the US-led Coalition’s military 
offensive to force the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait was heavily reliant on the use of air power. Even 
before the outbreak of the actual combat, air power played a pivotal role by promptly bringing in 
the Coalition troops, armoury and supplies in the region, and thus deterring further Iraqi action 
against any of the Coalition partners. After the outbreak of the conflict itself, the Coalition air 
offensive was undertaken in four phases: in Phase 1 overall air supremacy was achieved and Iraqi 
strategic targets attacked; in Phase 2 Iraqi air defences in the Kuwaiti theatre of operations (КТО) 
were suppressed, this led to Phase 3 which involved attacks on the Iraqi Army in the КТО, and.
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lastly. Phase 4 whose prime aim was to provide direct support for the Coalition land force 
offensive/®
Overall, the results achieved by air power were outstanding: the Iraqi Air Force was 
effectively grounded; Iraq’s integrated air defence system was crippled; many strategic 
installations, including the national electricity grid, had been destroyed or badly damaged; transport 
feeder routes were cut by half; the Iraqi Navy was effectively sunk, and the Iraqi army reduced to a 
collection of isolated and dispirited units eager to surrender. Consequently, when the Coalition 
armies finally launched their ground offensive, they were faced with negligible ground resistance 
and Kuwait was liberated in less than five days. By any standards, this was a decisive military 
victory which was made possible by air power's ability to destroy the opponent’s military as a 
cohesive fighting force.
The pace of fighting was so rapid and the victory itself so effortless that, after the opening 
night of the Gulf War, the credibility and perceived importance of air power changed irreversibly in 
popular perception. Indeed, the initial operations of the conflict attested to a sweeping change in the 
capability and effectiveness of air power. This change marked, for many, the final emergence of air 
power, when properly equipped, trained and used, as the dominant instrument of combat power. 
The Gulf War proved that modem technology, including stealth, precision weapons and modem 
command and control, had revolutionised warfare, and placed air power at the centre of it.
Others, however, have been more pmdent in their treatment of the Gulf War, and argue 
that the conflict was a rare case in which a minor power found itself confronted by the full weight 
of the world's sole superpower, amply aided by the forces of its key allies. The use of air power in 
the Gulf War was accompanied by a number of unique circumstances, which limit considerably the 
analyst's ability to draw far-reaching lessons and generalisations about the future use of air power. 
As previously mentioned, the first among those peculiar circumstances was that Iraq was a regional 
power, oriented towards medium-sized threats, and not a massive air onslaught by a superpower 
that had deployed most of its conventional air power to the region. Indeed, the Coalition’s 
quantitative and qualitative superiority in aircraft, munitions, intelligence, personnel, support and 
doctrine was overwhelming by any standards.'" Among other circumstances that overwhelmingly 
favoured the Coalition air power were the Coalition’s ability to dictate when the war began, where 
to strike and when the conflict should end; the period of five and a half months of preparation 
during which the Coalition air forces could prepare and which was used to great effect to adjust to 
technical and geographic challenges; and, finally, the overall topographic conditions of the theatre, 
most notably the clear advantages offered by the desert as the predominant operating environment 
which proved uniquely suitable for the deployment and application of air power.''^ In short, despite
the seemingly pivotal role played by the Coalition air power, sceptics have argued that air 
operations can, at best, produce transitory effects on an able opponent, and that Iraq was not.
Another line of argument just as sceptical of the revolutionary impact of the air power 
alone has contended that from the time of previous conflicts to that of the Gulf War, a most 
profound change had taken place not in air power itself, but due to the application of information 
technology to existing weapon systems. This development, signifying a revolution in warfare, 
involved gathering huge amounts of data, processing them and displaying relevant information on a 
screen, and then destroying targets at much greater distances and with much greater accuracy than 
in previous conflicts. The length of combat was now compressed and operations expanded in 
space, giving rise to a new kind of warfare; ‘hyper-war’, distinguished by high-tempo round the 
clock operations which left the enemy unable to respond, and arguably replaced blitzkrieg as the 
most efficient form of modem warfare.''^
Air power in Bosnia
Four years after the monumental victory in the skies of the Persian Gulf, air power once 
more achieved dramatic results, this time around over the war-ridden territory of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. In this respect, during the summer of 1995, the North Atlantic Alliance’s eleven-day 
air offensive against Bosnian Serbs led the latter to accept the cease-fire and ultimately the terms of 
the Dayton Peace Accord. Overall, aircraft from eight NATO countries flew more than 750 strike 
sorties against 48 target complexes and 338 individual aim-points. Thanks to the exclusive use of 
precision-guided munitions, accuracy rates of nearly 100 per cent were achieved. According to 
many, the use of air power in Bosnia was a further manifestation of the ‘clinical’ use of air 
power.'*'* Indeed, despite a number of shortcomings (e.g. ambiguities surrounding the effectiveness 
of air strikes against bridges and underground command bunkers), as well as an urgent need to 
upgrade communications and operating procedures when multinational task forces were involved, 
in the final analysis, no one would argue that NATO air power had a significant influence on the 
outcome of the conflict in Bosnia.'*’
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Air power - past, present and future
A quick overview of the experience in the use of air power over the course of the last 85 
years indicates that all forms of warfare increasingly have an air component; armies and navies 
cannot function unless they exploit the third dimension. This trend, however, does not necessarily 
mean the dominance of air forces, much less the vindication of early theories of aerial warfare. 
Aerial platforms continue to be vulnerable to enemy fire, require elaborate supporting structures to 
make them functional and, sitting on the ground, they are useless and open to enemy pre-emption.
Furthermore, despite a number of quantum leaps in relevant technologies, those developments also 
apply to weapons and techniques aimed at destroying aircraft, and from where we stand today, 
aircraft do not necessarily outmatch defensive systems.
Meanwhile, while technological advances have forged ahead, the roles and missions of air 
power have remained essentially the same - the difference lies in the instruments being used and 
their degree of effectiveness. Technology has transformed them, but their basic intent has remained 
unaltered. Similarly, the success or failure of air power is still situational and dependent upon what 
one is trying to do and what the circumstances surrounding its use are. Recent experiences suggest 
that those states possessing high technology, well-trained and robust air forces operating according 
to insightful doctrines, can greatly increase their expectation of fighting a short war, and with it, 
that they will rapidly and overwhelmingly destroy an enemy force. The fulfilment of those parallel 
attributes of air power, however, requires information mastery of such magnitude that it renders air 
power dependent upon the power of information. Without it, modem air power cannot function 
effectively. Future growth of round-the-clock warfare, in which ever-more important intelligence is 
unable to catch-up, air power does and will continue to require the inter-netting of intelligence, 
administration and communications to a degree unknown in previous conflicts.·^ ®
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Ill-  FIRST CHAPTER - AN EPILOGUE
For the purposes of this study, our brief introductory overview of the concept of air power 
gives rise to three significant observations. First of all, despite the sense of fascination in popular 
literature which has come to characterise the treatment of air power, and the subsequent tendency 
to perceive it as an autonomous element of military power, in the last analysis, the inexorable links 
between the use of air power and the overall political goals of a nation are as important as ever. To 
put it differently, despite the dramatic increases in its potential and overall impact on the conduct 
of all forms of combat in recent years, an intrinsic quality of air power should never be overlooked: 
above and beyond all, air power is an instmment to pursue and ultimately fulfil its possessor’s 
political objectives. All assumptions and considerations relating not only to its employment, but 
also to the degree of its success or failure must be judged against this background. This 
presumption is as applicable to Greece, the main subject of this study, as to any other country in 
the world.
Secondly, during the course of the last 100 years, air power has gradually evolved from the 
status of being a useful but ancillary addition to surface warfare, into that of being an 
indispensable element of modem combat. As one observer has rightly noted, with the capabilities
acquired over the last decades for precision stand-off attack and better situational awareness (i.e. 
surveillance, command-control, data dissemination), ‘air power ... now commands a strong 
presumption of being the tool of choice for shaping the contours of war as the supported rather 
than the supporting combat element.’'” In other words, up until the 1990s, there was a strong 
presumption that the shape and the outcome of military confrontations would be determined on the 
surface, and air power only gained significance when its positive contribution to naval and, more 
commonly, ground combat was plausible. With the outset of the Gulf War of 1991, however, it 
was demonstrated that the turn of events and the overall course of modem combat was determined 
more by the potentialities and options offered by air power than those at the disposal of ground and 
naval forces. Indeed, the latter’s worth is now measured more against their capability to exploit the 
opportunities created by air power and their ability to “finish-off” the job already started by 
aircraft. However, this assertion should by no means be taken as synonymous to a capability on the 
part of air power to fulfil the political objectives independently of the other two forms of military 
power. Their critically important responsibilities to hold and seize ground, and secure sea lanes of 
communications, ground and naval assets preserve their status as indispensable components of a 
nation’s military might and this situation can be expected to persist for the foreseeable future.
Thirdly, while air power has been transforming itself quickly into a pre-condition for swift 
and decisive victory in modem combat, recent experience nevertheless implies that only those states 
in control of the necessary high technologies, well-trained and well-equipped air forces can ever 
hope of taking advantage of those potentialities, at least to the degree that the US and certain other 
Western powers did during the Gulf and Bosnian campaigns. For others that cannot realistically 
hope to fulfil all those preconditions, the results achievable when faced with an equally or better- 
prepared opponent remain at best ambiguous, and as such deserve more in-depth scholarly 
investigation. This last point constitutes the main objective of the following chapter of our study.
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CHAPTER 2
FIRST-RATE vs. SECOND-RATE AIR POWERS
Having broadly examined its theoretical premises and historical evolution, our attention 
in this chapter shifts towards the use of air power by those states in possession of material, human 
and/or technological capabilities that are deficient in one way or another, at least in comparison 
with the leading air powers on which the current scholarly investigation of the subject has been 
based. Accordingly, in this chapter, a moderate attempt will be made to distinguish between what 
henceforth will be termed ’'’first-rate" air powers and ’’second-rate" air powers. For the purposes 
of this study, this distinction is important because, as our subsequent analyses will further 
elaborate, minor and moderate-sized regional powers with more limited human, financial and/or 
technological resources are more likely to be confined to the status of ‘second-rate’ air powers, 
and find themselves relatively disadvantaged in making full use of the options offered by air 
power. In this respect, since Greece, and with it all the countries in its immediate vicinity, can be 
considered as a medium- or even small-sized regional powers, it goes without saying that the 
findings of this Chapter can equally be applied when in subsequent chapters Greece and her air 
power is discussed.
Indeed, as it will shortly be contended, the likely shape and circumstances, as well as the 
overall impact of an aerial confrontation between ‘second-rate’ air powers, will in all probability, 
differ immensely from widely-circulated accounts of the current and previous air campaigns 
involving at least one ‘first-rate’ air power. Based on this assumption and in preparation for the 
subsequent chapters focusing on various aspects of Greek air power, the ultimate aim of Chapter 
2 is to help the reader visualise an aerial confrontation between second-rate powers. Given this 
new perspective on the issue that is nowhere to be found in other studies on air power, new 
perspective on the issue, it is hoped that the reader will better comprehend the worth and 
significance of the particular air power-relevant assets at the disposal of Greece and her 
neighbouring countries and, in addition, indicate the options and capabilities which the 
employment of air power offers Greek decision-makers..
I- FIRST-RATE VS. SECOND-RATE AIR POWERS: WHAT SETS THEM APART ?
Our brief historical overview in the preceding Chapter revealed that, between 1911 and 
1945, perhaps air power’s greatest contribution to the development of warfare was the ability to
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overfly most obstacles. Thereafter, with the ability of aircraft to subject them to direct attack, 
came the end of economies and societies’ immunity and subsequently the obliteration of the 
distinction between front and rear, combatants and non-combatants.
During the 1950s and 1960s, rapid technological progress gave rise to advanced sensor 
and target acquisition systems and guided weapons. Concurrently, operational tactics and 
doctrines pertaining to the effective use of air power started to reach maturity. Hence, from the 
1970s onwards and, particularly, during the 1980s, equipped with laser-guided bombs and able to 
operate from stand-off ranges, at last combat aircraft seemed to possess the accuracy and 
precision which the proponents of air power had proclaimed, somewhat prematurely, before and 
during World War II.'
Those perceptions were validated during The Gulf War of 1991, and the optimism of 
force plaimers appeared completely vindicated. Not surprisingly, many analysts were euphoric. 
Air power had, after all, proven that, ‘... it could substitute for land power. It proved that even if 
it could not hold ground it could deny it to the hostile ground forces. It demonstrated that it could 
now reach into the strategic heart of a coimtiy to threaten any known static political, economic or 
military target with the maximum precision and the minimum collateral damage and casualties ... 
(The Gulf War) confirmed the fatal consequences of conceding command of the air to an enemy. 
That conclusion alone suggests that wherever air power can be applied, it is likely to dominate, or 
strongly influence the outcome of conflict on the surface.’^
Simultaneously, however, detailed study of the conflict has also given rise to a tendency 
to treat the post-war wave of optimism more carefully. As briefly touched upon in Chapter 1, the 
first attempt at more considerate analyses concentrated on the unique circumstances under which 
the Gulf War’s aerial operations were conducted. Accordingly, several analysts argued that, ‘the 
coalescence of so many circumstances which occurred in The Gulf War may be repeated 
elsewhere, but history suggest it is unlikely. Air power determined the outcome, but that is not to 
say that it will do so elsewhere next time. Technology came closer than ever before to matching 
the dreams and forecasts of the air power theorists, but may not do so in different environments
Meanwhile, a second line of more considerate scholarly inquiry, more relevant to the 
purposes of this study, concentrates on the systemic qualities of air power, and whether all states 
can exploit its potentialities as effectively. This line of thought pays tribute to the fact that, during 
The Gulf War, air power, and American air power in particular, became effective through an 
elaborate physical structure of aircraft, air bases, and supporting fecilities; a human structure of 
highly-qualified pilots and technicians; and electronic structure of sensing and communications 
aids which boosted the airmen’s situational awareness dramatically. Very few countries, however, 
can ever hope to bring those assets together and thereby exploit the potential of air power to the 
same degree. Consequently, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the division that separated
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“first-rate” air powers from “second-rate”, on the basis of the options and capabilities available to 
each, has become more accentuated.
Before delving further into the implications of this division, it is perhaps necessary to 
provide the reader with a broad definition of the dichotomy concerning first-rate as against 
second-rate air powers. In this regard, and for the purposes of this study, the term “first-rate air 
power” is used to refer to those air forces with world-wide responsibilities and capabilities, or 
else those air forces that could assume extended regional responsibilities and succeed in 
accomplishing complete supremacy over their regional opponents. The obvious candidates for the 
former category include US, British, French, and until recently, Russian air arms; while the best 
example in the latter category is the Israeli Air Force, a highly-capable air arm that has excelled 
in fulfilling a wide range of aerial operations against its regional opponents.
Among the technical, material and tactical pre-conditions that place a country among the 
ranks of “first-rate” air powers are; a fairly large number of modem combat aircraft, and 
supporting platforms (i.e. stealth, stand-off electronic jamming, tanker, and airborne early- 
warning aircraft, electronic intelligence assets etc.); large quantities and a wide variety of high- 
tech and specialised munitions, including “smart” ones; substantial maintenance and handling 
infrastmcture assisted by fairly advanced domestic defence industrial capabilities and an 
indigenous technical/technological base; a pool of highly-qualified aviators and technicians who 
are properly selected and trained; a fairly large number of airfields supplemented by satisfactory 
basing facilities; comprehensive and closely integrated air defence and (command, control and 
communications) organisation; intellectual and academic capital to generate creative and novel 
strategies, doctrines and tactics with regard to the use of air power; and last, but not least, 
abundant financial, industrial and human resources to acquire, sustain and upgrade those 
capabilities.
With regard to the last two aspects, which concern the nature of the human element 
directly, a close parallel could even be drawn between the attributes of first-rate air powers and 
the concept of ^Third Wave ’, as introduced by Alvin Toffler some years ago.'* According to this, 
the Third Wave of military capabilities denotes the information-led economy and culture of 
contemporary Western societies, whereas the previous two waves are composed respectively of 
agrarian societies and heavy industry-based societies. As each wave has its analogue in conflict, 
those societies poised to exploit the potentialities of air power are those that have made 
knowledge central to their daily life. In the course of The Gulf War, for example, Iraq unleashed 
second wave war forms, made up of brute force machines which were annihilated by the West’s 
third wave response.
As against the first-rate, the countries that are ranked as ‘second-rate’ air powers are 
those that cannot hope to marshal the resources and assets necessary to mount an aerial campaign 
on the scale, intensity and sophistication of, say operation Desert Storm in 1991. The following
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remarks of an Indian analyst on Desert Storm reflect on the implications of the Gulf War air 
campaign for Third World countries.’ With relation to the Airborne Early Warning and Control 
(AWACS) Aircraft®, one of the key players in the Coalition air effort, he noted: ‘Even if we were 
to discount the initial costs of equipment, the sheer cost of sustaining such an effort would create 
a substantial problem for developing countries ... Possession of modem sophisticated equipment 
does not guarantee its effectiveness and employability ... To operate AW ACS meaningfully, a 
complex inffastmcture has to be created at great cost and expertise developed in human resources 
and doctrines ... The capital investment in the system, including C’l support, and operating costs 
to induct and (co-ordinate) such assets into air forces of developing countries would be 
prohibitive. The limitation of fiscal resources would impinge on other modernisation 
imperatives.’
In order to clarify the term “second-rate” air power, a more detailed analysis of its 
characteristics, along with the reasons behind its properties is necessary. On the first count, it is 
possible to assert that, all second-rate air powers display at least some, if not all, of the following 
characteristics.
Combat aircraft
In most cases, there are insufficient numbers of modem combat aircraft in their inventory 
and their force is predominately made up of multi-purpose fighter-bombers, rather than role- 
specific (and more expensive) machines such as dedicated stealth bombers, close air support, 
maritime attack, and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. In an ideal world with unlimited 
resources, every air force would like to deploy role-specific aircraft, weapons systems and 
crewmen. However, economic and other constraints conspire against the accomplishment of this 
goal and lead air forces towards more flexible and versatile platforms. The real penalties of multi­
role dependence manifest themselves in the form of reduced mission effectiveness by the aircraft 
themselves and the decline in the competence of specialist air crew.
Munitions
Stocks are insufficient and critical shortages are observed, particularly with respect to the 
more costly and harder-to-get smart, precision-guided and/or stand-off weapons systems. 
Furthermore, very limited, if any, capability exists to quickly adapt available munitions to the 
unforeseen circumstances of a major conflict, and precise intelligence, a pre-requisite for their 
successful employment, is invariably absent. In this regard, it is noteworthy that air power’s 
capabilities were boosted considerably with the introduction of precision-guided ‘smart’ weapons. 
Since the 1970s, thanks to an increase in accuracy, a whole range of targets can be attacked 
almost simultaneously, as opposed to sequentially. During The Gulf War, at instance, 
approximately 9 per cent of total tonnage was made up of precision munitions which were 
responsible for nearly 75 per cent of the damage inflicted.’ In other words, an air force with
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insufficient quantities of advanced guided munitions and the means to enable their effective use, 
would continue to fight a war reminiscent o f the WW Il-type conflicts.
Air defence coverage
With a few exceptions, most second-rate air powers only have access to older generations 
of early warning, target acquisition and active air defence assets (i.e. surfece-to-air missiles and 
anti-aircraft guns); their air defence and early warning coverage tends to be piecemeal and/or 
porous; and since they are in possession of limited back-up/reserve assets and capabilities, the 
sustainability and redundancy aspects of their air defence infrastructure are highly questionable. 
Moreover, deficiencies in those areas give rise to limited integrated air space management 
capabilities, and thereby the likelihood of losing their own aircraft to fiiendly fire.
Electronic warfare
A total lack of specialised platforms such as stand-off jamming and SIGINT (signals 
intelligence) aircraft is very common and, in most cases, outdated electronic self-protection 
systems are carried by their multipurpose combat aircraft. Meanwhile, the absence of control over 
technology and know-how imperative when adapting in a timely manner existing hardware to the 
changing threat scenarios and profiles, is detrimental to the efficiency of electronic warfare. More 
importantly, thanks to recent advances in the field of ‘information warfere’, an electronically- 
advanced opponent can corrupt computer files and networks, or derive even greater advantages 
from reading a foe’s mail traffic and browsing stored files. In this regard, there is wide-spread 
speculation in defence circles that air forces acquiring their advanced equipment abroad in order 
to write or at least modify the latter’s software themselves, could even be susceptible to the 
activation of electronic ‘Trojan Horses” planted in their equipment.* The ramifications in terms of 
dependence on first-rate, or at least foreign powers, are obvious.
Command-control-communications-intelligence (C^I)
Their existing network is likely to consist of aged equipment, unsatisfactory both in 
coverage and overall integration, and thereby effectiveness. Individual components, as well as the 
overall system, are susceptible to counter-action and jamming. Additionally, severe limitations 
are observed in reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering capabilities and, among others, space- 
based intelligence assets (i.e. satellites) are beyond the reach of secondary air powers.
Personnel
As in warfare down the ages, in all three dimensions, the quality of the man exerts a 
powerful influence on the outcome, whatever levels of technology are applied.’ Yet, in most 
second-rate air powers, the human resources that could be drawn upon at a national level to create
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and sustain a pool of qualified aviators, technicians and command cadres, are either very limited 
or employed in the wrong sectors.
Bad-weather- and night-fighting capabilities
Given the highly-specialised equipment and extensive training associated with bad- 
weather and night-fighting operations, the claims by most air forces to have capabilities in these 
fields is little more than symbolic. This is especially true in the case of operations undertaken 
after dark. Here, over and above material shortages, a human being’s continuing need for regular 
rest in order to operate efficiently makes the ratio of operating crews to weapons systems an 
important factor. In the high tempo of wartime, this ratio must increase, but secondary-rate air 
forces may not have the same abundance of highly-trained and qualified personnel as first-rate 
ones.
Air-land- and multi-force operations
Due to a multiplicity of factors -shortages in sufficiently qualified military personnel, 
poor training, organisational and institutional hurdles - co-operation and co-ordination with the 
other two branches of armed forces is uneven, disorganised and non-systemic in nature.
Force multipliers
Those are the kind of assets and capabilities (i.e. in-flight refuelling, AW ACS, command- 
control network, stealth aircraft, precision strike capability) that make the products of an air 
force’s components greater than the sum of its parts.'® Yet, although the operational 
improvements conferred by force multipliers on a balanced air force are well established (cost- 
wise as well as operationally), the high cost of acquiring and sustaining them must detract from 
the overall volume of resources that can be directed towards the purchase of offensive and 
defensive aircraft and other essential equipment. Therefore, most air forces find it extremely 
difficult, if not totally impossible, to own and operate force multipliers, to the point where 
insufficient critical force multipliers (i.e. tanker and airborne early-warning aircraft) are available, 
and those in service are older and/or inherently more limited versions.
Sustainability & redundancy
In most second-rate air forces, human, material and financial resources are already over­
stretched to meet even the most basic of peace-time functions and operations. Thus, when faced 
with a highly-capable opponent and the high operational tempo of a major conflict, quick 
degradation and perhaps total collapse of the fighting capability is not inconceivable.
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II- SECOND-RATE AIR POWERS - CAUSES OF LIMITATIONS
Having identified some of the common characteristics of what we have termed “second- 
rate” air powers, our attention shifts now towards the circumstances which underpin them. Some 
of the factors that could help explain certain countries’ inability to take full advantage of the air 
power’s full potentialities are as follows:
Limited financial resources
The acquisition and up-keep of a fairly effective air force is an extremely costly 
undertaking and very few countries in the world are in possession of the necessary financial 
resources. To be more explicit, the flyaway cost of a single F-16 fighter aircraft -  a popular 
models used widely by first-rate as well as second-rate air powers -  varies between 20 and 25 
million dollars. However, taking into account the high price of auxiliary expenses (i.e. fuel, 
spares, ammunition, wages, construction of basing facilities), operating the same aircraft costs 
three or four times more over, say, 15 years, than its purchase price." In some cases -  stealth 
aircraft being one, highly specialised electronic warfare aircraft another -operating costs aside, 
even entry costs have become enormous and only a superpower can afford to play the game." 
Indeed, experience suggests that, to equip and maintain an air force of a few hundred fairly 
modem combat aircraft, inclusive of the necessary basing and support services as well as force 
multipliers, would consume a minimum of few billion dollars a year and, given the pressing 
financial needs of other two branches of military, this would equal to an annual defence budget of 
over $10 billion. Obviously, this is an extremely high price, within the reach of no more than a 
handful of nations." Furthermore, over the past twenty to thirty years, the real cost of all military 
equipment risen at an average rate of about 6 % per year, which, with an approximate constant 
procurement budget means either that the age of in-service equipment must rise, or that the size of 
an air force must shrink. The effect of this is that, in real terms, a modem combat aircraft costs 
four times more than its predecessor and, as the years go by, the real cost of acquiring and 
maintaining an effective air force continues to escalate.
Existence of alliance ties
Certain nations might have the necessary financial resources to maintain a large and 
highly-efficient air force. Yet, being part of a military alliance, whose internal division of labour 
effectively eliminates the need to acquire certain assets and capabilities, they may not deem it 
necessary to become first-rate air powers, for at least as long as that particular alliance scheme 
continues to satisfy their security needs. The best example of such a situation continues to be the 
North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), in which certain member states, most notably Germany and 
Italy, have long been in control of sufficiently large military budgets, but who, in order to avoid 
costly duplications with other allies, have refrained from using resources to acquire their own
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force multipliers such as AWACS, tanker and stand-off jamming aircraft. Instead, they have 
opted to rely on either joint-owned assets (i.e. the AWACS aircraft acquired and operated by the 
Alliance itself) or hardware provided by other Allied states (in the case of tanker, strategic 
transport and dedicated electronic warfare aircraft, The US). Similarly, from the perspective of 
certain East Asian states and, most notably, Japan and South Korea, co-operation with a patron 
(in this case. The US) once again eliminates the need for costly force multipliers, and thereby 
confines those countries’ air forces to the rank of second-rate air powers. It is noteworthy in this 
respect that, along with changing threat perceptions and the gradual decline of US military 
presence in The Pacific Basin, both Japan and South Korea have recently been taking steps 
towards acquiring their own contingents of AWACS, tanker and electronic warfare aircraft. In 
&ct, in the medium term, at least it can be expected that Japan take a seat in the league of first- 
rate air powers.
Geopolitical circumstances, characteristics of military
In certain countries, geopolitical circumstances, the make-up of the domestic politics, the 
role played by the military in conjunction with internal political structures, as well as the military 
culture and historical background of the armed forces are all important factors which help to 
explain the lack of priority attached to the aerial dimension of military power. In this regard, 
historical and/or geographic circumstances have led certain countries to possess army or navy- 
oriented military structures with air forces which have never or only very lately started to receive 
the degree of priority and prestige they deserve.’’ Likewise, in other regions of the world (most 
notably in Central and South America and Sub-Saharan Africa), armed forces have been 
perceived rather as tools of internal security than effective deterrents against external threats. 
Even more detrimental to certain nations’ air power-generating capabilities, has been a tendency 
to exploit the armed forces to grasp and maintain political power at home. The ultimate outcome 
of such an eventuality (as observed in Libya, Syria, Iraq, etc.) is the over-politicisation of military 
structures and a subsequent decline in the professionalism of all three armed services and, most 
notably, the air force. Another factor closely related to internal politics and which works to the 
detriment of an air force, is the deliberate move by certain countries -  such as Saudi Arabia and 
most Gulf states -  to wreak havoc on the contacts between the air force and the other branches of 
the military, so as to counter-balance a possible insurrection by any one of them against the ruling 
frmily.
Limited defence industrial and technological capabilities
Whereas all first-rate air powers are in possession of substantial defence industrial 
capabilities to back-up their military assets and can, therefore, relatively easily operate, maintain 
or modify their defence equipment, the same can hardly be said for second-rate air powers.'^ In
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this regard, and as a result of four closely inter-connected Actors, a nation’s access to 
comparatively advanced defence industrial and defence technological capabilities is of critical 
importance:
• First of all, the defence equipment that becomes available on the international market tends 
to be of relatively low technological content, and even those items used by the armed 
forces of the supplier state itself, are offered to the export customer in ‘sanitised’ or 
lower-grade versions. This is particularly true in the case of electronic items, for which a 
period of 5 to 10 years must elapse before critical products can be made available for 
export. Consequently, in order to gain access to cutting-edge technologies, a nation must 
possess relatively well-developed defence industrial capabilities, so as either to meet her 
own state-of-the art equipment needs, or at least make the necessary modifications to 
defence items acquired abroad.
• Secondly, the ability to compensate for the rapid erosion of stocks of consumable items 
such as munitions and spare parts, particularly during the height of a conflict, is important. 
Not only during the actual conflict itself, but also during periods of prolonged crisis 
preceding an outbreak of hostilities, it is extremely difficult to satisfy urgent equipment 
needs abroad. Hence, an effective air power must be in a position to sustain at least part of 
its operations using indigenous assets and capabilities.
• Thirdly, the unexpected circumstances and the element of surprise present in virtually all 
armed conflicts, make it imperative to make necessary modifications to existing equipment 
swiftly, so as to overcome their shortcomings and eliminate possible enemy advantage. 
Especially in the field of electronic warfare, the ability to adapt promptly to unexpected 
threat profiles is of critical importance.
• Last but not least, with warfare now revolving on technologies so advanced as to be 
developmental, regular (i.e. military) maintenance and repair teams’ knowledge and 
capabilities are frequently overwhelmed which makes it necessary to borrow the services of 
civilian experts and technicians employed by the industry. For instance, during The Gulf 
War of 1991, thousands of technical representatives in the field - civilian defence 
contractor employees, usually engineers - supported operations by monitoring and 
repairing their employers’ high-tech systems and showing troops how to operate, maintain 
and fix them.” Obviously, the number of countries able to bring together defence industrial 
and technological capabilities of that magnitude is very limited, perhaps less than a dozen. 
The rest could not realistically expect to join the ranks of ‘first-rate’ air powers while their 
technological and defence industrial capabilities lag behind.
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Inadequate human resources
Air power is not, and never has been, merely a matter of air strength. Behind the front­
line of any effective air force there must be a comprehensive support infrastructure, including 
personnel skilled in maintenance and repair as well as trained for the multiplicity of ground and 
air skills essential to an operational front line. That in turn will almost invariably depend upon the 
character of the nation itself, whether it has those skills essential to operational effectiveness, 
whether it has the depth of skills required and whether those skills reside in the right sectors. If 
they do not exist, or are in the wrong sectors, that nation’s ability to generate air power will either 
be low or it dependent upon the imported skills of a nation that is air-minded. As a result, its air 
power will lack depth and resilience. By and large, it would be no exaggeration to assert that, as 
warfare, air power is about people.'* Those observations lead one to ask, ‘whether, given the same 
material resources, different societies’ militaries are as good as eachother?’, a question which has 
interested political scientists for many years. One researcher has argued, for example, that social 
structures may create divisive loyalties and fissures in a society and in that way reduce the 
effectiveness of its military power as a whole. Moreover, he maintains that internal divisions can 
increase the amount of military power needed to maintain internal order, reducing the surplus of 
offensive military power that can be projected abroad.’’ Another study along similar lines 
concluded that, factors such as a country’s general level of education, the social acceptability of 
the armed forces, and the inherent martial nature of the population are instrumental in 
determining how well a country absorbs its equipment and weaponry, which in its turn renders 
possible a fair assessment of the quality and fighting efficiency of its armed forces.^“ Similarly, 
the ‘Third Wave’ argument, as already touched upon in this chapter, might also be forwarded to 
explain the readily visible discrepancies in various nations’ war-fighting capabilities. In 
retrospect, whatever the reasons and the circumstances surrounding the phenomenon at hand, 
there seems to be little doubt that in a fairly large number of countries, poor training and poor 
quality manpower lead to inept or at least ineffective air forces and that numbers can never really 
make up for quality. By way of example, a quick overview of aerial confrontations during the last 
10 years or so immediately reveal that, aviators from Libya, Syria and Iraq have proven to be 
inferior to their western or Israeli counterparts, and there is little doubt that both categories could 
be expanded to include dozens of other countries around the world.
Lack of familiarity and experience with the use of air power
War is intended to obtain a political objective as quickly as possible with minimum cost. 
To secure victory it calls for the most efficient use of all the forces available. Thus, the efficient 
conduct of war depends upon the development of doctrines flexible enough to be applicable to 
those situations which emerge. In this regard, air strategy is no exception, and air power must 
effectively relate to both grand strategy and any specific surface campaigns either current or
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contemplated. Germany’s success with blitzkrieg in the Second World War, for instance, 
stemmed from the development of an air-land doctrine, the acquisition of appropriate equipment 
during the inter-war period and their correct apphcation in the opening stages of the war. 
Similarly, the 1991 Coalition’s success against Iraq resulted from a better imderstanding of the 
real virtues and weaknesses of air power and its correct application on the battlefield. On the 
other hand, the Syrian Air Force’s performance over the Bekaa Valley in 1982 demonstrated the 
inherent problems which arise from the wholesale adoption of imsuitable tactics, their half­
hearted application and the overall failure that results from a lack of fiuniliarity with air power’s 
use. In other words, no good purpose can ever be served by blindly applying a given tactical 
philosophy to a battle situation and the adoption of inappropriate tactical doctrines will almost 
certainly lead to disaster. However, and unfortunately for the rest, experience in the successful 
use of air power has so far been confined to a mere handful of nations. Furthermore, as every 
aerial confrontation takes place imder a imique set of circumstances, lessons o f earlier conflicts 
are not readily applicable to the others. Thus, the need arises for intellectual and academic virtues 
both within the military and outside it, so as to formulate strategic, doctrinal and tactical 
guidelines governing the effective use of military power. Nations that are not equipped with such 
capabilities -  many are not -  are likely to deny themselves the chance of exploiting air power’s 
full potentialities.^'
I ll-  SECOND-RATE AIR POWERS - IMPLICATIONS
In the light of the events of the last eight decades, during which air machines have 
gradually assumed an indispensable role in all military confrontations, one can safely argue that 
air power has proved its worth and decisive impact on both the conduct and the outcome of most 
military conflicts, provided that it has been properly applied and employed. However, while 
proper application is an important pre-condition for air power’s successful use, it is by no means 
the only determinant. In fact, our reflections on the divergence between first-rate and second-rate 
air powers have hitherto contended that air power’s overall impact on the outcome of a given 
conflict can be boosted or curtailed by certain characteristics o f its possessor. Indeed, for reasons 
elaborated in preceding paragraphs, even if strategic and tactical circumstances are conducive to 
the proper employment of aerial assets, certain air powers are incapable of taking full advantage 
of the opportunities offered by the third dimension.
In this regard, since World War II, the effect of accelerating technological progress has 
been that each decade has seen an increasing number of different weapons in service and their 
integration into the overall system becoming the order o f the day. Consequently, rather than 
operate on an individual basis, there has been a tendency for weapons to be linked to each other
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by intricate networks of electronic signals, extended on the ground, at sea and in the air. Located 
at the heart of each system are command centres which can be stationary, mobile or even 
airborne. There, bank upon bank of computers are employed to “fuse” incoming information and 
officers find themselves trying to command while sitting in front of multiple television screens, 
talking into microphones and pressing buttons that, supposedly, will make things happen. 
Meanwhile in the air, faced with ever more advanced anti-aircraft defences and sophisticated 
enemy counter-action, tactical aircraft have become increasingly dependent on co-operation with 
electronic navigation and communication systems, early warning aircraft, unmarmed platforms 
and so on. Advancing technology has subjected pilots to demands verging on the limits of human 
capability, to the point where even the size of some air forces is determined by the availability of 
sufficient individuals of suitable quality.”
To put it differently, on the modem battlefield, a blizzard of electromagnetic waves is 
increasingly superimposed on the storm of steel in which war used to take place. Yet, as a result 
of the six factors elaborated upon in preceding sections, very few nations can realistically expect 
to cope with those developments and, together with them, the radically altered nature of 
contemporary air warfare. Indeed, when something goes wrong with electromagnetic circuitry 
and pulses, the side with inferior control over the technological and doctrinal content of the 
equipment can easily fall victim to an opponent with superior knowledge. Alternatively, when 
confronted by an equally impotent adversary, each side fails to derive anticipated tactical and 
strategic benefits from its investment in air arms. This factor might indeed be instmmental in 
explaining why certain countries, such as Iran and Libya in the 1970s and Iraq in the late-1980s, 
failed to materialise their much-cherished goal of becoming leading air powers, despite the 
impressive sum of financial and human resources dedicated to that end.
In retrospect, these observations also give rise to the solid proposition that air power’s 
ability to deliver the services expected of it and thereby help a nation to achieve its political goals, 
is one which does not readily lend itself to generalisation to cover all countries: political 
objectives and satisfactory results readily achievable for one operator may not necessarily be so 
for another, whose intrinsic and/or situational circumstances do not allow the exploitation of air 
power’s potentials with the same degree of effectiveness.
By the same token, it could safely be asserted that, given the rapid pace of technological 
progress and ever-widening technological gap between first-rate and second-rate air powers, 
certain states’ efforts to upgrade and join the ranks of first-rate air powers are rendered ever more 
delusive, because it is not realistic to expect those states ranked second-rate air powers to 
compensate for their deficiencies overnight and become a par with the very limited number of 
first-rate air forces.
Likewise, on the basis of the six factors identified as instrumental in explaining certain 
countries’ ability (or inability) to become first-rate air powers, it is possible to determine the
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likely position of any given country on the scale that differentiates first-rate air powers from 
second-rate. Needless to say, in accordance with the objectives of this study, a comprehensive 
exercise to this effect will be performed for Greece in the following chapters. In order to 
crystallise our proposition in the reader’s mind, however, a few examples by way of illustration 
may be useful.
Saudi Arabia, for instance, is a country with abundant financial resources directed 
towards defence spending which could well be exploited to create a first rate air force. However, 
the internal make-up of the armed forces which encourages inter-service rivalry, combined with 
the absence of even the most basic form of indigenous defence industrial capabilities, the lack of 
qualified human resources and familiarity with air power, all determine that this country ranks 
solidly amongst second-rate air powers. Indeed, given the difficulties in eliminating these 
inherent deficiencies, it can be assiuned that in the foreseeable Saudi Arabia will more than likely 
preserve its current status. Conversely, despite its small size, Israel provides an excellent, and 
perhaps imique example, of a country to fulfil most, if not a l l , of the pre-requisites of becoming a 
first-rate air power. This country’s proven ability to take full advantage o f air power’s 
potentialities in most conflicts, cast little doubt over the validity o f our proposition.
Beyond any doubt, not all countries’ status could be determined in such definite and 
unambiguous terms. By way of example, on the basis of its current capabilities and force make­
up, Japan could be cited as a second-rate air power. Yet, given its substantial financial, human 
and technological resources and its recent equipment orders to counter-balance the rapidly 
eroding US military capabilities in the Far East, it would be more appropriate to categorise Japan 
as a second-rate air power making rapid and steady progress towards first-rate status. Equally, in 
the light of its determined efforts during the last decade. The People’s Republic o f China, could 
also be considered a major regional power in possession of a second-rate air arm, but making 
progress in the same direction, albeit much more slowly. Conversely, Russia sp ea rs  to be a 
country moving in the opposite direction in that, along with its recent social and economic decay, 
its acclaimed Cold War status as a first-rate air power is increasingly shrouded in ambiguity.
Obviously, our task is not complete here. Since the virtues and the capabilities of the 
Hellenic Air Force and the worth and importance of air power from the perspective of Greek 
foreign and security policy goals constitute the main objective of this study, the real challenge 
will be to apply the propositions and findings of this chapter to Greek air power, and thereby 
determine how Greece scores on this scale and whether any progress is being made by the 
Hellenic Air Force in either direction. This important assignment will be fulfilled in succeeding 
chapters, but first, the by way of conclusion, the following section will consider the likely shape 
of an aerial confrontation between second-rate air powers.
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IV- AIR WARFARE BETWEEN SECOND-RATE AIR POWERS
Having distinguished between first and second-rate air powers, its is quite important to 
clarify the circumstances surrounding the use of air power by secondary air forces. Thanks to The 
Gulf War and later the operations over Bosnia, the general public came to perceive air power as 
an entity able to achieve miraculous results with great ease. Yet, as our observations in preceding 
sections reveal, this is hardly the case for the first-rate air powers, and is a remote possibility 
where second-rate air forces are concerned. Thus follows a more detailed account of the options 
available to secondary air forces when involved in a major military conflict. Indeed, the ultimate 
aim of this section is to help the reader visualise the likely shape and circumstances of an aerial 
confrontation between secondary powers. In this manner we hope to enable the reader to better 
comprehend the worth and significance of particular aerial assets and the options and capabilities 
at the service of the second-rate air powers’ operators.
In achieving these goals, the basic analytical framework to be utilised is to identify the 
specific ‘roles and ‘missions’ that an air force is expected to fulfil and to analyse separately the 
circumstances surrounding each of them. Accordingly, our brief overview of air power’s 
historical evolution in Chapter I has already indicated that air power’s development has been 
disorderly and piecemeal and, as such, has given rise to a multitude of diverse, but closely inter­
linked purposes to serve when air power is employed. In this regard, and in recognition of the 
challenge of understanding the complex set of circumstances surrounding air power’s use, it is 
necessary to employ a methodological tool to sort out and individually analyse the constituent 
elements. A useful instrument used widely by other scholars, is the practice of categorising air 
power into its so-called ‘roles’ and ‘missions’.
However, the reader must be wary of the dangers arising from the interchangeable use in 
existing air power terminology of the terms ‘roles’, ‘missions’ and ‘functions’. The ensuing 
confusion in the terminology is remarkable indeed and makes a careful and unambiguous 
definition of those terms before we proceed with their respective analyses imperative. 
Accordingly, in this study the term ‘role’ will be employed in conjunction with the four broadly- 
defined assignments that an air force is expected to fulfil in the course of an armed confrontation. 
In this sense ‘aerospace control’, ‘force application’, ‘force enhancement’ and ‘force support’ are 
the four indispensable roles which enable an air force, not only to undertake and sustain its 
activities, but ultimately to accomplish the tasks and the responsibilities entrusted upon it. In a 
markedly different manner, the term ‘mission’ will be used to denote the specific tasks given to 
air forces in order to achieve objectives under each one of the previously-defined ‘roles’. In this 
sense, the ‘mission’ can be considered as a more precisely-defined sub-category of the notion 
‘role’ which comes into play in actualising the latter. Meanwhile, the term ‘function’, frequently
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encountered in certain air power-related work and commonly employed in a manner synonymous 
to ‘role’, will not feature in this study.
We must also draw the reader’s attention to the feet that, in fulfilling the difficult task of 
differentiating between the various roles and missions of air power, the model employed by this 
student is not novel. Rather, it follows closely the standard terminology contained in more recent 
US Air Force manuals and documents. However, it should also be noted that, for the specific 
purposes o f this study which concerns a secondary rather than first-rate air power (i.e. US), a 
slightly modified version of the US Air Force breakdown of the roles and the missions will be 
utilised. Thence, the “roles & missions” blueprint drawn on the basis of comparable USAF 
documents and applicable for the purposes of this study is as shown in Figure-1
■  F i » u r e - 1 :  M o d it iee J  h lu e p i ii it o f  t h e  I J S A F 's  div is ion  o f  a i r  p o w e r ' s  l>asic r o le s  a n d  m is s io n s .
ROLES MISSIONS
AEROSPACE CONTROL (Offensive counter-air) Base strikes
Suppression of enemy air defence 
Fighter cover
(Defensive counter-air) Ground-based air defence
Interception 
Early-warning and C^I
FORCE APPLICATION Strategic bombing 
Air interdiction 
Close air support 
Maritime (ASuW & ASW)
FORCE ENHANCEMENT Airlift & airborne operations 
Aerial refuelling 
Electronic warfare 
Reconnaissance
FORCE SUPPORT Base operability and base defence 
Logistics
1. AEROSPACE CONTROL
The first and the most fundamental role of any air is to gain aerospace control, so as to 
assure that the environment is safe and deny its use to an enemy. Control, therefore, is a means to 
an end rather than an end in itself Obviously, the greater the control,the greater the effectiveness 
of aerospace and surface efforts. But, although absolute control, so-called ‘air supremacy’ (the 
ability to operate air forces anywhere and anytime without opposition) is the ideal, it is not 
possible as long as the enemy possesses aircraft or air defence forces capable of interference.
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Instead, ‘air superiority’ (local air superiority that gives basic air freedom of movement over a 
limited area for a finite period of time) stands out as a more realistic goal. Meanwhile, 
particularly where second-rate air powers are concerned, a third state of aerial balance between 
belligerents, called ‘air neutrality’ suggesting that neither side has won sufficient control of the air 
to operate without great danger, is not imcommon either.
Aerospace control can be achieved by both offensive and defensive operations. In this 
respect, offensive aerial operations are mounted in order to seek out and neutralise or destroy 
enemy air forces and ground-based air defences at a time and place of one’s own choosing. Thus, 
the initiative stays with the side that is launching them. Conversely, defensive operations aim at 
intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft that seek to penetrate the air space above friendly 
territory. Contrary to offensive operations, a reactive stand is inherent to defensive operations. 
Defensive and offensive operations each consist of three specific types of missions.
1 . a. Base Strikes
History demonstrates that it is cheaper by far to destroy aircraft on the ground than in the 
air. Consequently, the most efficient way to start aerial w a r^ e  and to neutralise substantial 
enemy air elements in a single blow, is a direct air attack on the enemy’s air infi*astructure and in 
particular on his airfields, as enemy air assets are most vulnerable when grouped together on the 
ground. In feet, even if the aircraft themselves cannot not be destroyed at once, damage inflicted 
on the airfields will force the enemy to keep his aircraft groimded, which is equal in impact to 
neutralising the aircraft themselves.
However, whether circumstances will permit such success is a function of surprise, the 
state of enemy defences, and the physical protection given to enemy aircraft on the field. Because 
of this, air bases are among the best-protected military targets, and attacking them is a risky 
undertaking. To avoid detection and counter-action by closely-knit layers of air defence, attacking 
aircraft must fly at extremely low altitudes, where they are invisible to radar waves. In other 
words, aircraft tasked with this particular mission must be very agile and manoeuvrable, and 
make their final approach by flying extremely low, in most cases no more than 100 meters above 
ground. The type of aircraft emerges as the most suitable to fulfil those requirements is the 
tactical fighter, provided of course that it carries appropriate weapons and targeting systems. 
Aircraft selection aside, another aspect of base strike tactics involves the choice of targets and 
weapons systems. In recent years, those tactics have increasingly tended to concentrate on 
operating surfaces -the runways- of the airfields, and munitions have been developed specifically 
for use against concrete operating surfaces.
Regardless of the type of munitions and aircraft used, base strikes rank among the most 
dangerous of all combat missions. However, the advantages to be gained from base strikes are
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simply too great to be abandoned and no matter how complex airfield defensive systems become, 
the offensive drive to penetrate them will always be sustained.^
1. b. Suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD)
SEAD refers to the destruction of an enemy’s air defence weapons and the detection and 
command & control assets enabling those to function as part of an integrated network. Obviously, 
the most attractive of SEAD targets are an enemy’s command and control centres, whose early 
neutralisation would enable the piecemeal destruction of other air defence assets. Yet, those 
centres are usually hardened and/or buried deep underground. A more viable approach would be 
to attack their sensors, i.e. air search radars.^® Since so-called early-warning radars are mostly 
static (signifying that their exact location would be known before the outbreak of hostilities) and 
since they are vulnerable to the blast effect of an explosion in their immediate vicinity, they are 
the priority targets of SEAD operations.
Another set of targets for SEAD missions are surfece-to-air weapons systems that employ 
radar beams to detect, track and engage their intended targets. Since they radiate electronic 
beams, those systems inadvertently reveal their exact location to a watchful enemy. In fuel, for an 
aircraft that is fitted with an appropriate set of electronic sensors to detect and locate enemy radar 
emissions, and also with anti-radiation missiles to home in on the origin of these emissions, the 
task of eliminating an enemy’s radar-guided air defence weapons is almost systematic.However, 
only a handful of air forces are in control of those precious assets and the technologies to back 
them up.
The absence of specialised equipment and platforms should not lead to the conclusion 
that second-rate air powers turn a blind eye to SEAD missions. On the contrary, given the 
imperative to attain air superiority in order for subsequent air operations to succeed, one way or 
another every air force seeks to neutralise its opponent’s air defence systems. Yet, instead of 
dedicated equipment, second-rate air powers are more likely to make use of multi-role fighter 
aircraft armed with general purpose bombs and rockets.^’
1. c. Fighter cover
Fighter cover is the term given to an offensive tactic with the objective o f contributing to 
air superiority by destroying or neutralising enemy air assets in the air. The so-called ‘air 
superiority fighter’ or ‘tactical fighter’ is the prima donna of this mission and, even in the age of 
stand-off weaponry, it constitutes an essential element of all modem air forces. In this regard, an 
air superiority fighter’s primary role would be to combat either similar hostile aircraft in the 
contest for local air superiority, or to intercept and destroy hostile bombers in the immediate 
vicinity o f sea or land warfare.Additionally, it may be called upon to contribute directly to a land 
campaign by attacking enemy surftice forces.“
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In the case of first-rate air powers, fighter cover is a neatly organised undertaking in 
which the approximate locations of both friendly and hostile aircraft are closely monitored by 
stand-off platforms such as AWACS (airborne early-warning and control) aircraft, and all 
components of an aerial task force operating in the vicinity of enemy forces are constantly 
updated about critical developments. This important factor of near-perfect ‘situational awareness’ 
in all probability reduces the likelihood of ‘friendly fire’ incidences, and enable air superiority 
fighters to engage their opponents at longer ranges.
Conversely, in the case of secondary air powers, once committed, air superiority aircraft 
need to act autonomously using the local judgement of the air crew and, to identify their targets 
when they come within visual range, meaning that close-up engagements - better known as 
‘dogfights’- are the order of the day.^’ Hence, in the case of secondary air powers, aerial combats 
taking place in conjunction with fighter cover missions should not be expected to display the 
near-perfect punctuality and clarity of the aerial operations undertaken during The Gulf War of 
1991 for instance. More likely is a kind of an aerial melee, in which old-fashioned guns and short- 
range missiles, as well as the individual skills of the pilots, determine the outcome of the contest 
for air superiority. '^^
1. d. Ground-based air defence
Turning now to the defensive aerospace control, we will first scrutinise ground-based air 
defence. Accordingly, at the high end of the spectrum are upper and medium-level surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) systems, best suited to engage distant targets flying at high altitude. By definition 
those are radar-guided missiles with an absolute reliance on electronic waves to locate, track and 
engage their targets. In this sense, although they make possible the protection of large areas of 
airspace with a small number of centrally-located missile batteries, they are bound by the laws of 
physics that apply to radar waves and, as illustrated in Figure-2, they cannot engage low-flying 
distant aircraft. Furthermore, they are susceptible to electronic jamming and other evasive action 
and their effectiveness is eroded by difficulties in differentiating enemy aircraft from friendly. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of those systems remains considerable, in the sense that they can 
severely complicate offensive operations by depriving enemy aircraft of the least problematic 
option of flying high, thereby forcing most missions to go in below the most efficient SAM 
altitude of about 20,000 feet.^'
The middle ground of the ground-based air defence spectrum consists of short-range 
SAM systems, used as gap fillers to compensate for the minimum range and minimum altitude 
limitations of SAM systems falling under the previous category. Accordingly, short-range SAM 
systems are used to provide localised protection around vital targets (i.e. air bases, transport, 
communications, industrial and energy generation assets, troop concentrations etc.). From the 
outset they were designed to counter low-level, high-speed targets flying at ranges of 15km and
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400 km
Figure-2; Why radars cannot see farther away ?  (*)
AEW&C
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10.000 m.
No critical zone
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Figure-3: Advantages of an airborne radar. D
(*) Both figures drawn on the basis of data contained in Jane’s International Defense Review, 8/1997, 
p,49; R.A. Mason, Air Power: An Overview of Roles (London: Brassey's, 1987), p.21; Neville Brown, 
The Future of Air Power (London: Groom Helm, 1986), pp.280-88.
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less. Their two main advantages lie in the inherent difficulty of jamming or spoofing them and the 
very short reaction time available to enemy pilot which makes it very difficult for hostile aircraft 
to undertake evasive action. On the negative side, however, fairly large quantities must be 
deployed to provide comprehensive coverage over large areas, making associated costs 
prohibitively high.
Finally, at the lower end of the spectrum come close-up air defence weapons comprising 
both manportable surface-to-air missiles typified by the infra-red tail-chasing Stinger (seeking the 
heat generated by enemy aircraft’s exhaust pipes), and the most traditional of all ground-based air 
defence systems, namely anti-aircraft guns. Those are effective in most cases to a distance of up 
to 5 kilometres, and provide a point defence capability against airborne targets that have 
successfully penetrated previous layers of air defence. On the negative side, anti-aircraft guns 
have limited or no impact against fast and/or high-flying enemy aircraft, and the Stinger-type 
infra-red missiles are only capable of engaging departing targets, typically after the latter have 
already released their w eapons.O ther drawbacks include the limited engagement range and 
altitude which necessitate their deployment in very large quantities and major difficulties 
encountered in the timely and accurate identification of enemy aircraft through visual means.
Overall, most military experts agree that ground-based air defence weapons’ main 
contribution is the emotional stress that the knowledge of their existence causes to enemy air 
crew.^  ^At the very least, although effective counter-measures and evasive techniques have been 
developed, they help divert enemy’s scarce resources away from the primary targets of air-to- 
ground operations. In other words, every enemy aircraft earmarked for the neutralisation of air 
defence systems, represents a diversion from the primary targets with much more direct relevance 
to the outcome of the surface combat.^''
1. e. Interception
Besides ground-based air defence assets, air defence operations also include an airborne 
component. Referred to widely as ‘interception’, this task is fulfilled by so-called ‘interceptor’ 
aircraft. Interceptors share many airframe and weapon systems characteristics with air superiority 
‘tactical’ fighters, but compared to the latter, which are designed primarily for aerial combat at 
close-range and probably highly populated air space, the interceptors are more commonly 
equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles and autonomous radar for long-range tracking and 
engagement of the intruders. In recent years, the demanding 'look-down, shoot-down' capability, 
i.e. the ability to engage intruders travelling at low altitude, has also become a sine quo non for 
modem interceptors.^^
As a distinct form of air combat, missions falling in this category imply the interception 
of an intruding aircraft well away from its intended target, preferably at the moment it enters 
friendly airspace. An obvious method would thus be to deploy airborne interceptors on constant
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patrol at medium or high altitudes, and in the immediate vicinity of air zones and corridors, where 
enemy incursions are most likely to take place. On the other hand, given the contrast between the 
huge areas of airspace to be defended and the limited number of assets available, and provided 
that the element of surprise is always in the intruder’s hands, a more viable (and less extravagant) 
alternative is to keep a small number of interceptor aircraft on ‘ground alert’. Once enemy 
incursions are detected by ground-based or airborne early-warning radars, those aircraft would be 
'scrambled' and take-off immediately and proceed towards hostile or unidentified aircraft. 
Approaching their respective targets, interceptors would switch on their on-board radars to detect, 
track and engage, if necessary, the intruders.^® The weapons o f choice at such distances would, 
obviously, be beyond-visual-range missiles, implying that there would be some form of guidance 
or targeting cues from the parent aircraft. In these cases the most classical guidance method is 
semi-active radar guidance, in which the missile homes in on the radar waves radiated by a parent 
aircraft and bouncing back from the target aircraft.
Yet, as fer as second-rate air powers go, the use of advanced radars and beyond visual 
range missiles leads to serious problems in identification. Warplanes are small objects that can 
rarely be identified through visual means from a distance of more than a few kilometres, and 
radar waves cannot distinguish enemy aircraft from fnendly. While electronic IFF (Identify 
Friend-or-Foe) devices are commonly used to interrogate unidentified aircraft, incorrect or absent 
returns are frequent and electronic ‘spoofing’ by the enemy is likely to cause additional 
confusion.^' In an actual combat, the degree of uncertainty and confusion will depend on the 
circumstances of the air battle itself. Some encounters -  the ones executed by first-rate air 
powers, for instance -  can be managed so coherently that the allegiance of aircraft can 
confidently be inferred from their observed movements, and the ones that are identified as 
‘enemy’ can safely be engaged at extended ranges.^® Without good IFF, others will be chaotic, 
and the need arises for interceptors to approach their targets for visual identification. In such an 
eventuality, more than likely to be experienced by secondary air powers, large and cumbersome 
radar-guided missiles lose their relevance, and the weapons of choice are infrared-guided short- 
range missiles, in adition to guns carried on-board combat planes. The short-range missiles falling 
in this category, however, require launch aircraft to manoeuvre themselves into an advantageous 
position -  favourably behind the enemy aircraft -  so that the missile’s infrared sensor can lock 
onto the heat radiated by the latter. The ensuing battle is most likely to take the form of a 
‘dogfight’, in which both aircraft undertake violent manoeuvres to gain advantage overe the other.
The implications for secondary air powers are obvious; if assisted by a well-functioning 
infrastructure of early warning and operational command and control, air interception is executed 
along precisely planned air defence zones and sequences and IFF poses no serious challenges. If, 
on the other hand, any of those elements is absent, air interception will not confirm to any
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coherent patterns, and leads instead to an aerial mêlée consisting of a chaotic assortment of brief 
and individual encounters at close range.^ ®
1. e. Early warning and O’!
An ideal air defence network is one that allows the safe passage of friendly air assets 
through its airspace whilst enemy air assets are engaged and destroyed by fighters and ground- 
based weapons. Yet, the overall effectiveness of an air defence network is not determined solely 
by its the weapons systems. In order for the constituent parts to be effective, they must be knitted 
together by detection, surveillance and C I^ (command-control-communications & intelligence)
assets 40
The most important element of such a network is the capability to detect enemy aircraft. 
In World War I, this was done by observers using field glasses and field telephones. Ultimately, 
since its first use in 1939, radar has become an indispensable early warning asset. No alternative 
all-weather, long-range detection capability exists."" A contemporary long-range air search radar 
can detect, track and provide height and velocity information (i.e. a three-dimensional picture) for 
dozens of airborne objects up to a range of 400 kilometres in a readily usable digital format. 
However, the detection and early warning potential of all radar systems is restricted to line-of- 
sight by the laws of physics."*  ^(see Figure-2)
A logical solution designed to eliminate the drawbacks emanating from this ‘elevation 
problem’ is to lift air search radars high in the air on-board airborne aircraft (see Figure-3). Called 
‘airborne early-warning and control’ aircraft (AEWifeC, also known as AW ACS), the latter are 
fitted not only with a saucer-shaped air search radar, but also accompanying data analysis and 
dissipation systems and air control officers for instant co-ordination of one’s own air activity. 
Hence, by placing the radar several thousand meters above ground, restrictions imposed by 
limited line-of-sight are eliminated and, by applying Doppler technique, even low flying aircraft 
can be detected at long distance. More significantly, however, airborne early warning aircraft 
contribute to battle management by tracking numerous targets and directing fnendly forces. 
During The Gulf War of 1991, for instance, by controlling up to 3,000 Coalition sorties per day, 
the airborne early-warning aircraft were the primary information source and invisible hand behind 
the neatly managed Coalition air effort."*^
Naturally, all those services come at a price, usually an astonishingly high one. The 
flyaway cost of a single E-3 AW ACS aircraft is more than 600 million dollars, and in order to 
have one aircraft in orbit on a 24-hour basis, at least 4 aircraft are needed, representing a start-up 
price of 2.4 billion dollars. Furthermore, the AEW&C aircraft are well-known for their high 
maintenance costs. Their dependence on specialised base support and skilled operating personnel 
should also be taken into account. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that AEW&C aircraft 
have only been accessible to a of a handful of air powers."'"'
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Reverting to our original topic, although radar on its own is capable of warning against 
attack, in order to exploit its potential, it has to be co-ordinated and integrated with other devices. 
In other words, electronic signals received by radar stations have to be translated into coherent 
information and sent to a central war room, which in turn sends out relevant orders through 
communications links to anti-aircraft batteries and interceptor aircraft.“’^  In this manner, early- 
warning and air surveillance networks of varying complexity are possible: at the lower end are 
those consisting o f just one or two surveillance radars and, at the higher, those which encompass 
multiple operations centres, reporting posts and all the necessary interconnecting communications 
links. Naturally, the more extensive and sophisticated end of the spectrum requires a great deal of 
careful design, development and construction and air defence networks falling in this category 
entail high financial outlays allocated over decades which puts them beyond the reach of most 
nations.
Over and above early warning and communications’ critical importance to air defence 
activity, is ‘command and control’s importance in air power. In this regard, while command is 
the sine qua non of all military operations, the relative strengths of air power - mobility and 
versatility - place much greater strain on the tasking and organisation of air forces than of slow- 
moving ground forces. To capitalise on the advantage of mobility, the air commander must have 
an information and tasking system which provides data that is accurate, timely, comprehensive 
and comprehensible, through systems that are sufficiently redundant to be survivable. This is a 
tall order, but the key to the air power’s successful use. Given the high tempo of air operations, 
even a slight upset in the command process can be dangerous or even catastrophic.
A final aspect which was referred to briefly under the section on ‘interceptors’, is the 
perennial problem of identification, i.e. the ability of air defence to positively identify potential 
targets while distinguishing its own aircraft from others’. Although dedicated IFF (Identify 
Friend-or-Foe) systems were developed to tackle with this complication, they fall far short of 
offering a satisfactory solution to the challenges of modem combat.'’* Those air powers with 
comprehensive capabilities try to compensate for this deficiency by combining inputs from more 
than one sensor. For those air forces with limited resources, however, IFF continues to constitute 
a major challenge. Evidently, the lack of reliable means of positive identification makes the 
decision whether to engage an unidentified aircraft a gamble, prevents using modem weapons to 
maximum effective, and ultimately could result in a modem manifestation of Clausewitz's fog of
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To summarise, the C I^ and IFF weaknesses which almost certainly exist and are 
aggravated considerably by battle damage, could easily transform a second-rate air power’s 
combat activity into chaos. In these circumstances, air defence aircraft must act autonomously on 
the basis of the air crew’s local judgement, as directives from other platforms such as AEW & C 
and ground controllers will be absent, imperfect or inteirupted, and even if relatively advanced
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long-range weapons are available, the contest for the control of the skies will consist 
predominately of authentic dogfights, confusion and frequent instances of fratricide.
2. FORCE APPLICATION
Force application is the second function of air power and denotes the use of air power 
directly against surface targets. The ability of aircraft and their air-delivered weapons to extend 
an offensive beyond the 20 or so kilometres permitted by artillery has from the beginning 
constituted a prime attraction of using air power. It is, however, more than just this extended 
radius of effect which makes offensive air action so vital. A typical artillery barrel can fire a 
projectile weighing some 20 kilograms a less than 25 kilometres at sustained rate of one round 
per minute. Compare this with the ability of a single aircraft to drop in excess of 5 tonnes of 
bombs at a distance of hundreds and even thousands of kilometres. This dramatic increase in 
firepower is further multiplied by the use of co-ordinated attacks by numbers of aircraft attacking 
the same target.^“
We will analyse ‘force application’ as a vital function of the use of air power under four 
closely inter-related missions: ‘strategic’ attack - aiming to destroy or neutralise an enemy's war- 
sustaining capabilities and/or his will to fight; ‘interdiction’ - which delays, disrupts, diverts or 
destroys an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear against fnendly forces; 
‘close air support’ which directly supports the surface commander by destroying or neutralising 
enemy forces in the proximity of friendly forces; and finally, ‘maritime strike’ operations which 
are conducted against an enemy’s naval assets.
2. a. Strategic bombing
Strategic bombing offensives are launched with the dual aim of destroying an enemy’s 
command elements, war production assets and supporting infrastructure (for example energy, 
transportation and communications assets), and shattering his morale. However, the very vital 
importance of assets targeted by strategic bombing raids imply that, they will be very well 
protected, both through extensive air defence measures and through physical hardening. Indeed, a 
nation’s air defence assets tend to be concentrated around the so-called ‘strategic’ targets; and in 
commensurate with their importance, the most critical of these, such as command and control 
bunkers, are buried deep underground and strongly hardened with layered steel-reinforced 
concrete several meters thick. Consequently, for an attacking aircraft to conduct a successful 
strike it must first avoid enemy’s defensive measures and secondly hit the intended targets with 
sufficient accuracy and might. Since that the most effective way to evade an enemy’s air defences 
is to penetrate his air space at low or ultra-low altitudes, flying under the lobes of his air defence 
radars and SAMs, small, fast, agile and low-flying fighter-bombers distinguish themselves as the 
most suitable platforms to fulfil strategic air strikes.
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In the early stages of an air campaign, when an enemy’s air defences are still intact, the 
only way to guarantee results is to penetrate the sophisticated air defence ground environment by 
flying low and, preferably, at night. Luckily for air power, over the last 10-15 years the 
increasing availability of night targeting and navigation systems such as LANTIRN, has rendered 
low-altitude penetration even at night and in adverse weather conditions a routine activity for 
more sophisticated air forces.”  Relying on a combination of radar and/or infra-red technologies, 
these systems enable strike aircraft to execute nap-of-the-earth flights even at night, while the 
pilots’ only task is to oversee overall activity, the interaction of computerised instruments and the 
aircraft automatically carrying out the remaining flight functions. Once in the vicinity of the 
target, these systems also enable the aircraft to strike their targets from stand-off ranges, with 
pinpoint accuracy.^^
As regards the precision and effectiveness of an attack, there has been gradual progress in 
developing ‘PGMs’ - precision-guided munitions.*“* The most commonly used version is the laser- 
guided bomb (LGB); a standard aircraft bomb fitted with a computerised seeker capable o f 
detecting laser light radiated by a pod in the launch aircraft and reflected off the target. The 
seeker then manoeuvres small wings on the bomb to guide it to the target. Another category of 
PGM mimitions are directed towards their targets by means of electro-optical guidance. In this 
case, the bomb or missile has a television or forward-looking infra-red camera in its nose, 
relaying the images of the target area back to the launch aircraft, where the pilot view the image 
and makes course corrections to achieve pinpoint accuracy.
Although a lot more sophisticated (and expensive) than regular bombs, precision-guided 
munitions hit targets with an error margin of no more than a few meters, meaning that the number 
of weapons (and sorties) required to neutralise a given target can be reduced drastically.** 
However, precision-guided munitions are not without drawbacks - rapidly declining performance 
in adverse weather conditions, increased exposure of the launch aircraft to ground defences 
during launch sequence, the extensive training required by crewmen, and above all, high 
acquisition and operating costs. For example, a ‘dumb’ bomb costs US$900, whereas a typical 
laser-guided bombs costs over $10,000-a-piece, and the figure might well exceed $100,000 for an 
optically-guided missile.**
In summary, one could argue that, equipped with precision-guided munitions and capable 
of penetrating enemy defences by flying extremely low, contemporary strike aircraft possess at 
last the accuracy and precision which proponents of air power proclaimed, somewhat 
prematurely, before and during World War II.*’ Yet, when conducting strategic air raids, second- 
rate air powers are not so fortunate. Specialised strike aircraft are unbelievably expensive, are 
very costly to maintain and operate, and the precious munitions that they carry further add to the 
burden. Instead, less sophisticated and costly fighter-bombers are more likely to be available to 
secondary powers. Typified by the US-made F-16, the contribution and worth of these light-
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weight fighters as substitutes for dedicated strike aircraft remain modest at best: they are only 
worthwhile when plenty of forward air bases compensate for their limited range and are equipped 
with costly precision-guided munitions to make full use of their limited warload. Furthermore, 
unassisted by such stand-off assets as AEW&C, electronic jamming, and reconnaissance aircraft, 
the general-purpose fighters commonly used by second-rate air powers are more prone to fall 
prey to enemy interceptors.^® Last but not least, ideally what is required of offensive fire power is 
an ability to detect targets in a highly effective manner, and react instantaneously when tasked 
The ability to do both these depends on the nature of the C I^ infrastructure and tasking 
organisation. Yet, overall proficiency (or rather, deficiency) in these two fields is more likely to 
affect adversely secondary air powers.
2. b. Air Interdiction
Air interdiction refers to the type of mission which aims to disrupt enemy military 
resources en route to ground battle. It has two facets: attack on the resources themselves (i.e. 
troops, military vehicles, etc.) and attack on their means of transportation (i.e. roads, railroads, 
bridges etc.). In either case, air interdiction constitutes an indirect effort to change the course of 
events on the battleffont and its success in a given conflict depends on its ability to complement 
surface action. In this respect, experience over the last 50 years or so has demonstrated that, the 
most effective area to apply air interdiction is relatively close to the battle zone, where the 
immediate re-enforcement of engaged troops presents many highly visible nodes of 
vulnerability.“  It has further been demonstrated that, an air interdiction campaign is not only 
unable to win without a ground battle, but also, to be effective the initiative must be seized on the 
ground as well as in the air and there must be access to timely intelligence. Last but not least, the 
golden rule of air interdiction still holds today as it did 50 years ago: in order for it to be effective, 
it must be very intense. Partially effective interdiction equals failure
Not unlike strategic bombing, air interdiction places heavy demands on combat aircraft. 
At least in comparison with the close air support sorties analysed in the following section: 
distances from home bases are greater, time spent within range of hostile air defences is much 
longer, surface-to-air defences are more closely co-ordinated than those caught in the ground 
combat area and no target designation support is available from friendly ground forces. 
Furthermore, thanks to increased mechanisation, better off-road performance, high speed 
bridging, and mobile surface-to-air missiles, today most armies are inherently less susceptible to 
air interdiction than a few decades ago.“
Since the mission to be fulfilled bears striking similarities to that of strategic air strikes, 
the t)q)e of aircraft most appropriate for interdiction sorties is virtually identical to the type 
utilised for strategic bombing: ideally, a large-sized fighter-bomber fitted with sophisticated 
ground-following radar (to enable nap-of-the-earth flight patterns), night targeting systems,
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precision-guided munitions and other types of defensive and offensive accessories (i.e. electronic 
jamming pods) to increase survivability in a hostile environment.
On the other hand, unlike the pre-determined set of targets which strategic raids seek to 
find and destroy, air interdiction aircraft seek ‘targets of opportunity’- constantly moving enemy 
troops or supply columns which are impossible to locate precisely in advance. Hence, although 
stand-off attack techniques and precision guided-munitions are increasingly applied in this 
dimension of air-ground warfare, an alternative mode of attack is still necessary, one which calls 
for aircraft to overfly their targets. Under such circumstances, the aiming errors associated with 
unguided munitions are off-set by covering the target area with large numbers of sub-munitions 
dispensed from cluster bombs.
Because air interdiction seek to have an indirect impact on the land battle, the controversy 
concerning what resources should be allocated to this mission is ongoing. The arguments that air 
interdiction sorties lead to loss of aircraft and flyers are convincing; thus, it is necessary to ensure 
that something useful is gained in return. After all, one modem aircraft and a highly trained pilot 
are probably too high a price to pay for one old, rice-loaded tmck driven by a private. This 
controversy is of greater importance where second-rate air powers are concerned, in the sense 
that their inability to achieve quick air superiority, combined with the absence of suitable and 
sufficiently numerous aircraft, sensor and weapon systems, is certain to lead to higher losses. 
Consequently, air interdiction sorties are more likely be confined to the most attractive of enemy 
targets. But, as already mentioned, partially-effective or piecemeal air interdiction campaigns are 
much less likely to produce successful results.
2. c. Close Air Support
CAS - Close Air Support refers to the engagement by aircraft of hostile troops in the 
immediate vicinity of one’s own and actually engaged in combat with the latter. Targets attacked 
might be mobile, static or dispersed and of varying degrees of difficulty. Due to constant 
fluctuations in the fighting, enemy targets might be closely interwoven with one’s own ground 
forces. Moreover, they are more than likely to be protected by a thick self-defence screen made 
up of a wide array of anti-aircraft weapons. Consequently, CAS is the most dangerous and 
challenging task which aircraft confront and heavy losses are to be expected, not only among 
attacking aircraft, but also among fnendly ground units falling victim to fratricide. Nevertheless, 
at critical points on the battlefield, where the balance of forces severely disfavours one’s own 
troops, aircraft, owing to their short reaction times and superior fire power, represent the only 
quick method of holding up an enemy breakthrough.®^
The local army commander initiates the operational cycle of action for a CAS campaign 
by requesting immediate air support. Upon notification by the command centre and prior to take­
off, the pilots assigned to the CAS are briefed on the tactical situation and what to expect in the
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way of enemy air defences. On route to the target area, they receive additional information via 
radio and, when approaching the battleffont, contact a Forward Air Observer (FAO), usually an 
experienced pilot on the ground tasked with vectoring the attacking planes to designated targets 
by simple orders transmitted over the radio and the help of marker flares and portable laser 
illuminators. Using his laser illuminator, a FAO can also enable CAS aircraft equipped with laser- 
guided bombs to attack targets not readily visible from the air. Conversely, without a final update 
either by radio or flares and laser markers, the pilots do not know the location of the target or the 
friendly forces and have to fly over defended airspace in search of both. In other words, without 
close air-to-ground co-ordination, which can only be gained through intensive inter-service (i.e. 
army-air force) training, CAS is elusive.'^ ®
With regard to aircraft and weaponry pre-requisites, all existing combat aircraft capable 
of carrying some kind of weapons load, can undertake CAS. However, while classic fighter- 
bombers excel in air interdiction and strategic bombing missions, when turned to CAS, due to 
their structural fragility, they risk high attrition losses, which benefit the ground soldiers little or 
not at all. The F-16, for instance, is acknowledged to be extremely vulnerable to projectiles or 
their fragments, both of which are abundant over the targets attacked during CAS sorties.^’ An 
alternative that has become increasingly developed since its appearance some three decades ago, 
is the helicopter gunship. Armed with rapid-firing guns, rockets and air-to-ground missiles and 
fitted with dedicated target acquisition devices, armed helicopters can hover on the edge of the 
battlefield, pop up, fire with pinpoint accuracy and get away. Indeed, thanks to their near constant 
presence over and around the theatre of operations, they can react immediately to ground units’ 
distress calls and come closest to meeting foot soldiers’ CAS ideal. However, doubts persist 
regarding helicopters’ disturbing vulnerability to ground fire and enemy combat aircraft. 
Furthermore, their limited range and payload characteristics depriving them of the mobility to 
create rapid concentrations of firepower at widely separated points in a conflict. Likewise, they 
are unsuited to penetration missions and lack the flexibility to switch from a CAS role to one of 
interdiction, offensive counter-air, or air superiority.“
The weapons most suited to CAS sorties depend on the nature and number of targets. In 
recent conflicts such as The Gulf War, the primary CAS weapons were stand-off guided missiles 
which allow the pilot to fire and turn away without having to overfly the target, thereby reducing 
friendly casualty rates.“  Given the limited availability of such weapons to secondary air powers, 
however, they are more likely to confine their options to a wide variety of ‘dumb’ (and cheap) 
iron bombs, clustered munitions and unguided rockets of much shorter range.
A final aspect of CAS mission deserving of mention, is its characterisation as a fair- 
weather, daylight affair only. In fact, given the margin for error in fnend and foe identification, 
fratricide fire remains a definite possibility on a dynamic battlefield, even in broad daylight and 
with ideal visibility. In recent years, however, the rapid proliferation of night vision devices has
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effectively turned ground warfare into a high-tempo, 24-hour-a-day affair where darkness no 
longer automatically calls for fighting to stop or slow down. Consequently, pressure has been 
accumulating on air forces to adapt their aircraft to CAS sorties to be flown at night. In this 
regard, the only form of night CAS currently available is provided by infra-red imaging system- 
equipped helicopters and fighter aircraft. As would be expected, for secondary air powers, aircraft 
falling into these categories are always in short supply and, as such, less likely to be committed to 
high-risk CAS sorties.
All told, CAS missions constitute a risky, but at times indispensable, dimension of air-to- 
ground warfare. They are particularly effective in fluid situations with enemy forces moving 
either to attack or retreat, during which his freedom of movement and deployment is considerably 
limited and when, with his attention focused on the ground units, his battlefield efficiency against 
airborne threat has declined sharply.” Nonetheless, criticism against CAS on the basis that it 
commits expensive combat aircraft to high-risk operations, will always be present. As long as 
available resources are limited, priorities must be set; and that air superiority be in first place and 
CAS in last, is universally accepted by air forces around the world. In other words, although 
literally vital for the ground troops, CAS constitutes a dirty and dangerous role with limited scope 
and air forces shy away from it at the earliest opportunity.’^
Second-rate air powers’ prospects in this regard are even less promising. It has already 
been noted that in bombing, strafing and rocketing enemy units engaged in actual combat with 
fnendly troops, careful planning and co-ordination is an absolute pre-requisite. But, given their 
inherent drawbacks in the fields of command, control, communications, training, inter-service co­
ordination etc., CAS techniques refined through decades of experience cannot be expected to 
work as seamlessly when deployed by second-rate air powers, as, for instance, during The Gulf 
War of 1991.
2. d. M aritime operations
Maritime air operations can be defined as the activities of aircraft in pursuit of a nation’s 
military policy, strategy and tactics at sea. Air power has distinct advantages and disadvantages 
in the maritime environment. On the positive side; the physical division between land and water 
is no barrier to aircraft and its ubiquity, including the inherent benefits of height and pace, means 
that it can counter or pose simultaneous threats across a wider geographical area than is possible 
from surface platforms. Hence, although an aircraft’s physical presence may be fleeting, its 
lasting effect can be truly devastating. On the negative side are the adverse cost/payload/time 
ratios: air assets are costly to own and operate; their combat payload is much smaller than that of 
naval vessels; further, as compared to the permanent presence offered by surface units, aircraft 
dominate an area only for the duration of their flight. Therefore, to be effective and lasting in 
impact, maritime air operations must be tasked and carried out in close concert with surface
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units. Likewise, as compared to air-ground warfere, geography is always a more important 
determinant, in that the equipment and tactics necessitated by littoral waters and congested 
archipelagos are radically different from those of maritime operations undertaken at open seas. In 
littoral waters, maritime operations will, in all probability, become joint operations -involving 
naval units, air forces and even armies -  in the fight to take command of land and sea, and as the 
possibility of maritime conflict moves closer to the coastline, the air threat to maritime assets 
increases.
As mentioned earlier, the height at which aircraft operate gives them a unique perspective 
on the battlefield, which gives pilots an extensive tactical picture of the area of operations. This 
factor makes the surveillance of the surface and subsurface environments in peace, crisis and war 
a fundamental task of aircraft allocated to maritime use. Indeed, before passing through contested 
or hostile waters, naval fleets need very accurate surface-picture compilation and the best tactical 
provider of this real-time information continues to be Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). These 
most commonly take the shape of large-body aircraft, equipped with imaging radar to detect 
surface contacts at stand-ofif ranges, an ESM (electronic support measures) suit to locate and 
identify enemy electronic emissions in congested littoral environments, and long-range electro- 
optical surveillance systems, which combine infrared and low-light television cameras to aid the 
classification of contacts. Meanwhile, a closely inter-related and core function of all maritime 
surveillance aircraft is search and rescue (SAR), wherein they search for survivors at sea and 
then drop canisters of rescue equipment and life-rafts, or else direct rescue helicopters and vessels 
towards survivors. Since there is always a risk that aircraft and crews will ditch into the sea, 
besides its humanitarian dimension, an efficient air-sea rescue service is a sound investment for 
any nation intent on preserving high morale among its air crews.’^
A second dimension of maritime operations concerns the contribution made by aircraft to 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW). ASW poses precisely the opposite problem to that of surface 
warfare: if a submarine can be located, it can be sunk without very much difficulty. In other 
words, the overwhelming task of an aircraft tasked with ASW is to find the submarine. Although 
a great deal of work has been done in this particular field over the years, nothing has yet emerged 
that makes the seas transparent and there is nothing to suggest that a breakthrough of that kind is 
imminent. Consequently, a wide range of tactics and sensors are being employed in conjunction 
to counter submerged threats; radars are used to catch submarines when they are snorting; passive 
sonobuoys are dropped in the water to detect the mechanical noises they generate; and special 
sensor outfits, capable of detecting the magnetic anomalies and exhaust plumes of submerged 
submarines, are fitted onboard ASW aircraft. Once a submerged submarine is detected, the 
mission is completed by dropping homing torpedoes and/or depth charges in its immediate 
vicinity. Overall, the most important element in that state-of-the-art exercise is shore-based 
maritime patrol aircraft’s long range and endurance.
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Besides their role in detecting and localising an enemy’s submarines, ultimately maritime 
operations conducted by aircraft also call for the destruction of enemy sur&ce ships. The sorties 
falling in this category are widely referred to as TASMO (Tactical Air Support of Maritime 
Operations) or ASuW (anti-surftice warfare). Because ships offer such a high contrast against the 
sürfece of the sea, it is not particularly difficult to find them. The real challenge in applying air 
power in maritime environments presents itself in the form of the advanced air defence systems 
found onboard most naval vessels which might include surface-to-air missiles effective to a range 
50-60 km. The solution for attacking aircraft almost certainly lies in using stand-off weapons of 
some kind. However, it should be noted that even stand-off missiles can be intercepted by modem 
ship-bome defensive systems.’^
In ASuW the principles of maritime air operations are manifest: accurate and prior 
information regarding the location of both hostile and fiiendly vessels is required; capable 
platforms and weapons are vital; and, given the complexity of such sorties, crews must train 
regularly and common procedures must be developed between air and naval components.’® As 
regards the most suitable platforms, maritime helicopters fitted with lightweight missiles offer an 
ideal solution in dealing with small and relatively unsophisticated targets found near land or small 
islands. Under these circumstances, wherein ground contours provide background cover for low- 
level approach, siufece vessels’ traditional vulnerability to air attack will be most marked and 
attack options maximised.”  Conversely, over large stretches of sea where the importance of 
stand-off detection and strike capabilities is augmented, MPA stand out as excellent firing 
platforms, offering long range, long loitering time and sophisticated sensor suite.
But, the optimal (although expensive) platform for high-performance air-to-surface anti­
shipping missions is the fighter-bomber. Thanks to their speed and penetration capability, modem 
fighter-bombers carrying purpose-built anti-ship missiles could become the most deadly players 
in maritime warfere. The ‘fire-and-forget’ type missiles felling in this category (i.e. French 
Exocet) can guide themselves towards their prospective targets from a distance o f 80 km away or 
more. These missiles’ extended range allows the laimching platform to operate safely in a stand­
off mode, without having to worry about ship-bome defences, whereas the targeted enemy naval 
vessels has to deal with the incoming missiles, without any realistic chance o f engaging the 
launching platform.
Although many air forces operate fighter aircraft which could easily be armed with anti­
ship missiles, those countries currently deploying at least a token capability in this regard appear 
to be hostage to the often sensitive relationship between naval air arms and the rest of the armed 
forces. Fixed-wing combat aircraft are a jealously guarded prerogative of the air forces and more 
often than not these services tend to assign maritime strike missions very low priority which 
leaves the Navy’s helicopters and MPA as the only available platforms for air-launched anti-ship 
missile.’*
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Consequently, when pressed into maritime use, most air forces’ fighter-bombers are 
armed with general-purpose bombs and rockets only. Of note in this context is the fact that, even 
in WW II, attacks delivered at low altitude and point-blank range against surfece ships were 
veritably suicidal. An obvious alternative is to employ laser-guided bombs and/or IR-guided 
missiles which are effective at a range of up to 15-20 km. But, despite the great improvement in 
accuracy, these weapons do nothing to improve the air crews’ chances of survival when engaging 
well-defended ships, armed with air defence missiles effective to a range of 50-60 km.’’
3. FORCE ENHANCEMENT
Force enhancement refers to aerial operations undertaken to back up air and surface 
forces. It includes airlift sorties and airborne operations to enable the projection of military power 
by rapidly transporting people and materials unencumbered by surface obstacles; air refuelling to 
increase aircrafts’ range, payload, and endurance; electronic warfere aimed at neutralising or 
destroying an enemy's electromagnetic capabilities; and finally, surveillance and reconnaissance 
to provide the data needed for effective combat operations in all spectrums of warfare.*’
3. a. Air transport, airlift, and airborne operations
Air transport facilitates the rapid deployment of military resources, and it is one of the air 
power’s most enduring and pervasive roles. Its contribution is particularly decisive when there is 
a pressing need to transport troops and equipment over long distances in a short time. On the 
other hand, while reaction time is virtually immediate as compared to other land and sea transport 
means, there are, undoubtedly, greater limitations as regards the load that can be transported and 
overall costs. Hence, aerial transport is an asset to be used when time is a critical factor, or access 
by air is the only means of transporting forces rapidly to the point of crisis and sustaining them 
thereafter.*'
Transport aviation comprises various categories of aircraft, which often complement each 
other. On this account, in addition to purpose-built military models, the civilian airliners operated 
by most countries offer huge potential. Both commercial and military models can be classified 
under two major categories: strategic and tactical. The former consists of the very large aircraft 
with intercontinental reach which are virtually monopolised by The US and Former Soviet Union. 
Conversely, those falling under the category of transport aircraft with tactical capability are more 
prevalent and are to be found in the world’s more important air forces.*^
Depending on the circumstances of a conflict, air transport activity takes several shapes. 
At the lower end of the spectrum are shuttle sorties flown between one’s own air bases and air 
strips carrying troops, equipment and other logistic support items. One rung up are Tactical Air 
Landing Operations (TALO); this is where transport aircraft land at an air strip recently captured 
by friendly ground units and troops and equipment are disgorged from the aircraft on landing.
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But, since securing an suitable air strip inside enemy territory is more of an exception than a rule, 
a more readily available alternative would be ‘airborne operations’, during which troops and 
equipment are dropped by parachute into designated landing zones.
While troops, equipment and logistic support can all be moved rapidly to respond to a 
changing situation, or to bring to a critical area additional forces, some basic factors must always 
be borne in mind when considering air landing operations. First and foremost is that airborne 
units must be lightweight. To achieve the strategic mobility needed to make them really effective, 
these units can have limited armour, mechanised, artillery and logistic support assets. Being 
light, they must accept to fight at a disadvantage in terms of numbers, heavy weapons, local 
mobility, logistic support, local familiarity and tactical isolation. More important is the pre­
requisite for complete air superiority in and around the theatre of operations, for bulky transport 
aircraft flying in large numbers constitute easy prey for enemy defences. Hence, air drops are 
operations avoided by most air forces, unless extremely favourable circumstances are present.®^
Less ambitious in scale is the use of helicopter to transport battle-ready forces. Indeed, by 
eliminating major drawbacks imposed by the need to operate from well-prepared airstrips and use 
parachute dropping, the so-called ‘helibome’ operations enable the ground force commander to 
re-deploy troops, move equipment and provide logistic support with little regard to terrain. A 
specific case inserting air-delivered special operations forces into enemy territory in order to carry 
out sabotage and other disruptive activities.
The US has demonstrated in both The Vietnam and Gulf Wars that helibome operations 
are potentially very beneficial to both offensive and defensive tactics. However, the limited range 
and payload characteristics of helicopters constitute major constraints which make them compare 
unfavourably with fixed-wing transport aircraft. Typically, a support helicopter can carry some 
15 men or 2 tons of stores, for a distance of up to 100 miles. While large transport helicopters 
can improve on this performance by a factor of four, they are very costly to acquire and operate. 
Consequently, common practice is to allocate helicopter lift to those tasks which can have a 
cmcial impact on the outcome of the battle, or when no alternative method exists.
All concerned realise that such craft are peculiarly exposed, not only to SAM and anti­
aircraft fire, but also to enemy fighter aircraft their revolving rotors being highly visible to 
‘Doppler’ radar. Thus, in order for helicopters to operate with relative safety, the universally- 
accepted mle is that enemy aircraft should be kept out of a 40-km area behind the battlefield, and 
that substantial efforts be made to suppress enemy air defences.
3. b. Aerial refuelling
In-flight-refuelling is a highly significant type of force enhancement mission, wherein 
large tanker planes are used to replenish other combat or non-combat aircraft while they are still 
airborne. Generally speaking, those tanker aircraft currently used are based on civilian airliners or
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military transports and except for internally-mounted fuel tanks and external refuelling booms, 
their appearance is identical to the latter. Typically, each loitering tanker aircraft carries 50-60 
tons of fuel, enough to fill the tanks of 10-12 fighters. In operational terms, this translates into as 
many as 20 fighter aircraft refuelling their half-emptied tanks while maintaining air superiority, 
air interception or strike missions.’^
Without doubt, in-flight-refuelling constitutes one of the most visible force multipliers, in 
the sense that it has a particular synergism with the multi-role combat aircraft. In-flight refuelling 
compensates for fighter-bombers’ limited range and transforms them into a strategic, long-range 
participants. Having more fuel on-board when entering hostile airspace, the tactical fighter is 
capable of sustaining longer combat air patrols, can take an indirect route to reach the target and 
can extend its interdiction and strategic penetration depth considerably. Likewise, its increased 
endurance in combat and reduced transit time fi'om/to base and the operational area equates to a 
higher percentage of total mission time is spent in combat and consequently better use of a given 
number of aircraft is achieved. Equally important are the wider tactical options which air power 
opens up to a commander It allows him to switch aircraft between tasks and geographic areas 
swiftly and have the advantage of using tanker aircraft, enabling combat aircraft to operate from 
distant, secure bases. The provision of such a buffer zone is of inestimable value, particularly 
when the opposing air force is capable of attacking air bases close to the border.
However, although an aerial refuelling capability greatly increases an air force’s overall 
potential, any improvement in military effectiveness must be measured against costs incurred. 
Not unlike airborne emly warning aircraft, the acquisition of tanker planes represents a substantial 
financial outlay and further costs detract from the overall volume of resources which can be 
directed towards the purchase of other crucial items. Furthermore, for regional air powers with 
limited resources and supporting infi^tructure, airfield length represents a serious operational 
problem when deploying large tankers which are incompatible with military air bases which 
usually have somewhat shorter and less capable runways than standard civil airports. Not 
surprisingly, for many years tanker aircraft were only considered to be a strategic capability, 
designed to enhance the nuclear strike power of the two Superpowers. Consequently, despite the 
recent tendency of medium-size air forces to deploy a token force of tanker planes, such 
expensive and demanding assets continue to constitute a rarity among second-rate air powers.
3. c. Electronic W arfare
Electronics have a pervasive impact on a wide range of military capabilities. Both in 
attack and defence, the functions of intelligence, surveillance, detection, identification, 
acquisition, engagement and assessment depend heavily on the data compiled through 
transmission and careful analysis of electronic signals. Yet, if one side uses electronics in attack.
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the other can for defence, the subsequent race between offensive and defensive blips commonly 
being termed ‘electronic warfere’.
In its simplest form, electronic warfare involves the detection of an enemy's broadcasts in 
order to sound the alarm. However, there is much more to electronic warfere than simply 
detecting enemy transmissions, the next logical step being to interfere with them. The earliest 
form of interference was ‘window’, now known as ‘chaff which is still in occasional use. This 
consists of dropping from aircraft thin strips of tinfoil to reflect the beams of radar and fool is 
operators. Jamming, a more advanced alternative, can also be used, which involves transmitting 
electronic noise or beams of the same frequency as those of the opponent but at a different phase, 
so as to make the enemy’s electronic sensors misjudge the location of an approaching aircraft.^^
Despite the mystical connotations and the clout of secrecy surroimding the term 
electronic warfare, the underlying principles were already well understood during WW-II and 
have remained unaltered ever since. Perhaps the only noteworthy addition in this regard was the 
introduction o f anti-radiation missiles which use the enemy’s own electromagnetic transmissions 
as a target, and force enemy radar operators either to shut their systems down or face 
decapitation. It is noteworthy that the whole electronic warfere process has recently been taken 
out of human hands and entrusted to computers. In their turn, these are confronted by other 
computers which detect the changes and respond to them. As the things stand today, the deadly 
game between electronic blips and the computers controlling and analysing them continues.
The electronic warfare capabilities and assets available to modem air forces can be 
divided into three categories. The first category consists of the dedicated electronic jamming 
and/or suppression aircraft with three separate, but complimentary roles; (1) to remain outside 
enemy air space and mask other friendly aircraft by jamming or suppressing long-range hostile 
surveillance radars; (2) to move in close to combat areas and, from low altitude, jam the 
acquisition, target tracking and missile guidance radars of the enemy; and (3) to escort deeper- 
penetrating strike aircraft to target areas, by jamming continuously all electronic elements of an 
air defence system, and in such a way open a safe corridor through heavily defended enemy 
airspace. In short, stand-off jammers allow friendly aircraft to fly undetected and strike their 
targets unharmed and they help block communications and co-ordination between enemy 
interceptors and their ground controller, all of which are conducive to swift seizure o f air 
superiority. However, such assets are very costly to acquire and operate, and most suppliers will 
not sell the necessary equipment. An obvious consequence is that force-multiplication residing in 
stand-off jamming capability is available to no more than half-a-dozen air forces around the 
world.®’
The second category of electronic warfere systems are comprised of the self-protection 
gear carried onboard individual combat aircraft. As its name suggests, it is only intended to 
protect the aircraft to which it is fitted. It has become standard for modem combat aircraft to
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come off the production line with a basic electronic w ai& e self-protection suite, including a 
RWR (radar-warning receiver), a ‘chaff dispenser and, perhaps, a low-power jammer, though 
this last item is often considered an expensive extra. In standard operating routine, the self­
protection cycle will be triggered when, within microseconds, the RWR detects and classifies 
enemy electronic emissions. The RWR then indicates to the pilot that his aircraft is being 
illuminated by a hostile radar, typically with 1.5 times the range of the latter. If the threat in the 
form of an upcoming SAM is imminent, the pilot can undertake an evasive manoeuvre, release a 
cloud of chaff to screen the radar waves or activate his electronic jamming system to confuse the 
enemy radar. In older aircraft, those three elements are only loosely integrated and much of the 
electronic battle is likely to be handled by the pilot himself However, this manual approach does 
not alert pilots early enough to use all the tactics at their disposal, a more viable answer lying in 
the full integration and automation of all three components. In this case, the system instructs the 
pilot to undertake evasive manoeuvring, the chaff is automatically released and the jammer will 
be activated at the optimum time and with maximum effect, all of which might momentarily 
break the enemy’s radar lock and in such a manner make enemy missiles to go stray.**
In contemporary aerial combats, very few doubt that electronic self-protection has 
become a pre-condition for aircraft survival. Yet, as in the case of stand-off jamming capability, 
the biggest issue is the cost and availability of the necessary hardware. An elementary self­
protection package can cost between 10-20 % of an aircraft’s basic cost and coupled with the 
investment in electronic support measures (ESM) shortly to be discussed, these costs can rise still 
further. As ever, the choice is between having a larger number of combat aircraft versus the 
advantages to be gained by having fewer with good electronic warfare protection. Many air 
forces may believe that they do not face a sufficiently significant electronic threat to require a 
major provision of electronic warfare. Yet, confronted with a moderately sophisticated opponent, 
they will start a conflict at an immediate disadvantage.*^
The third aspect of electronic warfere is comprised of so-called electronic support 
measures (ESM), through which incoming electromagnetic signals are searched, located and 
characterised for positive identification. In this sense, ESM are a means to an end, not an end in 
themselves. Their primary objective is to establish an enemy’s electronic order of battle and 
derive information about his intentions through long-term observation. Accordingly, surveillance 
by means of passive SIGINT (signals intelligence) apparatus can provide substantial information 
about a potential enemy’s military equipment, its disposition, his standard operating procedures 
and likely intentions.®® Fiuthermore, knowledge of the equipment deployed by an adversary will 
enable the development and introduction of appropriate electronic countermeasures for use in 
wartime. For any electronic w a r^ e  undertaking to be successful, be it in the realm of stand-off 
jamming or electronic self-protection, prior knowledge of an adversary’s electronic emitters and
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their vulnerabilities is a pre-condition, this vital information being compiled through electronic 
reconnaissance activity well in advance of the outbreak of the conflict.^'
Although the data compiled through SIGINT is increasingly a crucial element of modem 
aerial combat, the assets and capabilities falling under this category - high-sensitivity receivers, 
with the accompanying recording, analysis, collation and distribution system - are too often 
regarded as overly expensive. Indeed, currently less than two dozen air forces deploy any kind of 
SIGINT aircraft and only a handful of countries are in possession of a fully-independent 
electronic warfare infrastructure.®^ Yet, The Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated the extent and 
dangers of total dependence on foreign suppliers in this field: certain Coalition air forces that 
fought alongside The US found out to their dismay that their US-supplied electronic warfare 
equipment did not necessarily pick up US or Israeli radar transmissions. Thus, a major trend 
nowadays is for smaller air forces to acquire their own SIGINT capabilities thereby avoiding total 
dependence on the capabilities of the others.®^
To summarise, there is little doubt that in modem air combat, survival is inseparable from 
survival in electronic combat, any serious imbalance in electronics between rivals is likely to 
negate the effectiveness of the air arm. In the eyes of second rate air powers, electronic warfare is 
still a black art over which they have developed little control or grasp. Therefore, in conflicts 
involving second-rate air powers, the pattern is patchy and erratic on both sides and supposed 
electronic coherence can soon descend into electronic chaos.®'*
3. d. Reconnaissance®^
The first requirement of the successful application of air power to ground warfare is 
information enabling one to identify the enemy's weaknesses and exploit them. Not surprisingly, 
aerial reconnaissance being visual, the earliest mission expected of air power is to gather 
photographic or other forms of data. Over the last three decades, in addition to the constant 
development observed in reconnaissance aircraft themselves, their role has been supplemented by 
orbiting ‘spy’ satellites providing coverage of whole countries. These are very costly items 
beyond the reach of most countries and the scenes captured by them require considerable (and 
lengthy) analysis before generating practical information. Consequently, dedicated 
reconnaissance squadrons equipped with camera-carrying aircraft continue to serve with many air 
forces as the only viable means of data-gathering for both tactical and strategic purposes.
By way of illustration of modem reconnaissance planes’ capabilities, most of which were 
formerly front-line fighter-bombers, an RF-4E flying at an altitude of 10,000 meters can monitor 
over-ground deployments up to 100 km beyond the border and can also undertake limited night 
reconnaissance using its flashlight cartridge. Moreover, this category of capabilities are 
continually being extended through computer enhancement, passive infra-red cameras, low-light 
television and so on. Nonetheless, during fast-moving operations in a modem war, the existing
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method of aerial reconnaissance, based on camera-equipped manned-aircraft, continues to suffer 
from a number of drawbacks. Because of this, concerns about aircraft vulnerabihty when 
confronted by competent air defences are pushing reconnaissance planes to lower operating 
altitudes and higher speeds, which makes such information-gathering increasingly difficult.
Even more important, however, is the time taken to return from the target area to a base 
where photographic information can be processed and the time taken in image processing, 
analysis and dissemination, all of which reduce severely the tactical utility of the collected data in 
a rapidly changing battlefield. Indeed, processing an aircraft camera’s photographic film cameras 
is liable to take 45 minutes, integrating optical evidence with other kinds may take a further 30 
minutes and, when combined with the time that elapses during the tasking and return to base of 
the reconnaissance aircraft, the cycle time last several hours. Instead what is required is the rapid 
transmission of information back to the analysing centre, which would then be able to produce 
precise information in a digestible form for the commander on the field or pilots in the air. In 
recent years, new technologies and alternative methods of data collection and dissemination 
which can do this are rapidly being developed. First, although manned reconnaissance aircraft 
still predominate, remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are gradually taking 
over. The latter minimise the risk to human life and can be flown directly by those imits in 
immediate need of information, thereby reducing significantly transit and processing times. 
Second, when compared to ‘wet’ film processing on the ground, video or digital tape recorders 
which allow the instantaneous or near-instantaneous transmission of the data to a ground station 
or into the cockpit of airborne aircraft, shorten the information-gathering cycle by hours. And 
thirdly, thanks to the navigation and targeting pods carried by the most modem strike aircraft, 
attacks on targets are recorded on strike aircraft’s on-board video systems which are then used for 
assessing the damage inflicted on the target, thereby reducing the need for post-strike 
reconnaissance sorties.
However, running in close parallel with the rapid technological progress in the sensors 
2md electronics systems, the need for ever more precise and timely information is also on the rise. 
In this respect, an important, but often neglected element of achieving a high degree of accuracy 
with modem precision-guided munitions, is a large database containing precise intelligence 
concerning likely targets which must continuously be updated as the fighting proceeds. The Gulf 
War of 1991 revealed that even the most advanced of air forces can find it impossible to produce 
sufficiently accurate intelligence to match their precision weapons.®®In other words, thanks to 
rapid advances in sensor and weapon technologies, hitting targets with pinpoint accuracy is 
getting easier, while knowing what to aim at remains uncertain.
On this last point, the complications experienced by second-rate air powers can prove 
overwhelming: their reconnaissance aircraft have to negotiate heavy air defences in getting to the 
target area, they have to search for enemy targets, acquire intelligence, evade defences again
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when returning to inendly territory and then wait imtil their arrival back at base to unload camera 
film because, in all probability, they are reliant on photography or even the human eye to collect 
vital information. Taking this into account, since delays o f an hour or more are common, air 
strikes based on precise reconnaissance data are rendered highly problematical, if not totally 
impossible.
4. FORCE SUPPORT
The primary aim of activities and preparations falling under the category of force support 
is to help sustain operations in other realms of aerial warfare. Accordingly, one obvious aspect is 
to guarantee air base operability by defending its installations. A second aspect, of no lesser 
significance, concerns the logistic support chain, whereby it creates and sustains an air forces’ 
peacetime and wartime activities.
4. a. Base Operability and Defence
Warplanes are susceptible to immobilisation on the ground through pre-emptive enemy 
action, which targets either the machines themselves or their runways and other supporting 
facilities such as hangars and fuel and munitions dumps. Therefore, the ability to defend bases 
and resume operations quickly after an enemy strike are crucial. If an air force finds itself 
without the means and necessary preparations to keep its air bases in combat, it can lose the battle 
even before it has had a chance to get off the ground. As a result, all major air forces are obliged 
to allocate considerable human and material resources to increase the resilience of their air bases 
and other related infiastiucture, thereby attempting to guarantee the survival not only o f their 
operational aircraft, but also the fticilities to latmch and recover them.®’
The first category of preparations aimed at increasing the resilience of an air base consists 
of active defences, i.e. anti-aircraft guns and missiles, as well as ground troops deployed in a 
manner to form a dense defensive layer in and around the air base. If enemy air attacks from 
stand-off distances are also expected, the task of the so-called terminal defences’ will be further 
complicated. In this role, air defence weapons are supplemented by a certain number of surface 
troops, tasked with sealing disruptive incursions by enemy special operations and/or airborne 
forces.
The second category of preparations comprise passive defensive measures aimed at 
reducing the vulnerability of air base facilities. They include concealment measures such as 
tonedown, camouflage netting, smoke generators, vegetation, radar reflectors and aircraft and 
airstrip decoys; as well as physical hardening whereby aircraft, fuel and ordnance are placed 
within concrete revetments or imderground and the further strengthening of airstrips through the 
use of fibre-reinforced concrete. Alternatively, given the vulnerability of well-established and 
well-known air bases, rapid, last-minute dispersal to nearby airstrips and modified sections of
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highways can be undertaken, both to save the aeroplanes and to present the enemy with a larger 
set of prospective targets. However, dispersed airfields place greater demands on repair & 
maintenance manpower, alternative fuel and weapon stocks and call for increased investment in 
logistic support. Logistical strains are engendered when trying to service warplanes spread over 
large areas, often in awkward locations and sortie generation rates are likely to be severely 
impaired. Likewise, bad weather is less easily tolerated in small sites, aircraft devoid of hardening 
measures will be &r more vulnerable while on the ground and, above all, the command-control 
problem will be aggravated.
The third dimension of measures aimed at increasing the resilience of air bases concerns 
the ability to recover from attack and restore critical facilities as quickly as possible. This 
encompasses the rapid repair of battle damage (i.e. runway repair), finding and neutralising 
scattered mines and unexploded ordnance, dealing with fires and medical emergencies and 
clearing debris from operating sur&ces. Success is dependent upon how well facilities absorb the 
enemy’s initial strike and upon subsequent repairs carried out under the constant threat of 
recurring attack; it will depend largely on the availability of sufficient well-trained repair crews 
and specialist equipment (i.e. bulldozers and other engineering machinery, fibreglass and 
aluminium mats, pre-cast slabs, special filling fluids and mobile arresting gear to enable aircraft 
to land on damaged runways and stop within very short distances).
In an aerial confrontation between second-rate air powers, as enemy air and surface 
incursions through patchy and ineffective air defences are highly probable, the need for effective 
defensive measures around air bases cannot be underestimated. In fact, if an air force does not 
possess sufficient expertise in keeping its air bases open, it risks losing the battle before it has 
really begun. Of particular relevant to second-rate air powers is also the fact that activities falling 
within the confines of air base operability demand an abundance of manpower and suitable 
equipment, both of which will already be in short supply at the height of a conflict. Consequently, 
as the Arab air forces found to their dismay during the Six-Day war of 1967, no matter how 
potent their aircraft and air crews, the effectiveness of second-rate air powers can be severely 
compromised by the vulnerability of the airfields they operate from. This is a feet that few, if any 
regional air forces appear willing to confront.
4. b. Logistics
Besides surface bases, in order to continue operations, aircraft and all other components 
of air power require large amounts of consumable goods (i.e. fuel, munitions, stores etc.), depend 
on highly technical maintenance, including spare parts and the services o f competent personnel.^^ 
As the uninterrupted flow of those expendable items, as well as the constant availability of 
requisite handling services are mandatory to create and sustain an air force, from a technical point 
of view, one can portray an air force as a vast engineering and logistical organisation.
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Obviously, an air force’s logistical capabilities must be designed to survive and operate 
under attack and the additional demands of an actual conflict; that is, they must be designed not 
only for peacetime efficiency, but also for combat effectiveness. Yet, especially for second-rate 
air powers, this is easier said than done. Above all, a robust logistic support chain capable of 
sustaining the increased operational tempo of wartime aerial activities necessitates the pre­
positioning of extra fuel, munitions, spare parts and other expendable items. But, the acquisition 
and updating of such surplus material involves additional financial outlays and penalises most 
cash-stripped air forces.
More important still to the smooth-running of logistical support activities, it the 
requirement for a sufficiently large pool of trained technicians and support staff and the 
organisational skills and procedures to handle an immensely complex and detailed managerial 
undertaking. However, given most second-rate air powers’ shortage of qualified human resources, 
the fulfilment of this second pre-condition also appears to be on shaky grounds. It is possible to 
argue with a degree o f confidence, therefore, that, for most second-rate air powers, even if their 
combat-oriented skills and capabilities are satisfactory, their logistical support activities are more 
likely to undermine rather than enhance their operational effectiveness.
V- EPILOGUE TO CHAPTER TWO
Building upon observations in Chapter 1, in this chapter we have asserted that, in addition 
to its proper application, the nature of an air power’s possessor is equally important in exploiting 
its full potentialities. By distinguishing between what we have termed ‘first-rate air powers’ and 
‘second-rate air powers’, we have suggested that air power’s overall impact on the outcome of a 
given conflict can be boosted or curtailed by certain characteristics of its possessor. Mention 
should be made here of the fact that, the propositions forwarded to this end signify a first time- 
ever attempt to elaborate this interesting and often-neglected aspect culminating from the use of 
air power.
In addition to a modest attempt to identify some of these characteristics, a more ambitious 
undertaking in this chapter has been to consider the possible causes of these limitations. On the 
basis o f the six causes identified, we further asserted that a country’s status amongst first and 
second-rate air powers can be determined with considerable accuracy and that a number of 
predictions can also be made about the medium- and long-term prospects and duration of this 
status.
Lastly, a more detailed overview of air power’s basic roles and missions, has provided 
the reader with a picture of the circumstances most likely to surround the use of aerial assets by 
so-called second-rate air powers. In doing so, a common denominator has been that second-rate
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air powers’ use of the third dimension above the earth is not likely to take the form of the well- 
planned and controlled activity observed in more recent air campaigns launched by first-rate air 
powers. Instead, considerable confiision and disarray, approximating Clausewitz’s conception of 
a ‘fog o f war is considerably more likely to dominate the battlefield. Under these circumstances, 
it is normal to expect a sharp decline in the level of effectiveness with which an air power 
executes its roles and missions and that expectations based on first-rate air powers’ performance 
are doomed to disillusionment.
At this point, there is little doubt that categorising Greece as a first-rate or second-rate air 
power according to our definition of them, is of the utmost importance and relevance in achieving 
the stated goals of this study. But, before proceeding with this assignment, a close examination of 
the challenges to Greece’s security and the expectations of Greek air power in countering those, is 
deemed necessary. This will be accomplished in the following two chapters. *
NOTES:
' Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War (London: Brassey’s, 1991), pp. 196-197; John Gooch (ed.). 
Air Power: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.6.
 ^Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey’s, 1994), p.l66.
 ^Mason, Centeimial Appraisal. p.l66.
See, eg, Alvin Toffler’s three books on the issue: Future Shock, The Third Wave, and P ow er Shift. An 
insightful compilation of his arguments and their application to post-Gulf War circumstances is also 
found in “USAF plans the next age of warfighting”, Jane’s Defence Weekly. 13 August 1997, pp.29- 
30.
 ^V.K. Nair, War in the Gulf: Lessons for the Third World, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1991, 
p. 131; cited in Mason, Centennial Appraisal. p.l64.
® AW ACS is a widely-used term to refer to those aircraft that are fitted with a large air surveillance 
radar to detect and track distant air activity. In general, tlie aircraft falling into this category are also 
capable of sharing the data they compile with other friendly aircraft and ground stations, and they can 
direct and co-ordinate the overall operations of an air force. On the basis of those premises, tliey are 
treated by most air forces as assets of prime and in fact utmost importance. (Author’s note)
’ A.P.N. Lambert, The Psychology of Air Power. RUSI Whitehall Paper Series (London: Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence, 1995), pp.4-5.
* Various and, at times, highly speculative stories on this particular issue have been appearing in 
defence periodicals since the early-90s, and tire topic will be handled more into its details under 
Cliapter-9. Some exemplary work falling in this category includes: David A Fulghum, “Computer 
Combat Rules Frustrate the Pentagon”, Aviation Week & Space Technology. September 15, 1997, 
pp.67-68; Gleim W. Goodman, John G. Roos, “Vims Implants, Go Signals in Store for Future US 
Weapons?”, Armed Forces Journal International. August 1991, p.l; Defense News. 16 March 1992, 
p.33.
® Mason, Centemiial Appraisal. p.l63.
To offer an example, the in-flight refuelling tanker aircraft is considered the most visible force 
multiplier in the way that it has a particular synergism with the multi-role combat aircraft. The latter, 
commonly developed from an air superiority fighter, is unlikely to have the range of dedicated bomber 
aircraft. Tire tanker aircraft, however, converts the tactical fighter into a strategic, long-range 
participant and enables more flexible mission plaiming to include indirect routing or long combat 
patrols over the conflict area. See Mason, Centennial Appraisal, p.269.
" Neville Brown. Future of Air Power (Beckhenham: CroomHelm, 1986), p.236.
Tliomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in tire Persian Gulf 
(Armapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p.220. It would be useful to remind the reader that, a single 
airborne early warning aircraft costs up to $600 million to acquire, and that that price is exclusive of 
additional expenses such as spare parts, training, and operating costs.
64
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, as of 1996, there were 14 countries 
world-wide, whose annual defence spending exceeded $ 10-billion: US ($277b), Russia (82), Japan 
(50.2), France (48), Germany (41.8), United Kingdom (34.2), People’s Republic of China (31.7), Italy 
(20), South Korea (14.4), Saui Arabia (13.2), Taiwan (13.1), India, Brazil, and Israel (10.1). See 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, TTie Military Balance 1997-1998 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).
M.J. Armitage and R.A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age (London: University of Illinois Press, 
1983), p.231.
Illustrative exanq)les to that effect are offered by the People’s Republic of China, until recently an 
army-oriented country; and New Zealand, whose geographic circumstances has made the fielding of a 
strong air force not only urmecessary, but also irrelevant.(Author’s note)
Francis Tusa, “Aspects of Arms Absorption in Arab Armies”, RUSI’s and Brassev’s Defence 
Yearbook 1990 (London: Brassey’s, 1990), pp.341-353.
’’ Glerm Zorpette, “From factory floor to desert war”, IEEE Spectrum. September 1991, pp.40-42.
' * Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, p.231.
Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness - Why Society Matters”, International Security. Vol.l9, 
No.4, Spring 1995, p.5.
Tusa, “Arms Absorption”, pp.341-353.
Robin Higham, Air Power: A Concise History (New York: StMartin’s Press, 1972), pp. 10-12; Tusa, 
“Arms Absorption”, pp.341-353.
Van Creveld, Technology and War, pp.278-283.
The blueprint in its original form borrowed from Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air 
Force. Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume. 1, September 1991.
John A. Warden HI, The Air Camr)aign - Plarming for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1988), pp. 13-14.
R.A. Mason, Air Power: An Overview of Roles. Brasseys’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems 
and Technology Series, vol.l (London: Brassey’s, 1987), pp.47-55; M.J. Armitage and R.A. Mason,
Air Power in the Nuclear Age (London: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 247-248; Neville Brown, 
Future of Air Power (Beckhenham: Croom Helm, 1986), p.90; Alfi'ed Price, “Tornado Storm”, Flight 
International. 23-29 October 1991, pp.42-44.
Warden, Air Campaign, p.37.
Mark Hewish and Tim Ripl^, “Out of HARM’S Way”, Jane’s International Defense Review.
4/1996, pp.49-52; David M  North, “U.S. Military Weighs Future of SEAD”, Aviation Week & Space 
Technology. 16 June 1997, pp. 151-154.
^  Mason, Overview of Roles, pp.39-47.
Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, pp.245-246.
Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age p. 139.
Mason, Overview of Roles, pp.37-38; Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age. 107-108.
Trevor Nash, “Low Level Air Defence: Getting the Balance Right”, Armada Intftmatinnal 2/1997, 
pp. 10-17.
" Timothy Garden, “The Air Land Battle” in R. A Mason, War in the Third Dimension (London: 
Brassey’s, 1986), 154-161.
Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, p.226.
The main impediment of the iook-down, shoot-down’ capability is that, within several hundred feet 
of the Earth’s surface, the radar reverberation which it gives off (Imown as clutter) tends to strongly 
mask intruders. Under certain circumstances, this effect may be partly counteract^ by ‘Doppler’ 
discrimination between objects moving and a stationary background. See Mason, Overview of Roles. 
np.30-34; Brown, Future, pp. 155-156.
® The distance at which radar engages depends on the type of radar carried by the interceptors. A 
decade ago or two, detection ranges of 20-30 km were very common. With recent advances in micro­
circuitry, the range bracket of fighter radars is increasing constantly. The most recent versions of F-16 
fighters are credited with radar operating ranges of 120 km and more, while the French Mirage 2000 is 
said to have a radar detection range of 90-100 km. See Brown, Future, pp. 154-155.
Existing IFF systems consist of an antenna transmitting a pulsed interrogation signal, and the 
transponders on other fnendly aircraft that reply with a coded signal. (Author’s note)
Brown, Future, p. 155.38
Brown, Future. p.l56.
Nash, “Air Defence”, pp. 10-17.
65
In this regard, alongside radars, passive electro-optical systems can also play a part in air defence 
early warning but, since their range is limited to the visual horizon, they can act only as a very short- 
range back-up and are used primarily on the battlefield against low-flying aircraft and missiles. Martin 
Van Creveld, Technology and War (London: Brassey’s, 1991), pp. 189-193; Gert Retzer, “Air 
Surveillance Technologies and Techniques”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations. 4/1992, pp.44-49.
Mason, Overview of Roles. p.21; Brown, Future, pp.280-288.
Roy Braybrook, “Controlling the Air Battle from the Top”, Armada International. 2/1994, pp.8-17.
As of 1997,10 countries operated airborne early-warning aircraft: US, Russia, UK, France, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. Eight others displayed an active interest in 
acquiring the capability, namely; Greece, Turkey, Italy, PR of China, South Korea, India, Chile, and 
Australia. Meanwhile, it should be noted that, during the 1980s both Syria and Iraq had ill-fated 
experiments when using AEW&C aircraft. (Author’s note)
Van Creveld, Technology and War, pp. 189-193.
Bernard Blake, “Long-range Air-Deferrse Systems”, International Defertse Review. 5/1994, pp.39- 
42.
Garden, Air Land Battle, pp. 165-166; Warden, AirCampaigru pp.51-53.
LFE Coombs, “Identification in NATO”, Jane’s Defence Weekly. 25 July 1987, pp. 150-152; A.L. 
Murray-Rochard & P.D.E. Chase, “The Future of NATO Military Identification System”, Military 
Technology. 11/1988, p.88-91; Mark Hewish, “Who goes there ? - Target Recognition Pays OIF’, 
International Defense Review. 3/1995, pp.65-67; David Brinkman, “Looming crisis over IFF’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly. 31 August 1991, pp.367-68.
Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, p. 134.
Garden, Air Land Battle, pp. 153-154.
There are, of coiuse, alternative ways to penetrate an enemy’s air defences. One is to launch at 
enemy targets 'cruise missiles’, that combine impressive range and lethality, and pronounced 
compactness and achieve their aim without risk to human life. Another alternative is to take advantage 
of the ‘stealth’ aircraft’s inherent ability to avoid radar detection. The third option is to employ a large 
aerial armada consisting of a complex assortment of fighter, strike, SEAD, electronic jamming, 
AWACS, tanker and other aircraft, and even air-launched drones, so as to force one’s way into enemy 
airspace at medium altitude, by the virtue of numerical and technological siqteriority. However, the use 
of all three methods have so far been monopolised by The US, the only power capable of gathering the 
necessary financial, technological and human resources. (Author’s note)
LANTIRN (Low-altitude, targeting, infra-red, night) is the abbreviation used to refer to a well- 
known US-made night navigation and targeting system, widely used by The US and its allied states. 
(Author’s note).
Clifford Beal and Mark Hewish, “Airborne Navigation and Targeting Pods”, International Defense 
Review. 6/1995, pp.67-69; Roy Braybrook, “Flirs and Targeting Pods Getting to the Point”, Armada 
IntemationaL 3/1993, p.42; Sinunon Elliot, “Eagle Enhanced”, Flight International. 12-18 June 1991, 
Dp.79-80.
”  There is nothing new about the idea of precision bombing. In the 1920s, RAF crews consistently 
placed their bombs within a few meters of the targets during daylight attacks from 1000m. Against 
well-defended targets, however, the accuracy of the iron coming up equalled the accuracy of the iron 
going down and such tactics proved suicidal. Since then, plarmers have wrestled with the problem of 
hitting targets precisely without incurring heavy losses. It was only during the early-1980s that the 
problem was finally resolved; strike aircraft fitted with infia-ted target acquisition and laser designating 
pods and armed with guided weapons to accomplish the night precision attack role. Used for the first 
time against Libya in 1986, those devices were celebrated during The Gulf War. Alfred Price, “Deadly 
Darkness”, Flight International. 10-16 July 1991, pp.33-35.
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf 
(Aimapolis; Naval Institute Press, 1995), p.207.
^  Tim Ripley, "Deliberate Force over Bosnia", Jane's Defence '96: The World in ConflicL p. 152.
John Gooch (ed.). Air Power: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.6.
Sergio Coniglio, “Bombing and the Role of Tactical Aircraft”, Military Technology. 4/92, iq).30-43.
Brown, Future, p.254.
Mason, Overview of Roles, pp.58-63. Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, p.9.
Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, pp.250-51; Brown, Future, pp.141-42..
“  Brown, Future, pp.141-42.
Mason, Overview of Roles, pp.71-72.
^  Warden, Air (üampaign. pp.97-99,139-40.
66
Konrad Alder, “The Close Air Support: Potential of Modem Air Forces”, Armada International, 
2/1987, pp.58-67.
^  Alder, “Close Air Support”, pp.58-67.
Brown, Future, p.89.
® Sergio Coitiglio, “Close Air Support Operations and Debate”, Military Technology. 10/1993, pp.30- 
38; Alder, “Close Air Support”, pp.58-67; Van Creveld, Technology and War, pp.276-277; Anmtage 
and Mason, Nuclear Age, pp.243-245.
Lon O. Nordeen, “The Close Air Support Debate”, Military Technology. 2/1990, pp.36-42; Sergio 
Coiuglio, “Bombing and the Role of Tactical Aircraft”, Military Technology. 4/92, pp.30-43; Garden, 
Air Land Battle. 154-159; Mason, Qyeryiew of Roles, pp.71-72; Keaney and Cohen, Reyolution in 
Warfare. p.91; Brown, Future. p.l36.
Alder, “Close Air Support”, pp.58-67.
’’ Conyersely, when the situation on the battlefield becomes static, air force doctrines all around the 
worldagree that, in terms of the economic cost and relatiye flexibility of operation, field artillery is a 
more attractiye altematiye to warplanes as an instrument of attack against hard-point positions and dug- 
in troops. (Author’s note)
Coiuglio, “Close Air Support Operations”, pp.30-38.
A.E. Neal, “Missions multiply for maritime patrol ayiation”, Jane’s Nayy International. September 
1996, pp. 12-13; Ben Lake, Maritime Operations. Brasscys’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems 
and Technology Series, yol.ll (London: Brassey’s, 1991), pp.3-5.
Neal, “Maritime Patrol Ayiation”, pp. 12-19; Armitage, Nuclear Age, pp.237-238.
”  Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, p.235.
Lake, Maritime Air Operations, p. 104, p. 119.
’’ Mason, Qyeryiew of Roles, pp. 101-118.
Massimo Aiuiati and Ezio Bonsignore, “Air-Limched Anti-Ship Missiles Revisited”, Mihtary 
Technology. 6/1997, pp.66-73.
Lon O. Nordeen, “US anti-Ship Missiles”, Military Technology. 2/1989, pp. 16-24.
Basic Aerospace Doctrine, pp.6-7.
*' Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, p.233; Basic Aerospace Doctrine. p.l3.
Military airlift - prospects for Europe. Report by Assembly of Western European Union dated 6 
Noyember 1995.
Francis Tusa, “Jumping Off for Airborne Forces”, Asian Military Review. June/July 1997, pp.77-81; 
Garden, Air Land Battle, p. 162.
Garden, Air Land Battle, pp. 162-164; Brown, Future, p. 172-174; Robin Higham, Air Power: A 
Concise History (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1972), pp.222-23; Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age. 
p.139.
 ^Data on in-flight-refueling operations compiled from the following sources: Keaney and Cohen, 
Reyolution in Warfare. p.l94; Mason, Oyerview of Roles, p.269; John Turner, “Air-to-air refuelling: 
its contribution to cost effectiye air operations”, Jane’s Defence Weekly. 26 January 1985, pp. 148-51; 
Sergio Coniglio, “Modem Air Refuelling Systems”, Mkitary Technology. 6/1991, pp.91-98.
Van Creyeld, Technology and War, pp.270-72; Doug Richardson, “Jam the Geese and Dissolye the 
Paint”, Armada International. 1/1995, pp.44-58.
Mason, Centeniual AppraisaL pp.95-98; Mason, Overview of Roles, pp. 156-57.
“  Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, pp. 108-09; David Fulghum, “Missile Warning Fix May Be 
Needed”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. April 14,1997, pp.55-56; Jocelyn Rees, “Airborne 
Eiectrortic Warfare Options”, Military Technology. 4/1992, pp.55- 62; Mike Witt, “Airborne Electronic 
Warfare”, Asian Defence Journal. 3/1997, pp.32-37.
Francis Tusa, “Electroruc Warfare - Pushing the Bounds of the Black Art”, Asian Military Review. 
June/July 1997, pp. 16-21.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the umbrella term covering a number of specifically targeted sub- 
disciplines, the most important of which are electronic intelligence (ELINT) and commurucations 
intelligence (COMINT). See Martin Streetly, “ELINT Elite or Outcasts”, Flight International, 11-17 
April 1990, pp.50-52.
Bernard Blake, “Airborne EW”, International Defense Review. 8/1993, pp.619-23; Van Creveld, 
Technology and War, pp.270-272;
Data compiled from tire individual country sections in The Military Balance 1997-1998.
Mark Hewish, “ELINT for Strategic and Tactical Applications”, International Defense Review. 
2/1994, pp.39-43; Martin Streetly, “Airborne Signals Intelligence”, International Defense Review.
67
7/1995, p.42; Mark Hewish, Joris Lansen, “The intelligent wai^ ’, Jane’s International Defense Review. 
12/1997, pp.28-35.
Brown, Future, p.63,67-69; Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, pp.253-254; Van Creveld, 
Technology and War. 272-273; Tusa, “Electronic Warfare”, pp. 16-21; Mike Witt, “Airborne Electronic 
Warfare”, Asian Defence Journal. 3/1997, pp.32-37.
Data on airborne reconnaissance compiled from; Brian Walters, “Airborne Reconnaissance”, Jane’s 
Defence Systems Modernisation. April 1995, pp.20-22; Brian Wanstall, “Realtime images for post- 
Gulf TacR”, International Defense Reyiew. 8/1991, pp.833-39; “Eyes of the Storm”, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly. 4 May 1991, pp.735-36; Garden, Air Land Battle, pp. 150-53; Brown, Future, pp. 143-49; 
Mason, Qyerview of Roles, pp.82-85; Niall frying, “The Gulf Air Campaign - An Oyerview”, RUSI 
JoumaL February 1992, p.l3.
Keaney and Cohen, Reyolution in Warfare, pp.220-22.
Data on air base defence and operability drawn from the following: Basic Aerospace Doctrine. 
pp. 14-15; Robert Paterson, Dana Lombard, “Forward Airbases”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations. April 
1987, pp.83-86; Joseph G. DiLullo, “Getting the Air War off the Ground”, Military Technology. 
4/1989, pp.50-54; Brown, Future. pp.51,122,178,186-89; Armitage and Mason, Nuclear Age, pp. 198- 
99,248-49; Mason, Oyerview of Roles, pp.47-55.
Data on logistics compiled from: Basic Aerospace Doctrine, pp. 14-15; Brown, Future, p.51.
CHAPTER 3
FOCUS ON GREECE:
GEO-STRATEGIC SETTING, NEIGHBOURS, 
AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Having completed our introductory analysis of air power in general and laid the necessary 
foundations for an in-depth analysis of Greek air power, our attention now shifts to Greece. As a 
prelude to the circumstances likely to result in the use of Greek air power, we will first undertake a 
brief overview of Greece’s relations with neighbouring coimtries and concurrent threat perceptions. 
In doing so, in addition to Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey, all of which have problems 
and share a common border with Greece, we shall also consider Libya, an overseas problematic 
‘neighbour’ that is sufBciently close to Greek territory to apply air power with ease.
In addition to neighbouring countries, international institutions such as NATO, EU and 
WEU, as well as external actors such as The US and Russia, will also receive due attention, 
because they have varying importance in shaping Greece’s security calculations and would 
influence the use Greek air power.
I- GEO STRATEGIC SETTING AND HISTORY
Greece consists of a mountainous Mediterranean peninsula and over 3,000 islands and 
islets, scattered throughout the Aegean, Mediterranean and Ionian Seas. With more a than a fifth of 
its area of 132.000 sq.km made up of island territories and an impressive coastline length of 
13,600 km., Greece is a predominantly maritime country. It has population of over 10 million, 
most of which live on the Greek mainland extending northwards from Athens in the direction of 
Thessaloniki, while the island territories and mountainous provinces to the north and north-west of 
the coimtry are scarcely populated. The population comprises some 98 per cent Greek Orthodox 
and only 1.3 per cent Muslim Turks, and is among the most homogenous in the world, in terms of 
both ethnicity and religion. While traditionally dependent on agriculture and animal breeding, the 
lifeblood of the Greek economy is also the income from the shipping industry and tourism. In 
recent years, Greece has developed a modest light industrial infrastructure, but this has not been
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sufficient to improve Greece’s economic fortunes, and it preserves its status as the poorest member 
of The European Union.'
Located on the southern tip of the Balkan peninsula between Italy and Turkey, close to the 
northern coasts of Afiica and the Middle East and controlling maritime access into the Aegean Sea 
to the east, the Adriatic Sea to the west and through the Mediterranean Sea to the south, Greece 
has, historically, been a country of notable strategic importance. To the north, it shares a common 
border of roughly 1,000 km with three Balkan countries; Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria. This 
frontier consists mostly of a number of mountain rises and extremely rugged terrain, which 
nevertheless could not stem several invasions throughout history from the north. To the west, 
Greek shores are a mere 120 km from the southern tip of Italy. To the south, Libya and Egypt are 
within easy reach of the Greek island Crete. To the east, about 1,200 km of land and over-sea 
border separates Greece from its main rival, Turkey, and in the easterrunost portion of the Aegean 
Sea, Greek islands are located within a few kilometres of the Turkish mainland.^
Modern Greece emerged as a nation-state in 1829, the year independence was gained from 
the Ottoman Empire. The young monarchy which at that time consisted of little more than the 
Pelepponese peninsula and Cyclades islands, for over more than nine decades thereafter, sought 
forceful expansion of its territory. This legacy of violent expansion at the expense of adjacent 
states and populations left Greece, not only with enormously long and insecure frontiers, but also 
with feelings of bitterness and distrust across its borders.
Following the catastrophic 1919-1922 war with Turkey, the romantic Greek ideal of 
restoring the frontiers of the Byzantium Empire was shattered and the country entered the inter-war 
period with a broken economy and growing internal feuds. Its fortunes sunk even deeper after the 
Second World War which precipitated a 5-year long German occupation, followed by a civil war 
between Greek royalists and communists. Soon after the victory of the pro-western royalists, 
Greece became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and secured its place 
in the Western Bloc.
During the Cold War years, like many other regional powers, Greece was marginalised 
against the background of superpower rivalry. Amidst the political instability that characterised the 
1950s and 1960s, a military junta seized power in 1967, during whose rule the feud with Turkey 
over the inter-communal violence in the newly-independent republic of Cyprus quickly deepened. In 
1974, in response to an Athens-backed take-over there, Turkey made a military intervention. The 
long-term ramifications were twofold: the Greek military junta had to turn over its powers to 
civilians, and the perception of an imminent Turkish threat came to dominate all aspects of Greek 
life.
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In 1980, Greece was accepted as a full member in the European Economic Community, 
and upon Turkey’s lifting its veto, achieved full re-integration into the military structure of NATO, 
a status it had unilaterally ended in 1974. For Greece, the 1980s were characterised by gross 
economic mismanagement and virulent anti-US and anti-NATO rhetoric prompted by the ruling 
Socialists. Apart from an interlude of four years (from 1989 to 1993), the Greek Socialists 
continued to rule the country, after 1993, adopting much more liberal economic policies and pro- 
western attitudes. Greece is currently characterised by serious economic, social and political 
problems at home, a marked loss of prestige within the European Union, and a series of problems 
with its neighbours, including far too frequent and inherently dangerous military showdowns with 
Turkey.
II - RELATIONS W ITH NEIGHBOURS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Relations with Albania
As with many Balkan states, large stretches of Greece’s national boundaries have been 
created within living memory. These boimdaries often cut through ethnic groups and, at times of 
regional tension, may become a source of hostility. The current Greek-Albanian border, dividing 
the so-called region of Epirus into two, is a typical example of this and has continued to be a 
source of suspicion and fnction between the two countries ever since Albania gained its 
independence in 1912.
At the root of the problem is the close Greek interest in the area which gave rise to three 
military incursions (in 1912, 1917 and again in 1940), all rolled back by Great Power pressure. 
During the Greek Civil War of 1945-49, the assistance provided to Greek communists from 
mountain bastions in Albania, together with the 1958 renewal of Greek claims on North Epirus as 
a condition for establishing diplomatic relations, did not ease the situation either. It is noteworthy in 
this respect that, it was only in 1971 that the two countries were able to establish diplomatic 
relations and Greece finally recognised Albania’s existing borders. It was only in 1987 that the 
state of war which had formally existed since 1940, could be ended^
As things stand today, Greece’s hold in the region is confined to the southern portion of 
Epirus, while North Epirus, encompassing a sizeable Greek population, continues to be part of 
Albania. Because of this, although Greece has no current claim to North Epirus, it keeps a close 
eye on the large Greek minority there. The Albanians, for their part, remain suspicious of the overt 
Greek interest, their fears exacerbated by the existence of an influential nationalist right in Athens 
that continues to anticipate keenly a fourth and lasting ‘liberation’ of the region."*
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After the fall of Albania’s communist regime in 1991, Greek expectations of a much more 
relaxed attitude towards the Greek minority in Epirus failed to materialise and throughout mid- 
1990s relations were characterised by periodic exchanges of highly-charged rhetoric.* Then came 
1997, during the opening months of which the collapse of several pyramid investment schemes 
immersed Albania into a state of civil war. As the insurgents in the south seized heavy arms and 
took control of major cities, a refugee influx into neighbouring countries precipitated the 
deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force that included a contingent of 680 soldiers from 
Greece. Thanks to the relative stability imposed by this multinational force, a few months later 
parliamentary elections were renewed and an ex-communist reformer emerged as victor. To the 
surprise of many outside observers, relations between Athens and the newly-formed Albanian 
government flourished very rapidly. Upon the withdrawal of the Multinational Protection Force, it 
was declared in August 1997 that an unspecified number of Greek soldiers would remain in 
Albania, pending an agreement with the new Albanian government.*
Presently, having dramatically improved its relations with Albania, Greece has little reason 
to worry about a military threat from its northern neighbour. In fact, even if bilateral relations took 
a down-turn, at least in the foreseeable future, it would not be possible to talk about the emergence 
of an Albanian military threat directed towards any of its neighbouring countries. Internal turmoil 
led to the total disintegration of the poorly-equipped Albanian Army; its weapons caches were 
looted and in the process most of its personnel joined the ranks of the mutinies.^ As the things stand 
today, the Albanian army which consists of less than 10,000 raw conscripts, together with a 
dispirited police force, are still struggling to put down sporadic fighting in rural areas.®
Although a military threat ceased to be conceivable, that by no means Greece feels total at 
ease. Since 1991, the surge of migrant labour from North Epirus which has poured into Greek 
cities has already stretched the country’s resources, and a mass population movement prompted by 
a general conflagration continues to be a nightmare for Athens.’ Likewise, the power vacuum in 
southern Albania and the accompanying refugee, arms and drug-smuggling rings that have come to 
dominate the region, are unnerving developments for Athens, whose conventional military 
capabilities would be totally inappropriate to contain them. This Greek dilemma is best reflected in 
the following remarks by a former Greek defence minister: “We are not afraid of the army of 
Albania. (But,) it is not easy to seal the border. We can not increase our forces on the border by 
huge numbers, because we don't want to weaken our military presence elsewhere.”'*
Relations with Macedonia
From the perspective of Greece, the unexpected way in which the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav Federation came about in 1991, and the resultant independence of the small Republic of
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Relations with Macedonia
From the perspective of Greece, the unexpected way in which the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav Federation came about in 1991, and the resultant independence of the small Republic of
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Macedonia, could best be described as the realisation of a nightmare. In this regard, Athens had 
long contended that an independent Yugoslav-Macedonian state, feeling vulnerable and isolated, 
would seek the support of other revisionist centres (i.e. Albania, Turkey and Bulgaria) in the 
greater Balkan region and would thereby ressurect the Macedonian question.
The Macedonian question referred to by Athens has its roots in the Balkan War of 1912- 
13, when this geographic region and its people was split between Greece and Serbia, at the expense 
of Bulgaria. This resulted in Bulgarian frustration over the loss of ‘its’ part of Macedonia and 
alleged attempts by Sofia to spark age-old rivalry there and keep the issue alive." Not surprisingly, 
since the end of World War II, Greece’s primary concern with Macedonia has been to preserve the 
territorial status quo there, and this objective was best served by keeping Slavic-speaking 
Macedonia as part of the Yugoslav Federation.'^
However, when Greek efforts to achieve this aim were finally overwhelmed by the rapidly 
unfolding events o f the post-Cold War era, an almost instinctive Greek response was to use 
whatever leverage it could to prevent international recognition of an independent state of 
‘Macedonia’. Over the winter of 1992-1993, Greek efforts to block the United Nations and 
European Union's (EU) recognition of Macedonia following the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
reached such ferocity and persistence that all Western capitals reacted strongly to what was 
perceived as a hostile and unjustified attitude on the part of the Greek government. Eventually, 
Athens had to bend in fece of substantial European pressure and an acceptance by Greece of a 
compromise name for the new republic - officially entitled the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) appears temporarily to have settled the thorny issue between the two 
countries.'^
Macedonia is a small country with a very weak economy, and its fragmented ethnic make­
up results in a consistent and unresolved problem in that a Macedonian majority rules over a 
country where non-Macedonian minorities are wooed by neighbouring countries.'“' By the same 
token, the military of the new-borne state is also at an embryonic stage and devoid of sufficient 
economic and human resources to nourish its growth, meaning it is not a cause for concern for a 
country of Greece’s size.'^ Consequently, Greece's reaction to the emergence of a mini-state in her 
immediate neighbourhood appears to be based more on internal political and even psychological 
considerations than on justifiable threat perceptions. In fact, Greek officials admit that they are not 
concerned by the prospect of a military threat from the independent state of Macedonia.'® Rather 
their worries appear to be rooted in Greece's political psyche, in whose eye's 'Macedonia' is 
identified as an inseparable part of Greek history, civilisation, tradition, culture and, of course, 
territory. In this regard, Athens does not conceal its suspicions about Macedonia having territorial
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designs on northern Greece and the possibility of an anti-Greek alliance with other regional 
powers.”
Meanwhile, a more realistic security risk for Greece is the recent incitement of ethnic 
tension in Macedonia and the neighbouring Kosovo province of Yugoslavia, which could easily 
result in the emergence of Bosnia-like circumstances there.'® However, conventional military 
capabilities, cannot be expected to address the possible ramifications of such a conflict (i.e. a 
refugee influx or spill-down into Greek territory).
Relations with Bulgaria
The common denominator of historical bitterness and territorial disputes that characterises 
Athens’ relations with Albania and Macedonia, has been an important fector in Greek-Bulgarian 
relations as well. Accordingly, at the heart of Greek-Bulgarian differences are two factors: the 
ethnic make-up of the part of Macedonia annexed by Greece, and a latent desire to cede Greek 
Macedonia to an independent state under Bulgarian tutelage. Throughout The Cold War, Greek- 
Bulgarian relations were further strained, first due to the ample supplies provided to Greek 
commimists by conu^es in Sofia, and secondly as a result of the two coimtries' eventual shift 
towards, respectively, the eastern and western blocs.'®
After 1974, however, Athens’ decision to withdraw from the military wing of NATO, 
together with a shared distaste for Turkey, gave rise to a gradual Greek-Bulgarian rapprochement. 
In 1981, the coming to power of a Socialist Government in Athens accelerated this process, and the 
atmosphere of goodwill and good gestures reached its climax in 1986, when Greece and Bulgaria 
as members of competing blocs, signed a “Declaration of Friendship, Neighbourly Relations and 
Co-operation”.^ ° During the late-80s, and at the midst of Sofia’s forced expulsion of its Turkish 
minority, Greece further solidified its ties with Bulgaria and transformed a long-time foe into a 
staimch ally against Turkey.
Yet, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria 
revealed how futile and deceiving the Greek-Bulgarian alliance was. On the path to being Western- 
style democracy, Bulgaria reversed its discriminatory attitude towards its Turkish minority and, to 
the despair of Athens, relations with Ankara rapidly flourished. Moreover, in 1992, Bulgaria 
became the first country to recognise the newly-independent republic of Macedonia, a move which 
greatly shocked Greece, and a reminder that Bulgaria had never forgotten its 1913 and 1945 
humiliations over Macedonia. Meanwhile, the rapid advance of the Turkish minority in the newly- 
elected Bulgarian parliament gave rise to Greek fears that “serious pressure on the course of 
Bulgaria’s international relations will be exercised by the Muslim minority within its borders, 
which in turn is influenced by Turkey”.^ '
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Luckily for both sides, however, both Greek and Bulgarian governments have been 
extremely cautious, not wishing to flare up generations-old problems. To the contrary, initiatives 
have been launched to improve economic, poUtical and even military ties. In this respect, in the 
post-Communist era, Greece stood as the second largest foreign investor in Bulgaria, and in 
December 1993 a protocol was signed between Greece and Bulgaria to introduce confidence­
building measures concerning military activities in the border region.^^ Given the post-Cold War 
re-orientation in Sofia’s foreign policy towards the West and the consecutive Bulgarian application 
for full membership in both NATO and The European Union, at least in the medium term, there is 
little reason to expect a drastic reversal in the current state of Greek-Bulgarian relations.'^
In fact, in the unlikely event of a revival of irredentist claims giving rise to a renewed 
confrontation between them, the post-Cold War environment has rendered Bulgaria too weak a 
rival for the much more prosperous, influential and better-armed Greece. In this respect, the fall of 
the military-dominated communist regime, together with the parlous state of the Bulgarian 
economy, has left the Bulgarian armed forces in a shambles. At least in theory, the country 
continues to field an armed force of 103,000 troops, and a seemingly large array of military 
equipment, but recent remarks by Bulgarian officials suggest that 45% of the air force's equipment 
along with 30% of army are inoperable because of obsolescence or lack of fuel and spares. Even 
more remarkably, shortfalls in officer corps have reportedly reached chronic dimensions and troop 
morale and readiness are extremely low. Given the precarious state of the Bulgarian economy, a 
imminent reversal of fortunes on the part of Bulgarian armed forces and together with it the re- 
emergence of a credible military threat directed towards Greece, is simply unimaginable.^“*
Relations with Libya
Confident of the significance of its geographic proximity to both regions, Greece has 
traditionally aspired to playing the role of bridge between the Muslim Middle East and Christian 
Europe, in return for which it hoped to reap its share of The Middle East’s economic riches and 
also to boost its weight and influence on international platforms. Those ambitious goals 
necessitated a moderate approach towards Arab states and the utmost determination to avoid direct 
or indirect involvement in confrontations between The West and the Muslim world, the most 
striking examples of this policy line being the manner Athens has handled its relations with Libya, 
a country with which the rest of the Western world has frequently been in collision.^’
Throughout the 1980s, Libya adopted a highly destabilising and confrontational attitude 
towards the rest of the world, and during its all-too-frequent encounters with the West, its 
flamboyant leader Colonel Ghaddafi threatened to strike US and NATO bases in Crete. Yet, 
throughout the period, Athens was the only Western state to refrain from overtly condenming Libya
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for its actions and struggled to keep its diplomatic contacts alive. However, this extremely cautious 
attitude towards Libya has hardly produced the sense of security that Athens sought. With its 
pretensions to the leadership of the Arab world and countering the influence of the West, Libya has 
long counted on military strength to afBrm its regional and international role. Thanks to its huge oil 
revenues, it has also built-up, at least on paper, powerful armed forces. Moreover, the Lampedusa 
incident of 1986, during which Libya fired ballistic missiles against a small Italian island 
apparently in reprisal for US air raids, displayed Ghaddafi’s readiness to drag innocent third 
parties into conflicts. In the eyes of Greek decision-makers, the parallels with NATO and US bases 
on Crete and the possibility of Libyan reprisals against Greek territory was all too real.^ ®
However, the UN-imposed economic (and arms) embargo of 1992 has done a lot to ease 
the fears of Libya’s neighbours, among them Greece. On this account, sanctions have been 
singularly successful in negating Libya’s conventional military capabilities: the ban on weapon 
sales, spare parts and foreign military advisers caused a dreadful erosion of the military’s 
operational capability, and although Libya still boasts an impressive force on paper, more than 
two-thirds of its aircraft are inoperative and most vessels in the navy are no longere seaworthy. 
Thus, in the remote likelihood of a military confrontation with Greece, Libyan aircraft and naval 
vessels could not realistically be expected to overwhelm Greek defences.^’
Nevertheless, Ghaddafi’s policies are often irrational and counter-productive, and serious 
deficiencies in conventional military capabilities hardly negate the most worrisome facet of the 
Libyan threat; non-conventional capabilities in the form of large chemical and biological weapons 
stockpiles as well as over 240 Scud-type ballistic missiles.^* Aside the security guarantees offered 
by NATO and The US, Greece has no military means to address the non-conventional threat posed 
by Libya.
Relations with Turkey
Greek-Turkish relations could best be described as intensely hostile, dating back to the 
very first day Greece gained its independence. Since then, war after war has nourished a passionate 
mutual distrust between the two capitals and even today, when armed conflict has been replaced by 
desperate diplomacy and angry litigation, there are few signs of any real relaxation of tension 
between the two countries.
Most Greeks are of the conviction that Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus and the more 
recent Turkish moves in the Aegean, provide unambiguous evidence of Turkey’s expansionist 
ambitions vis-à-vis Greece. The Turks, on their part, make reference to the way in which the 
modem Hellenic Republic has continuously expanded at the expense of Turkish territory and 
people. After all, after 170 years of intermittent hostilities with Greece, it is the Turkish side which
76
has lost its Balkan and islands territories and which has experienced a destructive occupation of its 
Anatolian heartland. Thus, when combined with the popular cliché of Greeks as unreliable and 
capricious people, any Greek moves believed to challenge vital Turkish interests, are treated as a 
further manifestation of the Megali Idea, the Greek dream of re-constituting the Byzantium Empire 
at the expense of Turkey.
As already elaborated under the sections concerning Greece’s relations with Albania, 
Macedonia, and Bulgaria, the Greek sense of distrust and cynicism is not directed towards Turkey 
alone, but has come to characterise Athens’ relations with other neighbouring countries as well. 
However, in terms of the size of their population, their economic wealth, their influence on 
international platforms and, above all, their military capabilities, these other three neighbouring 
countries are much inferior to Greece. (See Table-1) Since their intentions are not believed to be 
matched by their capabilities, their actions and attitudes hardly cause a sense of dismay on the part 
of Athens. Turkey, on the other hand, is in an entirely different category: its population is six times 
that of Greece, its economy almost twice the size; its scientific and technological merits are clearly 
superior to those of Greece; its bilateral and multilateral connections include full membership of 
NATO and a solid and long-time strategic alliance with The US; and last, but not least, Turkey is 
in possession of the second largest military in the entire Western world, deploying four times as 
many troops as the Greek armed forces. Consequently, Turkey is perceived by Greece as an 
imminent and by far the most serious threat to its security. Taking into account Turkey’s past 
legacy as ruler of the Greek lands and the undaunting manner in which Ankara has handled its 
relations with Athens, it should come as no surprise that in Greece's eyes Turkey constitutes the 
major threat and that Athens’ defence and security policies, as well as its military posture, are 
shaped by this predominant sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis Ankara.
Tablc-1: Economic and military indicators of Greece and nei^hhourin· countrie.s,in 19%. '^'
Population 
(in millions)
Military personnel 
(in thousands)
Gross Dom. Product 
(in billion dollars)
Defence expenditure 
(in billion dollars)
Macedonia 2.2 10.4 1.3 0.117
Albania 3.5 40.4 1.5 0.098
Bulgaria 8.3 103.5 10.4 0.335
Libya 5.6 65 26 1.272
Greece 10.5 168.3 123 5.465
Turkey 62.2 525 182 6.856
Against this background of the Greek population's and decision-makers' threat perception, 
it would be quite natural to expect that the missions allotted to Greek armed forces and the likely 
circumstances under which Greek air power would be employed, would be closely connected with
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the issues that have so far placed Athens on a collision course with Ankara. Hence, a quick 
overview of the issues at the heart of the current Greek-Turkish dispute is necessary. The 
perplexing and closely inter-linked set of problems between Greece and Turkey will be analysed 
under four broad categories: the Aegean disputes; divergent positions on Cyprus; minority rights; 
and, finally, side issues which do not cut deep into vital interests but acquire significance in 
conjunction with the aforementioned issues and are exploited by both sides to gain advantage over 
the other.
i) The Aegean Disputes
At the root of the Aegean disputes are overlapping Greek and Turkish national interests in 
the area that stem partly from the geographical peculiarities of the region, and partly from the 
respective historical perceptions of the disputants. Over 3,000 Aegean islands and geographic 
formations, some of which are less than a few miles from the Turkish coast, are populated by 
Greeks. But, historically, the Aegean has been used by both countries as international waters. 
Turkey, therefore, fears that were Greece to extend its territorial waters beyond the currently 
existing limits, Turkish access to the Mediterranean through international waters and air space and, 
together with it, over 80 per cent of Turkey’s trade with the rest of the world, would be 
compromised. The Greeks, on the other hand, remain concerned that any concession in their claims 
over the Aegean would lead to further Turkish demands and result in a loss of sovereignty over 
their islands.^®
The first among the intermeshing series of disputes in this regard concerns the width of the 
territorial waters. Under present arrangements, both countries observe a six-mile territorial water 
limit, meaning that about 35 per cent of the Aegean is designated Greek territorial sea, 9 per cent 
Turkish and the remainder international waters. However, Greece has been seeking to extend its 
territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, thereby increasing its share of the Aegean to 71 per cent. 
Turkey maintains that any attempt by Greece to imilaterally extend its territorial waters to 12 miles 
would be treated as casus b e l l i . Currently, in order not to provoke Turkey, Greece is refraining 
from exercising its claim to 12 miles. Nonetheless, for both countries the interests at stake are vital 
and the potential for conflict remains as high as ever.
A closely inter-related issue is that of the ‘grey areas’, which was brought to the forefront 
of bilateral relations in early-1996, when a much-televised flag-planting took place on an 
uninhabited Aegean islet, known to the Greeks as Imia and the Turks as Kardak. Ankara used the 
occasion to dispute Greek claims to sovereignty on certain uninhabited geographic formations in 
the Aegean and argued that since the ownership of those formations was not defined under any 
mutually-binding treaties, a fait-accompli by claim by Athens to those ‘grey areas’ was totally
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unacceptable. Greece, on its part, proclaimed Turkey’s move as a fresh manifestation of its 
expansionist ambitions towards Greek territory. The consequent friction between the two sides 
reached a climax when the two countries' naval vessels and naval commandos came dangerously 
close to each other in the vicinity of the disputed islet. An actual clash was narrowly averted thanks 
both to intense US pressure and, definitely, both nations’ mutual experience in crisis 
management.^^ The issues surrounding territorial waters and grey areas constitute one of the most 
volatile and readily inflammable of Greek-Turkish disputes.
The third layer of Aegean disputes eneompasses rival claims by Greece and Turkey over 
certain portions of the Aegean continental shelf — i.e. rights pertaining to the exploration and 
exploitation of underwater and sub-soil resources. Claiming the entire continental shelf of the 
Aegean, in 1960 Greece began to grant licences for exploration and exploitation there, scaling up 
these initiatives during the 1970s. However, citing the proximity of many Greek islands to its 
shores and their location on the geological ‘natural prolongation’ of the Turkish mainland, Turkey 
opposed these moves and sought bilateral negotiations to find an equitable solution. Greece 
continues to reject this approach and favours the drawing of a median line between the eastern 
Aegean Greek islands and the Turkish coast, leaving Turkey with practically no continental shelf at 
all beyond its territorial waters. On a number of occasions during the 1970s and again in 1987, the 
two nations came to the brink of war over that particular issue. The sporadic harassment of each 
other’s scientific research ships and fishing boats continues and the danger of an eventual 
escalation into military conflagration remains significant.
The fourth dimension of Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean littoral involves the 
demarcation and control of the airspace above it. At the root of the problem was a unilateral Greek 
decision back in 1931 to extend the width of its airspace to 10 nautical miles. This was tantamount 
to a breach of well-established international law, whereby the breadth of national airspace must 
correspond to the breadth of the territorial waters. Hence, Turkey’s and other nations’ military 
aircraft flying in the region observe the internationally-acknowledged 6-mile, rather than the self- 
proclaimed 10-mile air space claimed by Greece. Consequently, every time a foreign aircraft flies 
into the disputed zone, Greece sends its own combat aircraft to intercept and force the ‘violators’ 
out, a situation that gives rise to dangerous confrontations and occasional ‘dogfights’ between their 
and foreign aircraft. '^* A closely related extension of the airspace dispute concerns responsibility for 
air traffic control in the Aegean Flight Information Region (FIR), assigned to Greece in 1952. 
Since the electrified atmosphere of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, however, Turkey insists that the FIR 
regulations did not stipulate that military aircraft file their flight plans and that Greece is abusing 
her position as a control authority to impose unjustified restrictions or alterations on Turkish 
military flights over the high seas in the Aegean, as if the FIR responsibilities entailed national
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no naval or air bases, no fortifications, only internal security forces are 
bcal recruits could be stationed only, albwed. 
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Figure-4: Demilitarised status of Greek islands, under Lausanne &  Paris Treaties.CO
Map drawn on the basis of the data compiled from Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, 
?nd Turkey; The Troubled Triangle (NewYork: Praeger, 198^, pp.121-23; Avni Kandemir, "Türk-Yunan 
İlişkilerinin Ekseni; Ege", Strateji, 1995/4, pp.79-81; Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Papers 
No.155 (London; IISS, 1979), pp.16-17).
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sovereignty.^* Thus, Turkish aircraft flying through international airspace deny the Greek 
authorities’ requests to submit flight plans, that situation giving rise to additional tension in the air. 
During 1996 alone, Greece reported 538 ‘violations’ of its 10-mile limit, a further 1,600 
unauthorised flights through the Athens FIR, and 456 cases of dogfights between Greek and 
Turkish aircraft.** As those figures clearly indicate, the imresolved state of aftairs in the Aegean 
skies raises the possibility of highly explosive incidents which could easily escalate into a full-scale 
Greek-Turkish war, constituting another extremely dangerous dimension of Greek-Turkish 
relations.
The last of the closely inter-related Aegean issues concerns the frequent complaints by 
Turkey that Greece has violated the provisions of the Lausanne and Rome Treaties, which provided 
for the demilitarisation of the major Eastern Aegean islands (see Figure-4). Ankara contends that 
the excessive military build-up and fortifications on those islands, which are extremely close to the 
Turkish coast, not only breach the provisions of those fundamental treaties, but also facilitates their 
utilisation as launching pads for multi-dimensional (jreek military operations against Turkey. 
Athens, on the other hand, insists that more recent legal arrangements have superseded the 
disarmament clauses of the two treaties in question and that the need for Greece to defend militarily 
those islands is justified by the presence of the Turkish military build-up in western Anatolia.*’ 
Despite being an important irritant in Greek-Turkish relations, this issue has been relatively static 
over the years and in and by itself is imlikely to create circumstances leading to a large-scale 
conflict.
ii) Cyprus *®
Since the 1950s, Athens’ and Ankara’s divergent interests and desires on Cyprus, and their 
subsequent quarrels have been one of the focal points of Greek-Turkish relations. In this respect, 
Greek Cypriots, who represent about 80 per cent of the island’s inhabitants, continually appealed 
for enosis (union) with Greece and as of 1954, their cause was also embraced by the government in 
Athens, which came to perceive Cyprus as a natural extension of Greece's ethnic, cultural and 
religious heritage. Conversely, the Turkish Cypriots, who constitute the remaining 20 per cent of 
the population, were adamantly opposed to all measures to transform their island into a Greek 
outpost or, worse, part of it. The pretext for a inter-communal conflict, therefore, was present even 
before the island emerged as a sovereign state in 1960 and the federal state formula imder which 
special treaties were signed with three Guarantor Powers (UK, Greece and Turkey), so as to 
preclude both enosis and the partition of the island, proved to be totally ineffective in easing inter­
communal tension. As of 1963, Cyprus saw scenes of brutal ethnic and rehgious strife between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, both receiving ample support from their mainland kin.
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Finally in 1974, in response to a right-wing coup d’état on the island engineered by the 
military junta in Athens, the Turkish government, which had always feared such a coup as a 
prelude to enosis, invoked its legal rights as guarantor to intervene and landed troops on the 
northern shores of the island. For several weeks Greece and Turkey were on the verge of war as 
Greece mobilised its reserves and clashes occurred between Greek and Turkish military contingents 
stationed on Cyprus. By the time a cease-fire was finally reached, 37 per cent of the island had 
come under Turkish control and, unable to shoulder the ramifications of their major farce, military 
juntas both in Nicosia and Athens had to step down.
Since 1974, endless rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotiations through the United 
Nations mediation have failed to produce any concrete results. The Turkish minority’s 1983 
declaration of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has not aided the finding of a 
lasting solution and, as things stand today, Turkish troops are still in Cyprus and the island 
remains solidly divided along a UN-patrolled “Green Line”. The Turkish side appears to be 
increasingly comfortable with the present state of affairs; the Greek side is not, but at the same 
time is unwilling to agree to compromise. It appears that the political situation is simply not ripe 
for meaningful progress.^®
In Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus problem constitutes a major stumbling block to 
reconciliation. For Ankara, besides concern for the fate of the Turkish minority there, Cyprus holds 
vital strategic importance and a Greek move to extend its military presence towards the eastern 
Mediterranean, thereby encircling Turkey’s soft belly to the south, is deemed utterly unacceptable. 
Consequently, unless a lasting solution is found which excludes mainland Greece's influence from 
the island and guarantees the well-being of the Turkish community, Ankara cannot be expected to 
withdraw its military presence from the island. Athens, for its part, continues to perceive Cyprus as 
an inseparable part of Greek Orthodox heritage, and remains intent on rolling back the Turkish 
military's presence and along with it Turkish influence on the island. Unable to force Turkish 
troops out through other means, Athens’ struggle has recently taken the form of a controlled 
escalation, with the dual aim of, first, drawing the international community's attention and, together 
with it, diplomatic pressure on Ankara; and, second, challenging Turkey's military superiority in 
Cyprus. To this end, Athens’ earlier declarations that renewed Turkish military action in Cyprus 
would constitute a casus belli, were supplemented in 1993 by a joint defence doctrine. The latter 
eventually expanded to include joint training, closely co-ordinated procurement activities and the 
permanent deployment of Greek aircraft and warships on Cypriot territory.'"’ Meanwhile, after two 
decades of relative tranquillity, the Green Line separating the two communities has become the 
scene of violent Greek demonstrations, the loss of civilian lives on both sides and sporadic 
exchanges of fire across the Green Line have became more frequent.
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1997 witnessed a further and unarguably provocative step in the form of a Greek Cypriot 
decision to purchase S-300 long-range air defence missiles from Russia and render the island off- 
access to Turkish aircraft. As would be expected, Ankara’s reaction was blunt and straightforward 
taking the form of an open threat to hit missiles as necessary.“' For the last one to two years, and as 
a result o f deliberate Greek and/or Cypriot efforts in this direction, tension on the island has been 
steadily rising. The joint military exercise held in October 1997, with the direct involvement of 
Greek troops, aircraft and naval vessels from the mainland and the subsequent Turkish reaction in 
the form of harassing Greek combat aircraft en-route to Cyprus, as well as in June 1998 the 
deployment of Turkish fighter aircraft in the northern sector of the island in order to reciprocate 
Greece's actions, highlighted how precarious the situation was and how readily minor incidents 
could lead instantaneously to an all-out conflict between Greece and Turkey.
In this context, the EU decision to defy strong Turkish objections and in March 1998 to 
open membership negotiations with Cyprus; towards the end of 1998 the expected arrival of the S- 
300 missiles on the island; and the official ceremony in January 1998 to inaugurate the first Greek 
air base on Cyprus, all indicate that in the near future the situation on the island could further 
deteriorate.“^ In order words, when combined with the background of mutual animosities that have 
become a way of life and the resulting failure to produce concrete results at the negotiation table, 
the parties to the conflict appear to be, more than ever, on a collision course.
Hi) Treatment o f  minorities
According to many observers, the quarrel over the rights and freedoms of minorities is the 
least explosive among the array of problems that continue to inhibit Greek-Turkish relations. This 
issue has not been raised officially in bilateral talks, but nevertheless continues to be a cause of 
fnction between the two sides. Turkey’s concerns concentrate on the status, rights and privileges of 
120,000 ethnic Turks located primarily in the region of Western Thrace and Ankara frequently 
complains that Greek legislation discriminates against the Turkish population there. Athens, for its 
part, remains worried by the close attention Turkey pays to its ‘Turkish-speaking Muslim 
commimity”, and tends to treat the latter as a potential “sixth arm” that could be manipulated by 
Ankara in case of a Greek-Turkish conflict.“^
Consequently, against the background of charged rhetoric between the two capitals, the 
inter-communal climate in Western Thrace has been characterised more by riots and street violence 
than dialogue.““ Nevertheless, while the detrimental impact on inter-communal relations in 
Western Thrace of renewed Greek-Turkish confrontations have been all too obvious, the opposite 
has hardly been the case, and harsh protests and rhetoric aside, neither of the two capitals are likely 
to risk a war over their concerns culminating from the minority issues.
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iv) Side issues
Besides the above-mentioned issues that cut through both sides' vital national interests, 
there are a number of what might be termed as ‘side issues’ between Greece and Turkey. The latter 
are treated as secondary, mainly because they gain significance only in conjunction with the three 
main sets of issues covered in previous paragraphs. They are exploited by both sides to harm the 
other’s interests or to gain leverage on international platforms and when discussing bilateral issues.
Some of the most noteworthy side issues are: (1) both sides’ determined efforts to 
undermine the other’s position vis a vis various multinational organisations such as The European 
Union, The Western European Union and, in particular, NATO, as a result of which the Alliance’s 
command and control responsibilities for the Aegean remained undefined for years and counter- 
vetoing has seriously curtailed NATO’s infrastructure investment in both countries; (2) the 
pressure brought upon The US, as both sides’ major military ally, to scale down its assistance and 
commitment to the rival party; (3) military and other co-operation schemes with the other’s 
neighbours (i.e. Athens’ recent military contacts with Russia, Armenia, Syria and Iran, and the 
agreements between Turkey and Bulgaria, Albaiua and Macedonia); (4) the status of the 
ecumenical patriarchate in Istanbul; and (5) last, but not least, fi^equent accusations by Turkey that 
Athens is providing shelter and financial and material assistance to terrorist organisations in 
Turkey.''* By and large, while utilised by both sides as part of a greater schemes to score points 
against the other, in themselves none of those ‘side issues’ are believed to have the potential to 
cause a direct military confrontation between the two countries.
To summarise, Greek-Turkish disputes have been caught in a web of mutual suspicion on 
both ends of the Aegean and, as a result, have remained unresolved. Progress depends on both 
sides lending credence to the other’s pledges. However, given the deep-rooted suspicions and 
vulnerability of foreign policy to domestic politics in both capitals, to defuse such a tense and 
volatile dispute may seem virtually impossible. The only promising aspect of the intermittent 
hostility that has come to characterise relations between the two countries, is their success in 
restraining from actual combat. Even at the height of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Ankara and Athens 
succeeded in confining armed clashes to the island and, despite the vital interests at stake, the 
conflict did not escalate into a full-scale Greek-Turkish war.'*®
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III- ALLIANCE TIES AND INVOLVEMENT IN MULTI-NATIONAL SCHEMES
As a medium-sized regional power situated in an extremely volatile area, during Greece’s 
160 years as a sovereign nation-state, alliances and Great Power politics have had a decisive 
impact on its external affairs. In fact, thanks to the protection of big powers and skilful 
manipulation of their politic relations with them, Greece has managed to transform several of its 
military defeats into territorial gains.'” Yet, this reliance on foreign powers to counter-balance 
regional opponents has not always produced the positive outcomes sought by the Greeks. For 
instance, the Greek expedition force despatched to Asia Minor in the aftermath of World War I 
suffered a catastrophic defeat when French and British backing evaporated against the background 
of rapidly changing international realities. More recently, a gross miscalculation on the part of the 
Greek junta with respect to the attitude of The US and other NATO allies resulted in the Turkish 
military intervention in Cyprus, a catastrophic outcome indeed in terms of Greek foreign policy.
In order to better comprehend Greece’s defence and security calculations and the likely 
circumstances surrounding the use of Greek military power, a broad overview of Athens’ alliance 
ties would be useful. The most relevant defence and security relationships to be considered are 
Athens’ long-term membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), its entry into 
the European Economic Community (EEC), and its more-recently gained status as a full member 
of the Western European Union (WEU). Greece was also among the founding members of both 
The United Nations and The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The 
latters' vast membership, however, precludes the possibility of decisive action and as a result these 
two entities have customarily scored low in Greece’s security considerations.
However, a second set of alliances, governing Greece’s bilateral relations with The US has 
had a decisive impact on Greek defence and security policies for more than five decades. In recent 
years the steady improvement in Greek-Russian relations has begun to incorporate an increasingly 
visible defence and military co-operation aspect. Thus, besides The US, brief analysis will also be 
made of relations with Russia.
NATO factor in Greek security calculations
NATO was founded in 1948 out of a shared concern over the expansion of communism 
and has become the most tangible and long-lasting multinational defence organisation of all times. 
Greece joined the Alliance in 1952, as a country with vivid memories of a major civil war against 
communist insurgents. Hence, in the Cold War climate of the 1950s and 1960s, co-operation 
within NATO to confront a perceived Soviet threat seemed reasonable. The Cyprus problem, 
however, drove a wedge between Greece and another NATO ally, namely Turkey, almost
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immediately after both coimtries had become members.“  After two decades of confrontation with 
Turkey and attempts by both sides to internationalise the problem by carrying it to NATO 
platforms, Greece’s relations with NATO finally hit rock bottom over the Cyprus issue. Following 
Turkey’s 1974 military intervention there, Greece decided to withdraw from the integrated military 
structure of the Alliance. In the eyes of Greece, alongside The US, NATO was responsible for the 
1967-1974 era of military rule in Athens and for the 1974 Cyprus debacle. Both were blamed for 
doing too much to support the former and not enough to prevent the latter.
Having stayed outside the Alliance for three years, Athens quickly realised the tactical 
advantages accruing to Turkey within NATO and, seeking to consolidate its European presence 
and secure early entry into the EEC, Greece proposed re-entry into the Alliance. Thanks to Athens' 
unfulfilled promise to solve outstanding NATO command and control disputes in the Aegean, 
Turkey’s objections were overcome and in October 1980 Greece re-assumed its position within 
NATO. However, Greece's re-entry to the Alliance has not mitigated long-standing disputes 
between Greece and Turkey and a resolution to the question of NATO command responsibilities 
for the Aegean has been left for a later date. As is to be expected, once Greece reclaimed its status 
as a fill! member, differences with Turkey could never be settled, and the command issue was 
rapidly supplemented by a whole set of new technical and legal disputes, among them the conduct 
of NATO manoeuvres in the Aegean and the inclusion of the demiUtarised Greek islands in 
Alliance planning.*® While in December 1997 a positive development took place in the form of a 
compromise between the two sides to resolve their differences on the command and control issue, 
ambiguities regarding the Allied perspective on the disarmed status of the Aegean islands 
continue.*' As a consequence, since 1983 Greece, and occasionally Turkey, continue to abstain 
from NATO exercises in the area. Moreover, Greece has frequently made protests about the use 
for such purposes of international waters and airspace in the Aegean Sea, prohibited NATO 
exercise participants from using facilities on Greek soil if Athens did not take part and finally, 
counter-vetoing the Turkish response to the annual defence planning questionnaire, since 1988 has 
blocked the construction of certain NATO-fimded infrastructure &cilities in both countries.*^
During the 1980s, another issue which caused a split in Greece’s relations with NATO 
was her insistence that the Alliance give a guarantee to shield Greece from aggression by Turkey 
and to secure her eastern borders with the latter. Other NATO states declared that, since the 
Alliance was not the proper platform to solve disagreements between two of its members, such a 
guarantee was imwarranted, and that granting one formally to Greece would be interpreted as an 
inappropriate affront to Turkey. In Greek eyes, NATO’s inability to take a clear position revealed 
a very serious weakness in the Alliance and thereby justified Greece's lack of commitment and 
hesitance relating to the Alliance schemes.**
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After PASOK’s 1988 electoral defeat and the assumption of power by conservative 
governments with a more constructive attitude vis-à-vis NATO, the Greece's popular nickname as 
“NATO’s Romania” has eventually waned. However, this has not altered the underlying sense of 
mutual suspicion and distrust on which Greece’s relations with NATO have been based. According 
to Greek policy makers, strategic considerations invariably give Turkey more weight in NATO 
than Greece, because o f its larger population, troop strength and border with the Middle East and 
former Soviet republics. Given their perception that is NATO membership is undervalued, Athens 
does not count on NATO assistance in encounters with its main adversary, Turkey. In other 
words, in the eye's of Greece, NATO is not indispensable in confronting the the Hellenic Republic's 
most important defence and security challenges.*“
This by no means equates to a total lack of interest in and adherence to NATO 
membership. On the contrary, the Greeks are convinced that NATO membership provides them 
with a golden opportunity to restrain Turkey’s influence within the Alliance, internationalise their 
problems with Turkey and minimise the likelihood of a nightmare scenario being realised; a one-on- 
one confrontation with Turkey. Likewise, continued membership in NATO provides Athens with 
precious financial assistance in the form of Alliance infrastructure ftmds which are used to 
construct and maintain major military installations on Greek territory. Furthermore, against the 
non-conventional military threat emanating from the Middle East, an absolute reliance on the 
NATO deterrent provides Greece with a sense of relief and enables it to concentrate its time and 
energy on its main rival.
A last point deserving of mention here concerns recent NATO initiatives aimed at averting 
crises and military confrontations over the Aegean through a number of confidence-building 
measures. These measures, initially devised by Greece and Turkey during their 1988 Davos 
meetings, have been re-vitalised by NATO in the aftermath of the Kardak/Imia crisis of January
1996. Accordingly, and imder NATO brokered arrangements, Greece and Turkey agreed to the 
creation o f a telephone hotline at NATO headquarters in Brussels and to send radar information to 
Naples which would allow the Alliance to determine the violator in disputed Aegean airspace. In 
this context, NATO’s Secretary General undertook to mediate between Turkish and Greek Foreign 
Ministers in times of emergency and a joint-statement concerning the promotion of better relations 
was issued by both countries during NATO’s July 1997 summit in Madrid. There are also 
frequent reports that the military commands of both sides are holding secret technical talks aimed 
at dispelling the risks of military confrontation over the Aegean.** The impact of these initiatives 
are yet to be seen.
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United States factor
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, when The US gradually began to 
assume the dominant role previously played by the British Empire in the Near East, Greece 
developed close political and military relations with Washington, in return for which it has been 
given ample American military and economic assistance. Ever since, due to the sheer size of its 
military and financial assistance and its influence in international arena. The US has outdistanced 
any other candidate as Athens’s number one ally, this observation being as relevant today as it was 
some 50 years ago.
However, it has by no means been a relationship devoid of fluctuations. 1974 marked a 
dramatic down-turn in Greek-American relations wherein ties were quickly strained. Besides the 
belief among many Greeks that The US was an accomplice to the 1967 coup that installed a 
military junta in Athens, the real source of tension was Greek-Turkish animosity, aggravated by the 
Cyprus crisis of 1974. When Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus, Greece held The US 
responsible for not preventing Turkish action. Although The US Congress imposed an arms 
embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, there was a strong belief among Greeks that the US had a 
bias toward Turkey in the area of defence co-operation. Consequently, Greece made efforts to 
reduce its reliance on The US and to broaden the basis of its security policy, particularly in the 
direction of Western Europe.“
During the 1980s, with the coming to power of the Socialist PASOK party, Greek-US 
relations deteriorated even more. The US failure to share Greece's fixation that Turkey posed a 
serious security threat, together with American efforts to upgrade Turkey’s military forces, were 
viewed with serious concern in Athens. Underlying suspicions to that effect were effectively 
exploited by the Socialists Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, whose markedly different 
assessment of international and bilateral questions and vitriolic anti-US and anti-western rhetoric 
had a very adverse effect on Greece's status in Washington.*’
After Papandreous’ fell in 1989, conservative governments replaced his virulent rhetoric 
with acceptance of the fundamental orientation of Greece as a soUd member state of the European 
Community and attempted to portray Greece's foreign policy to her main allies, among them the 
US as one in which they could have confidence and which they could rely. Consequently, Greece 
has continued to allow The US access to its military fecilities and has refrained from raising major 
objections to US policies elsewhere in the world. Among others, this acceptance has been based on 
the calculation that, vis-à-vis Turkey, Greece fares better with American bases on its soil and close 
alignment with Washington than it would without.**
Since the Cypriot crisis of 1974, Greek strategy vis-a-vis the US has been threefold; 
Washington should (1) exert pressure on Ankara to roll back its military presence on Cyprus; (2)
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support the Greek position in the Aegean; and (3) allocate its military aid to Greece and Turkey in 
a manner that would not disrupt the regional balance of power. With the exception of the 7 to 10 
ratio observed in US military aid to Greece and Turkey, the Greek strategy of using its alliance ties 
with The US as leverage against Turkey has achieved hardly any of its goals. After 25 years, 
Turkey still maintains its military presence in Cyprus and an official US commitment in 1976 that 
‘The US would actively and equivocally oppose either side seeking a military solution and will 
make major efforts to prevent such a course of action’ is the closest the Greeks have ever got to an 
official US guarantee for their country’s borders with Turkey.’®
After all, Washington’s policy towards Athens and Ankara has been designed to improve 
US bilateral relations with each ally to the greatest extent possible. This has meant, in effect, that 
Washington has sought to disassociate US relations with each country from the thorny Aegean 
disputes and Cyprus. Particularly during periods of high tension. The US has tried to bring about 
reconciliation through NATO and only when the two sides have come to the brink of an armed 
clash, has Washington intervened directly to dissuade Greek and Turkish decision-makers from 
resorting to violence. Obviously, this policy of non-involvement has been far from meeting Greek 
expectations. According to Greek conventional wisdom, given The US' deep-rooted appreciation of 
Turkey’s strategic value, if The US abstains from involvement, this is a sign either of US 
indifference to Greek security problems, or an indication of the implicit support given to the 
stronger party in the conflict. ^
European factor
After much controversy and hesitation on the part of other member states, in 1981 Greece 
was finally accepted as the tenth member of the European Community, Europe’s leading economic 
and political grouping. Throughout 1980s, the ruling Greek socialists’ continued animosity against 
what they called ‘a club of rich’, was not backed up by action, and in core policies directly 
affecting the country’s economy and security, Greece maintained its commitment to Western 
Europe. In this regard, all segments of Greece's ruling elite were fully aware that without western 
financial aid and private investments, Greece’s economy and armed forces would rapidly decay.®'
According to many observers, accession to the EC undoubtedly constituted the greatest 
post-war achievement in Greek international relations. In this sense, full membership in EC 
brought not only net benefits in economic terms, but it has also enhanced Greece’s feeling of 
security and independence. As Turkey was not a member state, the EC as a whole represented a 
very promising ally and provided Greece with a more agreeable political forum than NATO After 
1981 bilateral Greek-Turkish problems, in one way or other, have automatically started to affect 
the Community too.®’ Especially since the late-1980s, Turkey’s interest in reviving its special
89
relationship with the Community and its formal application for membership has increased 
European willingness to mediate between the two rival states. On this accoimt, increased Turkish 
responsiveness to EC rulings has provided Greece with a golden opportunity to use its vote in the 
EC as a splendid leverage in its dealings with Ankara. Accordingly, Athens has demonstrated both 
in words and practice that it regards its approval for further developing of EC-Turkey relations as 
dependent on Ankara’s concessions on bilateral Greek-Turkish issues and, in retrospect, Turkish- 
European relations have been rendered hostage to Greece's power of veto.®^
While Greece has effectively exploited its EC membership to ‘Europeanise’ its quarrels 
with Turkey and also at times to secure diplomatic leverage over Turkey, Greek expectations that 
EC membership would solidify and supplement Greek defensive posture have been proved 
farfetched. Particularly after the 1992 adoption of the Maastricht Treaty which transformed the EC 
into the European Union (EU), Greek expectations ran high and, in line with the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) goals, Athens hoped that the EU would gradually transform itself into 
a political alliance with a full-fledged security dimension.®®
However, the 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis, during which Greece hastily called for European 
assistance and solidarity to check the ‘territorial ambitions’ of Turkey, revealed how elusive Greek 
expectations were. During the crisis, the EU’s existing foreign policy decision-making mechanisms 
proved to be totally ineffective in quelling the conflict. Unable to criticise Greece and unwilling to 
infuriate Turkey at this delicate time, all The EU had to offer was dialogue and counselled patience 
- honourable aims, but hardly relevant. At the roots of European inaction was irritation toward 
Greece's obstruction of EU-Turkey relations and the resistance of certain member states to EU 
political integration. Accordingly, some member states continue to perceive EU as an entity for 
economic co-operation and integration and do not want a common foreign and security policy to be 
bom out a crisis. Those considerations found their expression in the blunt remarks of British 
Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind: the EU ‘does not take a position with regard to territorial 
disputes’.'“
Failing to support another EU member in a territorial dispute was not a precedent to be 
taken lightly and confirmed that the EU had not yet transformed itself into an alliance that required 
unquestioned solidarity in times of external conflict. Not only were many member coimtries 
unready to surrender significant sovereignty over foreign policy, but most of them were very eager 
to engage Turkey and not alienate it on the grounds of a grievance with Greece. Not surprisingly, 
disillusionment on the part of Greece was considerable. Athens’ hopes for an EU that would appear 
more like a military alliance than a common market and a comprehensive EU security policy that 
during conflicts would give Greece stronger and broader support, were proved misfoimded.
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Those observations are equally applicable to the defence and security arm of The EU, 
namely the Western European Union (WEU). Set up originally in 1954 and reactivated in 1984 to 
provide a framework for European consultations on security and defence, in 1991 The Maastricht 
Declaration rendered The WEU the defence component of the EU.®’ Greece’s delayed November 
1992 accession into The WEU reflected other member states’ reservations on Greece’s 
questionable track record within NATO, as well as the well-founded concerns that letting Greece in 
and leaving Turkey out would equate to extending Athens security guarantees in its deep-rooted 
disputes with Ankara. In fact, faced with actual Greek demands in this direction, other European 
governments made it clear that they would not accept any commitments to this effect, and Greece's 
eventual membership of the organisation represented a far cry from Greece's original desire to 
attain an advantageous defensive posture vis-à-vis Turkey.®*
In fact, even if the security guarantees sought by Athens were actually extended, they 
would have carried little more than symbolic worth. The WEU has no troops of its own, and 
although it can borrow them from certain member states, the transport, intelligence and 
communications assets at the disposal of the WEU would not be sufficient to sustain most 
operations. Similarly, the remarkable WEU inaction vis-a-vis Albania and Kosovo crises of 1997 
and 1998 respectively have clearly demonstrated that, the member states are often divided on key 
security interests, and the outcome is total inaction on the part of the WEU.®®
In summary, despite Athens’ strong expectations to manipulate its EU and WEU 
membership in striking a new balance in its troubled relations with Turkey, the geo-strategic and 
economic realities presided, and duplicating the circumstances within the North Atlantic Alliance, 
Greece has not been able to secure the solid security guarantees that it had sought. On the other 
hand, thanks to its right to vote in both EU and WEU, and as compared to Turkey, Athens holds a 
diplomatic upper hand within those two organisations. Indeed, an increasing number of pro-Athens 
declarations that have come to recently characterise EU’s position vis-à-vis Greek-Turkish disputes 
are indicative of the diplomatic advantages accruing to Greece as a result of the asymmetry in the 
membership status of the two countries.’® Turkey’s more recent rebuff with respect to its 
application for full membership and the emergence of a rift between Ankara and Brussels is certain 
to increase advantages accruing to Athens on that account.
Russian factor
Due to Greece’s alignment with The US and its distaste for communism reminiscent of the 
Greek civil war, throughout the 1950s and 1960s Greek-Soviet relations remained low, the only 
exception being the complex set of dealings revolving around the Cyprus problem. In its struggle to 
prevent a Turkish military intervention there, Athens inadvertently found itself of Moscow’s side.
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During the period. The Soviet Union, was also worried about the possibility of an increase in 
Turkey’s and NATO’s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Cyprus crisis of 1974 therefore 
signalled a real reversal of fortunes in Greek-Soviet relations: the subsequent notion that the 
primary threat to Greek security did not come from NATO’s main adversary, but rather a fellow 
NATO ally to the east, resulted in improved bilateral relations. In 1981, the coming to power of 
socialists in Greece added new momentum to the process and on various East-West issues, Greece 
appeared to be more on the Soviet Union’s side than that of NATO and The US.” However, as 
during those years relations between Turkey and Soviet Union were not particularly problematic, 
Athens’ pro-Moscow attitude did not transform the latter into an anti-Turkish ally.
At the end of the Cold War, however, as the Soviet Union disintegrated and was becoming 
the much-weaker Russian Federation, the initial atmosphere of explicitly harmonious relations 
between Ankara and Moscow was eventually superseded by contradicting positions on the turmoil 
in Transcaucasus and competition over transit procedures for oil from the Caspian Sea region. 
Greece, on the other hand, has no reason to worry about improving its ties with the successor of the 
Soviet Empire.’^
The most visible ramification of this transformation in Moscow’s relations with Greece 
was a Russian decision in late-1996 to sell S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to the Greek Cypriots. 
These missiles arguably constitute the most effective air defence system currently available world­
wide, and will no doubt turn the island in the most heavily defended anti-aircraft stronghold in the 
whole of the Mediterranean.’  ^ Thus, its air superiority over the island being seriously challenged, 
Ankara threatened to take action and strike the missiles if necessary. The tension rapidly escalated 
and as Athens gave absolute endorsement to the Greek Cypriots, Russia accused Ankara of 
inflaming tensions and declared that any interference with the Russian ships transporting the 
missiles to Cyprus would not be tolerated.’'' Subsequent developments in the form of a joint 
Russian-Greek air force exercise in the Aegean, reports concerning the involvement of Russian 
‘technical advisers’ in Cypriot-Greek military manoeuvres and talk of the prospective protection of 
the S-300 missiles by Russian forces when the hardware is shipped to Cyprus has left a very strong 
impression that Moscow has unequivocally taken sides in the Greek-Turkish dispute.’'*
Above all, however, rather than constitute a grand-strategic decision on the part of Russian 
policy-makers, Moscow’s unambiguous tilt towards Nicosia and Athens could well be explained by 
the pressing Russian need to promote arms exports and thereby meet its rapidly ^ tering  defence 
industrial sector’s need for foreign currency. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been 
actively seeking to boost its arms export with cut-rate prices all over the world.’® Consequently, 
despite the revival of the decades-old Greek expectation that Russia intervene and support them in 
a Greek-Turkish conflict, those hopes appear to be as remote today as a decade ago. Indeed,
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remarks by high-ranking Russian officials as well as rapidly the flourishing economic 
interdependence between Ankara and Moscow indicate that, in return for the questionable benefits 
of an alliance with Greece, Moscow has too much to lose, both politically and economically, from 
alienating an important regional power of Turkey’s size and influence.”
IV- EPILOGUE TO CHAPTER THREE
Our brief overview of Greece’s foreign relations and threat perceptions have revealed that, 
as a result of the legacy to force expansion of Greek territory, active or latent disputes continue to 
underscore Athens’ relations with virtually all neighbouring countries. Yet, against the background 
of serious economic, social and political problems which continue to beset neighbouring states to 
the north, Greece has little worry of a conventional military threat from that direction. In other 
words, neither Albania, Bulgaria, nor the mini-state of Macedonia, could realistically be depicted 
as threats to Greek security.
The same could hardly be stated for Turkey, however, whose clearly superior 
demographic, economic and military might, as well as its considerable political influence, present 
Greece with a formidable opponent. The existence of a number of highly inflammable disputes over 
the Aegean littoral, together with a dangerous stalemate in Cyprus, renders an actual outbreak of 
armed conflict a real possibility and as such continue to dominate Greek security and threat 
perceptions.
To counter this perceived Turkish threat, Greece appears to exploit every opportunity it 
can to internationalise its problems with Turkey and to neutralise the disparity that exists in the 
relative strengths of the two countries. Athens’ alliance ties with outside powers, as well as its 
membership of a number of international institutions, are thus perceived as crucial instruments to 
fulfil this goal. Greek initiatives within NATO and comparable pleas towards The US, have hardly 
produced the results that Athens hoped for and both entities continue to preserve neutrality in 
Greek-Turkish disputes. Conversely, Greece and Turkey’s differing status in the European Union 
appears to have provided Athens with a diplomatic leverage. At the very least, certain aspects of 
Turkish-European relations are continually rendered hostage to Greek obstructions and vetoing 
power. From a different perspective, however. The EU’s failure to devise common foreign and 
security policy goals and member states’ unwillingness to provide Greece with the security and 
territorial guarantees it has long sought, continues to shake Greek confidence in the balancing role 
of this institution.
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Lastly, the re-emergence of the Russian fector in Greece’s security calculations towards 
Turkey is unlikely to produce the concrete results that Athens is hoping for. After all, the same 
geo-strategic and economic considerations that continue to block a decisive US or European tilt 
towards Greece at the expense of Turkey, appear to be as relevant to Moscow as well.
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CHAPTER 4
GREEK SECURITY POLICIES AND EXPECTATIONS FROM
AIR POWER
Having completed our brief overview of Greece’s complex set of relations with neighbouring 
countries, and also touched upon Athens’ alliance ties and its involvement in multinational schemes, our 
emphasis now shifts to the impact of those factors on the formulation and conduct of Greek security 
policies, whose direct continuation will be an exercise in defining the role and the place of air power in 
Greek defences. Only then, will this student feel ready to undertake a more detailed analysis of the Hellenic 
air force itself, and draw far-reaching conclusions about air power’s degree of utility in Greek national 
security policies.
First of all, however, it is important to clarify the definition and content of various terms used in 
this chapter. Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, the term ‘security policy’ equates to those 
decisions and principles devised by national governments in the light of perceived threats, ie the conditions 
and circumstances which dictate the use of military or non-military power to secure national values and 
interests against adversarial risks. The notion ‘foreign policy’, in its turn, is used to refer to that 
combination of geographic, political, diplomatic, economic, ideological and social factors which form the 
nation's attitude and actions vis-à-vis other countries and multinational entities. Hence, foreign policy is 
taken to be predominant in a state in a given period and is discernible in the actions and attitudes of its 
government.'
I. PARAMETERS OF GREEK SECURITY POLICY
As a small nation located in the midst of a conflict-ridden region and experiencing serious 
difficulties with virtually all its neighbours, the Greeks contend that their security posture is shaped by the 
following two concepts of central importance; preservation of national sovereignty and, along with it, the 
historical, cultural and religious heritage of the Greek people; and the safeguarding of Greek territorial 
integrity and maritime zones and airspace rights considered by them to be legitimate. Other Greek national 
interests, of marginally lesser importance include; the preservation of the economic welfare and quality of 
life of the Greek people; the survival of the state of Cyprus; the continued existence and well-being of Greek 
minorities and Diaspora elsewhere; and the world-wide promotion of Greek orthodoxy’s principles and 
values.^
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On the basis of those underlying principles, the national security objectives with respect to those
regions and/or coimtries adjacent to Greece can be identified as follows;
• Towards the Balkans: Greece seeks to: discourage the revival of old territorial, religious and ethnic 
feuds, so as to assure Greek territorial integrity in the north; pay close attention to the fate and well­
being of the Greek ethnic minority in Albania; prevent the formation of an anti-Greek coalition, 
particularly with Turkish involvement and create instead an anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish security 
grouping within the arc of orthodoxy stretching from Moscow to Nicosia; when necessary, take pre­
emptive action to avert turmoil in her immediate vicinity, with the twin objectives of avoiding the 
emergence of power vacuums that could be filled by external powers, and to forestall the spill-over 
effects in the form of post-Cold War security threats such as ethnic violence, refugee influx, arms and 
drug-smuggling activities etc., all of which are viewed as templates for crises that could spill down the 
Balkan peninsula into Greece.* Given the comparatively limited and, in fact, negligible military 
capabilities of Greece’s Balkan neighbours, non-military instruments in the form of diplomatic overtures 
gain utmost importance in Athens’ dealings within that region.
• Towards the Middle East: Athens has traditionally sought to distance itself from Western interventions 
in the Middle East and avoided becoming a front-line state, so as to maximise the interests and strength 
of the Greek Diaspora in the Near East and reap economic benefits through increased commercial 
transactions within the region. A further goal has been to increase Greece’s political and diplomatic 
weight, thereby counter-balancing Turkish influence in the region.
• Towards Turkey: Greece perceives that Turkey has specific claims and objectives directed towards 
Greek territory and sovereign rights in contravention of international law. Accordingly, in Thrace, Greek 
security goals take the form of securing Greek territorial integrity by rendering a Turkish military 
incursion across the border ineffective and minimising the likelihood of subversive action by the Turkish 
minority residing in Western Thrace. With regard to the Aegean littoral, Greek action aims to secure the 
territorial integrity of the island territories with the mainland, and calls therefore for comprehensive, 
permanent and imchallenged Greek control over both islands themselves and the maritime zones and 
airspace separating them from each other.^ Finally, with respect to Cyprus, in order to enable the 
hopelessly out-powered Greek Cypriot government to deter and/or repel possible Turkish aggression 
and, should the opportunity arise, to roll back the Turkish military presence on the island, Athens’ 
national security objectives incorporated the extension of sufficiently-credible security guarantees and 
military assistance to that relatively far-off island state. Given the on-going tension in Western Thrace 
and Cyprus and the fi~equent confrontations with Ankara over the width of the territorial waters, 
continental shelf and airspace, realisation of those goals against a militarily superior Turkey undoubtedly 
does necessitate the permanent and sufficiently-effective deployment of Greek military assets over a 
large area, extending all the way fi'om the over-land border in Thrace, through the full width of the
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Aegean littoral and Eastern Mediterranean and reaching the island of Cyprus, some 1,500 kilometres 
away. Hence, Greece’s peculiar geographic circumstances, along with the way its national security 
interests vis-à-vis Turkey have been defined, render its miUtary capabilities the most significant 
component of the security policies aimed at countering the perceived Turkish threat.
Deterrent posture
In the official parlance, Greece’s security policy is based on an active foreign policy and capable 
armed forces.* Accordingly, on the basis of our most recent observations, it is possible to argue that, while 
against the Balkans and North Afnca, foreign policy is the predominant instrument of the Greek national 
security, against Turkey, military capabilities preside over foreign policy. In other words, priority is 
attached to developing the capabilities of the Greek armed forces and substantial resources are allocated to 
that end due exclusively to the perceived Turkish threat. However, this by no means equates to Greek armed 
forces alone being used in Athens’ dealings with Turkey. On the contrary, Greek foreign policy undoubtedly 
plays an important part. The interaction between military capabilities and diplomacy in Greece’s complex 
set of relations with Turkey can best be clarified through a closer examination of Greece’s deterrent posture 
vis-à-vis Turkey.
In this regard, as many other coimtries', the broad purpose of Greece's deterrent posture is to avert 
aggression, persuading the opponent that the costs of using military force against Greece will outweigh the 
benefits. The Greek deterrent posture in this sense incorporates a strong element of national deterrence, 
which involves both denial to enemy of battlefield objectives, and punishment (also referred to as 
retaliation) -  i.e. damage inflicted on military and other assets of the aggressor. Unsurprisingly, the 
achievement of those goals necessitates both the creation of strong armed forces and the ability to signal to 
the potential opponent a readiness to use them when and if necessary. In addition to this indispensable 
element of national deterrence, Greek deterrent posture against Turkey encompasses three additional layers;*
• International deterrence, which seeks to exploit the opportunities and advantages accruing from 
Greece’s membership of NATO, EU, WEU, its alliance ties with The US, and the uncertainty arising 
from Greece’s sketchy alliance schemes with Turkey’s other neighbours, all of which, it is hoped, 
increase the costs and risks accruing to Turkey if taking military action against Greece and thereby deter 
Turkish aggression.
• Extended deterrence, which involves the extension of security guarantees beyond Greece’s own 
territory to cover the island of Cyprus. However, the credibility of such a commitment depends upon 
Greece’s capability to deny Turkey its objectives in Cyprus - an extremely difficult task given the 
geographic distance between Greece and Cyprus. Therefore, deterrence against Turkish ambitions on 
Cyprus is sought through a threat to escalate any conflict there into an all-out war, whose credibility is 
destined to remain questionable.
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• Intra-deterrence, which foresees the threat of retaliatory blows and/or further escalation after the 
outbreak of hostilities, in order to confine the conflict to a particular region or minimise possible Greek 
losses by bringing a swift end to the fighting. When applied to Greek-Turkish relations, this notion, 
frequently used in conjrmction with nuclear deterrence theories, would entail actual or symbolic 
retaliatory action by Greece (i.e. air strikes against economic targets and population centres in Turkey) 
to prevent the imminent loss of Greek territory or other vital assets.
Basically, Greece's deterrent posture is based on the goal of making Greece a hard prey to swallow. 
This objective dictates that not only defensive, but also offensive capabilities are imperative to carry the 
fighting into the opponent’s territory.’ Likewise, in addition to her military capabilities, foreign policy tools 
and Greece’s relations with outside powers must be exploited to the full.
Virtues expected of Greek armed forces
For the purposes of this study, Greek foreign policy's role as a national security instrument will not 
be elaborated any further, but emphasis placed on the characteristics of the Greek armed forces. As 
mentioned elsewhere, the Greek military intends to preserve its status as a modem, strong and flexible tool 
of security policy, capable of achieving credible deterrence and, if needed, of safeguarding Greece’s 
territorial integrity and sovereign rights within its national space. Furthermore, at least according to 
rhetoric, the Greek armed forces are also expected to take part in NATO and WEU schemes, in the form of 
collective defence and/or peacekeeping operations.® Accordingly, the armed forces' battleworthiness and 
cohesion constitute one of their primary goals, pre-supposing a high level of training, the continuous 
modernisation of equipment and introduction into service of state-of-the-art technologies.®
Since other neighbouring countries are not believed to possess the capability to pose a substantial 
military threat to Greece, the main preoccupation of the Greek armed forces and the make-up of the 
accompanying military doctrines and force are based on the perceived Turkish threat and military 
capabilities at the disposal of Ankara. Together with their preoccupation with Turkey and in order to 
counter the military capabilities of the latter, Greek armed forces are expected to demonstrate the following 
virtues and characteristics;
• Qualitative superiority; In order to deter aggression and pursue Greek national interests, Greek armed 
forces must be sufficiently strong. In this regard, force multiplication is perceived as the only way by 
which a small coimtry like Greece can successfully confront the threat posed by a neighbour that 
possesses a much larger number of troops. In other words, in order to challenge Turkey’s niunerical 
superiority, superior quality is sought, the aim being to acquire technology-intensive, rather than 
human-intensive military capabilities.'®
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• Rapid mobilisation and rapid movement of reinforcements. With a population of just over 10 million and 
static birth rate, Greece pushes forward all her human resources to produce a standing armed forces 
totalling some 160,000 -  only a fifth the size of its main rival Turkey. In times of need, however, this 
munber can be increased by 435,000 mobilised reserves, bringing the total defence force to 
approximately 600,000. The recall of reservists for refresher training annually affects between 30,000 
and 40,000 men and places an additional strain on the national defence budget. However, this is 
perceived by Greek planners as a condition sine qua non for an army which is highly dependent on its 
reserves." Furthermore, given the lack of geographic continuity of Greek territory (i.e. large extents of 
sea separating the mainland from thousands of islands and the territories in Thrace being connected to 
the rest of the country through a choke point no more than 25 km in width), besides the mobilisation of 
fairly large number of reserves, their timely amval to the easternmost territories of the country is of the 
utmost importance. Thus, free maritime and airborne access to all points of national space, as well as the 
availability of requisite transport means become imperative.
Forward defence of Greek national territory and Cyprus. Greece’s strategic environment, dictated by its 
geography, results in a lack of strategic depth and the extreme vulnerability of communications lanes to 
the island territories and Cyprus necessitates the adoption of the ‘defence begins at the border’ principle. 
In other words, given their remoteness fi’om the Greek mainland, if any of the Greek islands and Cyprus 
are lost to enemy action, their recovery would be virtually impossible. Consequently, geographic 
circumstances dictate a peacetime deployment of Greek military units to forward positions, as well as the 
maintenance of very high response and readmess rates.
Swift and decisive military action. As a small nation whose economic livelihood is dependant on tourism 
and the shipping industry, the Greeks have no illusions about the limited sustainability and force 
generation capabilities of their coimtry. Subsequently, should hostilities break out, the Greek armed 
forces would have to gear themselves for an armed confrontation of limited duration, of days, rather than 
weeks or months. A Greek-Turkish war would be expected to generate strong US and Western pressure 
on both warring parties to halt hostilities at once. Even military action by outside powers to that end is 
not inconceivable. Consequently, should circumstances favour Greece on the battlefront, swift and 
decisive military action is imperative to achieve pre-set tactical and strategic goals. On the other hand, 
should Turkey gain the initiative, Greek forces must be in a position to repel incursions and secure vital 
Greek territory until international pressure can be brought to bear upon the enemy.
Highly flexible and responsive force structure. Due to the peculiarities in Greece’s strategic environment 
(an extremely large front-line of some 1,500 kilometres, hundreds of lightly-defended islands located a 
few miles off the Turkish mainland and the exposed and isolated position of the island of Cyprus), 
Turkey holds both strategic advantage (the ability to decide when and where to strike) and tactical 
advantage(a chance to choose the means and the particular tactics to be used) over the Greek armed
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forces. Consequently, high-value military assets are held back, and the military assets deployed on the 
Greek islands and Cyprus are designed to act as a trip-wire, revealing the real direction and magnitude of 
a possible Turkish thrust and delaying it until the arrival of highly-mobile ground, naval and especially 
aerial assets, in their turn expected to repel possible enemy incursions.’  ^ However, the need for a high 
degree of flexibility and responsiveness dictates the deployment of highly-trained and preferably 
professional troops, as well as copious naval and aerial transport assets, none of which are readily 
available nor low-cost items.
Reliance on conventional capabilities. Greece supports global non-proliferation efforts through 
ratification of all relevant international arms control and non-proliferation treaties (among them the 
Geneva Protocol, the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the Inhumane Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention) and 
through her participation in a number of export control regimes (i.e. Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile 
Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group). Along with its international 
treaty-bound status as a non-nuclear, non-biological and non-chemical weapon state, and due to 
Turkey’s comparable lack of interest in those capabilities, Greece’s military has to date refrained from 
showing any interest in non-conventional weapons.
Ability to open a second front. In Greece's view, Turkey is a formidable opponent possessing not only 
strategic and tactical advantage, but also superior military capabilities that could be readily applied in 
the Aegean theatre of operations and in Cyprus. Hence, the Greek armed forces’ best chance of tipping 
the balance in their favour lies in their ability to cause a diversion in Turkey’s war effort, a goal which 
could be fulfilled by opening up a second front to the south, east or north of Asia M i n o r . I n  this 
respect, a readily available alternative presents itself in Cyprus, whose valuable strategic location as a 
natural ‘aircraft carrier’ off the Turkish coast, could well be exploited by Greek armed forces to open up 
a second front against Turkey’s soft belly to the south. Correspondingly, should they acquire the 
necessary strike elements and basing facilities to operate from the Greek sector of Cyprus, the Greek 
armed forces would complicate Turkey’s military calculations considerably. Likewise, especially during 
the mid-1990s, there has been widespread speculation about the possibility of a Greek-Syrian military 
alliance that also incorporated basing rights for Greek fighter aircraft.
Suitability to crisis management. The assets at the disposal of Greek armed forces must be capable of 
help containing and controlling prospective crises in the Aegean, Cyprus and elsewhere along Greek- 
Turkish divide. Accordingly, aside the types of military and formations that lend themselves to ventral 
control and direction, highly visible military assets with long-lasting presence in the crisis zone would be 
preferable. Conversely, decision-makers in both capitals would find platforms with very high speed and 
accompanying short reaction times less desirable.
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Minimise dependence on foreign arms supplies. As a direct outcome of the consecutive arms embargoes 
imposed on Greece during the rule of the Colonels and during the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the impetus 
arose to gradually diversify arms supply sources and develop the Greek defence industry, with the 
primary aim of boosting Hellenic armed forces’ self-sufficiency and sustainability, especially in times of 
high-tension and armed confrontation.'* Consequently, attempts have been made during the last two 
decades to reduce Greece’s absolute dependence on US arms supplies, and increased armaments co­
operation has been sought with European countries and, more recently, the Russian Federation.”
In the light of Greece’s national security goals and the particular characteristics of Greek armed 
forces, it is possible to conclude that investment in air power capabilities constitutes the most feasible form 
of military build-up for Greece. It is further possible to argue that air power is closely followed by naval 
power, while the role of Greek ground forces could be categorised as ancillary. The best way to substantiate 
this assertion is to compare the virtues and qualities of air power against those of the Greek military in 
general.
Accordingly, air power’s underlying status as the most technology-intensive form of military power 
falfils the Greek pre-requisite for ‘qualitative superiority’; its inherent flexibility and versatility fulfils the 
Greek goals concerning ‘rapid reinforcement’, ‘forward defence’ (even when deployed backwards), ‘swift 
and decisive action’ (on the basis of aerial combat’s high tempo), ‘flexibility and responsiveness’, 
‘conventional capabilities’ and, finally, the imperative to open a ‘second front’, for which air power 
constitutes the only viable option. However, given air power’s absolute reliance on state-of-the-art 
specialised equipment, ‘independence from foreign suppliers’ constitutes the one virtue that cannot readily 
be fulfilled by when placing emphasis on the aerial component of the Greek armed forces. Similarly, the 
very volatility that combat aircraft tend to introduce into crises means that ‘suitability to crisis management’ 
is another aspect whereby the use of air power would not be desirable.
To illustrate more clearly these observations, the geographic and operational circumstances under 
which Greek armed forces are expected to fulfil their missions need to be analysed more thoroughly. In this 
regard, one of the most peculiar characteristics of Greece's operational environment is the length of its 
dividing line with Turkey (some 1,500 kilometres running mostly through the island-dotted waters of the 
Aegean Sea) and its compartmentalised nature (consisting of an operational sub-theatre in Thrace, 
numerous island groups in the Aegean and Cyprus as a separate theatre by itself). In fact, only air power 
and, to a much more limited extent, naval power, possess the inherent speed, flexibility and versatility 
needed to provide comprehensive coverage over the full length of this dividing line and to concentrate their 
powers at short notice over decisive points of possible enemy incursion.'*
Furthermore, since most Greek-Turkish disputes revolve around the differing interpretations of such 
issues as the width and control of the airspace, the limit of territorial waters, and the demarcation of the
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continental shelf, the aerial and naval components of the Greek armed forces' responsibilities extend into 
peace-time operations as well, including the imposition of permanent Greek control over the disputed air and 
maritime zones in the Aegean. On this account, while combat aircraft excel as platforms to respond to any 
incursions and/or confrontations along the Greek-Turkish dividing line, the dose of urgency and volatility 
they bring about render naval assets more suitable platforms to contain and control longer-term crises and 
confrontations. Meanwhile, the Greek army is expected to fulfil a war-time-only role, securing Greek 
territory in Thrace, and preventing the overrunning of the eastern Aegean islands.
A further consideration for Greek force planners is that the success of their war effort in the 
Aegean, Thrace or Cyprus depends to a large extent on the immediate provision of war-time reinforcements 
to those forward deployed units that come under direct attack. The implementation of this scheme would 
only be possible through unchallenged Greek control over air and maritime traffic through the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Seas. The same applies to the augmentation of Greek Cypriot military capabilities in a 
timely manner, which could only be achieved through the lending of air support and founding of an air 
bridge between the two countries. Obviously, at the height of a conflict lasting a few days, air transport 
would be the only type of military capability able to serve those goals.
Last but not least, because of the absence of a substantial land border with Turkey, the launching of 
retaliatory blows (representing the 'punishment' leg of the Greek deterrent posture) against high-value 
targets on the Turkish mainland, could only be achieved by the Hellenic Air Force.
Before concluding our observations, the implications of the principles identified hitherto on the 
responsibilities allotted to the each of the Greek armed services will be elaborated. Accordingly, the 
individual missions and service doctrines of the three branches of the Greek Armed Forces could be outlined 
as follows:
• Hellenic Army: Its primary mission is to safeguard the integrity of the Greek national mainland and 
island territories according to a, primarily, defensive doctrine.'® Over the last 25 years, one third of its 
troop strength has been positioned to defend the Greek islands in the Aegean, while the best equipped 
and trained of the remainder has been deployed along defensive positions in Thrace, across the Turkish 
frontier. Conversely, the orientation of the ground units despatched along the Albanian and Macedonian 
frontiers remains one of border patrol, while the small contingent deployed in Cyprus is tasked with 
assisting the activities of its Cypriot counterpart. The end of The Cold War made it imperative for the 
Hellenic Army to transform itself into a more mobile and flexible force and, along with a recent 
regrouping effort, parts of the mainland-deployed army units are being transformed into a modem rapid- 
reaction force, comprising amphibious and/or airborne-capable elite contingents and their accompanying 
maritime and airborne transport assets. In times of high tension, this rapid-reaction force will be 
expected to be dispatched immediately to the crisis area.^°
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Hellenic N aw : The areas of immediate interest and possible future maritime operation theatres for the 
Hellenic Navy are the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas. Accordingly, its primary missions are to 
defend the Greek islands and coast, sea control, projection of power, and secure sea lanes of 
communications. Additionally, in times of high tension or actual combat with Turkey, the Hellenic Navy 
will be expected to exert control over the disputed maritime zones, provide the vital fire support to 
combat on the islands and help supplement the latter with reinforcements and also, for the purpose of 
diplomatic pressure or intra-deterrence, to deny Turkey the use of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean 
Seas. In this regard, the unique morphology of the Aegean avails itself to an unusual type of naval 
warfare, in which over 3,000 islands and islets canalise maritime traffic into a narrow corridor with at 
least three choke points formed by island complexes.^' Subsequently, with its main assets normally 
located at Piraeus, Salamis, Poros and Suoda Bay, the Hellenic Navy chooses powerful naval units and 
island-deployed anti-ship missiles able to deal effective blows and, with the help of the land-based strike 
aircraft, block those successive choke points in the Aegean.^^
Hellenic Air Force: Not unlike its naval counter-part, the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) also has a role and 
duties during peacetime in the form exerting control over disputed air and maritime zones in the Aegean. 
At the outbreak of an armed conflict, the highest priority of the HAF would be to defend Greek air space 
against possible incursions by enemy aircraft and thereafter attain air superiority, so as to extend timely 
assistance to fnendly ground and naval units, both through air support sorties and air transport flights 
aimed at replenishing and augmenting distressed ground units. In the case of an all-out war with Turkey, 
the HAF aircraft could also be called on to launch retaliatory/punishment sorties against high-value 
targets on the Turkish mainland and to respond to distress calls of the Greek combatants in Cyprus.
II. RESOURCES DEVOTED TO DEFENCE
The degree to which the Greek military instrument would be able to fulfil the virtues expected of it 
is a function of the economic and human resources allocated for that purpose and the success (or failure) of 
the military authorities to exploit these resources in full. The intellectual exercise of defining a nation’s 
national security objectives and subsequent struggle to fulfil those objectives cannot be treated in isolation 
from the economic and human resources available to fulfil them. Hence, as a first step towards measuring 
the effectiveness and success of the Greek armed forces, and Greek air power in particular, in fulfilling 
those duties and missions entrusted to them, we need to identify the limits to the human and economic 
resources that could be allocated to Greek military instrument. Accordingly, we will conclude this chapter 
with a brief analysis of the human and economic resources available to Greece to boost its military 
capabilities.
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Human resources
Of a total population of 10,5 million, the pool of young Greek males (i.e. between the ages of 18 
and 32) readily available for military service amounts to some 1,2 million. Of those, 168,300 are currently 
under arms in the Hellenic Armed Forces, either as conscripts or professional cadres. This number is 
supplemented by 291,000 reservists that can be called up for service at short notice in the case of a national 
emergency.^^
Those figures are quite large for a country of Greece's size and are maintainable at their current 
level thanks to a lengthy compulsory military service term for young conscripts, in fact the longest amongst 
NATO countries: the standard term of service for reserve officers is 23 months and for 19 years-old non- 
ranked conscripts between 18 and 21 months.According to official statistics, the personnel involved daily 
in the country's defence is close to six per cent of the country’s total labour force. As Table-2 clearly 
demonstrates, that figure is almost three times the NATO average and certainly constitutes a heavy burden 
on Greek economic and social life.^  ^Because of this, an attempt was made in the early-1990s to reduce the 
term of military service, but citing the emerging instability in the Balkans, those plans were quickly 
cancelled and the length of military service is likely to stay at its current levels for the foreseeable future.“
TabIe-2: The share of Greek military personnel within national labour force.^
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997e
Military pers. ratio to labour force (%) 6.2 6.5 6.1 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.3
NATO average (%) NA NA 2.8 2.8 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.8
In addition to active forces, the mobilisable reserve system is also an extra burden for Greece. In 
this respect, every Greek male who has been a conscript has a reserve obligation until 50 years of age and, 
for reserve officers, this period extends till the age of 60. The recall of reservists, both officers and other 
ranks, annually affects between 30,000 and 40,000 men, who are mobilised for exercises, courses and 
meetings to familiarise themselves with new units and new weapons. The Greek officials admit that, “it is a 
large number and an additional strain on the finances which are not liberal for the armed forces”.“  In fact, if 
Greece proceeds with its plans to establish a “People’s Defence Organisation” (an entity to include all males 
between the ages of 19 and 65, as well as all females between 19 and 50, and to provide all capable Greek 
citizens with 12 days of military training annually), the loss of labour hours in other segments of social and 
economic life would further increase and Greece would solidify its reputation as the Western world’s most 
heavily militarised society.^^
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Further, the importance of the fact that, as a result of the population decline in Greece, the Hellenic 
Armed Forces is experiencing major difficulty in preserving its current force levels should never be 
underestimated. While the introduction of a five-year voluntary military service for vital duties and the 
opening of military ranks to females could temporarily substitute for the erosion in new conscripts, those 
measures will further increase the economic and social hardships currently being imposed on Greek 
society.^®
It is possible to affirm that Greece’s human resources are already over-stretched to meet even 
existing force levels and, leaving aside the war-time mobilisation of the reserves, any further -and unlikely- 
increase in military personnel has the potential of further upsetting Greece's already-strained economic and 
social life.
Economic and financial resources
Greek defence spending is somewhat difficult to track because it is drawn from several accounts. 
The national defence budget approved by the Greek parliament each year reflects only part of military 
expenditure. Running in parallel with the Defence Budget, the procurement of major defence equipment is 
funded under a supplementary budget and other defence-related expenses, such as pensions, appear under 
the Ministry of Finance's budget. Likewise, foreign military aid once received from Germany and The US, 
as well as NATO-funded defence infrastructure investments do not appear in official defence spending 
figures which accounts for the disparity between official and non-official estimates of Greek military 
expenditures.^'
Despite these uncertainties, figures released annually by NATO paint a vivid portrait of the overall 
magnitude of Greek defence spending. Indeed, as Figure-5 reveals, Greece's defence expenditure has been 
buoyant, rising more than 100 per cent in the period from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, being preserved 
at that level ever since. From a different perspective, Figure-6 illustrates that, despite annual fluctuations, 
Greek defence spending has been set at roughly 5 per cent of the Grand Domestic Product (GDP), and 
accounts for roughly 20 per cent of the national budget over the years.Finally, Figure-7 is indicates that, 
among 16 NATO member states, Greece has the highest ratio of defence spending. In fact, along with its 
Turkish and Portuguese counterparts, the Greek national economy ranks as one of the weakest, not only 
within NATO, but also in the entire western world.^  ^One could safely assert, therefore that Greek economic 
fortunes can far from sustain current levels of military spending. As we will elaborate shortly, it could also 
be argued that at least some of Greece's economic ills and bottlenecks are due to disproportionately high 
levels of military spending by Athens for more than two decades.
Leaving aside NATO, the same observations could be upheld in a regional context. In this respect, 
Figure-8 is misleading, in that it gives the impression, at least in a regional context, a high percentage of 
defence spending is normal and that, in comparison with the size of its economy, Greece is spending a lower
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(*) Data compiled from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-1998, 
Section on Tables & Analyses.__________  ______________
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percentage of its economic wealth on defence than most its neighbours. Of the three countries spending 
more on defence than Greece, Libya has long made a way of life high military spending and virulent threats 
to use brute force, whereas civil war-stricken Albania and the newly-independent Macedonia are in the 
midst of an extensive effort to create militaries from scratch.
A more meaningful and accurate picture is seen in Figure-9, illustrating that, thanks to its annual 
military spending of nearly six billion dollars, Greece holds overwhelming superiority over all its 
neighbours, the only exception being Turkey, whose much larger population and rapidly growing economic 
might means Greece is unable to compete. In other words, even given its extremely high levels of military 
spending, Athens cannot realistically hope to match the military expenditure of its main adversary Turkey. 
This fact becomes yet more apparent in Figure-10, which clearly demonstrates that Greece is being 
increasingly outclassed by Turkey in equipment acquisition expenditures, the most relevant category in 
force build-up. There are indications that, in stark contrast with the lack of interest on the part of Greek 
public, at least some within Greek defence planning circles fully comprehend and watch with despair this 
continuously accelerating trend. '^'
As shown in Table-3, an equally striking aspect of Greek military spending derives from the fact 
that, sequential increases in Greek defence spending are not always matched by growth in the national 
economy. In fact, in all other Western countries a healthy and flourishing national economy is perceived as 
the number one pre-requisite for an effective defensive posture. Whereas in Greece, this principle has been 
too easily overlooked by the decision-makers and often defence expenditures have been allowed to work to 
the detriment of economic development. Former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, fort instance, justified 
high levels of defence spending in the 1980's by arguing that “schools and hospitals are of much greater 
importance in the long run; but we are in a period when neither schools nor hospitals will mean much if we 
cannot defend our territorial integrity”.^  ^ Subsequently, as one of the country’s defence ministers pointed 
out, the Greek defence budget has always been a major drains on the state and is likely to be maintained at a 
similar level, despite the country's critical economic situation.” ®^
Tablc-3: Annual variation (%) of defence expenditures and GDP, based on constant prices/’
Period 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995 1996 1997e
Defence expenditures 6.2 4.6 8.0 -3.9 -0.7 1.8 5.4 5.2
GDP 6.5 5.3 0.5 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.6 3.5
It is noteworthy that, in the aftermath of the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996, the decision was reached 
to allocate an additional 4 trillion drachmas ($16 billion) for defence acquisitions over the course of the 
following ten years, despite the realisation among Greek decision-makers that the Greek economy could not
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(*) Data compiled from The Military Balance 1997-98, Tables and Analyses.
Figure-10: Comparison of Military Procurement Expenditure Between Greece and Turkey, at 1990
prices and exchange rates, in million
(*) Data drawn from SIPRI Yearbook on Armament and Disarmament 1996, pp. 185-86; 
“Turkey Boosts Procurement Budget to $3.3 Billion in 1998”, Defense News, 27 October-2 
November 1997, p.l7.
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shoulder the weight of additional defence spending.^* Indeed, faced with an acute lack of fresh funds within 
the Greek national budget, and pressured by the European Union to scale back public spending, the Greek 
government declared that it was hoping to finance this new wave of defence expenditure in part through 
loans raised on the international money markets and in part through pending FMS credits from The US, 
while the possibility of a special tax has not been ruled out by the Greek government officials.^®
In the context of Greek defence military spending, deserving of brief mention is the ultimate 
destination of financial resources devoted to defence. Figures released by NATO for the year 1997 indicate 
that over 62 per cent of Greek defence spending is allocated to personnel expenditures and a further 16 per 
cent and 2 per cent to operating and infrastructure expenditures respectively.^® In other words, nearly 80 per 
cent of financial resources are directed towards those spending categories that would stay within the 
confines of Greek national economy. The remaining 20 per cent, amounting to over $1 billion atmually, is 
being used to finance the purchase of major defence equipment. Since Greece has failed to develop a critical 
mass in high-technology products, the local defence industry turns out a mere 20 per cent of the Armed 
Forces’ major equipment needs, the remainder, costing at least $800 million annually, is procured abroad.'" 
In fact, according to SIPRI statistics, those figures place Greece in fifth rank among the world’s leading 
arms recipients and causes a major drain on Greek economic wealth.'’^
Aside from the national resources diverted towards the defence of the country, brief mention should 
also be made of foreign military assistance Greece has received from its Western allies for over five 
decades. Indeed, throughout The Cold War years, Greece was a major recipient of foreign military aid from 
The US and Germany, while the Netherlands, Canada and Norway also provided Greece with surplus 
military equipment. Likewise, the NATO Infrastructure Fund used to finance the construction and continued 
operations of a number of NATO facilities (i.e. radar sites, airfields, storage sites, refuelling facilities, naval 
installations, etc.) on Greek soil, also constituting a net contribution to the defence of the country.
Since the end of The Cold War, however, Greek fortunes in terms of foreign military assistance 
have started to decline dramatically. The first serious blow came through the decline and finally evaporation 
of German military aid. Since it began in 1963, German military assistance had consisted of DM70 million 
packages given at 18-month intervals which provided Athens with valuable financial resources to purchase 
German-made defence items at cut-rate prices. The German government informed Athens in 1995 that the 
cost of the reunification had forced Germany to cease her annual military aid.''^
The second, and even more significant blow, was caused by drastic cuts in US military aid to 
Greece. Since 1947, Greece has received sizeable military assistance from The US in the form of FMS 
(Foreign Military Sales) credits to purchase US-made equipment, grant military aid (MAP) packages, grant 
military training (IMET) programmes and economic support funds (ESF). From 1950 to 1992, overall US 
security assistance was substantial indeed, amounting to more than $7 billion under military packages and a 
few billion additional dollars under economic support funds.S ince the end of The Cold War, however, a
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Data drawn from; The Military Balance 1997-1998, p.56; DMS Market Intelligence Review, p.5; “US May End 
Turk, Greek Aid”, Defense News, 26 January-1 February 1998, p.l.
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Steady decline has been observed in US military and economic assistance and, as Figure-11 clearly 
demonstrates, in the course of the last six years, US military aid to Greece has shrunk to one-third of its 
1992 level. To make the matters worse, since 1979, US military assistance to Greece has taken the form of 
loan and credit packages that will have to be paid back after a grace period of 5 to 10 years. Consequently, 
from the perspective Athens, the attractiveness of the of US military assistance has been on a steady decline 
and, as one of the Greek Defence Ministers expressed back in 1984: “through FMS credits Greece 
purchases major equipment from The US, but the terms under which this kind of assistance is provided are 
considered unfavourable for our country.Consequently, over the years, only a fraction of the FMS 
credits being made available to Greece have been taken up and the only category of US military aid that still 
carries some degree of importance for Greece is the Southern Region Amendment (SRA), under which the 
Hellenic Armed Forces are furnished with surplus US equipment.'*®
Last but not least, NATO's ‘cascading’ programme which came into effect in the aftermath of the 
1990 CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty and provided the southern flank countries of the 
Alliance with substantial quantities of surplus defence equipment, is rapidly drying up as well. After all, the 
slack created by CFE in the inventories of Western European and North America militaries, has been 
soaked up by cascading and, while Greece benefited in a major way from those transfers, the equipment 
holdings available for future transfers have simply dried up.
III. EPILOGUE TO CHAPTER FOUR
Since the Greek public and policy makers alike continue to perceive an imminent Turkish military 
threat directed towards their countr>’’s territorial integrity, it is hardly surprising that Greece’s deterrent 
posture and its accompanying force structure is shaped by the direction, nature and magnitude of 
anticipated Turkish military action. The Greeks assume that, given the imminent nature of the threat from 
the east, the existence of a 1,500 km long common border with Turkey and the vast number of exposed 
islands in the Aegean Sea, the Greek Armed Forces must be considerably larger than the size of the country 
dictates.
Yet, the maintenance and the modernisation of an armed force of this size is a heavy burden on the 
national budget and affects the economy adversely. Accordingly, Greece’s unfavourable economic 
circumstances as the poorest member of The EU, with the highest inflation rate and highest ratio of public 
zmd foreign debt, can, undoubtedly, be explained in large part by her exceptionally high level of defence 
spending. Even more importantly, the economic woes that Greece has been tackling are a clear indication 
that she has reached her ultimate economic limits, wherein any further increase in defence spending would 
seriously upset the economic balance and be to the detriment of national security. This finding is of
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particular significance because as more recent defence procurement figures clearly indicate, Turkey 
increasingly outclasses Greece in economic terms. If not immediately, at least in the medium term, this 
tendency will undoubtedly also be reflected in the military realm.
In other words, on the basis of the financial resources available to each side, Greece cannot 
realistically hope to match Turkey’s armaments efforts. In terms of both human and financial resources, 
Turkey appears to be too large a chunk to swallow for Greece. Consequently, the only option remaining for 
Greece is to compensate for this imbalance through more effective use of her human and material assets and 
boost the qualitative aspects of its defence potential to such heights that the unavoidable quantitative 
superiority of its opponent is neutralised. Herein lies the significance of air power for Greece, being, as 
previously stated, the most technology-intensive form of military might. However, given the inherent 
characteristics and limitations of the country, whether such a goal is realistic is of considerable significance, 
and will be answered in the course of following chapters. *
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CHAPTER 5
GREEK A m  POWER: DESCRffTIVE ANALYSIS
Our analysis of Greek air power will first eoncentrate on various static aspects of the Hellenic Air 
Force (HAF), such as its organisation, force and command structure, airfields, aircraft, munitions, air 
defence systems, the supporting infiastructure etc. This does not mean, however, that we shall omit air 
power-relevant assets at the disposal of the other two branches of the Greek armed forces and civilian 
entities in Greece. Whenever we shall also note aerial capabilities residing within the non-HAF entities, 
giving the reader a fuller picture of the air power capabilities found in Greece.
Historical background
The HAF has its roots in the early Greek experiments with the use aircraft during the Balkan Wars 
of 1912. However, despite a series of epic descriptions of air power's use during those years and the fact 
that the HAF became a separate branch of the armed forces back in 1930, the role of Greek military 
aviation remained rudimentary and even symbolic. During World War II, having had little impact against 
the German invaders, the HAF continued its struggle in North Africa along with British-led Allied Forces. 
After the war, the role played by the HAF in the Greek Civil War was not noteworthy either.'
During the 1950s, having moved on from the calamities and destruction wrought first by foreign 
occupation and then the civil war, the HAF finally found the opportunity to organise itself as an 'equal' arm 
of the Greek Armed Forces. Greece's membership of NATO in 1952 marked the beginning of direct 
benefits for the HAF in this regard. Thanks to a fairly large number of brand new jet fighters forming part 
of foreign aid packages and through a major NATO-funded infi^ructure programme, the HAF was 
presented with a golden opportunity to change its face and take its seat alongside the other two branches of 
the Greek armed forces.
Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974, while a tragedy for Greece in foreign policy terms, 
signified a turning point for the HAF. During the 1950s and 1960s, Greece had strictly followed the force 
planning and deployment guidelines adopted by NATO Headquarters at Brussels and had, therefore, geared 
itself to counter an over-land Warsaw Pact offensive which was expected to be launched by one of its 
northern neighbours. The HAF's role was to defend Greek airspace and, when necessary, to assist groimd 
combat in Thrace through close air support and interdiction sorties. Moreover, well into the 1970s, 
NATO's defensive strategy was based on an assured second-strike retaliatory capability, and thereby on 
close control of tactical nuclear weapons. However, this preoccupation with nuclear deterrence left little 
need on the part of member states for large-scale conventional air assets, Greece being no exception.
Figure-12: H AF combat aircraft strength.*
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Figure-13: HAF combat squadron strength.*
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Consequentiy, when Turkish forces landed on Cyprus, an island located some 750 km away from the 
closest Greek air base, the HAF realised in despair that it could neither defend the airspace above the island 
nor provide the much-needed assistance to the hard-pressed Greek Army units there. Furthermore, the HAF 
realised that its inferiority both in niunbers and quahty vis-à-vis its Turkish counterpart effectively ruled 
out the prospect of retaliatory strikes against Turkish mainland. Thus, among the results of the Greek- 
Turkish confrontation of 1974 was the determination to place emphasis on the HAF and convert it into the 
long-arm of the Greek war machine.
To fulfil this goal, subsequent Greek governments started earmarking a considerably larger 
percentage of an already expanded National Defence Budget towards air force-related items and projects. 
Included in this new drive was the acquisition of larger numbers of feiirly modem combat aircraft, as well 
as the constmction of new air bases and early-warning radar sites, all positioned against Turkey. Figures 
12, 13, 14 and 15 reveal the steady increase in the number of aircraft, combat squadrons, military airfields, 
and early warning radar sites post 1974.^
From the mid-1970s, another transformation which started taking place in the HAF concerned the 
countries from which major equipment was acquired. Until 1974, the HAF had been dependent on second­
hand equipment purchased or acquired free-of-charge from The US. After 1974, reflecting both the Greek 
frustration with what they perceived as US inaction in the face of Turkish mihtary operations against 
Cypms and the Greek government's willingness to demonstrate its will to align itself with European 
markets, France started to increase its share in HAF procurement programmes. This new tendency is best 
illustrated by the 1975 acquisition of Mirage fighters from France. Nonetheless, given the continuation of 
the US Military Assistance Program - with loans under favourable terms - and in conjunction with its large 
foreign debt commitment, Greece was forced to maintain with The US its long-term acquisition links for 
major military equipment, including those made on behalf of the air force.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a further expansion of the HAF's capabilities through the acquisition of 
third generation fighter aircraft both from France and The US, along with a large variety of advanced 
munitions, specialised equipment, such as electronic warfare gear, and a major upgrade of the national 
airspace management network to include new radars and communications links. Given the emphasis placed 
on air force programmes and items in the $16 billion EMPAE (Mid-Term Programme for the Development 
and Modernisation of the Armed Forces) disclosed by the Greek government in November 1996, at least for 
another decade or so, there is little doubt that the HAF will continue to enjoy its prominent position vis-à- 
vis other force commands.^
Mission
The officially-stated mission of the HAF is “to prevent war, protect national sovereignty and 
maintain the country's integrity in co-operation with the other services of the armed forces and the Allies.”" 
In order to accomplish these missions, “the HAF aims to acquire air supremacy, a concept which allows 
great freedom during the operations of the three armed services while denying it to the enemy. However, air
1 2 1
Figure-14 · Growth of Greek air search radar sites, 1975-1995.*
:::
X : : : i  B I
x::!;;;
y  : : y  -·
€
r-
\
^ ■  '::: ::: y ;;; :;;I y ^
■ i-^h
'W
;;
^==.
.
Iv^
:!!
U \
Saiiiy£ii6i$lBl9S5.
rfW
St* i?
) \V ^  ^ " r t  •’*i;:: :::
^  /-7
>^:·^ :·:·:<мУ f -
m m M  :·>:■
■
i .
::: ::: ::*^ :u :t: ::: ::: :;: :: - 1 ...................... ^i:: ;* x:: ::: ::j^ :: ::: ::: ::: ::: 4 v :» ::: ::: :::
·" ·* ··:-·*^■^-íJ:.:J./E :: .......
:^::jg »! ni .·: k:' ■  ■  !-''' ^  »"vigV’V *
\ i 5 : ^  r< .,>V > *
:::· \  Wtf i: :::m  i; .......
,  .r-2;;:
'?■"
^ ;v, '-«t U  ^ Ni, %
' ' A
\V ·
» :;·■
V '
0
l^ i ik r i^ i t i  l# 5 . iL H ^·.
i j i
lJ_cssj:
(*) Data drawn from DMS Market btteUigence, Greece Market Oveiview,pp.lO-l 1; "Procurenients”, 
bitemational Defense Review, 4/1990,p445; "NATO Bolsters Southern Region”, International Defense Review, 
1/I995,p.l3.
1 2 2
Reference; M-5, 1/1976, p.59; Congressional Research Service, Greece and Turk^: Some 
Implications Related to NATO and Middle East (Washington, D. C.:US Government Printing 
House, 1975), p. l l .
\
123
supremacy is a condition rarely achieved due to the economic cost and the volume of the required forces. 
The achievement of air superiority, i.e. the control of the air space at a specific time and place, therefore 
constitutes the most feasible target.”^
In addition to its more traditional responsibilities in safeguarding the integrity of Greek air space 
and its defence in general, after The Cold War, a further dimension was added to the HAF's duties: 
participation in multinational peacekeeping and expeditionary operations. In line with this new mission, 
quite fashionable throughout Western Europe, the HAF is expected to take necessary measures to boost its 
interoperability with other air forces and to acquire specialised gear for overseas deployment. This will be 
discussed in Chapter-7, suffice it to say here that the absence of concrete efforts to date to fulfil the pre­
requisites - i.e. special gear, training, etc. - of such a role may be taken as an indication of the low priority 
the HAF attaches to this mission.
Beyond these primary roles, the HAF also carries out important tasks for civilian benefit, such as 
putting out forest fires, crop dusting, search & rescue within the Athens Flight Information Zone (FIR) and 
air force assets are frequently used to transport sick people from the coimtry's isolated islands.®
Organisation
Under the peacetime co-ordination and wartime control of the Hellenic National Defence General 
Staff, the Chief of the Hellenic Air Force General Staff exercises full command and control over all units, 
personnel and equipment owned by the HAF (see Figure-16). Accordingly, the Air Force General Staff 
Headquarters located at Athens is organised into three branches: Operations, Personnel, and Logistics, all 
of which are guided and co-ordinated by the HAF Deputy-Chief of Staff’
Following NATO practices closely and, as shown in Figure-17, the basic levels of the HAF's 
organisational structure are the Hellenic Tactical Air Command, the Hellenic Air Support Command and 
the Hellenic Air Training Command. Of those, the Tactical Air Command, which is based at Larissa in 
central Greece, exercises the tactical control of all combat aircraft and air defence forces and is the 
operational headquarters of the whole HAF. Coming under the operational control of the Tactical Air 
Command are: 7 Combat Wings with two squadrons of an average 16-18 fighter aircraft each, 4 Combat 
Groups with one fighter squadron each, a single surface-to-air missile group and the Air Defence System 
equipped with a dense array of radars covering all Greek territory.*
The Air Support Command, in its turn, has its headquarters and main operating base at Elefsis, on 
the western outskirts of Athens. It is tasked with providing technical and material support to maintenance, 
supply and transport operations involving all units of the HAF and exercises command over two aircraft 
maintenance centres, a supply centre, all support units and services, as well as a single Combat Wing 
consisting of the HAF's entire transport aircraft, helicopter, and maritime patrol aircraft fleet.^
Regarding the Air Training Command, as its name indicates, this particular Command is tasked 
with meeting the training requirements of all HAF units. It has at its disposal the Air Force Academy (at 
Tatoi, immediately north of Athens) and the Weapons Tactics School (at Andravida, on the Ionian Sea
1 2 2
Reference: M-5, 1/1976, p.59; Congressional Research Service, Greece and Turkey: Some 
Implications Related to NATO and Middle East (Washington, D.C.:US Government Printing 
House, 1975), p. l l .
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supremacy is a condition rarely achieved due to the economic cost and the volume of the required forces. 
The achievement of air superiority, i.e. the control of the air space at a specific time and place, therefore 
constitutes the most feasible target.”*
In addition to its more traditional responsibilities in safeguarding the integrity of Greek air space 
and its defence in general, after The Cold War, a further dimension was added to the HAF's duties: 
participation in multinational peacekeeping and expeditionary operations. In line with this new mission, 
quite fashionable throughout Western Europe, the HAF is expected to take necessary measures to boost its 
interoperability with other air forces and to acquire specialised gear for overseas deployment. This will be 
discussed in Chapter-7, suffice it to say here that the absence of concrete efforts to date to fulfil the pre­
requisites - i.e. special gear, training, etc. - of such a role may be taken as an indication of the low priority 
the HAF attaches to this mission.
Beyond these primary roles, the HAF also carries out important tasks for civilian benefit, such as 
putting out forest fires, crop dusting, search & rescue within the Athens Flight Information Zone (FIR) and 
air force assets are frequently used to transport sick people from the country's isolated islands.®
Organisation
Under the peacetime co-ordination and wartime control of the Hellenic National Defence General 
Staff, the Chief of the Hellenic Air Force General Staff exercises füll command and control over all units, 
personnel and equipment owned by the HAF (see Figure-16). Accordingly, the Air Force General Staff 
Headquarters located at Athens is organised into three branches: Operations, Personnel, and Logistics, all 
of which are guided and co-ordinated by the HAF Deputy-Chief of Staff.’
Following NATO practices closely and, as shown in Figure-17, the basic levels of the HAF's 
organisational structure are the Hellenic Tactical Air Command, the Hellenic Air Support Command and 
the Hellenic Air Training Command. Of those, the Tactical Air Command, which is based at Larissa in 
central Greece, exercises the tactical control of all combat aircraft and air defence forces and is the 
operational headquarters of the whole HAF. Coming under the operational control of the Tactical Air 
Command are: 7 Combat Wings with two squadrons of an average 16-18 fighter aircraft each, 4 Combat 
Groups with one fighter squadron each, a single surface-to-air missile group and the Air Defence System 
equipped with a dense array of radars covering all Greek territory.*
The Air Support Command, in its turn, has its headquarters and main operating base at Elefsis, on 
the western outskirts of Athens. It is tasked with providing technical and material support to maintenance, 
supply and transport operations involving all units of the HAF and exercises command over two aircraft 
maintenance centres, a supply centre, all support units and services, as well as a single Combat Wing 
consistmg of the HAF's entire transport aircraft, helicopter, and maritime patrol aircraft fleet.®
Regarding the Air Training Command, as its name indicates, this particular Command is tasked 
with meeting the training requirements of all HAF units. It has at its disposal the Air Force Academy (at 
Tatoi, immediately north of Athens) and the Weapons Tactics School (at Andravida, on the Ionian Sea
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coast), as well as an Air Training Wing consisting of several types of training aircraft located at Kalamata, 
the southern tip of the Mora Peninsula.'®
Although the HAF has been given primary responsibility for the defence of Greek airspace and 
lending air support to surface combat, not all aerial assets fall within its organisational and command 
structure. The Hellenic Navy and the Hellenic Army deploy their own helicopters and light aircraft which, 
according to some senior Greek officers, is a mistake. “In a small country like Greece”, stated the Deputy 
Commander of the HAF, General George Scarlatos, “all machines should be flown by the air force (so that) 
you have a better command and control in a real situation”." Obviously, those remarks are indicative of the 
inter-service rivalry and jealousies between aerial, ground and naval components of the Hellenic Armed 
Forces, a phenomenon widely observed among the majority of miUtaries aroimd the world.
Its virtues and disadvantages aside, the Hellenic Army has a US-type aviation branch consisting of 
several aviation units which are under an independent directorate, reporting in its turn to the Army General 
Staff Headquarters in Athens. The operational elements of this branch comprise five battalions, each 
containing several companies of helicopters and fixed-wing light aircraft.'^ Likewise, the aerial component 
of the Hellenic Navy consists of a Naval Helicopter Command administered directly by the Naval 
Headquarters in Athens. When not on-board naval vessels, anti-submarine and surveillance helicopters 
belonging to this Command operate from the Koffoni air base (immediately east of Athens), where they are 
kept in independent squadrons.'^
Personnel
As of 1996, the HAF's official strength stood at 26,800. Of those, some 12,400 were regulars (i.e. 
officers and NCOs - non-commissioned officers), while the remainder consisted of conscripts and short­
term volunteers. Overall, some 1,100 women were also among the ranks of the HAF, though their positions 
are mostly subsidiary. In addition to these figures are 32,000 air force reservists, consisting of NCOs and 
conscripts that remain in reserve until 40, as well as retired officers who continue to be part of the reserve 
corps until the age of 50. The reservists are called up for refresher training lasting 6-10 days once every 
three years, held at fixed positions and involving occasional participation in National Exercises.''*
One of the frequently cited goals of the HAF has been the attainment of qualitative rather than 
quantitative superiority over neighbouring countries' air forces. As a result, besides the importance attached 
to modem and highly-capable military gear, they claim to place utmost emphasis on improving the human 
element of the HAF. However, whether those goals have been achieved and whether the material assets 
available to the HAF are manned and operated by competent and qualitatively superior personnel as 
suggested by the HAF's stated ‘superior human factor’ goals is highly questionable. In this regard, there is 
no doubt that the HAF is allotted the best human resources at the disposal of the Greek armed forces. For 
instance, whereas up to 70 per cent of the Army's units are composed of conscripts serving for a period of 
18 to 23 months, the HAF’s inherent need to operate with advanced technologies and sophisticated 
equipment, has enabled it to rely more heavily on the services of enlisted -  i.e. long-term and professional -  
cadres.'*
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However, this does not mean that the HAF’s demand for highly qualified human resources is fully 
met. To begin with, the best educated Greek youngsters, who tend to reside in urban areas, opt for non­
military careers offering much wider opportunities. Consequently, the Greek armed forces have 
traditionally been forced to recruit cadets primarily from agricultural and small towns, whose inhabitants 
are more likely to be attracted by the mobility, security, and prestige offered by the military. Hence, given 
the relatively low social acceptability of the armed forces in Greece, a steady stream of good quality 
candidates entering the professional branches of the various arms has not been realised, and quality at all 
levels could be said to be poor. Moreover, since the Hellenic Navy has been historically viewed as the most 
prestigious of the three services, the HAF and the Army have had to be content with less educated and 
sometimes less-qualified of the applicants.'®
A second factor tending to detract from the overall proficiency and quality of the most vital of all 
military cadres, mainly the officer corps, appears to emerge during the education of young cadets at service 
academies. Despite the fact that officership is depicted as a ‘sacred mission’ and the military cadets are 
called evelpis, meaning ‘the best hope for the nation’, at times governments have used service academies to 
indoctrinate cadets in the political values of an existing regime rather than in professional ethics.'^
Similarly, once out of the academy and posted to their units, another factor works to the detriment 
of professionalism: the politicisation of the military and, in particular, the officer’s corps, part of Greek 
politics since the early periods of the Hellenic Republic. The kinship and family connections that continue 
to characterise modem Greek politics and life, extends to the military. Subsequently, poUtical leaders seek 
to cultivate support from individuals (clientage) within the military and, while officers may resent the 
system, they do not hesitate to use an exchange of favours as a means of career advancement. Promotions 
and officer retirements, especially at senior ranks, have traditionally been dependent upon an officer’s 
support of the mling party or the appearance of complete neutrality; and for one to hold power in the armed 
forces, a certain political coloration is required.'* Furthermore, the coming to power of every new 
government in Greece has been accompanied by a campaign of purges and massive dismissals at the rank 
of general.'® Consequently, a military organisation which lets political affiliations gain precedence over 
professional qualities and experience, cannot be expected to fare very well on the basis of professional 
competence.
Air bases
As previously mentioned, the main fighting force of the HAF is the Tactical Air Command. With 
its headquarters at Larissa, in central Greece, this entity acts as the centre of the HAF's nervous system, 
controlling 7 Combat Wings and 7 Combat Groups stationed in air bases all around the country.^® Also 
reporting to Lanssa are two surface-to-air missile umts and a fairly large number of early warning radar 
sites, most of which are at the same time integral to the NADGE - NATO Air Defence Ground 
Environment - network.
Each Combat Wings and Combat Groups occupy an air base by themselves and the building 
blocks for both are squadrons of 13 to 19 aircraft. What sets them apart, however, is the number of
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squadrons - usually two or three - operated by Combat Wings, as against a single squadron fielded by each 
Combat Group. Perhaps, an even more significant distinction is the extent of supporting infrastructure 
available in their respective air bases. This includes repair and maintenance capabilities, ammunition and 
fiiel storage sites, air defence assets and hardened aircraft shelters. Air bases housing Combat Wings 
possess a much more comprehensive and self-sufficient infrastructure and are therefore labelled ‘Main 
Operating Bases’. The less sophisticated air bases, from which Combat Groups operate, are called 
‘Dispersal Air Bases’.
All told, in peacetime, the fighter and strike aircraft of the HAF operate fi’om 14 air bases (see 
Figure-18). Of those, the following seven are Main Operating Bases, housing a Combat Wing of, typically, 
two fighter squadrons; Larissa, Nea Anhialos, Thessaloniki-Mikra, Tanagra, Souda, Araxos and 
Andravida. The remainder are the so-called Dispersal Air Bases, each containing a Combat Group of a 
single fighter squadron: Iraklion, Kalamata, Limnos, Preveza, Agrinion, Thira, and Skiros.
In addition to these main and dispersal air bases are four airfields employed by the aircraft of the 
Air Support and Air Training Commands. From Elefsis Air Base near Athens the transport, liaison, fire­
fighting and anti-submarine warfare aircraft of the Air Support Conunand operate.^' The latter also 
controls the Marathon Air Base 30 km north-east of Athens, housing search & rescue helicopters, while 
from the Sedes airfield near Thessaloniki fly a handful of obsolescent C-47 Dakota transport planes. 
Meanwhile, the Air Training Command operates its fleet of training helicopters and basic training aircraft 
from the Tatoi airfield north of Athens, while the advanced trainers under its responsibility share the 
Kalamata Air Base with the combat squadrons of the Tactical Air Command.
In times of crisis, those airfields are certain to be augmented by a fairly large number of civilian 
airfields, some of which (i.e. Athens-Helinikon, Karpathos, Trippolis, Kavala, Kastellorizon/Megisti, 
Rhodes) are known to be furnished with provisions for military operations as well. In fact, since 1974 the 
construction of most civilian airfields in Greece has been undertaken as part of a plan to build airfields on 
all Aegean islands surrounding Turkey’s coast. Closer attention will later be paid to those airstrips under 
the section on supporting elements.“
As mentioned elsewhere, besides the HAF, the land and maritime branches of the Greek Armed 
Forces also possess a small number of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft that operate from separate airfields 
and air stations owned and controlled by their respective force commands. Accordingly, the recently formed 
Hellenic Army’s 1** Aviation Brigade which constitutes a key part of the army’s new rapid reaction force, 
controls four aviation battalions operating from the following airstrips; Stefanoviklio (serving central 
Greece), Pachi and Megara (serving Athens and the south), and Alexandroupoli (fielding helicopter 
gimships that are deployed near the Turkish border). The principal Army airstrip at Stefanaviklio is also 
home to a training battalion of four companies operating training helicopters and light surveillance aircraft. 
Meanwhile, the Hellenic Navy's helicopter squadrons are based at Kotroni air field near Athens.“
All told, and at least in comparison with other countries in the region, the number of active air 
bases owned and operated by the HAF is quite large. The Turkish Air Force, for instance, is tasked with 
safeguarding a territory six-times the size of Greece and deploys twice as many aeroplanes, yet, its combat
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aircraft operate from eight permanent air bases, and training, transport and miscellaneous aircraft use a 
further four airfields. These figures form a stark contrast with the 18 permanent air bases used by the HAF. 
In fact, in conjunction with political considerations and motives, as reflected in the recent declarations to 
permanently deploy HAF aircraft in the Kastellorizon/Megisti island off the Turkish coast and also in the 
Paphos air base in Cyprus, the number of Greek air bases could be further multiplied.^''
On the positive side, given the large and fragmented geography in which the HAF is expected to 
display a strong presence, a large number of air bases not only provides increased operational flexibility, 
but also aids the survival of assets. Conversely, a multitude of active air bases with a token force of combat 
aircraft deployed in each also gives rise to insurmountable problems of maintenance, logistic support, base 
protection and sustainability and tends to skyrocket operating and maintenance costs. In fact, this last point 
has also been made in commentaries by certain HAF officers. For instance, one of the HAF’s former 
Deputy Commanders was recorded as saying; “Greece has no plans to build any new bases. We probably 
have more than we need and if the economic situation deteriorates, we would have to close some active 
b a s e s . I t  is noteworthy that, since this commentary was made back in 1992, the number of HAF air 
bases has actually increased.
Aircraft
The HAF fields a total of 343 active and some 100 stored combat aircraft, plus a further 34 
aircraft used for reconnaissance, 38 for transport, 4 for maritime patrol and 114 for training. The air force 
also mans and operates 24 helicopters.^®
With respect to front-line combat aircraft, the main striking force of the HAF consists of the 
extremely versatile and flexible F-16, considered by many to be the world’s most prominent fighter aircraft. 
The HAF deploys 37 F-16s (referred to as Block30) and a further 40 F-16s (BlockSO) built to a higher 
standard will be delivered from mid-1997 through to the end of 1998. Thanks to their capability to carry a 
varied weapons load and operate at night and in adverse weather conditions, in the Greek service F-16s are 
allocated primarily to air-to-ground strike roles, while also preserved a secondary air defence role. 
Particularly noteworthy in this respect are the LANTIRN-type night navigation and targeting pods being 
carried by some of the newly-acquired F-16s.^’
The second group of most potent combat aircraft in Greek inventory comprises Mirage fighters 
purchased from France. Of those, some 35 Mirage 2000 delivered in the late-1980s are equipped with 
advanced radars and are capable of firing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. They are, therefore, used 
primarily for air interception, but recent plans call for half of them to have a stand-off maritime strike 
capability as well. The other variant of the Mirage aircraft used by Greece is the Mirage F-1. Of 40 aircraft 
bought from France back in the mid-1970s, 14 have been lost in accidents and the remaining 26 continue to 
fly air interception missions. However, as compared to the Mirage 2000, the older Mirage F-ls are fitted 
with greatly inferior radar and electronic warfare equipment and they can only carry short-range air-to-air 
missiles.^®
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The US-made A-7 Corsair ground attack aircraft is the type most used by the Greece. Overall, 
some 108 are in use and in active reserve, constituting nearly one-third of the HAF’s total combat aircraft. 
A-7s encompass a night/adverse weather ground and maritime attack capability and thanks to their long 
combat range and substantial weapons load, they can execute low-altitude penetration missions with the 
assistance of a purpose-built ground mapping radar. In fact, the original Greek preference for A-7s in the 
immediate aftermath of 1974, is explained by the urgent need to challenge Turkish naval presence in the 
Aegean, to extend air support to Cyprus and to acquire the capability to strike targets deep inside the 
Turkish mainland. The initial batch purchased from The US in 1974-75 was later augmented by the 
transfer of surplus A-7s from US Navy stocks. Despite its high potential as a ground attack platform, A-7 
is a slow aircraft devoid of advanced air-to-air weapons and sensors outfit, and so stands little chance of 
surviving when confronted by dedicated air superiority fighters. Moreover, its low sortie generation rate 
(3.3 sorties per day, nearly half the figure for the F-16) caused by demanding maintenance procedures, is 
another major drawback.^®
The fourth category of front-line combat aircraft used by the HAF consists of the venerable F-4 
Phantoms. This legendary US aircraft has a production and operational history far outstripping that of any 
combat jet in the Western world. The F-4 is used by the KAF for air defence and air interception purposes, 
but a secondary ground attack role is also retained, as the Phantom is also capable of handling a varied 
payload of air-to-surface weapons. The F-4s in Greek service are an assortment of first-hand aircraft 
bought during the 1970s, as well as surplus machines transferred from US stocks in several batches. All 
told, some 72 active F-4E, plus a further 19 kept in storage, are available. Since most of these aircraft are 
close to the end of their service life, a three-year upgrade programme was launched in 1997 to cover 39 F- 
4s.^“ While those 39 aircraft will have their operational life extended for a decade or so, the remaining F-4s 
will have to be phased-out soon, and so far no clear replacements have been designated.^'
The last type of combat aircraft in active HAF service is the F-5 Freedom Fighter, an inexpensive 
lightweight fighter aircraft developed by The US back in the 1960s to meet the requirements of overseas 
allies. Devoid of dedicated sensors and advanced air-to-air weapons, some 60 F-5s plus a further 25-30 
stored aircraft remain on the HAF’s books. These are devoted mainly to day-time and clear weather-only 
air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Of the two HAF squadrons deploying F-5s, one is gradually being 
phased out on the arrival of new F-16s, while the short-term replacement of the remaining F-5 squadron 
represents an utmost priority for the HAF.^^
' Having considered the active combat aircraft in the HAF inventory, reserve aircraft not serving 
with the front-line squadrons, but kept instead for possible re-activation by reserve air crews during 
wartime emergencies should also be mentioned. Besides in-store examples of the above mentioned combat 
aircraft, the only other viable option consists of 30 now-obsolescent F-104G Starfighters. This high-speed 
multi-role aircraft, that saw widespread NATO use during Cold War years, is limited to unguided ordnance 
only. Therefore, its value in contemporary air combat could be rated as marginal at best.^^
Supplementary to the first line combat aircraft, the reconnaissance function is fulfilled in the HAF 
by the US-made RF-4E Phantoms. Equipped with a variety of cameras to perform reconnaissance missions 
both in daylight and at night, these are the dedicated tactical reconnaissance versions of the F-4 fighter. Of 
the 34 that are currently available to Greece, 20 are in active use and the remainder are kept as attrition
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replacements. While most of these went through extensive structural and avionics upgrades in the early- 
1990s, their reconnaissance apparatus contain outdated technology.
Regarding non-combat aircraft, in the transport role, the C-130 Hercules aircraft is the workhorse 
of the HAF. Accordingly, 15 aircraft, \vith an average age of more than 25 years and the capacity to carry 
92 troops each, are operated by a single squadron based at Elefsis Air Base. The operating costs of 5 of 
those C-130s are ftmded by the Hellenic Army and, therefore, their priority is airborne assault. The 
remaining 10 aircraft are used for other transport duties. The Greek Hercules fleet is supported in the 
transport role by much less-capable aircraft, including 3 Japanese YS-11 regional airliners, 10 CL-215 
fire-fighting amphibians, also assigned to the transportation of troops, 12 ageing Do-28 liaison aircraft and, 
finally, 4 antiquated C-47 Dakota transports used in auxiUary roles such as target towing and VIP 
transport.^*
Also in the HAFs inventory are 4 P-3 Orion dedicated maritime patrol aircraft, acquired from US 
Navy surplus stocks during 1995-96. Manufactured in the early-1960s and continuously modified 
thereafter, these four-engine aircraft are fitted with a variety of sensor and communications systems to 
perform long-endurance maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare missions.^® Furthermore, to fulfil SAR 
(search and rescue) tasks, the HAF has at its disposal a squadron of 14 ageing AB-205A general purpose 
helicopters of Italian origin. Also attached to that squadron are a further 5 helicopters used for VIP and 
other transport duties.
The last category of non-combatant Greek mihtary aircraft are trainers. 19 Cessna T-41 propeller- 
driven primary trainers operating out of the Air Force Academy at Tatoi, are supplemented by US-made jet 
trainers deployed at Kalamata Air Base. These include 29 T-37s used for basic training and 35 T-2s for 
advanced and weapons training, with a secondary ground-attack role for wartime contingencies. 
Completing the training picture are the venerable T-33 jet trainers, of which 28 are distributed among 
several main operating bases, where they undertake operational conversion and reserve training missions.^’
Table-4: Active and stored combat aircraft in the inventorv of HAF.
Type Quantity Origin Average
age
Max. speed 
(Mach)
Combat 
radius (km)
Weapons 
load (kg)
F-16C/D 57 + 20* US 6 2.2 600 7000
MiragelOOO 35 France 8 2.2 700 5000
MirageF-1 26 France 21 2.2 640 4000
A-7E/H 93 +15** US 25 0.9 1100 6800
F-4E 72 +19** US 25 2.2 840 7000
F-5A 60 +30** US 25 1.1 315 3000
F-104G 30** US 35 2.0 1800
TOTAL 343 +94** 22
(*) Deliveries pending. (**) Held in reserve.
All told, with more than 25 different types of aircraft, including six combat aircraft, some in 
several configurations, the HAF is in urgent need of rationalising its fleet, a feet frequently cited by Greek
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military authorities.^® Ultimately, the aim of the HAF is to gradually phase out all F-5s, A-7s, Mirage F-ls 
and, later on, F-4s in the inventory, so as to retain only F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Such a move is expected 
to enable reductions in operational and maintenance costs and also increase operational effectiveness, 
sustainability and the strength of the fleet.^ ®
However, given Greece's obsession with catching up with a numerically superior Turkish Air 
Force, together with the frequent involvement of foreign policy considerations in procurement decisions, it 
is highly doubtful whether such long-overdue rationalisation goals can ever be achieved. Indeed, despite the 
detrimental impact of accepting both French and US-made fighters into service, which has been all too 
obvious, it is quite striking that Greek politicians and high-ranking military officers are now contemplating 
the purchase of an additional type of strike aircraft (the US-made F-15), or even new fighter planes of 
Russian origin. Despite their high credentials as highly-capable combat platforms, the introduction of the F- 
15s or their Russian counterparts into Greek service would strike a fetal blow to the HAF's already 
stretched repair & maintenance, training and logistic support infiastructure and, ultimately, would result in 
a considerable decline in the overall effectiveness, sustainability and redundancy of the Greek air power.'"’
Even more alarming for the HAF is the feet that the overwhelming majority of the aircraft in its 
inventory are second-hand machines, containing increasingly outdated weapons and electronics systems, 
rapidly reaching the end of their useful life. Up until the early-1990s, the HAF had been able to off-set this 
rapid erosion in numbers through surplus equipment granted by NATO allies and The US in particular.'" 
But, with the gradual drying out of NATO's “Cascading” programme, very few or, in fact, no surplus 
aircraft are expected to become available through such charmels over the coming years. Likewise, national 
funds which could be directed towards the procurement of brand-new combat planes are being consumed 
by 40 additional F-16s, whose delivery is currently underway. Since 1994 the HAF has planned to 
purchase up to 80 new combat aircraft: 10 Mirage 2000 and 10-20 F-16s as attrition replacements and 50- 
60 brand-new types. Yet, despite the fact that Greece’s newly-approved Ten-Year Procurement Funding 
Package (EMPAE) includes $1.5 to $2 billion for 30 or 40 brand-new fighters, there are serious doubts as 
to whether the extra-budget allocations under the EMPAE scheme can be made available in time for that 
purpose.'*  ^Thus, even if smaller numbers of new and/or second-hand aircraft could be made available, in 
the medium-term, the HAF would unavoidably be faced with the choice of either reducing the number of its 
combat aircraft or maintaining a large fleet of increasingly obsolescent and less-capable aircraft.
Besides these drawbacks and problems in conjimction with the combat aircraft fleet, other pressing 
procurement needs of the HAF include; 2-4 radar-fitted airborne early warning and control aircraft, a 
minimum of 6 additional Hercules type transport, the purchase of at least 20 training aircraft, 6 new 
helicopters able to imdertake SAR missions imder combat conditions and a more recently formulated 
requirement for 2-4 tanker planes. Of those, only 2 early warning aircraft have been incorporated in 
EMPAE’s short-term funding projections, whereas other items are likely to wait for a at least a few more
years.43
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Army and navy-operated aircraft
As previously mentioned in the section on organisational aspects, besides the HAF, the other two 
branches of the Greek armed forces possess aerial assets. The Hellenic Army’s most potent aviation assets 
are 20 US-made Apache attack helicopters used for close air support purposes by front-line Greek Army 
divisions. Equipped with modem weapons systems and state-of-the-art sensors and electronic outfit, those 
helicopters were accepted into service in 1995-96 and are attached to the 1“ Army Aviation Batallion at 
Alexandroupoli (Thrace). There are also indications that, in the case of an anticipated Turkish offensive, 
the Greek Army is planning to use its attack helicopters to lend immediate support to the island garrisons, 
and the inclusion of an additional 10 Apache helicopters in Greece's ten-year procurement programme 
appears to strengthen the viability of those schemes.^ Meanwhile, it should also be noted that, along with 
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty to which Athens is a signatory, Greece is entitled to a total of 18 
attack helicopters only, and the current force level of 20 helicopters plus an anticipated purchase of 10 
more, represents a breach of that Treaty.“**
As many other armed forces, the Hellenic Army deploys and operates its own transport and general 
purpose helicopters. The mainstay of the fleet is the Vietnam-era UH-1 Huey series and their Italian-built 
versions, operating under the 2"** Aviation Battalion. Overall, some 110 of those flexible, but ageing 
machines, each capable of carrying 11 to 14 troops, are in the inventory.^ The other significant category of 
helicopters consists of 9 CH-47 Chinooks, used for heavy lifting purposes. Originally purchased by the 
HAF in 1977 and transferred subsequently to the Army's aviation battalion, the CH-47s have recently been 
modernised to give them improved performance and increased service life. Current plans call for an 
expansion of the Chinook fleet through the acquisition of a further 7 machines from The US and such an 
order was placed in late-1997.^’ Other fixed and rotary-wing aircraft in the Hellenic Army's inventory 
include 14 AB-206 and 14 Bell 47G light helicopters, along with 43 U-17 light aircraft used mainly for 
observation purposes, as well as some 19 H-300C training helicopters.
The Hellenic Navy's helicopter division based at Kofroni has three different types of maritime 
helicopters. Of those, the 6 S-70B-6 Seahawk, plus two further machines on order, are the most modem 
and, besides dedicated anti-submarine sensors and weapons outfits, they are also capable of carrying stand­
off anti-shipping missiles. Also used for anti-submarine warfare are 8 older AB-212 helicopters, acquired 
from Italy from 1979 onwards, and two French-made Alouette-III. Completing the small naval aviation 
division are a further two AB-212 helicopters that are being used for electronic warfare purposes.“*®
Disposition of combat aircraft
It is almost certain that the combat aircraft in the HAF's inventory are distributed amongst 18 
active squadrons, 7 of which are tasked primarily with the function of ground attack, 10 tasked with air 
superiority and air defence, while a single squadron is devoted to reconnaissance missions. With regards to 
the types of aircraft available to each one; 5 squadrons are equipped with A-7s, 2 with F-5s, 3 with F-4E 
Phantoms, 2 with Mirage FIs, 2 with Mirage 2000s, 3 with F-16 fighters and, finally, one with RF-4E 
reconnaissance planes.
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The deployment patterns and the exact composition of those squadrons, however, are more difficult 
to ascertain. Complicating the matter are a few squadrons that appear to have twice the normal complement 
of combat aircraft. In this case, extra aircraft are believed to be accommodated by dividing the squadron 
into two detachments alternating between the parent and a nearby air base. Consequently, on the basis of 
publicly available data, the task of a researcher attempting to sort out the exact composition and location of 
each and every one of the HAF squadrons proves to be quite a feat. Nevertheless, Table-5 is an attempt to 
come up with a rough estimate of the locations of HAF squadrons that have tended to be more stationary in 
recent years.
Table-5: HAF combat squadrons.
Squadron No. Type of aircraft Role Air base
347 F-16 (Block50) Strike/Air Defence Nea Anhialos
341 (forming) F-16 (Block50) Nea Anhialos
346 F-16 (Block30) Strike/Air Defence Larissa
330 F-16 (Block30) Conversion/Strike Nea Anhialos
331 Mirage 2000 Air Defence
332 Mirage 2000 Air Defence Tanagra
334 Mirage FI Air Defence Iraklion
342 Mirage FI Air Defence
340 A-7H Strike Souda
345 A-7H Strike Souda
335 A-7E Strike Araxos
336 A-7E Strike Araxos
A-7E Strike Tanagra
337 F-4E Air Defence
338 F-4E Air Defence/Attack Andravida
339 F-4E Air Defence/Attack
343 F-5A/B Day Fighter Thessaloniki
344 F-5A/B Day Fighter
348 RF-4E Reconnaissance Larissa
As is to be expected, the HAF’s primary orientation and the subsequent deployment pattern is 
geared towards countering what the Greeks consider the Turkish threat. Accordingly, the first defensive 
perimeter consists of the four island air bases of Lemnos, Skyros, Thiria and Iraklion, each believed to be 
equipped with a light complement of interceptor planes, tasked with the peace-time interception of the 
intruding Turkish aircraft. The second layer of air bases encompasses the main air superiority and ground 
attack force of the HAF and includes the bases on the eastern half of mainland Greece, as well as the A-7 
air base at Souda Bay, Crete. The aircraft at those bases are expected to defend vital targets in mainland 
Greece and accomplish deep penetration sorties, when and if such sorties become necessary. Finally, the 
third layer of combat air bases include those on the western coast of the country, all housing older ground- 
attack aircraft that are more likely to act as augmentation and reserve forces in a major confrontation with 
Turkey, and so lend vital air support to the naval and surface combat in the Aegean littoral and possibly 
also in Thrace. Meanwhile, it must be noted here that Andravidha air base is home to an estimated 10 US-
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owned and NATO-assigned B-61 nuclear aircraft bombs and one of the Greek A-7E squadrons is 
earmarked to carry and deliver those tactical nuclear weapons.“
Munitions
In analysing the overall capabilities and hence the combat effectiveness of any air force, an 
important yet often overlooked aspect is the quantity and the quality of its munitions stockpile. The term 
‘munitions’ comprises missiles, bombs and rockets, for both air-to-air and air-to-surface use. However, as 
compared to other force components such as the aircraft themselves, comprehensive information about 
munitions is extremely hard to come by. Defence annuals containing detailed information about the number 
of military aircraft available to each air force are not particularly useful, as they only offer very general and 
often inconsistent information about the types of air-launched missiles in service, while the type and 
quantity of information about bombs and rockets is absent altogether.
Hence, while paying full attribute to the critical importance of munitions in determining not only 
the combat potential, but also the sustainability of any air force, an attempt is made in the following 
paragraphs to come up with an overview of the munitions available to the HAF. To acquire this data, all 
the major defence periodicals that have appeared over the last 20 years have been carefully sifted through.’' 
The data collected was then worked to produce important clues with respect to both types of munitions in 
service and current stockpile levels.
Starting with air-to-air missiles, those most numerous in the HAF appear to be the AIM-9 
Sidewinder, which also happens to be the world’s most widely used air-to-air weapon. This lightweight 
missile of US origin homes onto the infra-red (IR) radiation of an enemy aircraft and is limited to dogfight 
engagements of up to 8 km. Entering operational service more than 40 years ago, new and more capable 
versions of Sidewinder were developed at about five year intervals. All told, the HAF is believed to have 
accepted some 1,500 second and third generation Sidewinder missiles into service during the last two 
decades, and most were brought to the standard of the most recent AIM-9M version through two batches of 
upgrade kits purchased from The US in 1990 and 1995 respectively. On the basis of the number of upgrade 
kits received, as well as the natural erosion in the inventory over the years, the actual number of readily- 
available missiles is anywhere between 1,000 and 1,300 units.“
The only other type of air-to-air missile currently used by the HAF for short-range engagements is 
the French-made “Magic 2”. This missile is a direct equivalent of the US Sidewinder, and Mirage aircraft 
in Greek service are believed to carry 200 to 250 out of the total of 300 bought in 1985.“  Meanwhile, it is 
probable that a small number of AIM-4 Falcons, the world’s first operational air-to-air missile withdrawn 
from Greek service in the early-1980s, are still held in reserve as part of the HAF’s last resort war stocks. “
Proceeding to medium-range air-to-air missiles, the US-origin AIM-7 Sparrow is the most 
numerous in the HAF inventory. Like the Sidewinder, successive developments have created a large family, 
all the way to the AIM-7P Sparrow-III variant that entered production in 1992. All variants of Sparrow 
missiles employ semi-active radar guidance (fire control radar in the launch aircraft illuminates the target 
and the missile homes on to reflected energy), and can typically reach ranges of 30-35 km against intruding
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enemy aircraft. Over the years, Greece is believed to have acquired a total of 850 Sparrows, which can be 
used on-board F-4 and F-16 aircraft. Of those, however, only 300 are of the more modem AIM-7M model, 
suggesting a current stockpile of some 250 missiles. The status of the remaining 550 older series of 
Sparrows is much more difficult to determine, and since they are beyond their shelf life, it would be 
realistic to assume that only a fraction of those are still in storage for emergency use.^’
Supplementing the Sparrows in the role of long-range interception are the more modem AIM-120 
AMRAAM missiles, whose first delivery to the HAF was in 1997-1998. Developed by The US, 
AMRAAM uses active radar guidance (i.e. the missile finds its target with its own radar) to extend its 
engagement range to over 45km, which makes it the world’s most potent air-to-air missile. From 1994- 
onwards, the HAF has placed orders for a total of 242 AMRAAMs, the deliveries are mnning in parallel to 
those of the new F-16s, the only type of Greek aircraft to carry the missile in question.**
The third and the last type of medium-range air-to-air missile in Greek service is “Super 530D”, or 
the so-called ‘French Sparrow’, of optimum use against low-flying targets at extended ranges of 20 to 
40km. An order was placed by Greece in mid-1993 for 80, with deliveries extending into late-1990s. In 
Greek service, the Super 530D can only be carried by the Mirage 2000 interceptors.*’
Turning our attention to air-to-surface weapons, we first come across with the well-known 
‘Maverick’, a missile designed to give combat aircraft a capability to attack hardened point targets with 
pinpoint accuracy. Since the mid-1970s, the HAF is believed to have acquired around 600 Mavericks from 
The US. Yet, only the last 200 acquired are the fairly-advanced AGM-65Ds, the rest being of outdated 
AGM-65A and B variants, barely able to satisfy current operational requirements. Nevertheless, it would 
be safe to assume that some of those older missiles, alongside fewer than 200 modem AGM-65D models, 
are in the inventory of the HAF.*® Besides Maverick, there are indications that a handful of obsolescent 
Bullpup missiles with a range of only 7 km are also operational with the A-7 aircraft, and that they are still 
being used for maritime strike and close air support missions.*’
A further category of air-to-surface weapons in the Greek inventory consists of the anti-radiation 
missiles that function by locking onto hostile radar emissions and are used to suppress enemy’s air defences 
by destroying its air search and tracking radars. Up until the mid-1990s, a few dozen Vietnam-era ‘Shrike’ 
missiles constituted the only anti-radiation capability of the HAF. In 1994, however, an order was placed in 
The US for the much more capable AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles. The latter is credited with a 
range of 25 km when launched from low altitude. Between 1997 and 1999, the HAF is to take delivery of 
104 such missiles for exclusive use on-board the most recent (Block 50) F-16 fighters.*’
The most numerous air-to-ground guided weapon at the disposal of the HAF appears to be the 
‘Paveway’ laser-guided bomb. This is a conventional free-fall bomb fitted with modular guidance and 
control kits which is a guided weapon of pinpoint accuracy. Widely known as the LGB (Laser Guided 
Bomb), the Paveways can be carried by all Western combat aircraft, provided that the latter are equipped 
with a pod to designate the target with a laser beam. The first Greek order for LGBs was in 1978 for 600 
GBU-10 Paveway I versions, combining 900 kg bombs with guidance, control and steering assemblies. A 
few years later, the HAF placed a second order for a further 600 GBU-lOs, this time of the more advanced
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Paveway II type. Since Greece is not known to have ordered any additional Paveways since, all told, nearly 
1,000 laser-guided bombs are believed to be operational on all types of combat aircraft in the HAF's 
inventory.®'
Besides the Mavericks and the Paveways, the third category of Greek guided weapons used to 
strike surface targets are anti-shipping missiles. In fact, given the geographic features of the country and 
the need to exercise maritime control over large extents of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, deployment 
of stand-off anti-ship missiles has long been considered by the Greek military as an absolute necessity. In 
this respect, the Hellenic Navy already deploys 35 Penguin Mk.2 missiles acquired from Norway since 
1995, effective to a range of 35km, and used onboard Seahawk maritime helicopters.®  ^ Surprisingly, 
however, the HAF does not possess any purpose-built anti-ship missiles. Back in the 1980s, the HAF is 
known to have asked US and Norwegian manufacturers to certify the Mk.3 version of the Penguin missile 
for the F-16. But, since HAF did not have the necessary funds to cover certification costs, the idea was 
shelved and was soon replaced by a French proposal to equip the Mirage 2000 interceptors with Exocet 
missiles, thus giving them a maritime strike capability up to a range of 70 km. Although this proposal has 
been kept in limbo for financial reasons for some time, in the aftermath of the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996, 
the acquisition of Exocet missiles has become a priority and an order is believed to be imminent.®^
Moving on to the unguided munitions in the HAF's inventory, one comes across conventional 
general purpose bombs, unguided rockets, dispenser weapons, and runway cratering bombs. With respect 
to unguided bombs, the HAF is believed to have in its inventory a feirly large number and variety of 
‘Mark’ series NATO standard free-fell bombs. Those are all of identical construction and differ only in 
size, weight and destructive power. The only foreign order that could be identified took place in 1978 for 
1,004 pieces. However, the Greek ordnance manufacturer EBO has been producing aircraft bombs for 
nearly a decade now. Consequently, while it would be virtually impossible to determine the exact numbers 
in the inventory, given their relatively low cost, it would be safe to estimate that thousands of those bombs 
are currently available. Likewise, Greece is known to be using a variety of US and French-origin unguided 
rockets, and since some of those are manufactured domestically, the exact quantities in the inventory are 
impossible to estimate. ®^
Regarding dispenser weapons, three types are being used by the HAF: the Rockeyes supplied by 
The US, and much smaller quantities of Bélougas and BAT 120s acquired from France. Also known as 
‘cluster bombs’, these munitions consist of a conventional bomb-shaped casing packed with a large 
quantity of bomblets, grenades or mines that scatter at a pre-determined height over the target area, and so 
are employed to neutralise hard targets such as tanks, armoured vehicles and gun emplacements, and soft 
targets such as parked aircraft, truck convoys or small ships. The numbers in service have again proved 
impossible to determine.
Lastly, constituting the main counter-air munitions in the Greek arsenal are the French Durandal 
anti-runway cratering bombs used in the disablement of airfields. Although the Durandal can be carried by 
any NATO attack aircraft in the Greek service, they are reported to be used in conjunction with F-16s, 
revealing as such the latter's counter-air role in the Greek contingency planning.®® Meanwhile, also believed
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to be operational with the HAF in much smaller numbers are the BAP 100s, that were developed as a 
smaller and lighter alternative to Durandal and are believed to be carried in Greek service by Mirage 2000 
and F-5 fighters.
All considered, despite the large variety of munitions currently being used by the aerial elements of 
the Greek armed forces, the more modem (and costly!) munitions appear to be available in token quantities. 
In feet, on the basis of the preceding analysis, it could well be asserted that the munber of modem guided 
mimitions in the Greek stocks currently are critically insufficient, at least in comparison with the size of the 
Greek combat aircraft fleet. Accordingly, to be used by more than 400 active and stored combat aircraft, 
the HAF has at its disposal a total of roughly 1,500 short-range and less than 300 medium-range air-to-air 
missiles, while the combined figure for ready-to-use air-to-ground missiles and guided bombs stands at less 
than 1,500. Those figures mean that roughly half-a-dozen modem munitions are available for each combat 
aircraft -  an unacceptably low figure by modem standards.
The Gulf War of 1991 illustrates modem aerial combat’s himger for all types of munitions. During 
40 days of aerial operations, roughly 650 USAF front-line combat aircraft deployed in the Gulf region 
expended a total of 5,255 Maverick air-to-surfece missiles, 1,120 HARM and Shrike anti-radiation 
missiles, 8,456 guided bombs and nearly 150,000 imguided bombs.“  A simple arithmetic calculation would 
reveal that, an average of two air-to-surface guided munitions were expended by each USAF aircraft every 
three days of conflict. When applied to Greece, the same figures give rise to the prediction that, in a large- 
scale conflict with a major adversary, the HAF would deplete its munitions stocks in a matter of days, 
perhaps 4 or 5 days and would afterwards be confined to WWII-type aerial operations, undertaken on the 
basis of unguided bombs and on-board guns only. Therefore, even if older guided munitions held in 
wartime stocks were pressed into service, these unreliable and outdated weapons would not only pose a 
considerable ijsk to the aircraft and air crews that operate them, but also would have little impact on the 
course and final outcome of the aerial combat.
ТаЫс-6: Guided munitions in the inventory of the HAF.
Quantity Type Definition Average Age
1,000-
1,300
АШ-9М air-to-air missile 10-20
200-250 Magic-2 air-to-air missile 10-12
250 AIM-7M air-to-air missile 10-12
400-500 AIM-7F air-to-air missile 18-20
242* AIM-120 air-to-air missile 1*
80 Super 530D air-to-air missile 3-4
200 AGM-65D air-to-surface missile 10-15
200-300 AGM-65A/B air-to-surface missile 20-25
104* AGM-88 anti-radiation missile 1*
1,000 Paveway laser-guided bomb 15-20
(*) Deliveries currently underway.
Mirroring our observations in the section on the combat aircraft inventory, of even greater 
significance is the fact that time is likely to exacerbate rather than diminish the problem encountered in the
139
field of munitions. The guided missiles in current stockpiles are rapidly decaying and the following two 
fectors not only prevent an expansion in the stockpile levels, but also rule out the replacement of older 
munitions on a one-by-one basis: first, the increased unit cost of the new guided munitions by a margin of 
up to 5-6 times; and second, the dramatic reduction in the pool of surplus munitions offered by other Allied 
countries. In other words, if the HAF insists on preserving its current force levels, not only would its 
aircraft become increasingly obsolescent, but they would also be devoid of modem munitions to fight their 
adversaries.
Electronic Warfare
At the time of writing, the only specialised electronic warfare aircraft in the inventory of the 
Hellenic armed forces were two general purpose helicopters operated by the Navy which are believed to be 
fitted with relatively outdated electronic support measures equipment, used to identify and locate enemy 
electronic transmissions.®’ Furthermore the HAF had not deployed any dedicated electronic warfare 
platforms such as stand-off jamming aircraft. Instead, its electronic warfare capabilities consisted solely of 
electronic self-protection suites carried by its combat aircraft.
Among the large variety of combat aircraft operated by the HAF, F-16s are the ones fitted with the 
most advanced electronic warfare equipment. Under a contract signed with a US manufecturer in 1993, all 
Greek F-16s are being fitted with ASPIS integrated electronic warfare suites. Accordingly, HAF F-16s are 
equipped with radar warning receivers (RWR) to detect and identify electronic transmissions reaching the 
aircraft and chaff & flare dispensers to provide last resort protection against air-to-air missiles. 33 of the 
F-16 fleet are also in the process of being fitted with electronic jammers offering a self-protection capability 
by confusing enemy radars and radar-guided missiles. Depicted by some international experts as inferior to 
the more versatile and efficient Rapport III electronic warfare suite fitted to the Turkish F-16s, the ASPIS 
is rated by others as one of the best integrated electronic warfare self-protection suites available to any air 
force in the world.®*
Type of aircraft Radar warning receiver Chaff&flare dispenser Jammer
F-16 (33 examples) ALR-66(V)H ALE-47 DIAS/ALQ-187 (internal)
F-16 (42 examples) ALR-66(V)H ALE-47 —
Mirage 2000 ICMS Spirale Thomson-CSF (internal)
Mirage FI ALR-66(V)H ALE-40 —
A-7H ALR-66(V)H ALE-39/40 ALQ-129(extemal), 126A(int.)
A-7E ALR-25/27/45 ALE-39/41 ALQ-101 (internal)
F-4E ALR-66(V) ALE-40 ALQ-101, 119, 131 (pod)
RF-4E ALR-68 ALE-40 ALQ-101, 119, 131 (pod)
F-5A/B ~ ALE-40 ~
The Mirage 2000s, equipped with French-made electronic warfere systems, constitute the second 
type of aircraft in Greek inventory to carry relatively modem electronic countermeasures systems. Called 
ICMS-2000, these integrated suites were fitted to Greek aircraft between 1993 and 1997, and they are
140
believed to provide first-rate self-protection against aircraft radars and semi-active radar-guided missiles, 
both of which constitute the kind of threats frequently encountered by Greek Mirage 2000s when 
performing air superiority and interception missions.®’
In stark contrast with of F-16s and Mirage 2000s, other types of Greek combat aircraft are 
equipped with much less advanced electronic self-protection systems that encompass technologies dating 
back to the late-1960s and early-1970s. As Table-7 illustrates, the main piece of electronic 
countermeasures equipment carried by some 140 Greek aircraft (Mirage FIs, A-7Hs, and F-4E Phantoms) 
is an older version of the US-made RWR which is also being fitted to the F-16s. US-made chaff & flare 
dispensers that scatter chaff to deceive enemy radars and flares to distract IR-guided missiles, complement 
these RWRs. Meanwhile, there are indications that at least some of the Greek A-7H, RF-4E and F-4E 
aircraft are equipped with early versions of the ALQ-187 internally-mounted jammers, and it is highly 
probable that some of those are being modernised in conjunction with the off-set commitments by the F- 
16/ASPIS project. Complementing this list are a number of old-fashioned jamming pods carried externally 
by Greek F-4s.’°
The A-7E strike aircraft acquired second-hand from The US Navy, together with the F-5A/B 
fighters manufactured in the late-1960s, are the two types of aircraft in the HAF only equipped with the 
most basic type of electronic warfare systems. A-7E ground attack aircraft are known to be fitted in US 
service with comparatively primitive RWRs, chaff & flare dispensers and internally-mounted electronic 
jammers, but whether this comprehensive but relatively outdated outfit is retained in the Greek service is 
far from clear. Likewise, the data compiled from open sources suggest that, while at least part of the F-5 
fleet is equipped with US made chaff & flare dispensers, very few of them possess RWRs, even then in 
their most obsolescent form.”
To summarise, as a result of the high priority attached to electronic warfare capabilities in the 
1990s, the HAF has acquired relatively advanced electronic counter-measures capabilities which are 
integral to its more recent combat aircraft. Older aircraft, however, continue to fly with the most basic form 
of electronic warfare gear, consisting mostly of the standard items delivered by the aircraft’s original 
manufacturers.’  ^Under these circumstances and, when compared to neighbouring countries to the north and 
south, it is safe to assume that the HAF controls superior electronic warfare capabilities. Against Turkey, 
however, the picture is more complex and the state of Greek electronic warfare capabilities much more 
difficult to judge. An attempt to do so will nevertheless be made in Chapters 6 and 8.
Meanwhile, a further factor to be taken into full consideration when evaluating Greece’s electronic 
warfare capabilities is the pace of technological progress in the electronic spectrum. Developments in this 
particular domain are dazzling and those systems acquired five years ago could rapidly become outdated. 
For instance, recent reports suggest that, even those RWRs fitted to the most recent versions of the US Air 
Force F-16s do not alert pilots early enough to use all the tactics at their disposal, particularly when 
operating against newer air defence missiles.”  Hence, a very important precondition for successful 
electronic warfare is local industry's capability to adapt the existing systems to the rapidly changing threat 
envirotunent, this capability being very limited in Greece. In line with the more recent F-16/ASPIS
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prograinme, Greece is known to have acquired the capability to write the country-specific software which is 
being fitted to those systems. But, for other counter-measures suites that are in use, this capability is 
believed to be at a minimum, or perhaps negligible. Besides, as we shall elaborate in the section on 
Greece’s defence industrial capabilities, the nation’s electronics industry is not sophisticated enough to 
undertake any significant manufacturing or major upgrade activities in this field.’'' It is therefore possible to 
argue that the wartime adaptability of the HAF to unexpected electronic warfare circumstances w'ould be 
seriously curtailed by the lack of a supporting infrastructure and the failure to establish full control over 
state-of-the-art electronic warfare technologies.
Ground-based air defence
The Chief of the Hellenic Air Force is responsible to the Ministry of National Defence for the air 
defence of Greece. To fulfil this task, the HAF has at its disposal an early-warning network consisting of 
several ground-based air search radars, air-defence units operating surface-to-air weapons, interceptor 
aircraft (that have already been analysed under the preceding sections), and a dedicated command, control 
and communications network tying all air force assets together. Additionally, fairly large quantities of 
ground and sea-based air defence assets are operated by the Hellenic Army and the Hellenic Navy, who 
also co-ordinate their activities with the air force, so supplementing HAF operations aimed at safeguarding 
Greek air space. The interface between air force and other components of the Hellenic Armed Forces is 
directed by the Hellenic National Defence General Staff, which supervises and co-ordinates air defence 
operations involving two or more services. Meanwhile, the responsibility for the so-called passive air 
defence, i.e. civil defence, rests with the Ministry of Public Order, which co-ordinates its activities with the 
Armed Forces through an ad-hoc directorate within the General Staff.”
i) Early-warning radars
The backbone of the HAF’s early-warning capabilities is formed around the assets acquired 
through NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment), a multinational programme dating back to 
1950s in the updating and co-ordinating the air defence systems of 10 European members of NATO, 
among them Greece. The cost culminating from the new construction and equipment acquisitions are met 
through NATO infrastructure fund, and in return for its negligible contribution to this fund, Athens has 
been receiving incomparably large sums of investment into its air defence infrastructure.”  Since late-1950s, 
Greece had 12 fixed radar sites constructed on its territory by NATO. To be added to this number are a 
handful of mobile air search radars dispatched to critical locations in the Aegean, as well as the nationally- 
funded and operated early-warning radar sites on such strategically-located islands as Lemnos, Rhodes, 
Lesvos and Samos. NATO has so far refused to incorporate the latter into its NADGE network, because of 
the disputes culminating from the disarmed status of those islands and the pursuant Turkish objections to 
this effect. The approximate locations of NATO and other early-warning radars are shown in Figure-19, 
the types and characteristics of the radars contained in NADGE facilities are provided in Table-8, whereas
142
Figure-19: G reek Early-warning radar sites, in 1997.
Data dtawn from DMS M arket Intelligence, "Gteece Market Overview”, pp.10-11; "NATO Bolsters 
Southern Region", International Defense Review, 1/1995, p.l3; James Brown, Delicately Poised 
Allies: Greece and Turkey (London; B rasse^s, 1991), p. 145, p. 177; "Procurement", International 
Defense Review, 4/1990, p.445; Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey:
The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983), p.l34; AliL. Karaosmanoglu^ "NATO's South-East 
R egionB etw eenC entralEw ope and the Middle East", International Defense Review, 10/1986, p.44, 
VanCoufoudakis, "The Essential Link - Greece in NATO", NATO's Sixteen Nations, July 1988, p.36; 
etc.
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Figure-20: Likelv O rganisation of NADGE assets on G reek territo ry .
Supreme Headquaters Allied Powers 
Europe
Co-ordinates Alliance-wide AD (air 
defence) operations.
Regional Air Operations Centre
Co-ordinates AD operations in Southern 
flank.
(National Level)
Air Defence Operations Centre
Co-located with HAF Tactical Air 
Command, overall control of AD system, 
allocation of assets.
Sector Operations Centre 
Co-ordinates all aircraft activity within 
Greece’s airspace, scrambles fighters, makes 
operational threat prioritisation, allocates 
assets provided by ADOC, has its own 
radar.
Surface-to-Air Missile Battery Command 
Posts
Have engagement radar only, get target 
cueing from SOC and/or CRCs.
Command & Reporting Centres
Detects and tracks intruders, vector airborne 
fighters, alerts surface defences, provides 
tactical control of fighter interception, can 
also act as emergency SOC; each equipped 
with their own radar and 5 intercept 
controllers.
Command & Reporting Posts + 
Reporting Posts
All equipped with radar, reporting to CRC.
Reference: Ted Hooton, International Defense Review, 7/1988, pp.781-83; A.J.Wilson, “Technical Challenges 
and Opportunities for Future Air Defence”, RUSI Journal, October 1994, pp.64-71.
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the organisational outlay and different categories pertaining to those radars, as well as their functions is 
provided in Figure-20.
Table-8: NADGE radars on Greek territory.”
Type Quantity Origin Activated Range (km) Band
Marconi S247/S266' 
Thomson-CSF 377 
Thomson-CSF Ares 5
Hughes HR-3000 2
Marconi Martello 743-D 3
UK
France
France
USA
UK
late-50s
late-50s
1970s
late-80s 500 
mid-90s 500
460
320+
E/F
E/F
D
When analysing Greece’s early-warning radar network, mention should also be made of a single 
surveillance radar (a French-made TRS2215) owned by the Republic of Cyprus. This radar is believed to 
be situated on top of the Mount Trodos and it certainly shares its data with the rest of the Greek air defence 
network.’® Besides those air surveillance radars owned and operated by the HAF, the national АТС (Air 
Traffic Control) system erected to track and manage national and international air traffic within Greek 
airspace should also be considered an important supplementary element of Greece's early warning 
capabilities. Accordingly, when the decision was reached in 1989 to award a French company with a 
contract to modernise Greece’s АТС system, the Defence Ministry also played an active part in the 
programme, obviously expecting to use the new АТС network to improve surveillance of unusual military 
air activity over the Aegean littoral. The АТС system established thereafter consisted of both S-band 
primary and MS SR type secondary surveillance radars, all of which report via digital communications links 
to a control centre in Athens. Although relatively recent, this АТС system currently covers nearly 60 per 
cent of Greek airspace and it is deemed by international aviation authorities dangerously “inadequate”. Two 
particularly problematic aspects of the network often mentioned are deficiencies in the communications 
element and poorly-trained and low-quality operators. A French contractor is currently attempting to 
upgrade the system and extend its coverage, but major deficiencies are unlikely to be overcome in the near 
future.’®
Meanwhile, the chain of coastal surveillance radars owned and operated by the Hellenic Navy also 
make a direct contribution to the national early-warning capabilities. Although they are primarily used to 
survey maritime activity in the coastal waters, half a dozen coastal surveillance radars erected during the 
1990s with NATO funds, have a secondary capability to detect and track low flying aircraft at a range of 
up to 50 km. It is presumed that those radars report to the Hellenic Navy General Staff headquarters in 
Athens and, at the time of this writing, it was fer from clear whether Greek plans to integrate those into the 
NADGE network and overcome the deficiencies in associated display, control, and communications 
equipment held ever materialised.*®
To summarise, although extensive in coverage, most NADGE and other early-warning radar sites 
on Greek territory are equipped with obsolete radars and rapidly ageing communications equipment, all of 
which are in need of replacement. Part of this requirement is being met by a gradual NATO-funded
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modernisation programme which incorporates a large number of Greek NADGE facilities.*’ However, an 
important limitation, inherent to all ground-based air search radars, is their inability to provide timely 
notice of the approach of low-level attack aircraft and, given the rugged nature of Greek land and maritime 
territories, only fragmentary information about low-flying aircraft can be generated from NADGE and 
other radars. Similarly, many of these sites are located in forward positions very close to the lines of 
intercept. They need to be defended either by combat air patrols or ground-based air defence and, being 
devoid of physical hardening measures such as ballast walls or SAM umbrella, are extremely vulnerable to 
destruction by penetrating enemy aircraft.*^
To overcome those deficiencies, NATO has permanently deployed an airborne early-warning and 
control (AWACS) aircraft at Preveza air base in western Greece.*  ^Greek officials have long been aware of 
those drawbacks too, as demonstrated by the following remarks by the Chief of Staff of the Hellenic Air 
Force in 1987: “Contemporary radars must be able to detect low flying aircraft, resist ECM and survive 
opponent's actions. Ground radars should also be supplemented by airborne early-warning radars. The 
HAF has not yet selected such a system, but is evaluating the existing systems in order to determine the 
most appropriate one for its air environment.”*'' But, the high cost of the aircraft falling in this category has 
so far delayed any concrete Greek action. Despite the fact that the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996 appears to 
have increased the sense of urgency to acquire airborne early warning aircraft to provide round-the-clock 
coverage of Greek airspace, the current dearth in defence ftmding has obliged the HAF to continue to rely 
on groimd-based early-warning radars. Due to financial constraints, a recently opened tender to acquire two 
to four low-cost early-warning aircraft to provide partial airborne coverage of the Greek territory, is not 
expected to result in enhanced capabilities any time soon.*^
itj Surface-to-air weapons
The anti-aircraft weapon systems deployed by the HAF can be divided into two categories: long- 
range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) used against enemy aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes, and 
the SHORAD - short-range air defence - missiles and gxms tasked with the protection of air bases. In the 
long-range category, two Nike Hercules SAM squadrons operating from fixed sites deploy a total of 36 
launchers. Both squadrons are integrated into the NADGE system, which alerts them to intruding aircraft 
and subsequent target engagement by their own radars. The Nike Hercules is a fifties-vintage missile and, 
despite its impressive range of some 145 km, given its large size and outdated guidance system, it could be 
easily underflown, outflown and jammed by modem combat aircraft. The HAF has, therefore, recently 
decided to phase them out by the turn of the century and accept into service 18 Patriot launchers. More 
recent press reports suggest that, the HAF is also considering the Russian S-300 (NATO designation SA- 
10 Grumble) air defence system as a low-cost and perhaps politically viable alternative to the Patriot. 
Whether there will be sufficient funding for this programme of acquisitions remains to be seen.*^
With regard to short-range air defence, the HAF is equipped with a composite system for the 
protection of its main airfields and has at its disposal 20 SHORAD batteries, fielding a total of 40 Italian 
Aspide SAM launchers and a similar number of Swiss-made 35mm anti-aircraft giuis. Tasked with the
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protection of all major military airfields, in each air base these systems are connected to a Skyguard fire 
control system capable of receiving target cueing from the NADGE radar network.*^ The missiles, used in 
conjunction with the Aspide launchers, are derivatives of the AIM-7 Sparrow, also used by Greek 
interceptor aircraft for air-to-air engagements. Out of a total of 280 missiles received in 1984-85, the HAF 
is believed to have at least 200 at its disposal. Future plans for further enhancement of air base defences 
include the acquisition of vehicle-moimted Stinger short-range anti-aircraft missiles.*®
As previously mentioned, in addition to air force-owned and operated air defence assets, other 
branches of the Hellenic Armed Forces are in possession of anti-aircraft weapons and their deployment and 
activities are closely co-ordinated with their HAF counterparts. The most potent of the Army-operated air 
defence weapons are the Improved Hawk missile systems which are organised into two SAM battalions. 
The Improved Hawk is a US-made mediiun-range SAM system used widely in most NATO coimtries. The 
MIM-23B version that entered the Greek inventory in 1972, has an effective range of 20 to 40 km, 
depending on the altitude of the intruding aircraft. The Hellenic Army has at its disposal 42 launchers and a 
fraction of the 216 missiles originally acquired from The US. Plans exist to upgrade those systems to the 
standard of the most recent electronic counter-measures resistant PIP-3, and funds have been allocated for 
this purpose in Greece’s most recent ten-year EMPAE modernisation programme.*® The ownership of the 
I-Hawk systems is unique to the Greek Service in the sense that, in most other countries, medium-range air 
defence systems with an immediate and prominent role in the integrated air defence of the national airspace 
come under the direct control of air arms. Whereas in Greece, the HAF’s control over these important air 
defence assets is achieved through indirect channels and, in the confusion of an actual conflict, it is highly 
doubtful whether Greek anti-aircraft weapons with overlapping characteristics, yet differing command 
chains, would achieve satisfactory co-ordination and interface to form a multi-layered air defence 
umbrella.®®
Other air defence assets in the Hellenic Army's inventory have limited range and ceiling 
characteristics and, as integrated components of the Army units, they are intended for the protection of 
troop formations. The most significant of the weapons systems in this category are 12 Soviet-made SA-8b 
Gecko self-propelled air defence systems transferred from the former East German stocks and deployed 
near the Turkish border and 838 Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile launchers (and their 1,500 
missiles) produced jointly with other NATO allies. Also under the control of the Hellenic Army are 1,000 
anti-aircraft guns of varying calibre and age, over one third of which are kept in storage. ®‘
Finally, Greece's air defence make-up is very unusual in that the Hellenic Navy also plays a direct 
role in the multi-layered air defence structure of the country, and particularly in the context of the Greek- 
Turkish confrontation. Accordingly, when in 1992 the decision was made to acquire surplus naval vessels 
from The US Navy, 4 Adams class destroyers with an average age of nearly 30 years taken in preference to 
more modem models, mainly because they incorporated an area air defence capability. ®^ Indeed, with their 
Standard SMI missiles reaching a distance of 40 km, Adams class destroyers are used by Greece as 
floating SAM batteries and, when deployed in the North-South axis of the Aegean Sea, they constitute the 
forward line of the layered air defence structure directed towards Turkey.
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Communications
Gaining access to data about military communications is a major challenge for any researcher 
depending on open sources. In compiling such data, we have used fiagments of information filtered out 
from various books, articles, interviews and news reports, and have drawn the following conclusions about 
the HAF's communications infrastructure.
In rhetoric, communications programmes have always been depicted by Greek officials as the force 
multipliers to which the Hellenic Armed Forces supposedly attaches utmost priority. But the reality appears 
to be quite different. Well into the late-1980s, the Greece military is believed to have confined most of its 
military commimications improvements to NATO-funded projects, other communications programmes in 
need of national funding scarcely being treated as priorities in planning or budgeting. Thus, one can 
conclude that, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the HAF’s basic communications network was built upon 
NATO’s Integrated Communications System (NICS) which was created in the 1970s to fuse a variety of 
older and more modem systems together (see Figure-21). While relatively extensive in coverage, by today’s 
standards, in some respects this network is severely deficient, one deficiency being the vulnerability of its 
easily recognisable very large, hill-top dish antennas to enemy counter-action.”
In the mid-1980s, the status of commimications began to change following the launch of a major 
effort to restmcture and re-constitute the national communications network. In 1986 German and British 
companies were selected to install a comprehensive defence communication network for all three Greek 
armed services. This network, known as HERMES, comprised a mix of static (strategic) and mobile 
(tactical) detachments and was based on the PTARMIGAN battlefield communications system, also used 
by the British Army, Australia and New Zealand. The system could be configured to meet a wide range of 
operational needs, ranging from tactical communications to operations centres and strategic headquarters. 
The HERMES system was completed in 1991 and, according to the main contractor, it gave the Greek 
armed forces “the most advanced communication network in NATO”.”
NATO’s own assessment of the state of command and control assets in its southern region, 
including those of Greece, is not as optimistic. In the late-1980s, for instance, the funds available in the 
region only permitted the procurement of a combination of very simple commercial data processing systems 
and systems worthy of the name, this situation, reportedly, resulting in a patchwork of equipment of all 
generations. The ensuing problems arising in interoperability, software, maintenance and training were all 
too obvious. Furthermore, due to insufficient hardening, mobility and intermeshing, and a lack of back-up 
headquarters and equipment, their survivability and robustness was not guaranteed either. It is noteworthy 
that a much more recent NATO report identified comparable deficiencies and weaknesses in the Greek 
command-control and communications infrastructure.”  It is possible, therefore, to conclude that, despite 
the increased emphasis placed by Greece on the communications aspect of their force structure, a number 
of problems and shortcomings persist.
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Figure-21: NATO's ACE-HIGH Communications Network on Greek Territory.^
(*) Data drawn from “NATO Command and Control S5rstem", International Defense Review, 6/1994, p.58.
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Supporting elements
i) Defence industry
Greece has a well-developed naval construction industry but lacks a sophisticated infiastructure in 
aerospace and other related sectors of the defence industry. In the mid-1990s, the country was only able to 
20 per cent of its armaments, of which a negligible fraction was destined for the aerospace sector. Despite 
successive Greek governments' view that the development of the defence industry is crucial to gaining 
independence from their traditional suppliers of weapons systems and ridding themselves foreign political 
interference, national defence manufacturing activities have been plagued by economic problems, charges 
of corruption, excessive politicisation, flagrant management shortcomings, obstructive labour laws and a 
lack of a strong policy lead from the political cadres. In 1991, large privatisation and merger plans were 
announced in an effort to restructure the whole sector, but when the leftist PASOK returned to power in 
1993, those schemes were temporarily shelved. In mid-1997, renewed efforts were made to partially 
privatise the major state-owned defence companies, but, given the degree of political disarray and 
hesitancy, it is unlikely that the unfortunate state of the Greek defence industry will improve any time
96soon.
The Hellenic Aerospace Industries (HAI) constitutes not only the most significant, but also the only 
dedicated aerospace industry entity in Greece. Operational since 1980, the HAI is situated at Tanagra, 
some 60 km north of Athens, its facilities being adjacent to an HAF air base. Initially, it was devised as a 
Greek-American joint-venture to bring in technology and know-how for the repair and maintenance of US- 
made aircraft and engines. But, while its activities gradually expanded beyond repair and maintenance to 
incorporate under-license parts manufacturing as well, the HAI quickly became an inefficient, inflexible, 
over-staffed and loss-making state enterprise. Not only did its deliveries start to run two to three years 
behind schedule, but HAI has also started producing abysmal losses. By the early 1990s, HATs debts had 
moimted to almost $1 billion and foreign and local experts alike expressed the view that, the HAF was 
largely responsible for this extremely unfavourable situation: the relationship between the company and the 
HAF, its number one customer, was unprofessional - an “arms length affair”. Rather, throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, air force authorities forced HAI to take work on without requisite payments being budgeted, a 
problem which contributed to the company's large debt. In 1993, for instance, HAI planned to work on 48 
aircraft and 149 engines, but the HAF could only pay for 35 aircraft and 114 engines.®’
In late-1997, the Greek government announced a new plan aimed at making HAI profitable by 
1999, thereafter initiating its partial privatisation through a public stock offering. However, despite 
successive doses of debt relief from the government, HAI's debts still amount to around $80 million, with a 
further loss of $7-8 million in 1997 and any short-term schemes resulting in profitability and privatisation 
seem doubtful.
In 1997, through a continuous and costly expansion of its activities over the years, HAI's facilities 
consisted of a complex of five different factories for airframe maintenance, engine overhaul, aircraft 
accessories, electronics, and parts manufacturing. Of those, the aircraft maintenance segment has at its 
disposal sufficient indoor facilities to simultaneously accommodate 50 fighter aircraft, 12 helicopters, two
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airliners and four large military transporters. Extensive repair including crash damage repair can be earned 
out on 23 different types of aircraft and 20 different engine types used by the Greek military. The work 
performed at HAI’s electronics division includes support and repair services for aircraft avionics and 
radars.
All told, the HAI employs over 3000 people, with work for, probably, no more than 2500, even this 
work being carried out ineffectively. Current activities are confined mainly to repair, maintenance and 
overhaul services, which form some 90 per cent of all work available to HAI. This leaves a mere 10 per 
cent for manufacturing work, an overwhelming percentage of which is generated through foreign 
contractors’ off-set trade commitments to Greece. The only category of products with a development and 
design ingredient is the one incorporating a number of electronic and optical systems, none of which are 
destined for the use by the HAF. The only attempt to develop an indigenous product for the HAF was also 
doomed to failure, it being occasioned in the mid-1980's by the HAF's interest, latter lapsed, in a propeller- 
driven remotely piloted air vehicle.
Besides HAI, there are two other defence industry establishments whose products directly or 
indirectly help sustain the activities of the HAF. The first is the Hellenic Arms Industry - EBO, the 
country’s main ammunition and explosives manufticturer employing some 1,500 at three factories. EBO 
delivers to the HAF external accessories for fighter aircraft (i.e. drop tanks, practice bombs, and bomb 
pylons) and groimd support equipment (i.e. bomb loaders). EBO also imdertakes the final assembly of an 
indigenous anti-aircraft gun. Developed with the technical support of a German company, this fully- 
automatic weapon and its associated fire control system reflect the extent of the problems hampering the 
development of the Greek defence industry; having completed its prototype in 1982 and received an 
optional order from the Hellenic Army for 150 pieces, budget cuts and technical problems delayed the serial 
production of the Artemis-30 gxm well into mid-1990s. As of 1997, the Greek Army was still on the look 
out for a functioning fire control system, and the current production rate is not believed to exceed a few 
units per aimum.®*
A second state-owned defence company making deliveries to the HAF is PYRKAL, whose air force 
relevant products include 20mm rounds used by the HAF aircraft, projectiles of various calibre consumed 
by army and air force-operated anti-aircraft guns, motors and warheads for the 2.75" air-to-ground 
luiguided rockets, and training bombs.”
In Greece there is a fairly large number of privately-owned, small-scale defence industry companies 
contributing in a minor way to the HAF’s efforts to meet its hardware requirements. The items received 
from those entities include; towed target drones, light rocket launchers, military trucks, runway repair 
decking for bomb-damage, secure voice transmission systems and so on.'°®
While the Greek authorities continue to portray themselves as having a dynamic and competitive 
national defence industry with a strong technological base as a crucial component of the national security 
policy, the reality is quite different.’®’ Indicative of the insufficiencies in Greece’s industrial web, caused by 
constant and excessive interference from the political circles, is the feet that a decade on, Greece is no near 
achieving independence from foreign suppliers for critical defence equipment. Indeed, a domestic defence
Figure-22: Civilian airstrips in Greece.*
151
152
industry that has confined itself to the most basic forms of parts manufecturing, repair and maintenance 
and licensed-production activities, carmot be expected to make a major contribution to the HAF, 
particularly when there is a major and/or prolonged conflict.
a) Airliners and civilian airstrips
Besides the defence industry infiastructure, there are three civiUan assets that play a direct role in 
augmenting Greek air power's potential; the Air TrafiBc Control System, which has already been touched 
upon; passenger and other aircraft used for civilian transport purposes; and, finally, a feirly large number 
of non-military airfields and airstrips. Regarding the civilian aircraft, Greece’s national flag carrier 
Olympic Airways has in its fleet a total of 36 airliners, consisting of Boeing 727, 737, 747 and Airbus 
A.300 types.'“  These aircraft could be brought into service in times of emergencies to ferry reserves to 
hard-pressed isolated areas, such as the Greek islands in the eastern part of the Aegean. However, these 
airliners can only operate from long and well-prepared airstrips which may be a rarity in conflict areas, and 
the need for air supremacy for them to fly safely might not be attained easily. To supplement the wide-body 
airliners, the HAF would also have at its disposal 18 regional airliners operated by the state-owned 
Olympic Aviation and an additional 14 privately-owned corporate aircraft (10 business jets and 4 
turboprops) with a much more limited passenger capacity, but greater ease of operation from fiu'-ofF 
locations.'“  Compared to her main adversary Turkey, however, Greece has ftir fewer civilian aircraft that 
could be used in the last resort to transport assets during a major conflict.'“
Reverting civilian airfields, Greece has at its disposal some 80, all with permanent-surface 
runways. Of those, 19 have runways longer than 2440m, allowing all passenger and combat aircraft to take 
off and land. Another 22 have runways longer than 1220m, which are capable of handling smaller 
passenger and most combat aircraft. The remainder could only be used by short-distance take-off and 
landing-capable combat aircraft, such as the Mirage FI, and small commuter airliners and military 
transporters. The location of the most important airfields is shown in Figure-22.'“
On the basis of this information, it is possible to assert that the extensive airstrip construction 
which has taken place since 1974, has created a favourable conditions for the HAF, in terms of war-time 
dispersal and emergency air transport. In fact, their construction was undertaken as part of a Greek plan to 
build airfields on all of its Aegean islands off the Turkish coast, and the completion of this plan was 
marked by the opening in 1986 of a small airstrip on the sparsely-populated island of Meis/Kastellorizon, 
the latter being only two miles off the Turkish coast.'“  In addition to the problems of sustainability when 
military aircraft operate from airfields devoid any relevant infrastructure, the wide range of possibilities 
those airfields could offer to an enemy intent on launching airborne operations should not be overlooked.
Training and personnel readiness
As discussed in the section on human resources, the HAF's persotmel could be divided into three 
categories; officer corps, NCOs (non-commissioned officers) and conscripts. Of those, the carrier officers 
graduated after four years at The National Air Academy, while regular NCOs attend schools basically for
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two years. After their graduation, both groups undergo specialist training and over the course of their 
career, continue to receive refresher training, both in Greece and abroad. Conscripts, prior to joming their 
respective units, undergo basic training for a minimum of two months at the Air Force trainmg centres. 
During the second phase, taking up to 8 months, they are assigned to units where they are trained by taking 
part in exercises. Finally, during the third phase of 8 to 11 months, some conscripts are assigned to front 
line units, while the rest go to rear units for secondary duties.'®’
As in the rest of the Hellenic Armed Forces, exercises constitute an important part of the HAF 
training. These exercises which aim to increase the operational experience of military personnel, can be 
divided into three categories:'®*
1) Non-specific technical exercises and focusing on methods and tactics of employed in electronic 
warfare. These may occasionally include detachments with NATO and other coimtries.
2) National joint exercises conducted five times a year. Three are live-fire manoeuvres and two 
Command Post Exercises (CPX) for the testing of operational contingency plans pertaining to 
possible threats. In recent years, this Ust has expanded to include periodic exercises held jointly 
with the Greek Cypriot National Guard.
3) NATO joint exercises based on NATO plans approved by its Military Committee and largely 
boycotted by Greece since 1982 as a part of the government's protest over imresolved aspects of 
Aegean disputes. To reinforce its objections, Athens also refuses to allow forces involved in 
exercises to which Greece is not a party to use NATO infrastructure facilities, thereby losing 
the opportuiuty to become acquainted with new tactics and technologies fielded by the more- 
advanced members of the Alliance.'®® Nevertheless, the HAF tries to compensate for this loss by 
entering into bilateral training arrangements with other allied air forces or sending combat 
aircraft to the take part in exercises held elsewhere and not attended by Turkey."®
In the HAF, the combat pilots who are not only the mainstay, but also the most qualified personnel, 
begin their training at the Air Academy at Tatoi, where they complete 40-45 hours of basic flying 
instruction as part of their standard education. After graduation, some 120 hours of basic jet training follow 
at Kalamata Air Base, before switching to 75 hours of advanced stage flight training at the same location. 
Some weapons training is also undertaken at this stage. Subsequently, they receive 80-90 hours training at 
squadron level by specialised sections in front-line aircraft skills using the two-seater trainer versions of the 
combat aircraft. Once all those stages are completed and the pilots join their respective squadrons, using 
their own aircraft they spend 12-14 weeks at the Weapons and Tactics School at Andravida.'"
In addition to flight training on-board combat and training aircraft, the HAF pilots also receive 
additional training opportunities through flight simulators. Accordingly, the HAF has at its disposition half 
a dozen flight simulators located at its major air bases. These simulators, now standard items in all modem 
air forces, make it possible to recreate flight and combat conditions at the level of ‘virtual reality’, allowing 
trainees to test themselves without putting themselves or costly aircraft at risk. Information available 
openly suggests that, with the exception of A-7s, simulated models of all HAF's combat aircraft are
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available to Greek pilots (see Table-9).However, at least in comparison with its main rival, The Turkish 
Air Force, it is safe to say that the HAF has insufficient simulation assets, in terms both of quantity and the 
overall technologies and accessories that they contain.
Tal)Ic-?>: Flijiht simulators used hv the HAF.
Type of a/c Ont Location Manufacturer Notes
F-16 Block 30 1 Nea Anhialos Hughes (US) Image EIT visual display, no motion axes.
Mirage 2000 1 Tanagra Thomson-CSF (France) Air defence mission simulator.
Mirage FI 1 TTS (France) Visual display in dome, no motion axes.
F-4E 1 Hughes (US) No visual display, 6 motion axes.
F-5A 1 Hughes (US) No visual display, no motion axes.
T-2E ? CAE-Link (US) No visual display, no motion axes.
F-104G 5 CAE (US) No visual display, 2 motion axes.
Besides actual flying and simulator training, a further factor which has a major impact on the 
overall proficiency and readiness of Greek aviators, is the hours they spend flying their aircraft, especially 
after they join front-line squadrons. Here, the HAF is bound by standards imposed by NATO. By the mid- 
1980s, HAF was able to declare officially that the requisite 180 hours a-year figure for each pilot had been 
attained."'' As Table-10 illustrates, this figure compares favourably with most other NATO air forces and 
as of 1996, only three Allied nations were able to provide their pilots with more flying hours than the HAF 
did.
Tablc-10: Pilotflvlnsi hours per sinnum for selected air forces.
Country Flvine Hour
USA 236-240
UK 228
Canada 210
Netherlands 180
Turkey 180
Greece 180
Belgium* 165
Germany* 150
Bulgaria 45
Libya 40
Albania 25
(*) Certain NATO countries’ flying hours are seriously constrained by the limited size of national air space and/or 
strong political protest over low-altitude flying.
The general level of training and readiness of HAF personnel belonging to other categories is more 
difficult to determine. It is known that transport and other support aircraft are flown by former fighter 
pilots who, because of their age or physical limitations, are no longer able to fly the modem, more
155
demanding jets. For the other so-called ground - i.e. non-flying - duties and functions, most career officers 
are of university level education, while high school education is mandatory for other personnel.” * An 
important training asset worthy of mention is the Akrotiri guided missile training centre on the island of 
Crete. Called NAMFI, since 1968 this centre has been jointly funded and operated by a number of NATO 
countries, and is the most significant of its kind in Europe. At NAMFI, alongside air defence personnel 
from other Allied armed forces, the crews of the Greek SAM and radar-guided anti-aircraft gims conduct 
annual firings, and so acquire valuable experience in handling ground-based air defence weapons.” ’
In assessing the overall proficiency and competence of Greek air crews, the positive impact of the 
frequent Turkish incursions into the self-declared lOnm limit of the Greek airspace should be noted. For 
many years these incursions have enabled the HAF to maintain a high state of operational readiness, best 
reflected in the following commentary by a high-ranking HAF official: “We fly real missions, scrambling 
them all the time because of the problems with our neighbours. (...) Even during the Gulf conflict, my 
neighbouring alliance continued their surprises and their usual practices through the FIR and we had to 
scramble aircraft for defence purposes.”” *
Detrimental to training is the varied make-up of the HAF’s equipment inventory which includes 
aircraft, munitions and other major items of many varieties, origins and configurations.” ® This deficiency 
was brought to the attention of one of the Greek Defence Ministers through a question that read, “how can 
the forces handle large number of different types of weapons from various sources in operations, training 
and maintenance? What is being done to standardise?” From a professional point of view, the answer was 
strikingly simplistic and unsatisfactory:
“We are not confronted with particular problems as regards the handling of the various types 
of weapons in training, maintenance, and ultimately, in operations because: we seek to build 
combat units with uniform equipment; Greeks have a natural ability and desire to leam 
which, combined with a considerably improved standard of education, contributes to the 
rapid assimilation of new equipment.”'^ *
Another fector which works to the detriment of the overall proficiency of HAF's personnel is Greek 
party politics whose frequent interference assiunes greatest importance in the promotion and posting of 
high-ranking officers. In 1984, for instance, a total of 122 generals were retired, to be replaced by the 
supporters of the Prime Minister Papandreou or political neutrals, and the Chief of the General Staff 
became an Air Force officer, whereas historically this billet belonged to the Army. In 1988, the transitional 
Greek Government confronted a spate of resignations, including those of the Chief of National Defence, the 
heads of the Air Force and Navy, as well as the Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff. And in 1990, for 
the third time in less than half a decade, a number of high-ranking HAF officers resigned in protest, after a 
retired Air Marshal was recalled to take over as the Chief of the Hellenic Air Force, thereby, in their eyes, 
blocking their chances for promotion. Strikingly enough, a similar reshuffle at the level of high command 
accompanied the Socialists' return to power in 1993. All those developments led foreign observers to 
conclude that, in the Greek military, political and party affiliations, not professionalism, constitute the most 
important criteria for the selection and promotion of officers, especially for higher ranking officers.'^'
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All this leads us to believe that, while the training of HAF personnel is deemed satisfactory; there 
are sufficient indications to suggest that, at least in comparison with their NATO ally counterparts, Greek 
aviators do not compete in terms of technical knowledge and overall competence.
Maintenance and aircraft availability
An important determinant of the state of readiness of any air force is the general condition and 
availability of its equipment at any given time. This factor is of critical importance during war time, in the 
sense that it also determines the sustainability and the redundancy of an air power. Accordingly, the 
following paragraphs include an overview of the HAF’s maintenance capabilities and procedures.
As every other western air force, the HAF has three levels at which it maintains its aircraft, their 
engines, weapons systems, avionics and electronic equipment. The first of these is the so-called ‘flight line- 
level maintenance’, wherein malfunctioning systems or sub-systems are identified and replaced immediately 
from the stocks at the squadron’s own facilities. The next level is referred to as ‘operating base-level 
maintenance’, the malfunctioning system that has been removed from the aircraft is passed on to a 
dedicated workshop, available at major air bases, and there problematic components within the system are 
identified and replaced, again from stocks. The third, ‘depot or factory-level maintenance’, the 
malfunctioning components are sent back either to a repair and maintenance depot or to its original 
manufacturer, for the necessary repair work to be carried out. Once this repair work is complete, the same 
cycle is activated backwards, and the component that has been repaired becomes part of the stocks at the 
operating base and/or squadron-level workshops. While this highly complex system allows combat aircraft 
and their sub-systems remain operational without major interruptions, it is at the same time highly 
demanding in the sense that fairly large stocks of spare parts need to be pre-positioned at various levels of 
the repair and maintenance cycle, and a dedicated and constant communications and transport network has 
to be in place.
In the HAF, Level-1 and Level-2 maintenance activities are performed at all seven major air bases, 
which possess aircraft maintenance hangars and a complete range of workshops for engines, avionics, 
electronics, fuel systems, weapons, corrosion control, arsenal maintenance and even rocket testing facilities. 
Third level maintenance activities are undertaken by the two air force-owned and operated maintenance 
centres and a supply centre, as well as the facilities of the Hellenic Aerospace Industries (HAI) near 
Athens.However ,  for certain avionics and electronics sub-components, it is believed that a domestic 
repair capability does not exist at all and those items are sent back to their manufacturers in Europe and 
North America.
From the mid-1980s, the HAF is known to have implemented a comprehensive programme to 
revise their whole maintenance philosophy and improve inventory control methods through computer 
controlled analysis. Thanks to these efforts, during the last ten years or so, it is claimed that relatively 
satisfactory results have been achieved in combat aircraft's cross-servicing and quick turn-around (i.e. the 
time between an aircraft’s entry into the maintenance cycle and its becoming mission-capable again). Greek 
authorities have claimed that, for each type of aircraft in service. Level-1 and Level-2 level maintenance
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and the quick repair of battle damage can be provided at a minimum of two bases, in addition to the one 
from which that particular aircraft took off. However, Greek officials admit that, given the number of 
different aircraft in the inventory, as well as the constant state of alert that has to be maintained to intercept 
Turkish aircraft over the Aegean, the HAF must continue to spend extra effort (and resources) to preserve 
its combat readiness at all times. Whether this over-stretched network could be kept at the same level of 
effectiveness amid the confusion of a major conflict remains a cause of ambiguity, with which Greek 
officials have opted not to concern themselves too seriously.
Before analysing the logistic support infrastructure as a closely inter-related aspect of repair and 
maintenance activities, it would be useful to touch upon an additional indicator, sometimes capable of 
providing a fairly accurate picture of not only the effectiveness of the maintenance infrastructure, but also 
the proficiency of both flying and ground-based personnel. This indicator derived from the rate of air 
accidents.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the HAF’s pre-occupation with improving its maintenance 
capabilities has been accompanied by attempts to minimise air accident rates and to modernise methods of 
accident investigation. In fact any improvements in these fields are closely associated with improvements 
in the personnel professionalism and the consistency of the operating procedures, as well as preventive 
measures taken in the training and maintenance cycles. The HAF authorities claim that, thanks to their 
determined efforts, Greek aircraft have had a very low accident rate, in fact among the lowest among 
NATO countries. NATO statistics, however, do not necessarily support this claim. In 1994, for instance, in 
terms of accident/loss rates, the HAF scored higher than 4 and lower than 8 other Allied air forces.’ ’^ In 
fact, given that its climate is more favourable than any that of other Allied country, it is only normal that 
the HAF would score higher than most NATO countries on terms of accident rates. For Allied air forces 
operating in the harsh weather conditions of the central and northern Europe, a significant percentage of the 
aircraft losses are caused by atmospheric conditions, such as heavy precipitation, icing, gale force winds, 
fog, mist and haze that can severely obstruct visibility and/or aircraft handling. To provide the reader with 
a more accurate account of the causes behind Greek military aircraft losses, a comprehensive list of 
military aircraft casualties in Greece, and also in Turkey, is included in the Appendix-1. Close examination 
of this list reveals that, out of approximately 40 aircraft lost by the HAF since the beginning of 1987, 10 
appear to have been caused by pilot error, 14 by technical failures, and the remaining 15 are due to other or 
unknown reasons.
Certain observers attribute HAF's relatively high rates of attrition to the constant struggle to 
counter every single Turkish plane entering the Aegean littoral and to the accompanying high state of alert 
that works to the detriment of both personnel morale and fitness and to the proficiency of the aircraft 
maintenance services. In the words of one Greek officer, especially since the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996, 
the constant state of alert has placed a heavy psychological strain and fatigue on all HAF personnel, to the 
extent that the pilots are unable to assume full control over their sophisticated aircraft once airborne.'“
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Logistic support
As every other air force in the world, the HAF has a logistic support infrastructure in place and 
together with it large stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and other expendable items, all destined for to 
cater for the increased tempo and consumption of wartime operations. Gathering exact figures in this 
regard has proved to be an insurmoimtable task, but this by no means excludes the possibility of drawing 
important conclusions on the basis of fragmented yet valuable information. In 1992, for mstance, the Chief 
of the Hellenic National Defence Staff went on record as saying that war stocks and the operational stocks 
must be improved by purchasing spare parts and other items, thereby improving umts' sustainability.'^’ 
This high-ranking Greek officer’s remarks were developed further by an independent observer, presumably 
familiar with NATO documents on Greece: both Greece and Turkey's ammunition and fuel storage sites 
have shortcomings for which NATO is trying to compensate by allocating greater infiastructure funds to 
the region. Major deficiencies in Greece's current force plans include a serious shortage in ammunition 
stock levels, particularly of air defence munitions.'“  A more recent and supposedly classified NATO report 
reached the same conclusion, asserting that, among others, there were serious spare parts shortfalls in all 
three services, the missile stocks in particular being dangerously low.'“
Remarks about the general state of affairs are of most importance for the HAF, the branch of the 
Hellenic Armed Forces most dependent on a smooth-running logistic support system to fly and arm its 
aircraft. Moreover, there is little doubt that the highly dispersed and numerous air bases and the diversity of 
the aircraft in the inventory further complicate the task of HAF logisticians. The HAF currently flies six 
distinct types of combat aircraft, some of which are further diversified into sub-versions, all requiring 
distinct engines, spare parts, repair & maintenance equipment and, in the case of French-made aircraft, also 
specific types of munitions.
Further, since most Greek air bases are separated from each other by large stretches of water, 
during a conflict, the HAF would have to rely on air transport to sustain constant and timely circulation of 
logistic support items between air bases, repair & maintenance facilities, and supply depots. Yet, the 
number of Greek transport aircraft fulfilling this task is extremely limited. Most air forces employ large 
numbers of designated light transport aircraft to fly back and forth between the logistics-relevant locations. 
The Turkish Air Force, for instance has 50 CN-235 light transporters readily available. The HAF, 
however, has no aircraft falling in this category and, since the much larger Hercules transports is the only 
viable alternative and would be badly needed elsewhere, there is little question that at the height of a major 
conflict, the HAF would encounter insurmountable logistic support bottlenecks and drawbacks.
Financial Resources
In order to fulfil the tasks with which it is charged and establish itself as the main deterrent and 
retaliatory tool of the Hellenic armed forces, the HAF undoubtedly needs substantial financial resources to 
acquire aircraft and mumtions, pay and train its personnel, build a large infiastructure and, above all, to 
maintain and operate all its imits and components at a satisfactory level of readiness and effectiveness. In 
meeting those requirements, reflected in its modernisation plans, the HAF has used two alternative tools: 
foreign military aid programmes and the national defence budget. Regarding the first category, until
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recently the HAF continued to receive substantial quantities of surplus equipment from NATO allies, most 
notably The US. In fact, most of the older aircraft in its inventory, as well as some of its weapons systems, 
were acquired second-hand from allied air forces, either free of charge or at symbolic cut-rate prices. (See 
Table-11) Even more significantly, some air bases and most early-warning radar sites were constructed 
with NATO Infrastructure Funds, furnished by well-to-do members of the Alliance. However, as stated in 
preceding chapters, since the end of The Cold War, foreign military aid has declined steadily and by the 
late-1990s has become virtually insignificant.
T a h le -1 1 : M a jo r  a e r ia l  p la tfo rm s  a n d  w ea p o n s  a c q u ire d  th ro ii i’h fo re iu n  m il i ta rv  a id  p ro « ra m m e s .
Ont. Item Year SuDolier Cost i$m>
28 F-4E fighter aircraft 1996 us surplus
8 P-3 A/B maritime patrol a/c 1995-96 US 69
36 A-7E/TA-7C strike a/c 1995-96 US 70
8 AH-IP Cobra attack helicopter 1995 US
9 AH-IP Cobra attack helicopter 1994 US
27 RF-4E reconnaissance a/c 1994 Germany
30 UH-IH helicopter 1993 US
5 C-130B transport aircraft 1992-93 US
5 RF-4E reconnaissance a/c 1992 US
12 NF-5 fighter aircraft 1992 Netherlands 11
28 F-4E fighter aircraft 1991 US surplus
62 A-7E strike aircraft 1992-94 US
300 Sidewinder AA missiles 1984 US 30
8 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter 1980 US 35
200 Maverick AS missiles 1980 US 13
300 Sidewinder AA missiles 1980 US 20
300 Sidewinder AA missiles 1977 US 8
100 Sparrow AA missiles 1977 US 13
18 F-4E fighter aircraft 1977 US 161
10 CH-47 1977 US 61
38 F-4E fighter aircraft 1974-76 US
With regard to the second category of national budgetary resources, since 1974, in comparison 
with its land and maritime counterparts, the HAF has received a higher percentage of funds allocated to 
equipment modernisation. During this period and personnel, operating and construction costs apart, some 
40 per cent of the national funds available for the procurement of new defence equipment were allocated to 
the HAF.'^° There is little doubt that this privileged status damaged the other two services, the Hellenic 
Army’s equipment inventory in particular witnessing a relative erosion in the process. Having used up 
more than its fair share of defence procurement funds during the preceding two decades, briefly in the mid- 
1990s the HAF was the force command receiving less fresh procurement funds. In 1995, the HAF 
consumed some 31,5 per cent of total defence expenditure and its share of the total procurement funds 
dwindled from nearly 40 per cent to 33,5 per cent. During the same year, long-term defence budget 
projections foresaw a slight decline till the year 1999, when HAF's share of total defence funds and total 
procurement funds were expected to settle at 32-33 per cent.* '^
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However, those plans never saw finition and, with the implementation of the new EMPAE ten-year 
procurement programme in late-1997, air force equipment requirements once more took precedence over 
their ground and maritime coimterparts. Accordingly, the Hellenic Navy s and Army s new submanne and 
main battle tank programmes took a back seat to the air force’s new fighter and early-warning aircraft 
acquisitions.'^^
This privileged position vis-à-vis other force commands does not mean that the HAF has been 
immune from budgetary cuts and fluctuations. On the contrary, a deterioration in the national economic 
situation, particularly in late-80s resulted in a series of delays over an order of fighter aircraft, as well as 
some other items of critical importance. Accordingly, HAF's long-held requirements currently on the back- 
burner include air-to-surface anti-shipping missiles, airborne early warning aircraft, transport planes, 
combat SAR helicopters and trainers.
All told, with regard to the distribution of national and foreign aid resources amongst the three 
branches of the Greek armed forces, it could be asserted that the HAF has traditionally been favoured over 
its ground and naval counterparts, receiving far more than its feir share. By the same token, since Greece's 
economic assets are already over-stretched to meet current levels of defence spending, and since foreign 
military aid from Allied countries is rapidly evaporating, it would be realistic to assume that current levels 
of financial resources represent the maximum the HAF could ever hope to receive and that over the coming 
years financial circumstances and the resources available to Greek aviators are unlikely to alter drastically.
Epilogue to Chapter Five
Our descriptive analysis of the Hellenic Air Force portrayed it as an air arm of considerable size 
with approximately 400 combat and 200 other types of aircraft deployed to 20 permanent air bases. In 
addition, there is a relatively dense array of early warning radars and army and air force-owned anti­
aircraft missiles, as well as over 150 helicopters operated by the Hellenic Army and Hellenic Navy. At first 
sight, comparison with other NATO countries suggests that, at least in terms of numbers, this is a sizeable 
aerial component only surpeissed by the air forces of The US, United Kingdom, France, Germany and 
Turkey, the Italian Air Force appearing to be on a par with that of Greece. All other NATO air forces are 
significantly smaller. By the same token, the HAF holds clear numerical superiority over its regional rivals.
Yet, numbers alone are not indicative of the true strength and potential of an air force. Besides the 
quantitative aspect, the quality of the aircraft and the aviators that fly them, as well as the nature of the 
supporting infrastructure and services are at least as important. Despite a fi'equently-expressed Greek 
desire to improve the qualitative aspects of its air arm, Athens’ obsession to catch up with a numerically 
superior Turkey appears to be working counter to this goal. Against the background of the high operating 
and maintenance expenses necessitated by a large and varied fleet of combat aircraft spread over an 
absurdly high number of air fields, little fresh resources are available for less visible, but equally important 
components and functions of the force structure. More precisely, critically low levels of mimitions 
stockpiles would limit to a few days the length of an extensive aerial confrontation; an over-stretched 
system of logistic support is certain to give rise to serious hurdles and bottlenecks at the height of aerial
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combat; and short&lls in early warning, communications and battle management flmctions are certain to 
take their toll on operational effectiveness.
Even more significant from the HAF's point of view is the fact that time is more likely to aggravate 
than improve this situation. First of all, the aerial component of the Greek armed forces is already getting 
more than its fair share of national defence expenditures. Since increased military spending is unlikely, in 
the foreseeable future, the HAF is destined to be confined to current levels of financial and human 
resources. Second, a large number of second-hand aircraft are rapidly nearing the end of their useful life, 
and US and NATO surplus stocks, from which most of the Greek inventory was acquired in the first place, 
are nearly depleted. Consequently, in order to sustain its current fleet size, the HAF would have to either 
rely on increasingly outdated aircraft, or cut even further into the logistic support, munitions, maintenance, 
training, communications and other quality-relevant aspects of its force structure. Hence, unless significant 
reductions in the fleet size are accepted, a steady decline in quality will become unavoidable. This last 
aspect presents the HAF with a major dilemma, whose solution lies more in the political realm and the 
country's accompanying threat perceptions rather than in purely military considerations.
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CHAPTER 6
GREEK AIR POWER: AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF 
CAPABILITIES AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS
As our previous analyses have revealed, by virtue of Greece’s geographic circumstances 
and the nature of its disputes with its main rival Turkey, air power ranked by Greek policy-makers 
as a prominent and distinguished element of the nation’s military capabilities. However, The 
Hellenic Air Force (HAF), which holds the overwhelming majority of the national assets and 
resources readily available to generate air power, is neither the oldest nor largest of the three armed 
services. Under the re-formulation of Greek national security priorities in 1974 and, as compared 
to other branches of the Greek armed forces, the HAF plays a distinct role in Greece's military 
posture. As reflected in the five-year Greek procurement plans announced in late-1997, during the 
years to come, the HAF can also be expected to enjoy this privileged status in Greece’s military 
posture.
However, this by no means signifies that, as a result of this utmost precedence, the HAF is 
in a position to automatically fulfil all peace-time and war-time missions and responsibilities 
entrusted to it. On the contrary, our descriptive analysis in the preceding chapter indicated that the 
HAF had a porous and uneven force structure and accompanying capabilities. But nevertheless, to 
complement our descriptive analysis, a more dynamic and ‘analytical’ approach is necessary, so as 
to measure the HAF's capabilities against the background of responsibilities and tasks expected of 
air power according to Greece’s national security objectives. Our analysis to that effect will have 
two dimensions, each of which can be treated as separate, yet closely interconnected yardsticks. 
The first yardstick consists of an analysis of the ‘mission-effectiveness’ of the HAF, as well as the 
aerial force components of the other two branches of the Greek military. The capabilities as well as 
the deficiencies with respect to each of the missions entrusted to air power will be identified. 
Needless to say, these missions are those identified in Chapter-2.
The second dimension -  or yardstick -  of our dynamic analysis will seek to determine 
Greece’s position in relation to the spectrum differentiating first-rate air powers from second, a 
notion also elaborated at length in Chapter-2. The links established between the two yardsticks and 
the conclusions drawn should provide the reader with a more comprehensive picture of Greek air
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power. This particular analysis of Greek air power's dynamic aspects will also contribute to the 
formulation of the overall findings of our study.
I- OVERVIEW OF BASIC VIRTUES
Before setting out on a detailed analysis of the Greek military’s proficiency with respect to 
air power's particular missions, a lesser number of basic virtues, common to the success (or 
failure) of most missions are worthy of mention. These six virtues and the standing of the HAF 
with respect to each one of them is as follows;
• Range: this indicates the distance which a combat or non4x>mbat aircraft can fly on a given 
mission. Since aircraft are the primary instruments of force projection at the disposal of any air 
force, their effective range defines the operational outreach of that air force. Yet, the range of 
aircraft is not an absolute notion and, depending on two variables, it displays great variation. 
The first variation is in the weapons or other load carried by the aircraft; as the so-called 
‘payload’ carried onboard increases, the distance that can be flown shrinks. For instance, an F- 
16 fighter plane equipped with two laser-guided bombs can strike targets up to 1,000 km away. 
But when armed with four such bombs, the combat radius would decline sharply to less than 
600 km. The second variable that determines the range is the height at which a given mission is 
flown. Missions flown at very low altitudes to minimise the risk of detection by enemy air 
defences, maximise fuel consumption. For example, a fully-loaded Tornado strike aircraft 
flying at medium or low altitudes would be able to fly to and back from a target up to 1,200 km 
away, but switching to a very low altitude flight pattern, this figure would drop to 750 km.' 
Bearing in mind the highly elastic features of this concept, a number of generalisations can be 
made on the maximum outreach of the HAF. The longest range combat aircraft in the inventory 
is the A-7 that can travel a distance of 1,100 km with a full load of weapons and fly back. This 
gives Greece enough outreach to cover the entire area of the three neighbouring countries to the 
north. But when faced with Turkey, Greek A-7s would only be able to reach those targets 
located in the western half on Asia Minor, whereas the vital targets, including a number of 
operating air bases to the east of the country, would be immune from air strikes. (See Figure- 
24). To off-set this major tactical drawback, the HAF has recently adopted a two-pronged 
approach; first, plans exist to acquire 2 to 4 tanker aircraft to extend the range of strike planes 
through in-flight refuelling; and second, thanks to the basing arrangements vvith Cyprus, the 
newly-built Paphos air base on that island would be used for HAF contingencies, in a manner 
to enable Greek strike aircraft to operate and/or refuel there and widen their combat range to
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Operating from Greek territory. Taking-off from Cyprus.
Figure-23: Outreach of Greek combat aircraft. (*)
(*) Map drawn by merging the openly-Hstcd range of A-7 Corsair strike aircraft with tiie 
locations of Greek air bases as illustrated in Figure-18.
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cover targets in the eastern half of Turkey. Other combat aircraft in Greek service, most notably 
F-16s which are dedicated to the role of ground attack, all have shorter combat radii than the A- 
7. Greece could well be categorised as a regional air power, with all its combat aircraft only 
capable of operating in the immediate vicinity of Greek territory, mission requirements in the 
form of extended outreach to cover the eastern half of Turkey, only being accomplished through 
politically and operationally shaky basing arrangements.
Night-fighting and all-weather capability: Many warplanes are tolerably effective in bad 
weather and at night against quite a variety of air and ground targets. Yet, not even the most 
advanced of avionics and electronic sensors are proof against all weather or light conditions 
and factors, such as darkness and poor visibility caused by precipitation, low cloud cover or 
fog, tend to curtail all aspects of aerial operations. Moreover, even the most advanced all- 
weather aircraft experience major difficulties in taking off and, particularly landing, when 
runways are slippery and there is low visibility. Thus, operating at night and in adverse 
weather conditions places heavy requirements on any air force, in the form both of properly 
equipped aircraft and adequately-trained air crews.^ Turning our attention to the HAF, with the 
exception of the day-time only F-5 fighters, at least in theory, all combat aircraft in the 
inventory consist of night and all-weather capable machines. However, a number of accidents 
observed in recent years during night and adverse weather training are indicative of certain 
deficiencies in training and crewman proficiency.^ Even more significantly, while an 
overwhelming majority of Greek combat aircraft could fly at medium and high altitudes with 
relative safety and can also fix and attack airborne targets using their radars, only a fraction of 
Greek fighters are actually capable of flying low and striking surface targets regardless the 
light or weather conditions. A-7 strike and RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft are those adequately- 
equipped for radar-assisted sorties flown at very low altitudes, but their electronic systems are 
becoming increasingly outdated, hence their reliability is questionable. On the other hand, 
LANTRIN pod-equipped F-16 fighters due to be delivered to the HAF in 1997-98 will equip 
Greece its first round-the-clock combat capability. Of the 40 new F-16s to be accepted into 
service, 12 will have navigation and a further 14 both navigation and targeting capabilities 
under most weather conditions and at night. Plans also exist to give 25-30 older aircraft a 
similar capability through add-on navigation pods.'* However, it is highly unlikely that all 
operational requirements can be met on the basis of a token force of a few dozen aircraft.
’ Precision strike capability: The ever-increasing importance of precision strike capability in 
modem aerial combat has been documented in preceding chapters. Basic assets needed to be 
able to make precision strikes can be divided into three categories; 1) sensor, navigation and 
other supporting electronic systems fitted to the aircraft; 2) ‘smart’ and other guided munitions
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onboard; 3) effective intelligence-gathering and timely reconnaissance in order to identify 
targets, plan missions and assess battle damage. Under 1), the HAF scores fidrly well: most of 
its combat aircraft are equipped with relatively modem inertial navigation and visual targeting 
systems enabling day-time, fair-weather delivery of unguided weapons (i.e. ‘iron’ bombs) to 
their targets with an error margin of less than 10 meters, when such strikes are conducted at 
low-altitudes.* However, if fljdng a few thousand meters higher to avoid anti-aircraft fire, or in 
less satisfactory light and weather conditions, accuracy goes astray and tactically-significant 
air raids rapidly become improbable. Under such circumstances, the use of guided munitions 
from higher altitudes and/or at stand-off ranges could minimise the risk to parent aircraft and at 
the same time increase the chances for pinpoint accuracy. Again, at least in theory, all Greek 
fighter-bombers could be equipped with laser designator pods to enable the carriage of guided 
weapons, but as the pods and the weapons to be used with them are not abundant, it is believed 
that only a fraction of them are so-fitted. In this respect, the LANTIRN-equipped F-16s 
currently being delivered are the most capable aircraft, and a tender has recently been opened 
to acquire 20-25 additional laser targeting pods for some of the older aircraft as well. Moving 
to the next category of guided munitions; our analyses in the preceding Chapter have already 
revealed that guided munitions in the HAF's inventory not only consist of older and less- 
capable types, but are also critically insufficient in quantity.* Hence, the deficiencies in this 
particular field are amongst the most striking drawbacks of the precision strike capability and 
the overall mission-effectiveness of the HAF. Lastly - reconnaissance capabilities in support of 
precision strike - the shortcomings appear to be at least as significant. After all, precision 
weapons are only as good as the intelligence which supports their targeting. Yet, Greece does 
not have satellite observation capabilities of its own and its tactical reconnaissance assets are 
limited to a handful of relatively outdated RF-4 aircraft. In other words, even if rapid progress 
were made in sensor and guided weapons inventories, knowing what aim points to target would 
remain open to uncertainty and the intensity and effectiveness of any Greek precision strike 
effort would thus be questionable.
Readiness: The term readiness refers to the degree to which a military organisation or unit 
would be able to conduct offensive and/or defensive operations at short notice. Accordingly, 
there are a fairly large number of determinants, such as equipment quality and maintainability, 
training and morale of the personnel, aircraft-to-crewmen ratio, directly or indirectly 
influencing the level of readiness of any military organisation. For the purposes of this study, 
two of the most readily manageable Actors, training and maintenance, have already been 
analysed at some length in the preceding chapter and it has been noted that the HAF scores 
poorly on the latter and only average with respect to the former. Regarding the aircraft-to-pilot
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ratio, although publicly available data is extremely limited, it can be concluded that, Greek 
statistics are more or less in line with NATO standards of 1,5 to 2 pilots to each aircraft. ’ Any 
generalisations about the overall availability rate of HAF aircraft is similarly difficult to 
accomplish in any degree of precision. Nonetheless, close examination of NATO standards on 
this particular aspect might prove helpful. During the late 1980s, the USAF availability rate for 
combat aircraft was 77 per cent and, while no precise figures were available for NATO as a 
whole, it is highly unlikely that this high rate is matched by many other air forces. It has been 
alleged, for instance, that between one-third and one-half of the Royal Air Force jets are 
grounded for repair, maintenance, modification or inspection, making them imavailable to carry 
out routine training or combat operations.® Using those figures, it would be realistic to assume 
that no more than two-thirds of the HAF's combat aircraft would be fully combat-capable at 
any given time.
Sustainability & Redundancy: The most basic definition of the term “sustainability” is a 
military unit’s or organisation’s ability to carry on with offensive and defensive operations at a 
certain level of effectiveness, after the outbreak of an armed clash. The conditions and 
circumstances of an actual combat are quite different from the daily routine of peacetime 
operations; a much increased tempo of operations places extra stress on equipment and 
personnel, disruptions in the logistic support chain, almost unavoidable losses to enemy action, 
blows by the enemy on one’s own assets and so on. Hence, besides the inventory of equipment, 
personnel and other assets available at the outbreak of a conflict, a nation’s ability to generate 
new ones or at least to replace the ones lost is of the utmost importance and urgency, this latter 
aspect giving an indication of a concept widely termed “redundancy”.
Hence, in judging the sustainability of the HAF in a potential conflict, an obvious aspect 
deserving of in-depth analysis is the war stocks of consumable goods, among them fuel and 
ammunition, the pool of pilots and other supporting personnel, spare parts and, ultimately, 
even the aircraft themselves. On the basis of our previous analyses of munitions stockpile 
levels, maintenance and logistics, it would be safe to assume that, the HAF would deplete its 
stocks of modem guided missiles and bombs in a matter of days and, under the strain of actual 
fighting, its already over-stretched maintenance and logistic support networks would 
unavoidably produce serious hurdles and bottlenecks. Moreover, not only is Greece not in a 
position to replace from domestic sources its losses of capital assets such as aircraft and radar 
sites, but neither could it replace expendables such as munitions and spare parts, this being an 
outcome of the weak state of Greek defence industrial capabilities. Hence, the HAF’s 
capability to sustain a major military confrontation with a duration of more than a few days 
would depend largely on outside assistance. In fact, even if this vital assistance becomes
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available, only a few categories of equipment could be taken up and pressed into service 
immediately: munitions, spare parts, electronic warfare pods etc. are the sorts of equipment 
that could be readily put into use, whereas capital items such as aircraft would be much more 
difficult to digest, first because the specific configuration of the aircraft being hurried in from 
the active service of a friendly nation would display significant differences in configuration 
and, second, the pool of Greek pilots capable of flying them without a lengthy conversion 
period would be extremely limited.  ^ Naturally, neither sustainability nor redundancy are 
absolute notions, and depending on the circumstances of a given conflict, they would display 
great variations. In this respect, the relative strength of the adversary and the duration and 
intensity of the conflict are all critical factors. Yet, our preceding conclusions have been made 
using the worst-case scenario of an all-out Turkish-Greek armed confrontation and at any 
• level of military operations below this threshold, Greek sustainability and redundancy would 
be expected to fare better.
Robustness: The term robustness is closely related to both “sustainability” and “redundancy”. 
However, it is a distinct notion with utmost significance of its own. Operationally, robust 
weapon systems, military units or organisations, when inevitable attempts are made to disrupt 
them, will not collapse suddenly, but rather fall away in a manner that can be controlled, 
through a process that has often been called “elegant degradation”.'® Indeed, in actual combat 
every military unit suffers losses, but whether those losses start degrading the overall 
operational capabilities in an uncontrolled manner is determined by that military unit’s level of 
robustness. Owing to its close connection with ‘sustainability’ and ‘redundancy’, the HAF’s 
overall picture of robustness is not markedly different from the former two. Again, in the light 
of our previous analyses , it is possible to locate three weak points of particular importance 
that could rapidly degrade the HAF’s war-making capabilities. The first is the vulnerability of 
Greek ground-based early-warning radars, most of which are unhardened and unprotected by 
active defences. Their destruction in the opening phases of a conflict would drastically degrade 
the HAF’s ability to co-ordinate its air defence activities. The second is the command-control- 
communications network which displays deficiencies even in peace-time and is also devoid of 
substantial back-up capabilities to compensate for the unavoidable war-time losses. As is to be 
expected, its total or partial collapse would bring the whole Greek war effort to an abrupt 
end." The last deficiency is Greece’s insufficient electronic warfare capabilities, at least in 
comparison with its main rival Turkey's. Capitalising on her ability to design and develop her 
own electronic warfare systems, Turkey could achieve technological surprise in the electronic 
spectrum and could thus wreak havoc on the HAF’s pre-planned activities and contingencies.
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Once control over the fourth, or electronic spectrum of warfare, is lost, the degradation of all 
war-making efforts will take place quite rapidly, if not instantaneously.
II- ANALYSIS OF MISSION-EFFECTIVENESS
Having briefly considered the six factors of direct relevance to the execution of air power's 
roles and missions, we now turn our attention to air power's missions and how well the HAF and 
other branches of the Greek armed forces would fulfil them in the heat of an actual combat. As 
stressed previously, the sequential ordering of air power’s missions would be identical to our 
previous analysis of the same topic in Chapter 2. Hence, we will begin our analysis with the six 
missions falling under the function of ‘aerospace control’, proceed with a total of eight missions 
under ‘force application’ and ‘force enhancement’ respectively and, finally, elaborate Greece’s 
proficiency with respect to the two missions within the sphere of ‘force support’.
• Base strikes: The HAF has allocated no dedicated aircraft or stand-off weapon systems to that 
task. Instead, the primary responsibility is believed to rest with the F-16 and A-7 squadrons 
that are assigned to strike roles. The aircraft are only expected to carry concrete-breaking 
munitions, unguided bombs and, occasionally, guided missiles and bombs as well, when 
undertaking the particularly dangerous task of striking air bases. Since such supporting assets 
as stand-off jamming and dedicated SEAD aircraft are unavailable and since Greek aircraft are 
not particularly beefed-up with electronic self-protection accessories, the attrition rates would 
be expected to be high and the overall mission effectiveness average at best. •
• Suppression of enemy air defences fSEADf The HAF does not deploy squadrons dedicated to 
this highly-specialised mission and both the quantity and quality of the relevant munitions and 
electronic warfare assets for use by the other general-purpose aircraft assigned to this role 
remain unsatisfactory. Currently, with the exception of the obsolescent Shrikes, no anti­
radiation missiles are available and the HARM missiles being delivered are too few in number 
and are only carried by the most recent of the F-16 fighters. Alternatively, general purpose 
munitions could be used to attack air defence targets with pre-determined locations, but even 
then precise reconnaissance and pinpoint accuracy would be imperative and Greek capabilities 
in both realms are in short supply. Likewise, the most important target set of enemy command 
& control nods are unlikely to be dealt effectively, because concrete and/or earth-penetrating 
guided munitions are not available. In short, faced with a moderately well-organised air defence
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effort, the HAF would either be forced to stay away from air defence sites or, under extreme 
circumstances, seek to neutralise them at the cost of very high attrition rates.
Fighter cover: The number of Greek fighter aircraft available for this mission is fairly large, 
but the absence of vital stand-off supporting platforms such as AEW & C aircraft make their 
neatly organised employment a remote possibility, particularly when operating near to or inside 
hostile airspace. Likewise, inability to refuel from airborne tanker aircraft would severely 
reduce the time that could be spent in combat air patrols and concentrating large numbers of 
fighters at critical times and in critical locations would be immensely difficult. Hence, the 
fighter cover mission performed by the HAF could not be expected to display the near-perfect 
punctuality and clarity of, say. The Gulf War and any major encounter with enemy aircraft is 
likely to produce an aerial mêlée, the latter being typical in regional conflicts between second- 
rate air powers.
Ground-based air defence: The anti-aircraft weapons deployed by Greece could be divided into 
five. The Nike Hercules SAM batteries which form the high-altitude leg of the air defence 
structure are in urgent need of replacement and offer little more than ‘symbolic’ protection for 
the nation’s capital against high-flying and non-manoeuvring intruders. The two I-Hawk SAM 
battalions fielded by the Hellenic Army constitute the second category, providing 
complementary protection at medium altitude. But, until their planned PIP-3 upgrade, they will 
remain vulnerable to electronic jamming, and being owned by the Army there are likely to be 
co-ordination and interface problems with the rest of the air defence network. The third layer of 
surface-based air defence consists of the Standard SAM-equipped destroyers operated by the 
Hellenic Navy which offering a medium- to high-altitude area defence capability in the Aegean 
Sea. Indeed, when deployed on the north-south axis along the Aegean Sea, they could constitute 
the mobile elements of a layered air defence shield positioned against Turkey. However, they 
are highly vulnerable to enemy submarines and would display the same type of co-ordination 
and interface complications as the Army-owned I-Hawks. The fourth group is made up of the 
HAF-operated Aspide/Skyguard SAM systems that are deployed by all major air bases. These 
weapons excel against low-flying intruders approaching an air base, but their short range 
confines them to the role of point defence only and, even when protecting air bases, this 
limitation can be exploited with dire results, by stand-off missile-equipped enemy aircraft. 
Finally, the last group comprises the point defence systems owned and operated by Greek army 
units. With the exception of a dozen SA-8 Gecko launchers, believed to be quite effective 
against low-flying aircraft, the army systems falling in this category have extremely short
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ranges and could only be used as a last resort by army contingents as weapons of self­
protection. All told, although some of its components are rapidly ageing and problems persist in 
surmoimting integration and central control, Greece could be said to possess of a fairly 
comprehensive SAM shield, that would at least substantially complicate the mission planning 
of potential intruders. Meanwhile, quite significantly, Greece does not have any defensive or 
even early-warning capabilities against ballistic or cruise missiles fired by neighbouring or 
overseas coimtries.
• Interception: Given the high priority accorded by Athens to asserting its control over the Athens 
FIR and self-declared 10 nm air space in and aroimd the Aegean littoral and, given the 
perpetual challenge posed by ‘intruding’ Turkish aircraft, air interception is a priority mission 
for the HAF, needing to be fulfilled at times of peace and war alike. Not surprisingly, nearly 
half the HAF squadrons and one-third its aircraft strength are dedicated to this particular 
mission. However, serious limitations persist. Only three dozen Mirage 2000s in the inventory 
are ‘look-down, shoot-down’ capable and the remainder of the fleet is largely ineffective 
against low-flying intruders at slant ranges. Despite the forward deployment of certain 
interceptors to bases on the Aegean islands, the airspace they would have to secure is so large 
and the number of aircraft that could be scrambled at very short notice so small, that large- 
scale intrusions at several points are virtually impossible to check, a point also conceded by 
Greek officials.'^ Furthermore, since Greece relies on largely outdated and uiu’eliable IFF 
systems, over large distances, differentiating hostile aircraft from fnendly would be extremely 
difficult. Hence, instead of firing their guided missiles over extended ranges, Greek interceptors 
would have to close in for positive identification leading to ‘dogfights’, rather than neatly- 
arranged, ‘remote control’ type interception efforts. In fact, even when positive identification at 
long distance is possible, the number of relatively modem guided missiles is too low to allow an 
extravagant interception campaign. Last but not least, the absence of vital force multipliers (i.e. 
AEW & C aircraft enabling full control of airspace and closer co-ordination of interception 
efforts and tanker planes that would extend interceptors’ patrol time), will continue to inhibit 
the overall interception activity, at least until the planned acquisition of such assets take place.
Early warning and C^I: Thanks to the NADGE early-warning radar network erected by NATO 
and the Greek systems that supplement it, radar coverage of the Greek air space is 
comprehensive and detection capabilities are quite satisfactory, at least against those aircraft 
that are flying at medium and high altitudes. As illustrated in Figure-23, taking into accoimt the 
locations of the known radar sites, a four-layered early warning web positioned to counter
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Figure-24: Greek radar/early warning belts. (*)
(*) Radar detection belts were drawn on the basis of the radar site locations that have 
already been indicated in Figure-19.
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Turkish aerial activity is readily identifiable. Yet, despite their extensive coverage, almost all 
Greek and NADGE radars are decidedly immobile, some are too old and unreliable, they often 
lack anti-blast walls and are, therefore, manifestly vulnerable to sophisticated attack. Most 
important of all, like all ground-based radars, they are incapable of providing complete 
coverage at low altitude.'^ Hence, coverage against low-travelling intruders is patchy and enable 
the latter to penetrate deep inside Greek airspace by carefully circumventing radar lobes, whose 
exact location would be well-known in advance. The only solution is the AEW & C aircraft 
and, although plans exist to acquire 2 to 4 such platforms under the newly-approved 
modernisation programme, their entry into service and full operational status will take a few 
more years at the very least. Other drawbacks connected to the Greek early warning and C^ I 
include; vulnerability to electronic counter-measures; limitations accruing from the continued 
use of out-dated IFF systems'■*; serious deficiencies in command-control links and hardware that 
have continuously been cited in NATO annual reviews'^; and, finally, a total lack of detection 
and early warning capabilities against the rapidly intensifying threat posed by ballistic and 
cruise missiles, as well as low observables such as UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).'®
• Strategic bombing: As many other air forces around the world, Greece relies on fighter- 
bombers to undertake strategic bombing sorties, and so does not deploy any medium or heavy 
bombers. In the case of a conflict with any of her neighbouring countries, the prime 
responsibility for this is certain to reside with A-7-equipped strike squadrons, as well as those 
squadrons flying F-16s. Yet, although A-7s are capable of carrying a large load of munitions 
across a broad mission radius and can also undertake deep penetration at low altitude, they are 
slow-flying aircraft of limited agility and so stand little chance of survival against ‘look-down, 
shoot-down’ capable enemy fighters. The totally insufficient electronic self-protection outfit 
onboard Greek A-7s further erode their chances amidst the multiplicity of ground and airborne 
threats faced when attacking well-protected strategic targets. The better-equipped and much 
younger F-16s are poised to achieve better results, but their limited range and weapons load act 
to the detriment of strategic raids and the limited number of F-16s means that extreme caution 
is displayed in allocating these valuable assets to such dangerous assignments as strategic 
bombing. Other drawbacks of no lesser importance are; limited availability to the HAF of air- 
to-surface guided munitions and total lack of stand-off missiles, both of which are imperative in 
striking well-protected point targets; a serious discrepancy between the need for detailed target 
identification and prioritisation in strategic bombing, and the limited strategic and tactical 
reconnaissance assets available to Greece; the lack of stand-off jamming and SEAD aircraft 
that could play an invaluable role in opening ‘safe corridors’ through hostile airspace; and the
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aerial refuelling capability, of critical importance in re-routing strike aircraft or extending their 
range.
Air interdiction: The circumstances surrounding the mission of strategic bombing are more or 
less applicable to that of air interdiction as well, as the aircraft, munitions and even the tactics 
employed in both missions show striking similarities. Accordingly, even though Greece has a 
feirly large number of ground attack aircraft that could be assigned to this mission, deficiencies 
with respect to night and adverse-weather navigation and targeting, precision-guided munitions, 
defensive and offensive accessories such as electronic jamming pods, as well as aerial 
reconnaissance, would all act to the detriment of air interdiction’s effectiveness.
Close air support fCASl: The HAF does not deploy any purpose-built CAS aircraft. Instead, 
this particularly dangerous and demanding task is entrusted upon strike and ground attack 
squadrons that are also assigned to strategic bombing and air interdiction missions. In &ct, in 
emergencies, all other combat and even training aircraft capable of carrying some kind of 
weapons load could be assigned to CAS. However, the structural fragility of conventional 
fighters and their subsequent vulnerability to ground fire, signify that, in fulfilling CAS 
missions, the HAF would have to accept feirly high losses, without necessarily producing a net 
profit for the ground soldiers. The guided munitions needed against hardened or mobile 
armoured targets are too scarce to be used extensively, air-ground digital communications 
appear to be insufficient and very few Greek aircraft are capable of conducting CAS at night or 
in adverse weather conditions. With reference to this last aspect, two exceptions are a handful 
of newly-acquired F-16 fighters, whose LANTIRN navigation and targeting pods offer a 
hypothetical night CAS capability, and 20 examples of the Apache attack helicopters owned 
and operated by the Hellenic Army. Thanks to their highly-developed sensors and weapons 
outfit, the latter excel as potent day and night CAS platforms. No wonder Greece is planning to 
acquire a further 10 choppers of the same type, thereby introducing an independent capability 
to conduct CAS operations using attack helicopters.'^However, given their vulnerability to 
overhead fighter aircraft, unless local air superiority can be guaranteed (an unlikely 
undertakmg agamst a major adversary such as Turkey), their contribution to ground combat 
will be diluted by the perpetual danger posed by enemy fighters. More significantly, the 
compartmentalised nature of Greece’s eastern frontier calls for a rapid concentration of fire 
power at any point along the border in order to neutralise the numerical superiority of attacking 
ground umts. But, attack helicopters’ mherently restricted combat radius would curtail instant 
transit and assembly around areas of intensive combat.'* In summary, the combination of
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geographic circumstances, hardware limitations and the drawbacks in command, control, 
communications, training, inter-service co-ordination etc. indicates that, faced with the 
inherently dangerous job of CAS, the HAF is highly likely to shy away at the earliest 
opportunity, or else experience heavy casualties.
• Maritime operations: Since Greece is a maritime country, it is to be expected that it has 
substantial capabilities for the application of air power to naval warfare. However, this is not 
the case. For maritime patrol functions, the only aviation assets Greece has are 4 P-3B Orions 
with an average age of more than 35 years, recently acquired from US surpluses as a stop-gap 
measure until the arrival of more modem platforms. New maritime patrol aircraft, however, 
are not included in the 8-year modernisation plan and these ageing aircraft will continue to have 
this task for at least another decade or so. With respect to anti-submarine warfare, the 6 
Seahawks and 10 older naval helicopters deployed by the Hellenic Navy aboard its frigates, 
provide far from satisfactory coverage over the Aegean and Mediterranean waters, whose 
acoustic characteristics overwhelmingly favour submarines. Regarding TASMO (tactical 
maritime strike), the drawbacks are even more noteworthy: currently, no HAF squadrons or 
combat aircraft are dedicated to that particular role and, despite a frequently expressed 
requirement to this effect, no stand-off anti-shipping missiles have to date been acquired. As 
things stand, to carry out maritime strikes, Greece only has a handful of medium-range Penguin 
missiles fired from naval helicopters, as well as A-7 strike aircraft, expected to conduct old- 
fashioned bombing runs against naval vessels, only using their out-of-date guided and unguided 
weapons. Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis, the acquisition from 
France of AM-39 Exocet anti-shipping missiles and the dedication of a Mirage 2000 squadron 
to carrying out naval strikes have finally been incorporated in the force modernisation plans. 
Only after the realisation of these two steps will Greece have at its disposal a relatively decent 
maritime strike capability.
Air transport and airborne operations: Air transport is another sector in which long-overdue 
requirements have not been handled satisfactorily. Currently, the bulk of transport duties, 
including troop transport, airborne landing, logistic support etc., are fulfilled by 15 Hercules 
aircraft, while a comparable quantity of much lighter (and older) liaison aircraft are also in use. 
Frequent calls by the HAF for additional transport planes have been systematically denied by 
procurement authorities and as things stand, the Greek transport fleet is hopelessly 
overburdened and unable to meet the large variety of transport responsibilities imposed by the 
country’s peculiar geography. In this regard, the orderly shuttle flights between widely
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dispersed air bases and other military installations, rendered imperative by the high operational 
tempo of an actual conflict, is doomed to suffer considerably: the HAF does not have any light 
transports to fulfil this role and the heavier Hercules would be applied to more pressing needs 
elsewhere. The detrimental impact on logistic support and, ultimately sustainability and 
redundancy, are obvious. Likewise, island garrisons and troops stationed in Cyprus would 
depend on the timely arrival of airborne reinforcements and supplies to sustain their operations. 
However, even if all military transports were pressed into service, only approximately 1,500 
troops - excluding their equipment and supplies - could be ferried at once. If a parachute drop 
is attempted, this number would perforce decline to less than a battalion-worth of troops (i.e. 
less than 1,000), plus their accompanying supplies.^” Alternatively, civilian airliners could be 
called in to carry a further 7,000 to 8,000 troops, although most of those aircraft can only 
operate from well-prepared airstrips and can only hope to survive when air superiority or in 
fact air supremacy can be guaranteed. With respect to transport helicopters operated by the 
Army, the only significant assets are the 9 Chinooks plus a further 7 machines of the same type 
currently on order, each capable of carrying 50 armed soldiers. The remaining 110 or so Huey 
helicopters, each capable of carrying 10-14 soldiers, are already nearly at the end of their 
useful life and, due to their limited range, can only have a decisive impact in intra-theatre 
transport roles. In retrospect, faced with the high costs of deploying sufficient aerial transport 
assets, and given that large numbers of troops and supplies would have to be ferried during a 
crisis, recently Greece appears to have decided to switch its attention to maritime transport, her 
active interest in hovercraft and air cushion landing craft -  the fastest maritime transport 
vehicles available to that end -  being indicative of this change of mind. '^
Aerial refuelling: This is one of the easiest missions to analyse, because currently no such 
capability exists in Greece, either in the form of tanker planes or trained HAF pilots. On the 
other hand, following the Kardak/Imia crisis, a decision was taken to acquire 2 to 4 tanker 
planes over the next five years. These aircraft would, undoubtedly, be intended to extend the 
patrol time of Greek interceptors and enable ground attack aircraft to fly longer in order to 
reach Cyprus and targets deep inside Turkey. However, the lack of strategic depth, together 
with the obvious difficulties in securing air superiority over Greek air space, indicate that safe 
operating areas for such inherently vulnerable aircraft would be a rarity and their guaranteed 
survival a demanding task.
Electronic warfare (EW): In the analysis of EW, generalisations and confident assertions are 
very dangerous. In most other aspeets of modem war, it is possible to see some of the hardware
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and count some of the items. This is not the case with EW. The following commentary on 
Greek EW capabilities, therefore, must be treated with caution. In the realm of electronic self­
protection, only a fraction of Greek combat aircraft (Mirage 2000s and F-16s) are known to be 
fitted with fairly satisfactory EW systems, the rest of the fleet relying on rapidly ageing and 
increasingly ineffective hardware.“  Future programmes are expected to off-set this weakness 
with regards to F-4 Phantoms, while the bulk of the fleet will continue to fly with a minimum 
degree of electronic self-protection. Switching our attention to stand-off jamming aircraft, like 
numy of its coimterparts around the world, the HAF is not in possession of such assets, and 
Greek aircraft intruding into enemy airspace would have to rely on their own systems for 
protection. Finally, those supporting assets imperative in sustaining a self-sufficient and highly- 
flexible EW effort do not appear to exist in Greece either. The only specialised EW platforms 
consist of two helicopters operated by the Hellenic Navy, and they are probably fitted with 
ageing electronic direction-finding equipment only. There are no records of Greek ELINT or 
SIGINT aircraft and, even more significantly, due to a lack of sophistication on the part of the 
Greek electronics industry, full control over existing systems so as to manipulate and/or modify 
them in response to the unexpected circumstances of a military conflict would be extremely 
difficult, if not totally impossible. Greek control in this regard is partial and only believed to 
cover superficial modifications to the software of certain aircraft-mounted self-protection 
systems. In other words, given the vital importance of EW in executing all aspects of aerial 
operations, the deficiencies in this respect certainly constitutes one of the major factors 
jeopardising the overall mission effectiveness of the HAF.
Reconnaissance: With the exception of low resolution satellite imagery which can be purchased 
through commercial channels, Greece does not have access to space-based reconnaissance 
information. Instead, needs are fulfilled through the services of a single squadron of dedicated 
tactical reconnaissance plcuies. Based at Larissa, this HAF squadron consists of some 20 active 
plus 14 stored RF-4E planes, all of which are equipped with a wide array of fairly advanced 
photographic cameras and also flashlights which confer a limited night reconnaissance 
capability. However, the cameras on these aircraft rely on the increasingly outmoded ‘wet film’ 
technique and digital imaging devices, that allowing instant transmission of information back to 
the operators, have so far not become operational with the HAF. Consequently, several hours 
elapse before the optical evidence gathered by these aircraft can be analysed and disseminated. 
This is too long a delay when compared with the near-instantaneous changes observed on 
modem battlefields. Likewise, those targeting pods capable of video-recording the bombing 
runs are too limited in number and, for accurate bomb damage assessment, Greek
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reconnaissance planes would have to revisit the target area. Last but not least, and at least in 
comparison with some of the neighbouring countries, Greece appears to have been quite slow 
to exploit the ever-expanding tactical reconnaissance potential offered by UAVs (unmanned 
aerial vehicles). In this regard, some Greek companies are known to have developed medium 
endurance UAVs, but no concrete orders have so far been placed for those systems. Likewise, 
the Hellenic Army which has recently specified a requirement for a small tactical UAV system, 
would be luiable to fiilfil those reconnaissance assignments beyond the confines of battlefield 
surveillance and artillery spotting. '^*
Base operability and base defence: Thanks to the availability of Italian Aspide SAMs and 
Swiss Skyguard fire-control systems, the close-up air defence of most Greek air bases could be 
deemed as satisfactory. However, the same is not true for sur&ce defences. Since most Greek 
air bases are located in coastal areas, they remain dangerously exposed not only to enemy naval 
fire, but also to sabotage activity by enemy special operations units, whose penetrations would 
be extremely difficult to detect and seal effectively. Regarding passive defensive measures, 
there are some indications that smaller and forward-deployed air bases are deficient in physical 
hardening. Likewise, while war-time dispersal to nearby airstrips is easily accessible to the 
HAF, such a course of action would inhibit sortie generation rates substantially, because main 
and alternative air bases are separated by large extents of water and undoubtedly the timely 
flow of the support crews, munitions, spare parts and other critical logistic support items 
would be interrupted.
Logistics: This issue was elaborated at length in Chapter-6, and it suffices here to re-assert that 
shortfalls exist in both spare parts and ammunition stocks. Likewise, the limited capabilities of 
Greece's defence industry mean that certain categories of repair and maintenance work could 
not be performed domestically and the large variety of military hardware in use, as well as the 
number of widely dispersed air bases would further increase the pressure on the HAF’s logistic 
support infrastructure. Hence, in the event of a high intensity conflict, there is little doubt that 
the HAF’s over-stretched system of logistic support will swiftly reveal serious shortcomings.
Ill- GREECE: FIRST OR SECOND RATE AIR POWER:?
Our inquiry into the HAF’s capabilities in terms of mission-effectiveness has revealed 
important obstacles to fulfilment of most missions. In this regard, the HAF can be considered to be
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at a moderately satis&ctory standing on missions relating to fighter cover, groimd-based air 
defence and early warning; while critical drawbacks have been identified in base strikes, SEAD, 
interception, strategic bombing, airlift, aerial refuelling and electronic warfiire missions. Although 
the implications of these findings alone could indeed be &r-reaching, as stressed in the introduction 
to this Chapter, our analysis of the HAF’s capabilities would not be complete without a second 
yardstick, namely determining whether Greece is a first-rate or second-rate air power, and thereby 
whether Greece would be able to take full advantage of the potential offered by air power.
The observations made under our descriptive analysis in Chapter-5, as well as the findings 
of our more recent mission-effectiveness analysis already offer plenty of answers. Therefore, the 
task at hand can be accomplished without reverting to a detailed and in-depth inquiry. In fiict, at 
the most superficial level, a direct parallel can be drawn between the HAF’s drawbacks and the 
limitations common to many second-rate air powers around the world. Accordingly, of the 10 
limitations that have already been identified in Chapter-2, common to most second-rate air powers, 
limitation in regard to combat aircraft could well be applied to Greece, given that the majority of 
its aircraft are rapidly ageing machines and its force make-up is dominated by multi-purpose 
fighter-bombers. With reference to the second limitation, namely munitions, it has been well 
dociunented that the quantity of guided and other advanced bombs and missiles currently in Greek 
stocks are critically insufficient, those used are rapidly ageing and effective intelligence-gathering, 
a pre-requisite for pinpoint weapons delivery, is absent.
On air defence coverage, the majority of Greek air search radars and communications 
links are of an older generation, the low-altitude radar coverage in particular is porous and very 
limited back-up and reserve assets are available. As highlighted in our analysis of mission 
effectiveness, the drawbacks appear to be even more significant in the realm of electronic warfare, 
while the limitations in Greece’s existing command-control-communications-intelligence network 
are also apparent in the form of aged hardware, unsatisfactory integration and last, but not least, in 
its susceptibility to enemy counter-action. Personnel appears to be one aspect with mixed 
attributes. At first sight, one would conclude that, drawing its human resources firom a fair-sized, 
educated population, the HAF would have little difficulty in creating the pool of reasonably 
qualified aviators, technicians and command cadres. Yet, the low prestige attached to a military 
career in Greek society, the politicisation of the armed forces and accompanying set of ‘clientage’ 
relations within its ranks, plus the precedence of political affiliations over professional qualities 
and experience, can all be considered detrimental to personnel quality and effectiveness. Air-land 
and multi-force operations is another aspect that presents the researcher with ambiguities; Greece 
could well be considered as scoring better than most other second-rate air powers, but nevertheless
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relatively poor training as well as organisational and institutional hurdles might cause some 
degradation.
Turning our attention to bad weather and night-fighting capabilities, serious HAF 
shortcomings have already been identified. The observation has also been made that critical force 
multipliers, such as AEW & C aircraft and tanker planes, are totally absent; and that serious 
deficiencies exist with respect to the sustainability and redundancy of Greek air power.
On the basis of these limitations, one could confidently assert that Greece should be ranked 
as a second-rate air power. Yet, in order to boost the predictive qualities of this finding, one also 
needs to know whether any progress towards first-rate air power status is to be expected in the near 
future, or rather, whether the HAF is capable of compensating for some of its underlying 
limitations. The obvious way to answer this question would be to proceed with an inquiry into the 
causes of the above-mentioned limitations, a task that could again be accomplished on the basis of 
the “causes of limitations”, identified in Chapter-2. The nearly 6 billion dollars of financial 
resources currently being allocated by Athens to the defence of the country, appears to lag behind 
the minimum 10 billion dollars needed to acquire and sustain the material pre-requisites of an air 
power of the highest calibre. Even more importantly, since the Greek economy is already over­
stretched to satisfy existing levels of military spending, by and large, the current level of financial 
resources is the maximum the HAF can hope to receive during the coming years and, at least on the 
basis of the financial considerations, no radical changes are to be expected.
The same is not necessarily true for the second cause, namely the existence o f alliance 
ties. Throughout The Cold War years, the division of labour within the North Atlantic Alliance, 
together with the existence of close alliance ties with The US, eliminated the need for Greece to 
acquire certain assets and capabilities of critical importance. Yet, since the end of The Cold War, 
and given its determination to match similar Turkish initiatives in the same direction, the HAF has 
been rapidly developing an active interest in critical force multipliers such as AEW & C aircraft, 
tanker planes and even long-range strike aircraft (i.e. F-15E). Hence, alliance ties should no longer 
be expected to impose the kind of restrictions present during The Cold War years.
The third factor in the form geopolitical circumstances and characteristics o f the 
military, is not readily applicable to Greece either. Despite the Hellenic Navy’s historic position of 
seniority, a combination of Greece’s geo-strategic circumstances (and predominant threat 
perceptions) with air power’s inherent flexibility, versatility and responsiveness implies that the 
HAF is ranked first among the Greek armed forces’ three branches. Indeed, even the Hellenic Army 
and Navy have been observed acquiring aerial assets of their own. Hence, since the reformation of 
deployment patterns and principles back in 1974, the curtailing effects of an army or navy- 
dominated force structure have not been present. Likewise, as opposed to most other second-rate
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air powers, whose military is perceived more as a tool to grasp and maintain political control over 
its own society, the Greek armed forces have been geared primarily towards external threats. 
However, certain exceptions exist: the decade-long military rule of 1964-74 is known to have 
struck a heavy blow to the operational readiness of the Greek armed forces and frequent 
involvement by Greek politicians in military’s internal affairs continues to adversely affect 
professionalism.
Turning now to Greece’s defence industrial and technological capabilities, one discovers 
one of the major stumbling blocks to first-rate air power status. Our analysis in Chapter-5 
demonstrated that, in the period from 1974 to mid-1980s, while a number of defence industry 
companies were established and existing installations had ample opportunities to invest and 
manufacture, the development of Greek defence industry sector was seriously curtailed by a series 
of scandals and corruption charges, flagrant management shortcomings, over-politicisation in state- 
owned defence companies and a lack of a clear vision and consistency on the part of Greek 
governments. Consequently, after two decades of intensive yet misdirected investment, the Greek 
defence industiy has failed to develop a critical mass in high technology products and its activities 
answer a negligible portion of the HAF’s major equipment needs .As  discussed in Chapter-2, 
shortcomings in this particular field not only reduce the ability to take full advantage of air power's 
potential, but also lead to the formation of a patron-client type relationship with one or more 
foreign powers, thus reducing the flexibility to use air power effectively.
With respect to limited human resources as dictating second-rate air power status, it has 
already been noted that, despite Greece's comparatively large pool of educated and highly-qualified 
citizens, very few of those appear to opt for a low prestige militaiy career. When combined with 
the structural properties of the Greek military, further weaknesses are observed in the human 
element of the Greek air power. Nevertheless, when compared with most other second-rate air 
powers, the limitations imposed by limited human resources are not as decisive.
Last, but not least, are limitations accruing from the lack o f familiarity and experience 
with the use air power. In this regard, Greece's experience in the use air power in combat has been 
extremely limited; operations under British auspices and direction during World War II constitute 
the most recent and significant occurrence. The Cyprus episode of 1974, which was characterised 
by a surprising lack of contribution by Greek air power, helped reveal how inappropriate HAF 
doctrines and tactics were; the Greeks realised to their dismay that none of their combat aircraft 
and active air bases had the reach to intervene in the ongoing conflict on the island. In fact, the 
prerequisite for an air-minded nation in the form of intellectual and academic virtues both within 
the military and most certainly outside it, cannot be said to exist at a satisfactory level in Greece
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and, at least for the foreseeable future, the continued reliance on imported skills, visions and the 
experiences of other nations, can be expected to arrest rapid progress in this particular direction.
IV- EPILOGUE TO CHAPTER SIX
Our two-layered analysis of the dynamic aspects of the Greek air power has demonstrated 
that drawbacks, ranging in significance from being important to critical, work against the 
fulfilment of a number of air power’s key missions and that, when supplemented by a number of 
additional indicators, they lead to the unavoidable conclusion that Greece is a second-rate air 
power. Moreover, given the relatively static nature of the causes lying at the roots of the current 
shortcomings, rapid progress towards the status of first-rate air power appears to be an extremely 
remote possibility.
These findings are quite significant because, as already elaborated in preceding chapters, 
air power and its deterrent and retaliatory potential are considered by Athens as the most important 
military instrument in countering the perceived Turkish threat. But, as will be elaborated in more 
detail in Chapter Eight, Turkey is a major regional power with sizeable air power and other 
military capabilities, at least when compared to those of Greece. Consequently, by virtue of its 
much smaller population and economic resources, it would be impossible, or at least exhausting for 
Greece to try to match the numerical superiority that will, unavoidably, be enjoyed by Turkey, the 
Turkish Air Force being no exception.
Under the circumstances, the only viable option for Greece appears to be its ability to 
compensate for Turkey’s quantitative superiority through the acquisition of qualitative advantage, 
preferably in the aerial dimension which could bring its full impact and tip the balance in Greece’s 
favour in the other two realms (i.e. land and naval warfare) as well. Consistent with our previous 
observations, by now it should be obvious that in attaining such a goal it would be imperative to 
take full advantage of air power’s potential, in other words, to approximate the status of a first-rate 
air power. Real examples of such a strategy and of the accruing prizes are all too obvious, one 
being the much-praised successes of a numerically inferior, but qualitatively superior Israeli Air 
Force in striking heavy blows on its Arab adversaries.
However, our earlier analysis of Greek air power indicates that, from Greece's perspective, 
the achievement of these goals would be more difficult. To begin with, our descriptive analysis has 
revealed that since 1974, the HAF appears to have let its procurement goals and programmes be 
easily overtaken by quantitative considerations, resulting in a large fleet that is equal, if not inferior
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in quality to that of its main rival Turkey, and lags behind in several vital aspects such as 
munitions stockpiles, logistic support and training.
More important, however, is the feet that some of its intrinsic characteristics and virtues 
prevent Greece from quickly transforming itself into a first-rate air power and so fully exploit the 
full range of options and opportunities offered by the third dimension of warfere. In feet, in light of 
such developments as the rapid progress of Turkey’s defence industry capabilities and growing 
levels of financial and hiunan resources at the disposal of Ankara, Turkey appears to be covering a 
lot more distance towards the goal of achieving first-rate air power status than Greece does. Hence, 
thanks to the rapid progress made by Turkey during the last decade or so and Greece's relatively 
static circumstances, serious ambiguities emerge about the applicability and viability of Athens’ 
current national security goal of relying on air power to counter the perceived Turkish threat. The 
implications of this observation on Greece’s national defence and national security policies is 
dramatic and the issue will be discussed at greater length in ensuing chapters which will focus on 
the most plausible contingencies necessitating the use of Greek air power and their likely outcome. *
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CHAPTER 7
CONTINGENCIES INVOLVING GREEK AIR POWER
In order to render the findings and observations of the previous chapters into more 
practical, and relate them to the actual security challenges facing Greece, a brief yet ^-reaching 
analysis is deemed necessary.
The clear objective of the next two chapters is to help reader visualise those circumstances 
most likely to surroimd the use of Greek air power and also to predict relating the likelihood of 
each scenario. To simplify this task, the multiplicity of scenarios without direct Turkish 
involvement, as well as possible Greek participation in multinational operations, so-called 
‘expeditionary warfare’, will be covered in the current chapter. In accordance with their imminence 
and relative sophistication, possible contingencies with some kind of Turkish involvement will be 
treated separately and in much greater detail in the following chapter.
I- CONTINGENCIES WITHOUT DIRECT TURKISH INVOLVEMENT
In Chapters 3 and 4 it was upheld that the limited and, in certain cases, negligible military 
capabilities residing in Greece’s Balkan neighbours exclude any perception of imminent military 
threat on the part of Athens, and lead Greek policy-makers to focus on such post-Cold War 
security risks as ethnic violence, refugee influxes, arms and drugs-smuggling rings etc. Indeed, a 
closer look at the militaiy capabilities of the three neighbouring countries to the north clearly 
reveals that, with the exception of Bulgaria, their air assets and capabilities ene negligible and, in 
the extremely unlikely circumstances of a direct military conflict, the HAF would have no difficulty 
in achieving air superiority and imposing Athens’ will on its adversaries. On the other hand, the 
kind of security concerns prevalent in this particular geography are hardly conducive to the proper 
employment of air power: except for the supply of hiunanitarian aid or basic border surveillance 
flights, air power would have little scope in checking a refugee influx, smuggling activities, or 
other forms of post-Cold War security risks.
Nevertheless, to substantiate this postulation, we deem it useful to undertake an overview 
of the neighbouring countries' air power-relevant capabilities. Taking first Albania, it could be said 
that, up until the beginning of 1997, the Albanian air force consisted of less than 100 ageing,
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mainly Chinese-supplied combat aircraft operating from three main bases, plus a further 40 fixed 
and rotary-wing platforms used for transport duties. The groimd-based air defence relied on 24 
outdated SAM launchers of Soviet and Chinese origin, plus a few hundred obsolete anti-aircraft 
guns, while the only decent early warning asset was a single surveillance radar donated by The US 
in 1996. Thus, even before the internal turmoil of 1997 which saw the total disintegration of the 
armed forces and the loss of the entire fighter aircraft and air defence weapons arsenal to 
insurgents, the Albanian air force was struck by problems relating to ageing equipment, 
maintenance and fuel availability, and so was reduced to only being a force on paper.' After the 
pyramid financial schemes and ensuing chaos in the country, it is no longer possible to talk about 
air power-relevant assets or capabilities in Albania. According to one report, even the capital 
city’s airport is guarded by just two ancient Chinese anti-aircraft guns.^ Thus, not only Greece, but 
any decent air power would have no difficulty in flying unobstructed and achieving its tactical and 
strategic goals inside Albanian airspace.
Circiunstances relating to the more recent creation of an air wing as part of the 
Macedonian army are quite different, but the implications, in the form of a negligible air power are 
identical. Following independence from the disintegrating Yugoslav Federation in 1991, Macedonia 
had to wait until the lifting of the international arms embargo in 1996 to launch a modest 
acquisition programme, so as to constitute its own armed forces. The oiJy air power-relevant assets 
currently in its inventory are a handful of light aircraft, 4 ex-Russian transport helicopters and 
roughly 300 small calibre air defence guns and shoulder-launched SAMs. All other real air power 
prerequisites in the form of combat aircraft, air bases, trained air crews and technicians and an 
integrated early warning and air defence network are totally absent. Given the extremely limited 
financial and human resources available to Macedonia, a change in the current state-of-affairs 
seems improbable. Again, the HAF would have no difficulties in achieving air supremacy without 
any plausible risk to its own aircraft and air crews.
Bulgaria is the only neighbouring country to the north with a credible air force, at least in 
comparison with those of Albania and Macedonia. The combat fleet has some 235 fighter and 
ground attack aircraft of Soviet origin, only a fourth of which are relatively modem, while the rest 
are rapidly reaching the end of their useful life. Supplementing the fixed-wing combat aircraft are 
44 Soviet Mi-24 attack helicopters and nearly 60 transport planes and helicopters. Although a fair­
sized force on paper, Bulgaria’s lack of foreign currency exchange and precarious financial 
situation has left all aspects of air force seriously crippled. Due to critical fuel and spare parts 
shortages and as a result of the increasing obsolescence of the fleet, at least 45 % of the combat 
aircraft remain groimded and Bulgarian combat pilots are flying a mere 25 to 35 hours annually, 
with obvious consequences on combat readiness, morale, and flight safety. Facing similar problems
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is the air defence network, consisting of some 110 air force4>perated and a further 120 army- 
owned SAM laimchers of Soviet origin, plus dense radar coverage provided by the dated Soviet P- 
37 systems. Bulgarian officials admit that most of their SAM inventory is ineffective in countering 
modem airborne threats and that the radars are awaiting urgent modification to extend their service 
life, for which the funds are not readily available. Currently, Bulgaria is at the midst of a major 
effort to fully restructure its air force and its air defence network in a way designed to the extent 
that the defence budget permits. The preliminary indications are that a minimum operating standard 
based on few dozen aircraft and less than 70 combat pilots who will be given sufficient training 
and equipment is the target. In summary, the greatest challenge facing the Bulgarian air force today 
is the difficulty in keeping its aircraft and personnel at a minimum operating standard whilst the 
corrosive effect of restracturing, chronic fuel shortages and lack of spares continue to seriously 
curtail all aspects of operations.^
Finally we come to Libya, as the only neighbouring country to the south able to constitute 
a cause for Greek concern, whose circumstances are similar to those of Bulgaria, though for 
different reasons. The viraient leadership of Libya above all counts on military strength to affirm 
its regional and international role and, thanks to substantial oil revenues, it has been able to build 
up powerful armed forces. The Libyan air force has in its inventory over 400 fairly modem combat 
aircraft of Soviet and French origin operating from a dozen air bases. Supplementing those is the 
Air Defence Command, fielding an impressive array of surveillance radars and over 300 SAM 
launchers, all connected to each other through a dedicated command and control network. Yet, 
Libya stands out as an exceptional example wherein analysis of military capabilities on the basis 
of the ‘bean-counting’ method alone would be extremely misleading. Although the country appears 
to boast an impressive air force, the policy of purchasing larger quantities of weapons than can be 
practically integrated in the armed forces, a chronic shortage of human resources resulting in 
Libya’s absolute reliance on the services of foreign advisers to maintain and operate its aircraft and 
air defence systems, and gross operational, administrative and logistic mismanagement at the level 
of higher command, all signify that the Libyan air force has customarily been confined to the status 
of ‘paper tiger’. In fact, even at the height of Eastern Bloc assistance in the mid-1980s, Libya had 
not reached a significant level of technical or operational readiness to adequately defend its air 
space. Since the imposition of an international arms embargo in 1992, its proficiency has sunk yet 
further. The ban on weapon sales, spare parts and advisers have caused a salubrious erosion of the 
air force’s capabilities and, as the Libyans themselves have far from fulfilled technically- 
demanding tasks and functions, air defence and communications networks have quickly been 
crippled and over two-thirds of Libyan aircraft have stopped flying. Currently, Libya can barely 
hope to partially defend its air space, and offensive operations against any of the neighbouring
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countries are simply beyond the scope and capabilities of its air force. The only exception in this 
regard comes in the form of Libya’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, made up of a few 
hundred Scud-type ballistic missiles and chemical and biological warheads to arm them. This 
capability is even more significant because Greece lacks the necessary defensive capabilities to 
counter such a non-conventional threat. Currently, only a collective Western response in the form 
of retaliatory strikes and/or deployment to Greek territory of missile defence systems, could help 
avert or neutralise such a threat.'*
In short, as in the case of its northern neighbours, on the basis of its superior air power and 
other military capabilities, Greece would have little difficulty in countering and neutralising any 
possible conventional threats emanating from its neighbours across the Mediterranean Sea. The 
only exception in this regard appears to be a possible strike using weapons of mass destruction 
launched by any of the antagonistic regimes in the Middle East or North Africa, against which 
Athens continues to depend on the collective deterrent and defensive capabilities of its Western 
allies.
II - PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Since the end of The Cold War, particularly in the Western world, the need for increased 
responsiveness to crisis management and out-of-area operations has been increasing. Out of this 
need a new function for air power has arisen and its anticipated contribution to overall defence 
capabilities has rapidly grown. Undoubtedly, due to its responsiveness, the deployment of air 
power is easier to insert and extract and involves ^  less human, financial and thus, arguably, 
political liability than that of large-scale ground forces. Consequently, it has been convincingly 
argued that the timely arrival of a small but powerful air component within crisis region is far more 
likely to be seen as a tangible indication of political intent than the promise of much larger forces to 
arrive weeks later. In other words, air power has come to be perceived as a highly potent tool of 
crisis management, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, uniquely capable of reaching a crisis 
region rapidly and, by posing a counter-threat in depth, of deterring an aggressor.*
In accordance with this new tendency towards the prevention of low-level conflicts, several 
Western states have rendered peacekeeping and crisis management one of the primary tasks of their 
respective armed forces. Thanks to their inherent flexibility and higher degree of 
professionalisation, the task at hand has been less challenging for air forces than ground forces. 
Nevertheless, due to this emphasis on expeditionary warfere, necessitating rapid overseas 
deployment and interoperability with other militaries, additional demands have emerged in the form
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of more extensive training with other nations, deployable ground crews and new hardware such as 
increasingly mobile communications, logistic support and storage assets.
Steps towards meeting the specific demands of multinational operations aside, Greece has 
been quick to follow suit and incorporate multinational operations, including the ones to be 
conducted by its air force, into its defence doctrines and policy guidelines.® Hence, the HAF has 
found itself tasked with peacekeeping, peacemaking and crisis management operations to be 
executed under the banner of The United Nations, OSCE, NATO, WEU or, independently, with 
other countries. On the other hand, whether those highly-publicised Greek claims pertaining to a 
solid commitment towards multinational operations would be backed up by actions,and, more 
importantly, whether Greece's armed forces have ther capacity to fulfill political rhetoric is a 
different matter. These two questions are the main focus of this section.
As a first step, multinational operations to which the Greek air power could be expected to 
contribute, will be divided into four broad categories. This division will be accomplished on the 
basis of those international organisations that have assumed a peacekeeping and/or crisis 
management role and to which Greece is a party. Once the aerial assets assigned by Greece to each 
one of those organisations has been illustrated, on the basis of the prerequisites of multinational 
operations, as well as the findings of our descriptive and mission-effectiveness analyses, we will 
attempt to identify any possible Greek deficiencies and shortcomings with respect to multinational 
operations.
Assets assigned to NATO
Currently, the North Atlantic Alliance’s collective defence relies heavily on multinational 
forces falling into three categories. The first of these are the so-called * reaction forces' able to 
respond quickly to any threat to Allied interests inside or beyond its territory. Actually, an entity to 
this effect has been in place since 1960, when NATO announced the formation of a small, mobile, 
multinational task force which could be sent, at short notice, to any part of the ACE (Allied 
Command Europe) under threat, particularly the flank countries, to demonstrate the solidarity of 
the Alliance and its ability and determination to defend itself against aggression. This force was 
officially designated ‘ACE Mobile Force (AMF)’ and was composed of both land and air 
contingents, neither of which received a contribution fi-om Greece.’
Then at the Rome Summit of 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept that took into 
account the post-Cold War geopolitical environment in Europe and placed renewed emphasis on 
multinational structures and missions capable of coping with crisis management and low-intensity 
internal conflicts, rather than all-out warfere. Hence, consistent with the emphasis placed on 
multinational forces, the decision was taken to incorporate the Alliance’s small AMF into a new
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and much larger multinational structure, thereafter referred to as ‘reaction forces’. The latter 
encompass air, sea and land elements, all of which are organised at two sub-levels: the Immediate 
Reaction Forces (IRF) and the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), the former being smaller, lighter­
armed and so quicker than the latter. Whereas the land component of the AMF has come to 
constitute the ground force element of the IRF and a new ACE Rapid Reaction Corps was created 
to give substance to the land component of the RRF, a slightly different model has been adopted for 
air power. Accordingly, initial air support to both IRF and RRF will come from Allied countries in 
the immediate vicinity of the deployment area, through their air squadrons dedicated to the reaction 
forces. Thereafter, this initial air support will be supplemented, as and when necessary, by further 
squadrons from elsewhere within the Alliance territory. To this end, a total of 40 fighter squadrons, 
20 ground-based air defence units and two tactical command and control squadrons are currently 
assigned to NATO’s reaction forces by 13 member states.*
The second layer of NATO’s multinational defence effort consists of the so-called ‘main 
defence forces’, which are slower to deploy, but contain most of the forces required to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the Alliance states. In this respect, the assignment by Allied nations of their 
military forces to the collective defence of the Allied territory is not new and throughout The Cold 
War years, it constituted one of the fundamental principles of NATO. Subsequently, a substantial 
portion of each member state’s armed forces, Greece included, continues to be allocated to the 
North Atlantic Alliance. Finally, the third group of military forces answerable to NATO are the 
* augmentation forces’, i.e. those reserve and overseas forces that could be called upon to provide 
reinforcements in times of a major and/or extended conflict.®
Greek air power's contribution to the Alliance’s multinational forces is threefold. First, the 
HAF allocates an F-16 squadron and a single C-130 transport aircraft to NATO reaction forces. It 
is noteworthy in this respect that NATO’s request for two Greek F-16 squadrons was turned down 
by Athens, saying that it needs its scarce F-16 aircraft for air defence and non-nuclear attack 
missions.'® With respect to NATO’s main defence forces, Greek contribution is near complete: with 
the exception of an F-16 squadron, almost all combat and transport aircraft, as well as Nike 
Hercules SAM batteries are answerable to NATO. And lastly, despite a NATO request for three 
such squadrons, the HAF commitment to augmentation forces consists of two A-7 ground attack 
squadrons."
In addition to peace-time assignments, the Greek contribution to NATO’ aerial operations 
over the skies of former Yugoslavia should also be mentioned, the latter constituting the first ever 
employment of NATO’s forces for peacekeeping purposes. Initially, NATO air power acted under 
the banner of The UN and aircraft from Allied nations were used to police the no-fly zone over 
Bosnia-Herzogovina as part of the ‘Operation Deny Flight’. Then, NATO involvement escalated to
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providing close-air support for UN troops, enforcement of the weapon-exclusion zones, protection 
of safe heavens and, ultimately, forcing the belligerents to come to the negotiation table. On 
account of its close ties with Serbia, against whom most of those activities were directed, Greece 
not only distanced itself from NATO’s aerial operations, but also openly criticised them.’’
In late-1995, a peace agreement was finally brokered between the warring parties and a 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) took over responsibility for policing of the peace accords 
from The UN. This time around, Athens opted to have a say in the NATO-led peace enforcement 
force being deployed to Bosnia. Consequently, alongside the Hellenic Army and Navy assets, two 
HAF C-130H transport aircraft took part in NATO’s multinational transport squadron in Bosnia. 
The squadron in question constitutes NATO’s first experiment in the operation of a multinational 
air transport unit and it is only the second time that it has formed a joint air unit - the first being the 
successful force of AW ACS aircraft. Based at Rimini in Italy and operating under the lead of the 
Norwegians, transport aircraft belonging to Greece, Norway the Netherlands and United Kingdom 
have been flying daily missions to NATO air bases in the Former Yugoslavia since IFOR troops 
were deployed there.’^
Operations under WEU
Under the terms of St. Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, The Western European 
Union (WEU) has assumed a whole series of humanitarian, search and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis 
management and, when necessary, peacemaking tasks. Accordingly, at the outbreak of the 
Yugoslav crisis. The WEU sent ships to the Adriatic to help enforce an arms embargo on former 
Yugoslavia; helped Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to effect a blockade of the Danube against 
Serbia; and lent a police force to the Bosnian town of Mostar. Yet, although it can borrow them 
from WEU member states and NATO, The WEU has no troops of its own. Even more importantly, 
disagreement among its 10 member states about its role in European security has doomed the 
organisation to remain in suspended animation for the foreseeable future. In fact, its failure to take 
charge of humanitarian operations in Albania and a handful of European nations’ subsequent 
decision to send their own peacekeepers under UN auspices, is the most recent evidence of The 
WEU’s inertia and lack of cohesion.'“'
Its shortcomings and its inability to act swiftly aside, at least in theory, the WEU Planning 
Cell in Brussels (which is tasked with outlining some military aspects and operational 
development) foresees that its forces will be drawn from three sources: national forces of member 
states declared to be answerable to WEU on a case-by-case basis; permanent and non-permanent 
multinational force structures such as Eurokorps, EUROFOR, and Euromarfor, all established
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through bilateral or multilateral contacts between various European states; and finalK NATO 
assets and capabilities, on which an agreement with NATO authorities is still pending.'^
Having shown a marked interest in boosting the role and influence of The WEU, Greece 
became a member of The WEU in November 1992. Accordingly, Athens argues that for those 
issues directly affecting European members of NATO, but only indirectly non-European members, 
WEU should assume greater responsibility. Hence, Athens expressed its readiness to contribute 
forces to WEU operations on a case-by-case basis and announced that the majority of the HAF 
squadrons already assigned to NATO, would be answerable to WEU as well. On the other hand, 
since all those units are already allocated to NATO, their use by WEU will be subject to 
consultation with NATO. However, the negotiations remain stalled over an arrangement, called 
The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), which is intended to give The WEU access to NATO 
assets for operations of its own.'®
Greece's more recent admission into ‘EUROFOR’, a multinational force structure, may 
also be instrumental in assigning certain Greek assets to WEU. EUROFOR is a combined rapid 
deployment force tasked with humanitarian and peacekeeping duties in the Mediterranean and 
designed as part of the multinational forces on call for WEU missions. However, currently it is 
only composed of ground troops from Italy, Spain, France and Portugal, and since it does not 
contain any aerial assets, no HAF contribution is envisaged.” Meanwhile, it is also noteworthy 
that, Greece is not participating in the newly-formed European Air Group (EAG) either. In this 
regard, the EAG has recently been formed by The UK, France, Germany as a practical working 
model for multinational contingency operations to meet the needs of NATO and the WEU for joint 
task forces. While Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain are to be invited to be members, 
Greece is not thought to be among prospective member states.'*
In short, despite frequent Greek announcements to the contrary, the Greek allocation of 
substantial aerial and other military assets to WEU appears to be more symbolic than concrete.'’ 
Even for those assets actually assigned, organisational obstacles, including the continuing disarray 
between NATO and WEU persist.
Operations under UN and OSCE auspices
Throughout The Cold War years. The United Nations (UN) was the chief international 
organisation charged with multinational operations in pursuance of peacekeeping and occasionally 
"peace enforcement’ goals around the world. Throughout that period, Greece's contribution to UN 
operations could best be described as negligible. With the exception of 8 Greek transport planes 
that joined the alliance of forces in Japan in 1950 and took part in the Korean War, there was no 
involvement whatsoever.’’
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Then, in the midst of The post-Cold War international interest in peacekeeping operations, 
Athens has also started to demonstrate an increased willingness to contribute. During the Gulf 
crisis of 1990-1991, Greece sent a frigate to join the Gulf peacekeeping force, a decision that was 
taken after much deliberation and hesitation. Meanwhile, persistent rumours that an air component 
would also be dispatched was not substantiated. '^
The most significant Greek participation in a UN-led peacekeeping operation came in 
1992, when a Greek Special Forces contingent of 100 ground troops were dispatched to Somalia, 
where they served for two years until their withdrawal in early 1994. Moreover, in the wake of The 
Cold War, Greek participation in UN missions also included much smaller numbers of military 
observers being sent to such diverse locations as the Western Sahara, Kuwait, Northern Iraq and 
Georgia. But, all told, with the exception of Greek transporters which took part in the Korean 
War, no Greek air power contribution to UN-led peacekeeping operations have been observed. 
Since decisions on this front are taken on a case-by-base basis, it is impossible to speculate about 
the likelihood of any future such contributions on the part of Greece.
Since the late-1980s, another international entity, the Organisation for Security and Co­
operation in Europe (OSCE, formerly known as CSCE), has sought to increase its weight and 
influence in and around the European continent, through identical crisis management and 
peacekeeping objectives as The UN's. But, because of certain NATO nations’ and especially The 
US’ fears of undermining NATO, the OSCE has not been given adequate structures to accompany 
its tools and it has so far confined its activities to that of crisis management, performed on the basis 
of a small number of observers being sent to conflict areas. The Greek contribution to OSCE crisis 
management missions has so far been limited to a handful of observers sent to Nagomo Karabakh, 
in the former Soviet Union, no air power assignments being foreseen for this international 
organisation.“
Non-organisational and independent operations
While a number of collective security and defence organisations such as OSCE, NATO 
and WEU have expressed a willingness to assume responsibility for conducting peacekeeping 
operations in and around Europe, the recent Albanian crisis is just an indication that, in the future, 
small crises on Europe’s peripheries may be handled by coalitions of willing states, usually 
neighbours directly affected by the outcome of the crisis, without much reference to formal 
decision-making processes in either NATO, OSCE or WEU. In this regard, when Albania was 
shattered by civil unrest in January 1997, instead of reverting to a complex and time-consuming 
decision-making process that would have been necessitated by a unified WEU or NATO force, a 
handful of European nations decided to send peacekeepers to help Albania reconstruct a
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government by ensuring humanitarian aid deliveries. Thus, a limited Multinational Protection 
Force (FMP) consisting of troops provided by eight predominantly south European countries, was 
cobbled together on the basis of OSCE and UN resolutions. Prior to its withdrawal in mid-summer 
1997, the so-called “Operation Alba” force reached a peak strength of 6,300 personnel, including 
720 troops from a Greek infrntry company. Meanwhile, Greek air power's contribution was 
minimal, consisting of transport flights in support of Greek troops deployed there.^“*
Since independent multinational operations are almost certain to be undertaken as part of 
an urgent effort to fulfil somewhat less challenging peacekeeping and/or crisis management tasks, 
air transport and aerial surveillance are amongst the most likely forms of aerial contribution and 
any future HAF contribution can be expected to conform this general configuration.
Tasks and capabilities · a comparison
Greek military and civilian authorities have frequently stressed that the HAF remains fully 
committed ‘to meet its responsibilities towards the Alliance and to participate in every legitimate 
mission of the international community.’ Yet, the same officials have admitted that the allocation of 
existing aerial and other assets alone would be insufficient and concrete measures in the fields of 
military hardware, training and personnel are imperative.^^
Indeed, while requirements of air forces are less onerous because the weapons themselves 
are largely self-transportable and the numbers of individuals and tonnes supplies per unit much 
lower than for ground forces, for the successful execution of multinational operations over 
extended distances advance acquisition of substantial capabilities in three aspects is of the utmost 
importance.
The first is the quality of the personnel. Air powers that still rely on conscription to man 
their forces face significant handicaps. Conscription produces young soldiers who spend most of 
their short service learning basic skills before being discharged and among others, the highly 
demanding organisational procedures and rules of engagement of multinational troop formations 
place conscript-based forces such as Greece’s at a natural disadvantage. Likewise, foreign 
language problems and other personnel deficiencies can also lead to major problems in this 
particular area.^*
The second aspect relates to the availability of specialised hardware for multinational and 
overseas deployments. Major investment in transportable systems is essential to ensure that the 
delicate minute-by-minute management of air operations can continue. But, most of Greece’s 
network is old, static, already in short supply for national contingencies and so unsuitable for rapid 
re-deployment. Likewise, self-contained logistics like ammunition handling and storage units and 
equipment, large amounts of surplus fuel and ammumtion stocks, additional combat engineers and
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mobile maintenance and repair units, imperative in order to sustain overseas operations, happen to 
be those assets which the HAF has in seriously short supply.^’
Lastly, the importance of proper and extensive training caimot be underestimated. In this 
respect. The Gulf War and operations over Bosnia have highlighted a fact long recognised by 
NATO, namely that common procedures and prior rehearsal are imperative, especially when using 
diverse forces which may each have their own unique techniques to solve the same problem. Hence, 
common procedures must be practised frequently to overcome some of these problems and those 
air forces with a opportunity to participate in NATO and other multinational activity and exercises 
are able to spread vital operations experience among a wide range of personnel and allow 
equipment to be operated in a realistic multinational environment.“
However, as Greece continues to boycott most NATO exercises as part of the 
government’s protest over uiu'esolved aspects of the Aegean dispute with Turkey, the HAF has had 
few such opportunities over two decades now. The Greek military did not take part in any NATO 
exercise during the period from 1974 to 1978, and has only participated selectively from 1978 to 
the present day. The exercises that have been systematically boycotted include the annual ‘Display 
Determination’ and ‘Dynamic Mix”, both the largest multi-force exercise in NATO's southern 
region, besides Greece, the only other absentees being Iceland and Luxembourg. More recently, 
NATO Reaction Forces air combat unit’s first scheduled out-of-regional deployment to Tanagra 
air base was also cancelled at short notice, because Greece, the host nation, withdrew from it. 
Besides not taking part in routine exercises, perhaps even more importantly, no Greek aircraft took 
part in the two year-long ‘Operation Deny Flight’ over Bosnia that provided most Allied countries 
with major experience in joint operations.“
To summarise, existing HAF capabilities in meeting the prerequisites of multinational 
operations are notably deficient. This state-of-affriirs has certainly got to do with the feet that, 
since the place, nature and timing of peacekeeping operations are impossible to forecast, they are a 
lot more demanding and sophisticated a form of military operations than many of the public and 
military envisaged. Therefore, despite their inherent flexibility, the costs associated with making 
aerial assets readily deployable and sustainable during overseas deployments are significant and 
the extra acquisition, training and other handling expenses could well go beyond the limits of 
Greece's defence budget.
In allocating limited financial and other resources between national and multinational 
assignments, a fector more important still than cost considerations, is the nature of the main 
impetus behind multinational force structures, the latter deriving from a realisation among certain 
European militaries that now The Cold War is over and defending national territory should 
perhaps no longer be the driving impetus behind their military planning, such multinational
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operations provide a splendid justification for sustaining existing force levels.^ ® On the other hand, 
Greece is a country that still perceives an immediate military threat fi'om Turkey and as long as the 
Greek sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis Turkey persists, the preparations and force assignments for 
multinational operations can be expected to remain symbolic at best.
Ill- EPILOGUE TO CHAPTER SEVEN
The operational contingencies analysed in this chapter and our subsequent observations 
fell into three categories. The first set of contingencies involve the remote likelihood of a 
confrontation between Greece and any one of the three neighbouring countries to the north, which 
would not present Greece with a real challenge. The HAF is fer superior in both quantity and 
quality over its counterparts in Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia. Athens' main security concern 
in this region derives from such post-Cold War episodes as refugee influxes and cross-border 
organised crime activities, for which air power cannot constitute a real antidote.
The second possibility relates to attempts by one or more Middle Eastern rogue states to 
intimidate the Greek people and territory as part of a larger confrontation with the rest of the 
Western world or, more likely The US. On the account of both its geographic proximity to Greece 
and the characteristics of its leadership, Libya would be the number one candidate for such an 
eventuality. But again, a clearly superior HAF and Hellenic Navy would have no difficulty in 
checking airborne or naval incursions and strike heavy retaliatory blows in return. Conversely, 
biologically and chemically-tipped ballistic missiles in Libya's possession and some other backlash 
states in the region could pose a substantial threat, given that Greece does not deploy any 
protective means and continues to rely on the collective deterrent posture and possibly also the 
defensive deployments of NATO and The US.
Coming to Greek participation in multinational operations as the third type of operational 
contingency, its is possible to assert that the fi^equently-expressed Greek readiness to this effect 
would not translate to deeds. In addition to shortcomings in personnel, hardware and proper 
training, the Greek preoccupation with the sense of an imminent Turkish threat confers 
overwhelming priority on national requirements and political overtures regarding Greek 
participation in multinational operations continue to be no more than rhetoric.
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CHAPTER 8
MAIN ASSIGNMENT: CONFRONTATION WITH TURKEY
As mentioned elsewhere in this study, Turkey is perceived by Greece as the number one 
threat to its security and national interests. In Greece's eyes, Turkey's undeniable ambitions 
towards the Aegean littoral and determined efforts to challenge Greek ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ there 
at every given opportunity, the continued Turkish military presence in Cyprus, attempts by Turkey 
at manipulating ‘Christian-Muslim’ tensions in Western Thrace, a readiness on the part of Ankara 
to solve its problems through use of brute force and a continued Turkish military build-up backing 
up those intentions with actual military capabilities, all confirm the urgency and prominence of the 
‘Turkish threat’.
Turkey, for its part, is stronger militarily and does not fear and suspect its western 
neighbour to the same degree. Nevertheless, like Athens, Ankara considers the Aegean and Eastern 
Mediterranean as being of utmost strategic importance and also pays close attention to the well­
being of its compatriots in Cyprus and Western Thrace. Although the highest ranking Turkish 
authorities have given assurances on several occasions that they do not in any way question Greek 
sovereignty over Greek territory, they have also made clear that Turkey could not and would not 
tolerate any unilateral Greek claims over the high seas or international airspace beyond the six 
nautical miles limit, nor accept any violations of the international treaties pertaining to Cyprus or 
the demilitarised status of the Greek islands in Eastern Aegean. Indeed, absolutely unobstructed 
access to the Mediterranean and Aegean air and sea communication lanes is so vital to Turkey that, 
faced with what it sees as continued Greek violations and harassment, Ankara has adopted a post- 
Cold War ‘MASK’ document, in which Greece has been promoted to being a priority threat for 
Turkey.'
In addition to the continued Turkish assertions that a unilateral extension of Greek 
territorial waters to 12 nm would constitute a "causus belli’, and an identical position by Athens 
regarding the likelihood of a renewed conflict in Cyprus, the military aircraft and naval vessels of 
both nations are constantly engaged in a series of extremely volatile and dangerous encounters in 
the Aegean littoral and in and around Cyprus. Hence, despite the restraint that has so far been 
displayed by both sides, the probability of a military clash appears to be quite high and, as such, 
constitutes the most likely contingency necessitating the use of Greek air power. Before proceeding 
to a number of scenarios that would enable us to come up with predictions as to the most likely 
form, magnitude and impact of Greek air power's contribution to a Greek-Turkish confrontation, it
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is first necessary to become familiar with the HAF’s main opponent, the Turidsh Air Force, and 
briefly analyse the air power-related assets at Turkey's disposal.
I- TUMQSH AIR POWER
Turkey is a major regional military power which places particular emphasis on air power 
as the most significant military instrument and component of its deterrent posture. One could even 
assert that the Turkish Air Force (TuAF) symbolises the nation's desire for recognition as a 
contender in the world power equation.^ Accordingly, the TuAF, controlling most of the country's 
air power-relevant assets and capabilities, embodies those qualitative and quantitative virtues that, 
in the region, are only surpassed by the air forces of Israel and Russian Federation.
Maimed by a personnel of 63 .000, half of which are conscripts, the TuAF fields 17 
combat, two tactical reconnaissance and two transport squadrons operating from 8 fiilly-fumished 
combat air bases, 3 air bases housing training and transport aircraft and a much larger number of 
dispersal air bases hosting combat aircraft on a non-permanent basis (see Figure-25). The bulk of 
the 480-strong combat fleet is made up of the latest versions of the F-16 general-purpose fighter 
aircraft, of which over 200 are currently operational and a further 25 will be accepted into service 
through 1999. The other two types of combat aircraft in service are 180 F-4E Phantom, 54 of 
which are undergoing extensive upgrades in Israel and over 110 ageing F-5s, of which only 48 will 
be kept in continued use after being transformed into lead-in trainers. Supplementing those are 160 
older F-104 fighters believed to be kept as part of the war stocks.
In the TuAF, the reconnaissance mission is fulfilled by a total of 39 RF-4Es, divided 
between two squadrons in the eastern and western halves of the country. An Army-operated 
contingent of long^ndurance Gnat 750 UAVs is also in place to execute tactical reconnaissance 
and surveillance flights. Supplementing fighter aircraft in close air support missions are 37 Cobra 
and Super Cobra helicopter guiiships operated by the Turkish Army. The transport fleet consists of 
an impressive array of 80 light and medium transporters, plus over 300 general purpose helicopters 
of various ages and origins. Perhaps the most noteworthy aerial platforms in the TuAF's inventory 
are seven KC-135 aerial-refuelling tankers, providing Turkey with the decisive advantage of 
switching aerial assets between the eastern and western halves of the country, and also of extending 
their strike range to cover all possible targets in neighbouring countries. Those tanker aircraft are 
stationed at Erkilet air base in Eastern Turkey and, together with the majority of the transport fleet, 
outside the reach of the HAF.
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Airbases with combat a/c 
I Airbases with other a/c
Figure-25; Turkish air bases. (*)
(*) Map drawn on the basis of data contained in Rene van Woezik, "Keeping up Appearances", 
Fli^it International, 15-21 June 1994, pp. 37-40.
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At least in comparison with the wide array of strikingly modem combat and non-combat 
aircraft in the TuAF's inventory, land-based air defence assets are surprisingly lacking.^ The only 
medium and high altitude air defence capability is the easily underflown, outflown and jammed 
Nike Hercules SAMs, 92 launchers of which provide a protective umbrella over the Istanbul region 
only. For the rest of the country, the burden of hindering penetration by enemy aircraft rests with 
the interceptor force, on condition that they get satisfactory early-warning cueing. The air search 
radars fulfilling this function are numerous: over 25 fixed-site NADGE and mobile radars, some of 
which are currently being delivered. Turkey’s peculiar topography, dominated by several mountain 
ranges and rugged terrain, signifies that the radar coverage against low-flying intmders is at best 
piecemeal and porous. Meanwhile, a long-planned procurement of AEW & C aircraft as an 
obvious alternative, has been delayed by cost considerations. The state of the Turkish C I^ network 
is not markedly different from its Greek counterpart either, with part of its aged components 
remaining vulnerable to physical attack and jamming. But, thanks to the great emphasis recently 
placed on C I^ equipment, apparent drawbacks are likely to be off-set quite rapidly.^ Other ground- 
based air defence assets include 86 Rapier short-range SAM laimchers providing point defence of 
high-value targets such as air bases, roughly 1,000 shoulder-launched SAMs and over 1,600 
antiaircraft guns operated by Army units.
The munitions, electronic warfare (EW) and other accessories being carried by the 
impressive array of Turkish combat aircraft are satisfectory, at least in comparison with their 
Greek counterparts. Most notably, 40 LANTIRN-equipped F-16s -  more than three times the 
number in Greek service -  provide Turkey with a substantial night and low-altitude strike 
capability. Similarly, the TuAF holds an advantage over its Greek counterpart with respect to the 
quantity and technology of the air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions, although the numbers in 
stock are insufficient by the standards of first-rate air powers.^ One of the most remarkable aspects 
of the TuAF is the make-up of the EW gear carried by its aircraft and degree of national control 
over the electronic spectrum of warfare. All Turkish F-16s are fitted with state-of-the art EW self­
protection suites produced under US license in Turkey, and older electronic self-protection systems 
onboard F-4 fighter-bombers are also being upgraded with Israeli assistance. In feet, thanks to its 
determined efforts over recent years to promote local industrialisation, Turkey has become one of 
the few countries with relative independence in the development and production of critical 
electronic warifere technologies and has also acquired the ability to adapt its systems to new threats 
which may arise.®
In comparison with Greece, this significant Turkish achievement in the field of EW is 
matched in most other dimensions of air power-related manufecturing, maintenance and 
development activities. Thanks to a sound defence industrial base established in recent years.
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Turkey has reached a level at which it can manufacture and modify locally major aerospace 
platforms such as fighter, transport and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as various related items such 
as radars, munitions, communications and other electronic equipment. Needless to say 
comprehensive repair and maintenance support can also be provided domestically, all indicating the 
remarkable Turkish advantage over Greece, a point noted in despair by certain Greek observers.’
With respect to the less visible indicators of the TuAF’s overall proficiency, aircraft 
availability and sustainability is, by and large, superior to that of the HAF. Thanks to the smaller 
number of aircraft types in service (3 as against 6 in Greece), fewer active air bases and better land 
and air connections between them and self-sustaining repair and maintenance services, the logistic 
support base is a lot more sound than in Greece. Similarly, training aids and opportunities are more 
varied and numerous: flight simulators, some of which are among the most advanced in the world, 
are available at all air bases; average flying hours before pilots can assume the control of front line 
fighters are longer (415 hours as against 330 in the HAF); and most importantly, experience gained 
over Bosnia and Northern Iraq is proving invaluable to TuAF, in the form of new mission profiles 
with other allied forces involving both AW ACS and in-flight refuelling operations, as well as air- 
ground co-ordination, surgical strike planning and execution, and especially helicopter-borne 
landing skills acquired under real-combat conditions in Northern Iraq.**
Figure-26: Year of entry into service of certain defence items, a comparison between 
Greece and Turkey.
Item /C apability Turkey G reece
Tanker aircraft 1994 —
F-16/Block50 combat aircraft 1995 1997
LANTIRN navigation and targeting pod 1993 1998
F-16 Electronic Warfare gear 1992 1995
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 1993 —
HARM anti-radiation missile 1994 1998
AMRAAM air-to-air missile 1995 1996
AGM-65G air-to-surface missile 1994 -
All told, despite frequent Greek claims of qualitative superiority over TuAF, the reality 
appears to be just the contrary. As Figure-26 clearly demonstrates, as far as the most modem items 
and capabilities sought by both air forces are concerned, the TuAF holds a technological 
superiority by a margin of two to five years and for certain items still more. Hence, combined with 
the TuAF’s evident advantage in certain other aspects such as critical force multipliers (i.e. tanker 
aircraft) and operational and combat experience, it is impossible to substantiate Greece's claims 
regarding qualitative superiority. It could even be asserted that the TuAF is moving much faster 
towards the rank of a first-rate air power than the HAF and, as one independent observer has
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noted, Turkey is entering the next century with ‘a military and aerospace industry barely 
recognisable from the one with which it entered the 1990s. It is a combat capability which its 
NATO allies and neighbours hope Turkey never feels the need to exercise.’’
Its strengths and weaknesses aside, in order to determine to real weight that the TuAF 
brings to bear on its Greek counterpart, note should be made of Turkey’s other neighbours, 
because part of her air power and other military assets would have to be allocated to defend 
Turkey’s huge frontier on the East. Recent Greek efforts to erect bilateral defence links with 
Armenia, Syria and Iran could be considered part of a grandiose scheme to divert Turkey’s 
attention away from its western frontier. Yet, among Turkey’s neighbours, the mini-state of 
Armenia is not in a position to pose any plausible military threat to Turkey; the Russian 
Federation, a probable Greek ally, does not have any direct frontier with Turkey and an act of 
unprovoked aggression by its demoralised and rapidly disintegrating military is almost certain to 
trigger a strong US and NATO reaction; the existence of a no-man’s zone in Northern Iraq rules 
out the possibility of military action on the part of the badly-crippled Iraqi army; and finally, Iran’s 
hopelessly out-classed air force and military would have few plausible motives for initiating an out- 
of-the-blue strike on Turkish soil. Hence, considering the fact that military and political relations 
between Ankara and Sofia have shown a remarkable improvement in recent years, besides Greece, 
only Syria appears to be treated by Turkey as a military threat, though a much smaller one.”
Besides a badly-crippled Syrian air force which can hardly be kept in the air, Turkey’s 
recent rapprochement and military co-operation with Israel has struck a serious blow to the 
credibility of the Greek-Syrian alliance; in the case of a Greek-Turkish conflict, before harassing 
Turkish territory, the Syrian leadership would have to take into account the almost inevitable 
repercussions involving Israel, a country which would be more than ready to take any opportunity 
to settle some of its long-standing issues with Damascus. This delicate set of calculations explains 
not only the strong impetus behind the Israeli-Turkish rapprochement, but also the strong reaction 
it has elicited from both Greece and Syria."
In the light of those deliberations, it is possible to assert that, in the case of a Greek- 
Turkish armed clash, less than a quarter of the TuAF's assets (2 F-16 and 2 F-4 squadrons) 
normally deployed in the easternmost air bases should be sufficient to keep other neighbouring 
countries at bay. Actually, thanks to the availability of tanker aircraft at Erkilet, even some of 
those aircraft could take turns participating in aerial combat over the western half of the country.
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II- THEATRES OF OPERATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS FROM AIR POWER
Before looking at various possibilities for Greek-Turkish confrontation and speculating 
about the role and impact of Greek air power on the overall conduct and outcome of the combat, it 
is useful for methodological and practical purposes to identify the three theatres in which an armed 
conflict between Greece and Turkey could possibly take place and to identify the expectations of 
air power in each of these theatres.
The midget theatre: Thrace
Although the most capable of Turkish and Greek ground forces are concentrated along the 
Maritza River, which divides eastern and western Thrace and forms the only land border between 
the countries, Thrace is the most limited of the three theatres in terms of its size and the tactical and 
strategic opportunities it has to offer. The First Turkish Army deployed in the region has numerical 
superiority and still has under its control nearly 150,000 of the best staffed and equipped Turkish 
ground troops, despite recent transfer of its lighter units to the counter-insurgency campaign in 
south-east Turkey. Facing the First Turkish Army are D and C Corps of the Hellenic 1"* Army, 
with a combined strength of 60-70.000 well-trained and well-equipped troops, all placed 
defensively with sheltered stockpiles of supplies and munitions in the region. D and C Corps also 
control the most modem Greek main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery assets, and fly the 
precious Apache attack helicopters. Nevertheless, those two Corps are considerably inferior, an 
observation that applies not only to personnel strength but also to equipment holdings.'^
On the other hand, a key tactical advantage for the Greek forces lies in the terrain they 
would be defending: the Turkish troops would first have to traverse the Maritza River where the 
Greek forces would be in their well-prepared positions on high ground with the river to their front, 
and the combination of mountain ranges and narrow plains would make a defence at depth feasible. 
Likewise, from the perspective of denying their opponents battlefield objectives, the geographic and 
topographic circumstances in Thrace also favour Greek troops: tactical manoeuvres by large 
mechanised formations are not possible due to space constraints, and even if an initial 
breakthrough were to succeed the geography would enable concentration of fighting at successive 
choke points to the west. The Turkish Army could combine its frontal attack with a circumventing 
amphibious and/or airborne landing behind Greek lines, but the tactical and strategic risks would 
be almost unacceptable, and large quantities of landing ships, transport aircraft and helicopters 
would be needed in other theatres.
If the Greek forces were to assume an offensive stand (given the current balace of forces, 
an extremely unlikely happening), they, too, would fece serious difficulties trying to wrest territory
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from the larger Turkish units, whose defensive positions are equally well-prepared. Hence, since a 
swift advance by either side is unlikely, the objective of a Turkish attack on Greek positions would 
be to tie down Greek forces and prevent Athens from reinforcing the Aegean islands or launching a 
counter-offensive to seize territory in Turkish Thrace. Greece’s primary objectives would be to 
stop the Turkish offensive while extracting as high a mortal toll as possible.*^
The expectations of both sides from air power would probably take the form of air 
interdiction and close air support sorties in direct support of the ground combat. Additionally, 
airborne landing and especially helibome assault operations could be employed to outmanoeuvre 
the enemy and gain tactical advantage. But geographic features appropriate for static ground 
combat are far from ideal for the proper employment of air power. Even if the full impact of air 
power could be brought to bear by either side, the course and nature of the combat would be 
determined by developments on the ground. Thus, given the high probability of a bloody stalemate 
with little territorial gain and heavy losses, both warring parties would be tempted to divert the 
bulk of their scarce aerial resources towards less risky and more promising missions than the 
inherently dangerous close air support and air interdiction sorties in the skies of Thrace.
The pivotal theatre: Aegean littoral
In the Aegean littoral, Greek-Turkish military confrontation would revolve around two 
themes: first, Greek efforts to substantiate their claims of sovereignty over territorial waters and air 
space by military presence and action (i.e. blocking Turkey-bound maritime and air traffic), and 
Turkish efforts to counter those claims by sustaining its naval and air power presence in Aegean 
international waters and airspace; and second, the Greek struggle to safeguard the territorial 
integrity of the Eastern Aegean Greek islands and assert its disputed sovereignty over the large 
number of uninhabited geographic formations just a few miles off the Turkish coast. The Turkish 
reaction would be to challenge both those objectives and, at its extreme, could even include military 
action against Greek islands in order to buttress its position in post-conflict negotiations.
In terms of their respective force postures and goals and the geographic and strategic 
nature of the theatre, neither side holds a decisive advantage in the Aegean. From Greece’s point of 
view, the large number of Greek islands off the Turkish coast and the islets lying between are 
virtually indefensible. It is true that over 30,000 Greek troops deployed mainly on the islands of 
Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos and Rhodes would be operating from prepared positions on 
farmliar terrain.'* It is also true that, at least in theory, rapid deployment and special operations 
forces would arrive from the Cyclades islands to the east, Crete to the south, and mainland Greece. 
But Turkey has substantial amphibious and airbome/helibome landing assets to ferry its troops 
across the narrow channels that separate these islands from the Turkish mainland Turkey controls
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the world’s largest non-oceangoing landing fleet with a combined capacity of over 200 main battle 
tanks, 10,000 troops and their accompanying equipment and supplies, supplemented by hundreds 
of rubber rafts that could easily insert special operations units undetected at various islands and 
islets.'* Turkey’s exceptionally large fleet of helicopters (to carry 3,500 troops) and transport 
aircraft (a further 4,000 paratroopers) would also be available to land highly mobile and elite 
commando, airborne landing, special operations and gendarmarie units, all of which are battle- 
hardened through successive counter-insurgency campaigns against PKK.” Moreover, the very 
proximity of these islands to the Turkish coastline means that they would be within easy reach of 
Turkish artillery, and high-tech Greek weapon systems could not be deployed there. The Greek 
military presence on the islands is thus reduced to a tripwire to delay Turkish advance until 
mainland reinforcements and the full impact of Greek air power could be brought in, unless the 
Hellenic Navy were able to seal the islands from Turkish forces. More significantly, a strategic 
Greek retreat to gain time would not be conceivable either, and if any of the islands were lost, their 
recapture would be virtually impossible: Greece does not have the ships or aircraft necessary to 
carry out such counter-attacks on a large scale, and the geographic proximity of the islands to the 
Turkish coast would make the outlook for Greece bleak. Consequently, the HAF’s ability to 
achieve immediate air superiority and turn its attention to the on-going surface combat, as well as 
its adequacy in keeping air and sea lanes of communications open, would be of critical 
importance.'*
With regard to the maritime control of the Aegean, neither country enjoys an edge in naval 
capability. Nonetheless, an important Greek advantage lies in better surveillance provided by the 
island-based sensor and communications network, as well as land-based versions of the Exocet 
anti-shipping missiles deployed on the islands of Lemnos, Skyros and northern Rhodes which 
inhibit the Turkish Navy's access to open seas.'’ Turkey, for its part, constitutes a major menace 
through its large fleet of modem submarines. The deficiencies in Greek anti-submarine warfare 
capabilities, the suitability of the Aegean littoral to submarine activity, and the small number of 
major ports on the Greek mainland, all suggest that the latter could easily be blockaded by a token 
force of Turkish submarines, rendering the Greek sea lanes of communications hostage to the 
Turkish underwater threat.
While the pace and the outcome of underwater warfare in the Aegean would remain 
independent of the developments in the air, the same could not be said for the surface warfare 
between Greek and Turkish navies. The fate of the surface combatants would certainly be 
determined by the extent of air support available to each belligerent. The unique geographic 
circumstances of the Aegean Sea (thousands of islands in a confined area) dictate that all naval 
activity would be within easy reach of land-based combat aircraft. Moreover, the obstructions of
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the nearby shore and islands would seriously inhibit naval vessels’ ability to defend themselves 
against ‘pop-up’ strikes by enemy fighter-bombers. In other words, the side that achieves air 
superiority over the Aegean could wreak havoc on the other side’s naval activity and go a long way 
towards attaining its maritime objectives.
Cyprus: far-off, but not minor
Arguably, the island of Cyprus is the world’s most heavily militarised piece of land. A 
recent rush on the part of Greek Cypriots to acquire new and ever-more-capable weapon 
systems is heightening the tension and accelerating the spiral of military build-up on the island 
to the point of imminent flare-up. Yet, both on paper and in practice, the military balance 
heavily tilts in Turkey’s favour.
The Turkish Army’s 30.000-strong Peace Forces Command on the island is backed by 
4,500 Turkish Cypriot conscripts, and heavily outnumber, outgun and outclass the Greek 
Cypriot National Guard. Apart from the larger quantities of heavy equipment that are available 
to them, Turkish troops’ communications and night-fighting capabilities are also 
overwhelmingly superior to that of their Greek and Greek Cypriot adversaries. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996, Turkey upgraded its air defence 
capability on the island with additional guns and shoulder-fired SAMs, along with the 
installation of a new air-defence radar system and improved surveillance and communications, 
presumably to counter the perceived threat from the HAF. Although no Turkish aircraft are 
stationed on the island, Turkish aircraft taking off from the mainland air bases can reach 
Cyprus in less than 10 minutes to lend ample air support. The NATO-standard air base at 
Geçitkale could also be used to fly in fresh reinforcements and supplies from the mainland. 
But, the truth is that, even without mainland reinforcements and close air support, the Turkish 
contingent on the island would have no difficulty in holding an offensive or overwhelming 
Greek Cypriot defences. In other words, the expectations from Turkish air power are limited to 
its ability to keep its Greek counterpart away.“
The same is hardly applicable to the Greek Cypriots. The main military might at the 
disposal of the latter is the Greek Cypriot National Guard, a 10,000-strong largely conscript 
force stiffened by 1,300 mainland Greek officers on secondment, and two Greek infentry 
battalions totalling around 950 men permitted under the 1960 independence treaties. The 
Greek Cypriots have at their disposal an impressive array of modern tanks, armoured vehicles 
and artillery weapons, plus a small air wing of 4 anti-tank and 3 transport helicopters. The air 
defence capability is fairly comprehensive, too, and comprises medium-range Aspide SAMs 
acquired from Italy, shoulder-launched missiles of French and Russian origin, modem anti-
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aircraft guns that are coupled to the Swiss ‘Skyguard’ air defence radar systems for 
comprehensive short-range coverage, plus dozens of older anti-aircraft guns. Meanwhile, 
further improvements are expected with the pending delivery of 18 S-300P SAM launchers and 
Cjreece is reported to be forming a mechanised brigade on the island, using the surplus 
equipment it ‘donates’ to the Nicosia government.
However, despite the Greek Cypriots’ efforts to arm themselves to the teeth, nothing 
has changed in recent years to eliminate the most important element of imbalance between the 
two sides; on one side is the Turkish Cypriots higher combat readiness and preponderance of 
manpower, drawn from the pool of human resources present in a nearby country of over 60 
million people; on the other is a Greek Cypriot militia force that is confined to a mini-state’s 
population of less than 1 million. The Greek Cypriot National Guard lacks a professional 
military backbone of its own and its low-grade conscripts have so frr proved unable to handle 
advanced weapons systems. More recently, attempts to hire 5,000 full-time personnel to man 
specialist units operating advanced systems have failed, because there is little interest among 
Greek Cypriots whose prosperity makes military service luiattractive. The Greek mainlanders, 
too, find Nicosia’s employment conditions unattractive. Given critical shortages in high calibre 
military cadres, it will take considerable time for the Greek Cypriots to have high-technology 
systems manned effectively and, at least for the foreseeable future, Turkey’s dominance on the 
ground will continue unhampered. Put differently, on its own the Greek Cypriot National 
Guard is confined to the role of holding an offensive for a few days until political pressure can 
be brought to bear on Ankara, and its preparations are aimed at rendering a military 
confrontation too lengthy, painful and costly for Turkey.^^
Frustrated by its failure to achieve a modestly effective deterrent posture against 
Turkey, and intent on continuing its irreconcilable attitude towards Ankara, the Nicosia 
government appears to be gradually shifting towards a new strategic concept, built on the 
principle of solidifying its defence and security links with mainland Greece. Following the Joint 
Defence Doctrine of 1993 and developments since then, the Greek Cypriots have been 
transforming themselves into an important element of Athens’ overall military strategy and 
force posture vis-à-vis Turkey. The most visible manifestations of this include; an intentional 
blurring of the Greek Cypriot command chain, which currently includes input from both Athens 
and Nicosia; the 1994 acquisition of Exocet MM-40 anti-shipping missiles, signifying a 
Cypriot capacity to interrupt Turkish maritime traffic in and out of the vital Mediterranean 
ports of Mersin and İskenderun; allowing the mainland Greek forces to operate from the newly- 
built air and naval facilities at Paphos; participation of Greek aircraft in Cypriot military 
exercises since 1996 and planned acquisition of tanker aircraft, to enable sustained intervention
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of HAF aircraft to Cyprus. Last but not least is the signing in 1997 of a contract with Russia 
for the S-300 air defence missiles, arguably the most effective theatre air defence system 
currently available world-wide.“  Obviously, beyond its potential to neutralise Turkey’s 
substantial air superiority over the island, the acquisition of the S-300 would transform the 
Paphos air base into an impregnable HAF sanctuary, which could in turn be used to launch 
strategic air strikes against vital targets in the eastern half of Turkey. This last point helps 
explain Turkey’s strong reaction to the prospective acquisition of the S-300 systems.
A crucial aspect of this tendency towards full-scale convergence between Athens’ and 
Nicosia’s military strategies is the high expectations placed on Greek air power. Indeed, in the 
event of renewed hostilities in Cyprus, or a Greek-Turkish conflict flaring up elsewhere, the 
HAF is expected to: keep Turkish aircraft, naval vessels and reinforcements away; tip the 
balance on the ground in ^vour of the National Guard through close air support and 
interdiction sorties; bring in reinforcements and supplies to supplement mainland Greek forces 
already deployed on the island; interrupt Turkey-bound maritime and air traffic in the eastern 
Mediterranean; and launch pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes against counter-air and/or 
strategic targets deep inside the Turkish mainland, the latter constituting an important 
ingredient of Athens’ grandiose schemes aimed at opening a second front against Turkey.
Yet these high expectations do not mean they will be realised. On the contrary, by 
virtue of Cyprus’ geographic circumstances, Turkey holds an overwhelming strategic and 
operational advantage. This brings into question the viability of the Greek and Cypriot schemes 
elaborated to date. The Turkish mainland is only a few minutes' flying time away, giving the 
Turks a formidable edge. Conversely, the closest HAF air base is located on the island of 
Crete, some 750 km away. That is sufficient distance for the HAF fighter-bombers to deplete 
their fuel by the time they arrive over Cyprus. Moreover, the stretch of Mediterranean that the 
HAF aircraft would have to cover to reach Cyprus is dangerously close to several Turkish air 
bases, and most Greek fighters rushing to lend air support to Cyprus would certainly find 
themselves engaged in aerial combat with Turkish aircraft, which would force them to abort 
their bombing mission for fuel limitations.“
The deployment of a token force of HAF aircraft to the Paphos air base is unlikely to 
alter the air balance decisively either, mainly because the base will be extremely vulnerable to 
Turkish air strikes. Even if the protective umbrella of the S-300 missiles is deployed, the base 
will be too close to both Turkish forces and the Mediterranean coast to sustain its activities 
uninterrupted.“  In the final analysis, in stark contrast to the high expectations placed on air 
power by Nicosia and Athens, the impact of airborne assets on the conduct and final outcome 
of fighting in Cyprus would be minimal, or perhaps even negligible.
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III- GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATION: THREE SCENARIOS
As already elaborated in the first chapter, there is no universal formula for the proper 
employment of air power in a campaign, and each conflict would have a host of dynamic 
circumstances and rapidly changing situations peculiar to itself. The characteristics of any military 
conflict, including those involving air power, would be shaped by political factors and 
considerations giving rise to the conflict in the first place. Campaign decisions and freedom of 
action available for military operations will largely depend on the interplay of these political 
motives and objectives.^’ Further complicating the scene is what Carl Von Clausewitz termed 
“friction of war” more than a century ago;
‘Countless minor incidents -  the kind you can never really foresee -  combine to lower the 
general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal. (...) 
Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish 
real war from war on paper. The military machine is basically very simple and therefore 
seems easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one 
piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of 
friction.’ ®^
In view of these observations, speculating about the course of events leading to and during 
a Turkish-Greek conflict and the likely role of air power in it is a challenge for any researcher 
because a whole range of circumstances, such as the width and depth of the conflict zone and the 
mass and density of the air power committed, will vary in accordance with the complex set of 
political disputes between the two countries and the instantaneous political and military 
calculations in both capitals.
To simplify the task, emphasis will be placed on three alternative courses of events in 
which the likely role, impact and the overall effectiveness of Greek air power will be analysed at 
length. Our ultimate aim through this demanding exercise is to come up with important 
observations about the overall effectiveness of Greek air power when faced with its Turkish 
counterpart, and whether a discrepancy exists between the high expectations placed on the HAF 
and what it actually has to offer in a Greek-Turkish confrontation.
Meanwhile, besides the three ‘scenarios’, we will also take into account the possibility of 
third-party intervention in a Greek-Turkish conflict and the effectiveness of the tools at the disposal 
of possible candidates for such intervention.
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First scenario: peace-time and pre-conflict encounters
Although included in this section on conflict scenarios between Greece and Turkey, the 
first contingency differs from the rest in that it involves routine aerial encounters that take place in 
peacetime or before the outbreak of an armed conflict, while the other two scenarios deal with an 
actual clash between the two countries. As we have already elaborated earlier, one of the primary 
peacetime tasks of the HAF is to prevent foreign aircraft from violating the self-declared national 
airspace limit of 10 nm and to check out those aircraft that do not file their flight plans with the 
Athens FIR authorities. Turkey, like other NATO countries, does not acknowledge unilateral Greek 
claims to this effect and continues to fly its military aircraft in the disputed zone between 6 and 10 
nm off Greek territory. Turkish military aircraft flying in international airspace over the Aegean 
also deny Greek requests to submit their flight plans. In fact, Turkish military flights, which are 
labelled by Greece as serious violations of Greek territory and sovereignty, have come to constitute 
an important element of Ankara’s current policy of challenging Athens’ unilateral claims in the 
Aegean littoral. Naturally, Greece also attaches utmost importance to intercepting Turkish 
‘intruders’ as part of its efforts to assert its claimed sovereignty. The resulting state of affairs in the 
skies of the Aegean is a series of dangerous duels and shows of force between the air forces of the 
two countries. As mentioned, in 1996 alone, Greece reported 538 ‘violations’ of its 10-mile limit, a 
further 1,600 ‘unauthorised’ flights through Athens FIR, and 456 dogfights with Turkish fighters.
This continuous tug-of-war with its Turkish counterpart places a heavy strain on the HAF 
and is an assignment in which satisfactory results are simply unattainable. The TuAF has the 
decisive advantage because it can choose the time and location of its challenges of Greek airspace 
and because of the immense volume of airspace that needs to be secured at all times by the HAF. 
The moderate success achieved by dispersing HAF interceptors at several island air bases (i.e. 
Lemnos, Skyros and Thiria) has recently been reversed when the TuAF changed tactics and began 
sending large formations of aircraft into Aegean airspace at several points. In one recent encounter 
widely reported in open sources, more than 20 Greek interceptors had to be scrambled in a futile 
attempt to intercept 32 Turkish aircraft making simultaneous entries into grey zones throughout the 
Aegean Sea. During the most recent ‘Nikiforos’ exercise conducted in Cyprus, the task of the HAF 
was further expanded to include checking Turkish fighters flying on and around the island in 
response to similar activity by Greek aircraft and also preventing the harassment of Greek aircraft 
transiting to Cyprus. Given Turkey’s geographic proximity to Cyprus and the advantages of its 
aerial refuelling capability, satisfactory HAF results in those two categories appear to be simply 
inconceivable.^®
Mention should also be made of the detrimental impact this high state of alert has on the 
overall peacetime and wartime proficiency of the HAF. Reportedly, there are frequent complaints
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among Greek aviators about the heavy psychological strain resulting from this and the frequent 
dogfights with Turkish aircraft. The high state of alert results not only in serious personnel frtigue 
but also in poor aircraft maintenance because nearly 80 percent of the aircraft available to certain 
air bases have to be kept at flight line at all times and technicians find little time to make 
comprehensive checks on the aircraft.^' Conversely, the TuAF takes comfort in its ability to 
determine the pace, timing and direction of its aerial activity over the Aegean.
In retrospect, it is possible confidently to assert that it is virtually impossible for Greek air 
power to guarantee all-time and comprehensive coverage given the length of the dividing line 
between Greece and Turkey, the volume of airspace in central Aegean and the capabilities that are 
available to a country of Greece’s size and potential. Hence, despite all the investment, the high 
expectations placed on the HAF’s ability to fulfil its peace-time responsibilities are doomed to be 
dashed.
Second scenario: surprise strike and all-out-war
The second course of events which would be a test case for the potential and the overall 
effectiveness of the Greek air power against its Turkish counterpart is an all-out war, precipitated 
by a surprise strike by either country. In this case, a protracted crisis is among the most dangerous 
situations and, as the pace of military activities and preparations became common place, the side 
that chose to pre-empt could gain decisive tactical and perhaps even strategic advantage.
The remoteness of such a possibility aside, if Greece were the side to launch a pre-emptive 
strike against Turkey, this would certainly be initiated by air power and dominated by aerial 
activity thereafter. Without advance warning and the accompanying measures towards war footing 
(i.e. increased combat patrols and dispersal to other air bases), the vital Turkish air bases at 
Bandirma and Balikesir, where the most potent of TuAF combat aircraft are stationed, could be 
incapacitated with relative ease. Similarly, serious blows could be struck against the Turkish naval 
fleet whose ships are normally anchored at Gölcük, and against the bulk of Turkish landing craft 
that are normally concentrated near Izmir and Çanakkale, reducing Turkey’s ability to land troops 
on the Eastern Aegean islands. Moreover, if defenceless strategic targets near the Aegean coast, 
such as the main oil refinery at Aliağa, the port facilities at Izmir, and the thermal power 
generating plants at Izmir, Soma, Yatağan and Gökova are targeted, all aspects of civilian life in 
westernmost Turkey could be brought to a standstill.
Yet, despite its tactical benefits, the long-term strategic gains from a pre-emptive strike 
against the Turkish mainland would be precarious at best. The bulk of Turkey’s military might, 
including air power-relevant assets based in the central plains and eastern half of the coimtry, 
would be immune from the impact of a surprise strike, and would certainly be brought in to take
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part in the ensuing retaliatory Turkish action. Nor could Athens hope to ‘liberate’ the northern half 
of Cyprus, or capture a piece of Turkish territory to gain an upper hand in post-conflict 
negotiations. In other words, despite a temporary Greek advantage in the opening stages of the 
conflict, the ensuing battle would be lengthy and very costly for both sides and, with the exception 
of the initial damage inflicted on Turkey’s military capabilities, none of the Greek strategic 
objectives would have been served.
Again in purely tactical terms, Turkey appears to be the side to benefit more from a 
surprise strike on Greece. Most Greek air bases, early-warning and surveillance assets and 
command-control nodes are within easy reach of Turkish aircraft. Their early elimination through 
pre-emptive air strikes would certainly create a much more suitable environment for combined 
amphibious and helibome landings on the Aegean islands, and even a southwards thrust in Cyprus 
would become plausible. Since all Greek territory would fell within the scope of such a decisive 
first strike, Turkey would not have to concern itself with the strategic depth of its opponent and the 
consequent reprisals by fer-ofF Greek forces. Therefore, irrespective of Turkish intentions and 
whether Ankara would really like to grasp these prizes, in purely military terms it is quite obvious 
that a pre-emptive strike makes a lot more strategic sense for Turkey than Greece.
On the other hand, any analyst contemplating the likelihood of a surprise strike by either 
Greece or Turkey would need to consider the high political costs and repercussions of such a 
course of action. Both countries highly value their long-time membership of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, an organisation irked by the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war. They both have close 
alliance ties with the US, which would definitely react very strongly. Greece is a member of the 
European Union and has little room for manoeuvre in the political realm and no independence 
whatsoever in the economic and financial spheres. Finally, despite its recent rebuff on the way to 
EU'hiembership, Turkey’s economy remains all too dependent on European trade and investment, 
and no Turkish governments could possibly turn a blind eye to European capitals.
Even more importantly, since the end of the Cold War all acts of violence and aggression, 
whether provoked or unprovoked, are increasingly unacceptable internationally. Regardless of the 
motives and justifications behind such action, the reaction and condemnation of the international 
commumty tend to concentrate on the party that fired the first shot. Consequently, given the 
outward orientation of both countries and their inherent vulnerability to foreign pressure, it is 
hardly conceivable that either Greece or Turkey would commit an act of diplomatic suicide by 
launching a large-scale surprise strike on the other’s territory.
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Third scenario: from skirmishes to an all-out war
The series of dangerous and highly volatile encounters between aircraft and naval vessels 
of Greece and Turkey have become a routine occurrence throughout the Aegean Uttoral. Similarly, 
Greek and Turkish groimd troops facing each other along the Green Line in Cyprus also remain 
poised for immediate action. As the Kardak/Imia crisis of January 1996 clearly demonstrated and 
the death of half a dozen soldiers and civilians along the Green Line revalidated a few months later, 
this state of suspended tension could easily get out of control and spiral into an armed clash 
between the two countries. The daily dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter aircraft, and the 
on-going friction between naval and coast guard vessels continue to create the context for an 
intentional or accidental armed clash of limited scale, with an immense potential for instant 
escalation into an all-out confrontation in the Aegean, Cyprus and/or Thrace.
This is the type of armed conflict the military and political authorities of both countries 
have been anticipating. The Greek Chief of General Staff, for instance, stated on the record that the 
Turkish threat to Greece and Cyprus could best be described as ambiguous, but a real threat lay in 
the possibility of an escalation into war following the shooting down of an aircraft or a naval vessel 
being hit.^  ^The Conunander of Turkey’s Navy commented that if Greece chose to prevent Turkish 
vessels from using the seas within the 6-12 nm zone, Turkey would respond with force, and if the 
conflict became military, Turkey would target one or two Greek islands close to the Anatolian 
coastline.^^
What is more worrying is that, taking into account the lessons of the Kardak/Imia crisis, 
the militaries of both sides have been struggling to boost their relevant capabilities to gain an upper 
hand in this very type of local conflict. The Greek Ministry of Defence has reportedly altered its 
defensive stand in the Aegean so as to become more active and assertive in a future crisis on the 
status of the disputed zones and geographic formations, while the Turkish military has been 
expanding the size and capabilities of its special operations forces for immediate reaction anywhere 
along the Turkish coast.^“*
The initial action leading up to a local outburst of violence could take several shapes: a 
Greek or Turkish fighter pilot pressing the ‘fire’ button by mistake; the Greek coast-guard opening 
fire on Turkish fishing boats and their fire being returned by near-by Turkish naval vessels; 
renewed tension and ensuing exchange of fire along the Green Line; a further episode of 
uninhabited islet occupation by either side; Turkish action triggered by a Greek attempt to prevent 
Turkish ships fi-om using international waters beyond the 6-nm limit, and so on.^ * While the 
circumstances that could lead to an armed clash vary greatly, the same is hardly true for the 
intensity of the ensuing conflict. In very broad terms it is possible to identify three levels of 
conflict. At the lowest end of the spectrum is a local skirmish between the aircraft, naval vessels
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and/or ground troops at the point where hostilities break out, with the clash being quickly contained 
through rapid intervention by both capitals. Under the circumstances, the loss of one or two aircraft 
and human lives would serve no tactical or strategic purpose whatsoever, and would only be a 
reminder for how volatile and dangerous the situation was.
It is important to remember here that should both sides chose to restrain their military 
action and contain the crisis, naval vessels and not combat aircraft would be the military platforms 
of choice. Air power is not a very useful crisis management tool: when it is operational, political 
decision-making circles become largely deprived of flexibility and initiative because aircraft are too 
fast and too difficult to control. Consequently, echoing the course of events during the Kardak/Imia 
incident of 1996, it is probable that air power would be given a stand-by role while naval assets 
would assume the prime responsibility for de-escalation, mainly because they are much slower and 
easier to control and thereby provide the decision-makers in both capitals with more time to reflect. 
Naturally, this assumes a determination on the part of both countries to pursue a strategy of de- 
escalation and crisis management. Given the Alliance restraints by which both Greece and Turkey 
are bound, and taking into account the utmost importance attached by both countries to their role 
and status Avithin the Atlantic Alliance, a crisis management-bound contingency appears to be 
highly plausible.
The possibility of an escalation into a second layer of intensity, in which military assets of 
both nations would rush in from other locations and both armed forces would proceed to a war­
footing, cannot be ruled out. Under such circumstances, by virtue of its superior flexibility, 
versatility and reaction speed, air power would certainly play a dominant role and possibly have a 
major impact on the sürfece combat as well. If the conflict is ignited in Cyprus and restricted to a 
series of relatively low-level actions along the Green Line, it would most probably develop into an 
artillery duel with minor infantry thrusts by both sides. Overall, thanks to its geographic proximity 
and superior military forces on the spot, Turkey would be more likely to have the upper hand and 
dominate the turn of events and there would be little scope for air power to display its worth. 
Conversely, if the first point of contact is somewhere in the Aegean, initially a rough tactical and 
strategic parity would exist in the air. The HAF would have the advantage of operating from the 
nearby and more numerous air bases, and Greek surface and air surveillance capabilities would be 
more comprehensive. Turkey would be fielding better-equipped aircraft that could be kept airborne 
longer through aerial refuelling and it would also be the side to impose an electronic and 
communications jamming blockade aroimd nearby Greek islands. As the conflict extended beyond 
a few hours, however, advantages accruing to Turkey would increase: larger quantities of aircraft, 
some flying in from the east, would start operating from the dispersal airstrips in the immediate 
vicinity of the conflict zone(s). If both sides opt to limit the scope of the fighting to hit-and-run
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operations and limited sürfece skirmishes, their aircraft and human losses would be comparatively 
light and, given the low level of ammunition and fuel consumption, the hostilities could last 
substantially longer than the case of an all-out conflict. Under such circumstances, and from the 
point of view of strategic objectives, Turkey would certainly be the side to benefit more. As the 
HAF would be extremely unlikely to achieve air supremacy, air superiority, or even local air 
control, the continued presence and activity of Turkish armed forces over disputed zones would 
heighten doubts about the viability of the Greek attempt to impose its ‘legitimate’ rights over the 
Aegean littoral unless full respect were paid to Turkish desires and interests there.
The third layer of a Greek-Turkish conflict originating fi’om a local skirmish, would be 
reached through gradual escalation, both in intensity and geographic area, towards an all-out war. 
The circumstances leading to such an eventuality could be several: a World War I-type spiral into 
fiill conflict in which an important element would be the sailing of the Turkish fleet from Marmara 
into the Aegean Sea and the accompanying Greek action to choke it off when still in the 
Dardanelles; attempts at interfering with each other’s maritime and airborne traffic to prevent the 
timely arrival of supplies and reinforcements in the theatre(s) of operations; and finally, air and 
naval strikes on the opponent’s air bases and other miUtary targets to reverse a deteriorating 
balance on the battlefield. Alternatively, a more feasible course of escalation could result from a 
Turkish thrust directed towards the Aegean islands or even the Greek sector of Cyprus, with the 
obvious aim of using them as bargaining chips in the post-conflict negotiation phase.
At first, a conflict along the lines described above would appear to be quite similar to our 
earlier scenario in which the war was precipitated by a pre-emptive strike. But this is hardly the 
case. Compared with the substantial damage inflicted and important advantages gained through a 
pre-emptive strike, much of the surprise and impact of shock action, and with it the effectiveness of 
air power, would be sacrificed to gradualism in the case of an eventual escalation into full-scale 
conflict. The defences on both sides of the Aegean would be fully alerted, and ground, naval and 
air forces will no longer be bound by their peacetime deployment patterns and therefore the benefits 
of striking each other’s military forces and installations would shrink, and the accompanying 
attrition rates would certainly expand.
Given the multiplicity of independent variables, political motives included, present during 
the escalation phase and thereafter, the task of drawing up a precise picture of the turn of events 
and final outcome would be too risky and misleading an undertaking. What could be accomplished 
instead is to come up with generalisations and predictions on three important aspects of a Greek- 
Turkish war fought along those lines. The first prediction concerns the duration of a large-scale 
conflict, which would depend largely on fuel and ammunitions supplies at the start of the 
hostilities. As both sides are known to have inadequate stores of ammunition, fuel, spare parts.
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missiles, and weapons reserves, Greece and Turkey would have major difficulty in sustaining 
intensive combat, and particularly air combat, for more than several days without sizeable external 
re-supply. In fact, the HAF prospects with respect to the sustainability of its war effort appears to 
be less promising than its Turkish counterpart. Once the high-value munitions and equipment are 
depleted, a Greek-Turkish war will turn into a costly war of attrition that could hardly be sustained 
by the precarious economies of both countries.^®
The second aspect to be analysed is the likely set of targets in a wide-scale Greek-Turkish 
conflict. Beyond any doubt, those military targets with a direct relevance for the Aegean theatre of 
operations, such as the air bases, aircraft repair and maintenance centres, early warning radar sites, 
communications nodes, command centres, naval bases and the vessels alongside, will constitute the 
obvious targets of the initial air strikes. Then will come air strikes on those ‘strategic’ targets with 
a direct relevance for the sustainability of the overall war effort. Among the motives of such 
strategic strikes are: to force the other side to devote the much-needed air assets to air defence of 
civilian targets; to increase the morale of ones own population; or in the case of Greece, an attempt 
at achieving ‘intra-deterrence’ so as to avoid the catastrophic loss of the eastern Aegean islands. 
On the other hand, considerations that would argue against strategic air strikes are; both sides’ 
worries regarding the strong reaction of the international community; the absence on both sides of 
sufficient quantities of combat aircraft and munitions to be spared for those sorties with no direct 
impact on their battlefield objectives; and lastly, the limited duration of a Greek-Turkish conflict 
would argue against an extended bombing campaign aimed at winning the war by shattering the 
morale of civilians. Among the likely targets of a strategic campaign are oil refineries (Triasio, 
Pedio and Aliveri in Greece, Aliağa and Körfez in Turkey), oil storage tanks at major ports, and 
vital telecommunications links which are also used by the military. Alternatively, economic and 
industrial targets with more of a symbolic value, such as major power generation plants (at 
Megalopoli, Ptolemanda and Marathon in Greece; Yatağan, Soma, Izmir and Gokova in Turkey) 
could also be targeted. Given the limited accuracy capabilities of both sides, collateral damage 
resulting in the substantial loss of human lives cannot be ruled out. It should also be noted that 
Turkey would be the side to suffer less from such strikes because of its strategic depth and the 
inland location of most its defence industrial and power generation plants.
The third aspect lending itself to generalisations and predictions is the attainability or 
otherwise of air superiority by either side. As already pointed out in preceding chapters, denying 
the use of the sky to the enemy and preserving unimpeded access for one's own aircraft constitute 
the twin objectives in the struggle for command of the air. Command of the air and its local 
derivative (air superiority) are essential not only for the success of any operation in the air, but also 
for the integrity of activities on land or sea. Beyond any doubt, the efforts of both warring parties
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would concentrate on achieving air superiority over all three theatres of operations. The HAF has 
the advantage of operating from a larger number of centrally-located air bases and it controls better 
surveillance and communications capabilities in the Aegean theatre of operations.^’ Neutralising 
this advantage, however, are the larger number of advanced and better-equipped Turkish fighter 
aircraft flown by combat-proven pilots and the vital tanker aircraft support to keep them flying for 
longer hours. Complementing this scene are the superior sustainability, robustness and electronic 
warfere capabilities of Turkey, all leading to a state of ‘air neutrality’ in the Aegean and Thrace 
which leaves neither side in a position to exert full and unopposed aerial control over its opponent. 
The exception, of course, would be the ease with which Turkey would impose its control over 
Cyprus and attain air superiority there.
From a tactical point of view, this state of aflfeirs would mean a continued HAF 
preoccupation with Turkish aircraft present anywhere in Greek airspace and the resulting inability 
to concentrate its firepower and attention on surface combat. As the Greek defensive posture in 
both the Eastern Aegean islands and Cyprus relies heavily on the assistance of air power, the 
implications on surface warfere would certainly be dramatic. In Cyprus, the timely arrival of 
airborne reinforcements in cumbersome transport aircraft would be out of the question and there 
would be no impeding effect of close air support sorties against a possible Turkish ground 
advance. In the Aegean, the vital maritime and air communications would suffer Turkish 
harassment with the obvious effect of slowing down the flow of reinforcements to threatened Greek 
islands. Similarly, Turkish artillery’s lethal blows on nearby Greek islands could not be dealt with 
and the impending Turkish amphibious and airborne landings would proceed without major 
interference. Last but not least, the vessels of the Hellenic Navy would have to concern themselves 
not only with their Turkish counterparts, but also with pop-up strikes by Turkish aircraft.
Despite high levels of equipment and human losses on both sides, even in the course of a 
very brief conflict, if Turkey chose to take military action against the Greek sector of Cyprus and 
one or two strategically-located Aegean islands (i.e. Samos, Lesvos, Kos, Megisti), it would most 
probably succeed in getting those trophies and attaining a position of strength in post-conflict 
negotiations. Conversely, the Greeks would be the side on the defensive, struggling to preserve 
what they already possess in the Aegean and Cyprus. Even if they succeed in denying Turkey its 
strategic objectives, they could not hope to achieve any of their own.
IV- PROSPECTS FOR THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION
In contemplating the circumstances of a Greek-Turkish confrontation, intervention by 
outside powers is a high probability with direct ramifications not only on the course and outcome
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of the conflict itself, but also on the pre-conflict political calculations of both Ankara and Athens. 
The ever-present likelihood of a violent conflict between two NATO allies irks policy-makers 
throughout western capitals. A Greek-Turkish conflict would certainly constitute a serious blow to 
NATO and the EU’s post-Cold War struggle to remove the use of force as a means to settle 
disputes in Europe. These two organisations’ new applicants from the Eastern half of the continent, 
who have been told to settle their disputes through peaceful means and accustom themselves to the 
ideals and principles of the Western community, would be presented with a calamitous example to 
the contrary. There is little doubt that the US, as the only remaining superpower, detests the 
possibility of a violent conflict between two important allies in the eastern Mediterranean, a region 
already plagued with multifaceted and multidimensional tensions and uncertainties, and in which 
both Greece and Turkey stand as elements of stability.
In the light of these introductory observations, the likely role of outside powers in a Greek- 
Turkish conflict could be analysed at three levels. The first type of reaction consists of the 
enormous diplomatic pressure, and conciliatory initiatives, to be applied on both capitals to bring 
their hostilities to an immediate end. If the recent Kardak/Imia crisis is taken as a reference, the EU 
might tilt in Greece’s favour, but it would nevertheless be too slow to act decisively. The US, 
however, which normally employs NATO to effect its reconciling initiatives, would be the outside 
power to step in directly and with its full weight. Whether any of these diplomatic pressures would 
succeed in dissuading the Greeks and the Turks from their violent path would depend on the 
circumstances and the underlying motives of the conflict.
The second type of reaction involves outside material assistance provided to one or both 
warring parties. A fact that has frequently been identified throughout this study is the critically low 
stockpiles of expendable items such as missiles, ammunition and spare parts on the part of both 
Greek and Turkish armed forces, and both nations’ inability to fully meet their defence needs 
through domestic sources. Consequently, especially in the case of an extended conflict, the supply 
of critical defence equipment, both attrition replacements and new capabilities, could tilt the 
balance on the battlefield. Given the current make-up of both countries’ equipment inventories, 
however, only the US and to a lesser extent France and Germany could readily transfer relevant 
defence equipment and supplies which could be put into use with relative ease. Even then and 
particularly with air power-relevant items, compatibility problems would be considerable: those 
systems manufactured for export and the ones delivered to one’s own armed forces tend to display 
important variations, and appropriately-trained personnel to operate them would not be abundant. 
The prospects for Russian material assistance would be next to impossible because Russian 
defence systems are built to entirely different standards and operating principles. Technical 
limitations aside, what is even more important is the political calculations of the potential suppliers.
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US, France, Germany and other European powers all have strong political and economic ties with 
both countries, and tilting in one warring party’s favour would not only alienate the other but also 
prolong the conflict. Their interests would lie in an immediate halt to hostilities and it would be 
more realistic to expect them to remain neutral.
The third type of reaction to the out-break of hostilities between Greece and Turke>’, 
involves a much more speculative, but nonetheless conceivable course of action: the possibility of a 
direct military intervention to bring the ongoing fighting to an end. Given the current force postures 
and military capabilities, only the US has the necessary on-the-spot and on-call assets to fulfil such 
an assignment. For nearly five decades now, the US has deployed a large naval task force, 
including one or more aircraft carriers, in the Mediterranean Sea. Substantial US surveillance and 
basing facilities are located both in Greek and Turkish territories and their immediate vicinity. It is 
worth noting that there are frequent reports about an increased US ‘Sixth Navy’ presence in and 
around the Aegean littoral, to include larger vessels (i.e. aircraft carriers, helicopter ships and 
missile cruisers) capable of constantly monitoring all maritime and air activity in the region.^* US 
naval vessels and aircraft could easily sail into the midst of Greek-Turkish fighting and, thanks to 
their superior technology, could easily inflict heavy casualties on both sides to force them to stop 
fighting. But this ‘hard-kiir approach is hardly necessary. It would involve high risks in the form 
of reprisals against US assets, and it would certainly trigger the outrage of two important US 
allies. Instead, Washington has at its disposal very advanced interference and disabling capabilities 
in the realm of electronic and ‘information warfare’. This is what many call the ‘soft-kill’ option.
The first type of US soft-kill capability relates to orthodox electronic warfare techniques, 
an overview of which was given in the second chapter. Routinely deployed on US aircraft carriers 
are EA-6B Prowler stand-off jamming aircraft, which are capable of jamming and spoofing all 
electromagnetic waves at extended ranges. Likewise, the US Air Force could fly in other 
specialised electronic warfare aircraft, such as the ones used to jam radio communications. Indeed, 
just a handful of such platforms operating in the immediate vicinity of the Aegean and Cyprus 
could effectively block-out or at least obstruct all the radar and radio wave-based surveillance, 
command, control, and communications activities of both countries, thereby bringing most aspects 
of naval and especially aerial warfare to a standstill. Furthermore, there is wide-spread speculation 
that the US also has high-energy microwave emitters that could virtually ‘firy’ the electronic 
circuitry of radars and other electronic sensors over extended ranges, and cause permanent damage 
on them.^’ However, as both Greece and Turkey would immediately notice any obstructive and/or 
destructive US action, a much more attractive alternative could be the presumed US ability to make 
use of ‘computer viruses’ to disable electronic circuitry integral to all modem weapon systems.
228
In the newly-emerging concept of ‘information warfere’ there is a widespread belief that 
the micro-circuitry of all US-supplied defence systems have built-in electronic ‘Trojan horses’ 
which are normally dormant but which, upon receiving a special signal broadcast via radio or 
satellite, would be activated and cause temporary or permanent malfunction of the system in 
question. For example, if the target platform is a fighter plane, a malfunction in the micro-circuitry 
and/or computer software of the flight controls would result in the pilot losing control of his 
aircraft. A similar malfunction in the weapons control unit could give rise to premature bomb or 
missile release, thereby transforming the combat aircraft into a harmless flying machine. If every 
major weapon system is implanted with a slightly different version of the same virus, the weapons 
systems and platforms could be taken out on a selective basis using cipher codes. In other words, 
rather than causing wholesale grounding of an air force, only those aircraft approaching the combat 
zone could be neutralised. Among other advantages of electronic ‘Trojan horses’ are the near 
impossible nature of identifying them in advance among the thousands of micro-circuits and 
software codes contained in modem weapons systems, and their reputed ability to vanish without 
trace once they fulfil their dismptive function. Most striking of all is that certain US authorities 
have unofficially acknowledged successful employment of this capability back in 1991, when a 
number of I-Hawk anti-aircraft missiles seized by Iraqi invaders from Kuwait were transformed 
into scrap by activating built-in disabling codes.“*®
While built-in ‘Trojan horses’ could be effective in neutralising recently produced US- 
origin defence equipment, at first sight it might seem that weapon systems acquired elsewhere 
would not be ‘tainted’ and would be free of the interference of a superpower patron-state. But this 
may not be the case for two reasons. Firstly, to take the case of Greece as a reference, even if an 
aircraft itself was acquired from another source, some of the on-board avionics and other electronic 
sub-systems would be of US origin to achieve compatibility with other platforms that are already in 
the inventory. These aircraft or weapon systems would therefore also become susceptible to soft- 
kill interference. Secondly, and even more significantly, defence laboratories in the US are claimed 
to be working on a variety of techniques to implant computer ‘viruses’ on those systems that are 
not already infested.“" For instance, before the Gulf War, US intelligence agents are believed to 
have planted a disabling vims in Iraq’s military mainfimne computer network, a task achieved by 
allowing the Iraqis to smuggle in an infested printer of French origin and plug it into their system.“*^ 
The ever-increasing degree of connectivity between various computer networks around the world, 
the relative ease with which the mainfhune military computers of NATO coimtries could be 
reached by other Allied states, and the increased role played by computers in military command, 
control and communications systems all point to the possibility of attaining dramatic success by 
hacking those computer networks.“*^ If the widespread reports about the possibility of injecting
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viruses at stand-off ranges via radio waves are given credit, then even individual platforms such as 
fighter aircraft in the air or warships in open seas would not be immune from the effects of the so- 
called ‘soft-kiir strikes.'’'’
Our propositions concerning the range of options offered by the so-called ‘soft-kill’ 
techniques should not be taken as indicating the absolute fall of more traditional forms and means 
of warfare. It is true that the windows of opportunity being opened in the electronic realm have 
come to constitute an ‘Achilles heal’ of modem weapons systems: the more sophisticated a military 
gadget gets, the more vulnerable it becomes to such interference. But because their impact on the 
whole range and form of military capabilities will be improbable and because effective counter­
measures and antidotes will always be developed, ‘soft-kill’ capabilities must be treated more as a 
complementing and assisting element of traditional forms and tools of combat. They may create 
considerable confusion and interruption, but by themselves they cannot guarantee comprehensive 
destruction of enemy assets and therefore victory.
It should by now be obvious to the reader that, given the ever-expanding range of options 
provided by the electronic spectmm of warfare, and notable weaknesses on the part of both Greece 
and Turkey in this particular realm, a conflict between the two could be dismpted and its intensity 
be diminished by outside powers, most notably the US, should they decide to do so. Particularly 
vulnerable to that kind of outside interference would be the aerial dimension of a Greek-Turkish 
confrontation, because both countries’ air forces depend very heavily on electronic and other high- 
tech items acquired elsewhere. Even more importantly, modem aerial combat cannot be sustained 
without remote-sensing and distant communications capabilities, and both capabilities depend 
absolutely on electromagnetic waves and electronic devices that transmit, receive and analyse them.
V- EPILOGUE TO CHAPTER EIGHT
The Eighth Chapter was opened with the crucial observation that Turkish air power was 
by no means inferior to its Greek counterpart. On the contrary, not only does it hold quantitative 
superiority but also in most aspects it has the technological edge by a margin of 3 to 4 years and it 
possesses certain critical assets and force multipliers (i.e. tanker aircraft) that are not owned by the 
HAF. Likewise, despite the Greek expectations to the contrary, the Turkish Air Force also appears 
to be capable of bringing the full weight of its combat capabilities against its main rival, HAF. The 
steady erosion of the military capabilities of Syria, Iran, Iraq and Russia appears to have freed 
Turkey of its Cold War burden of sparing a substantial portion of its military assets to counter the 
threat from the east.
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Regarding the three possible theatres of operations that could be envisaged for a Greek- 
Turkish confrontation, in Thrace the expectations from air power are lowest as neither side could 
ever hope to achieve any tactical or strategic objectives of particular value. In the Aegean theatre 
the role and impact of air power would be overwhelming and the fate of a possible showdown 
would most likely be determined by developments in the air. In Cyprus, the third theatre of 
operations, the possibility of lending badly-needed air support and airborne remforcements is 
deemed critical by Greece, but even if precious airborne assets could be spared from the Aegean 
theatre their impact on the outcome of the conflict in Cyprus would be marginal at best given the 
degree of Turkish superiority on the ground.
The expectations of Greek air power in a confrontation with Turkey would be (1) to 
project air power over the entire stretch of the Aegean maritime and airspace zones to back-up and 
secure Greek territorial claims there; (2) to lend air support to hard-pressed island garrisons should 
they come under Turkish attack and to keep open the aerial and maritime routes between the 
islands and mainland Greece; and (3) to provide urgently needed assistance to friendly troops 
stationed on Cyprus.
Of these, the struggle to substantiate the Greek claims to lOtun airspace, and a possible 
extension to 12nm of their territorial waters in the Aegean, give Greek air power a constant 
peacetime responsibility. But, given the very length of maritime and airspace zones to be defended 
on a 24-hours basis, this is already proving to be an elusive task and placing a heavy strain on the 
equipment and personnel of the HAF.
In all circiunstances leading to a Greek-Turkish conflict, the best outcome the HAF could 
hope to achieve over the Aegean appears to be a state of ‘air neutrality’, denoting a situation in 
which neither side can hope to fly in relative safety over the theatre in question. In Cyprus, 
geographic and tactical circumstances work to the detriment of Greece as well, and the contribution 
of Greek air power, if any, would be of nuisance value only. This state-of-afFairs favours Turkey 
as the side holding the initiative and quantitative and qualitative superiority on the ground. In 
purely tactical terms, a state of ‘air neutrality’ would increase considerably the chances of success 
of a Turkish thrust against a few Greek islands and the Greek sector of Cyprus, should Ankara 
decide to acquire a valuable bargaining chip for post-conflict negotiations.
From the perspective of the employment of air power, other important observations of this 
chapter about the circumstances of a Greek-Turkish conflict include;
(1) Given the strong pressure imposed by their respective alliance ties, both sides have an interest 
in keeping any conflagration below the threshold of an actual outbreak of hostilities. Given this
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imperative for crisis management, air power, as the least suitable form of military power for de- 
escalation purposes, is very likely to leave precedence to naval forces.
(2) Should an extensive conflict break out, as both air forces appear to be critically low in 
advanced munitions and spare parts stocks, intense aerial activity cannot be sustained for more 
than a few days. Afterwards, aerial fighting will be confined to WW Il-style operations with 
little immediate impact on the pace and outcome of the conflict.
(3) Being fully aware of this feet, both sides appear to be gearing themselves towards a conflict of 
very short duration, to be defined in days and perhaps even hours. In the circumstances, rather 
than seeking absolute victory and total defeat of their opponent, both sides would gear 
themselves towards attaining limited tactical and strategic objectives.
(4) Material impediments aside, a Greek-Turkish confrontation is quite unlikely to continue for 
more than a few days or perhaps hours because extensive outside pressure is a certainty, and 
third-party intervention a high probability. The US appears to be in possession of the electronic 
and other ‘soft-kill’ means seriously to interrupt the air and maritime activity of both sides, and 
convince them to bring their hostilities to an immediate halt.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION
The first step towards identifying the role and value of air power as part of Greece's 
national security posture- the main objective of this study -was to concentrate on the basic 
properties and characteristics of air power itself. Our first important observation was that, during 
the course of the last thirty years or so, rapid technological progress along with the maturation of 
the operational tactics and doctrines pertaining to the employment of air power, seem at last to 
have presented the latter with an opportunity to bring its full impact into play on sürfece warfare, 
in the manner proclaimed by proponents of air power, somewhat prematurely, half a century ago.
However, a warning was given, namely that air power is not a miraculous instrument and 
its success continues to depend on applying its potential under the right circumstances. In this 
regard, alongside such variables as geography, topography and the nature of conflict, the inherent 
characteristic of air power as a military instrument to achieve the political objectives of its 
possessor cannot be overlooked. That leads us to the fundamental proposition that, unless the 
political objectives of a given conflict are in perfect harmony with the range of tactical and 
strategic options offered by air power’s effective employment, the latter—like all other forms of 
military power—caimot realistically be expected to achieve significant results.
Apart from this widely-acknowledged proposition, for the purposes of this study, an 
equally important, but much less frequently-cited analysis pertaining to the inherent characteristics 
and attributes of the countries intending to exploit the potential and opportunities offered by air 
power, was made. Correspondingly, on the basis of a number of limitations common to most air 
forces around the world, we have demonstrated that a distinction can be made between what we 
have called ‘first-rate’ and ‘second-rate’ air powers. On the basis of this observation, we have also 
established that, (1) the circumstances of an aerial confrontation between second-rate air powers 
will be quite different from those involving first-rate air powers, and (2) the recent expansion in the 
range of options and capabilities offered by air power is not easily accessible to most nations.
Leaving aside their implications on wider-scale deliberations concerning the use of air 
power, for the purposes and scope of this study, the observations made to date are significant in 
that: since the limitations bringing about the status o f ‘second-rate’ air power, as well as the causes 
behind them are identifiable, valuable remarks can be forwarded regarding whether a country can 
fully exploit air power's potential, and whether air power can assist a country to fulfil its national 
security objectives.
235
Obviously, those assertions are as applicable to Greece as to any country in the world. 
Thus, we proceeded with our scholarly inquiry on the presumption that, if Greek national security 
objectives and the accompanying expectations from air power are accurately identifiable, having 
made a detailed analysis of Greek air power’s efficacy and proficiency, it would also be possible to 
determine whether these goals are readily achievable or not and whether Greek air power can live 
up to the expectations placed upon it.
Our consequent inquiry into the basic precepts and characteristics of Greece's national 
security posture has revealed that, as a result of its geographic circumstances and the nature of the 
disputes with its main rival Turkey, Greece has high expectations of the options offered by air 
power. Not surprisingly, this remark is particularly applicable to policies aimed at countering 
Turkey, the country which most Greeks continue to perceive as a major threat. Significantly 
enough, it has also been demonstrated that the importance attached to air power is backed up by 
the current resource prioritisation amongst the Hellenic armed forces, the Hellenic Air Force 
receiving a larger share of the financial resources than its land and maritime counterparts.
Yet, despite Greek plarmers and policy-makers high expectations, our detailed analysis of 
the Hellenic Air Force and the country's other air-power relevant assets has revealed that serious 
shortcomings and discrepancies persist in a number of key areas and capabilities. More 
significantly, on the basis of the criteria previously given by which first-rate air powers can be 
distinguished firom second-rate, it is possible to conclude that, despite the emphasis placed on the 
air force and on boosting air power-relevant capabilities, Greece ranks as a second-rate air power 
and that this situation is unlikely to change in the near future.
The implications of these findings on Greek national security objectives are multiple. First 
of all, given the high responsibilities with which Greek air power is entrusted in order to back up 
the current Greek policy line of challenging Turkey at all possible levels and platforms, air power 
cannot and should not be expected provide all the services demanded of it. After all, Turkey has 
been found to be a major regional military power with more advanced, sizeable and comprehensive 
air power-relevant capabilities than Greece. If Greece did indeed have superior quantity or quality, 
the expectations of air power could more readily be met. But, our comparison between the two 
countries’ air forces has revealed that Turkey not only possesses quantitative, but also qualitative 
superiority over its Greek counterpart.
Without doubt, the implications of this discrepancy between the high Greek expectations of 
air power and what it can actually deliver, could not be more significant. If this discrepancy is not 
properly addressed, it will undoubtedly result in Greece being extremely disillusioned. It is true 
that, both Greece and Turkey have so far successfully desisted from armed combat. The 
probability of outside intervention also appears to place further restraints on both sides’ ability and
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willingness to escalate a crisis. Nonetheless, in the event of an anned clash between the two 
neighbours, the conflict scenarios we envisage indicate that, despite the significant damage likely to 
be inflicted on both sides, with both sides' national security goals in mind, Turkey would be the one 
to reap greater strategic benefit. The experience of recent military encoimters—Greek 
disappointment during the Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996 and Turkey’s domination of the October 
1997 aerial confrontations on and around Cyprus—are indicative, not only of the problems that lie 
ahead, but also of an underlying Greek security national security policy dilemma.
Accordingly, from the perspective not only of air power, but its overall military 
capabilities as well, Greece is presented with two possible courses of action: feced with a much 
larger and better equipped opponent such as Turkey, Athens either has to increase its military 
capabilities to carry out the tasks entrusted upon it, or else, it will have to reduce the scope of its 
national security goals in line with the services its military can provide. Our observations 
throughout this study have already revealed that the former option - further boosting Greek military 
capabilities - is an insurmountable task; the human and financial resources which can be allocated 
to defence have been exhausted. But, more importantly, against the backgroimd of air power's 
pivotal role in the Greek-Turkish tug of war, the limitations imposed by Greece’s status as a 
second-rate air power rule out the possibility of exploiting existing resources more efficiently and 
so off-setting Turkey’s qualitative and quantitative superiority.
This leaves Greece one viable option: to revise its national security objectives and, even 
more importantly, to seek a more conciliatory attitude to replace its current confrontational and 
escalatory attitude towards Turkey. This observation would imply to Greek decision-makers and 
the public at large that they must accustom themselves to the feet that, for a country of Greece’s 
size and capabilities, securing absolute maritime and aerial control over the entire stretch of the 
Aegean littoral and extending Greek tutelage and influence to the island of Cyprus cannot be 
attained without infringing Turkey’s vital interests in the region and so provoking a strong reaction 
from Ankara. Instead, Greece could disengage itself from those elusive political goals and attempt 
to adopt a more conciliatory and relaxed attitude aimed at dispelling Turkey’s fears and suspicions, 
most of which have their roots in the growing Greek military presence in the Eastern Aegean and 
Cyprus. Only then will Greece have a realistic chance of avoiding disillusionment and preventing 
new national security blunders such as the ‘loss’ of Cyprus in 1974.
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